

LORD HASTINGS
AND
THE INDIAN STATES

Thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Economics)
in the University of London

OPINIONS

Sir Robert Erskin Holland, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.V.O., C.I.E., I.C.S. (Retd.), Member of the India Council, writes:—

“I think that Dr. Mehta’s book *Lord Hastings and the Indian States* is based on original work and I believe it contains materials not published in any other book. I think that the book is well and carefully compiled and that, if published, it would be of interest and service to all persons who wish to study the origins and development of the Indian States.”

Prof. Henry Herbert Dodwell, Professor of History of the British Dominions in Asia, University of London School of Oriental Studies writes:—

“Dr M. S. Mehta’s volume on *Lord Hastings and the Indian States* is based on original sources and does contain a good deal of matter not published elsewhere. I regard it as a sound and meritorious work worthy of publication.”

LORD HASTINGS AND THE INDIAN STATES

Being a Study of the Relations of
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN INDIA
with
THE INDIAN STATES
1818—1828

BY

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FOREWORD

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FOREWORD

The subject of this monograph by Dr. Mohan Sinha Mehta is the external policy of the Marquis of Hastings in its bearing upon the relations of the Indian States with the Government of India. The period of his rule is one of the most important epochs in the history of the British power in India. The foundations of its political supremacy were laid by him on a firm and abiding basis. Strongly opposed as he was before his arrival in India to the policy of extension of territory and of interference in the affairs of Indian States, he found reason to modify his views, immediately after he assumed office. He departed from the ring-fence policy of his predecessors and vigorously carried out a policy of bringing all the Indian States into a position of subordinate alliance with the British power and keeping them isolated from each other. The treaty-map of India was mostly settled, as it is to-day, at the end of his term of office. He shares with Clive, Wellesley, and Dalhousie the credit of having been among the great empire-builders of Britain in India.

After giving a brief sketch of the circumstances under which Lord Hastings entered upon his term of office, Dr. Mehta gives an account of the principles which Lord Hastings laid down for himself and describes how, in the face of opposition from his councillors and disapproval by the authorities in England, he steadily adhered to his own policy and brought all the leading Indian States under the suzerainty of Britain. Lord Hastings had the good fortune to be served by a brilliant galaxy of administrators like Malcolm and Munro, Metcalfe and Elphinstone. All of them were men of remarkable talents, wide experience and grand ideals and were imbued with a high sense of devotion to duty and of the mission of the British power in the East.

Dr. Mehta has had the advantage of access to the manuscript records of the official correspondence in the India Office relating to this period including the secret political consultations and despatches. He has made full use of all the published material upon the subject and has given a vivid and faithful account of the views, underlying motives and characters of the leading actors in the events of the period.

Dr. Mehta is admirably equipped for the task of a historian. With a spirit of research that neglects no available source of information and with a shrewd discrimination in the use of his materials, he combines

a sober well-balanced judgment, a broad-minded outlook, a spirit of fairness and a sense of historical proportion and perspective. With his excellent command of flawless English and a flowing narrative style he has succeeded in making his monograph a very readable and attractive performance. He is free from the bias of partisanship and the love of polemics. His stand-point is that of the historian who seeks to arrive at the truth. In our estimates of administrators and statesmen we are often apt to make too little allowance for the circumstances which bent their principles, for their environments and difficulties and for the importance of the ends they had to achieve. The maxim that "the end does not justify the means" cannot be applied in matters of state policy with the same rigour, as it is in private life. The statesman who is actuated not by any selfish personal motives but by a regard for the highest interest of his nation or country, may well claim a mitigation of judgment in his favour. Even here the fewer the exceptions we recognize to the ordinary rules of ethics, the better. The leniency of judgment which history may be disposed to exercise is the result of a balance of the good and evil results of their acts. A Bismarck or a Cavour cannot be tried by the same standards of conduct as an Orsini. In our own ancient literature and in our books on the Arthashastra there is plenty of evidence to show that the conduct of the foreign policy of sovereigns was not governed by the same ethical considerations as the intercourse of individuals in private life. Empires are not built by saints or milk-sops, nor is the consolidation and unification of a country brought about without force or pressure. If the conduct of Lord Hastings sometimes involved a departure from strict principle, it has to be remembered in his favour that he was a great empire-builder. The one incident in his career as Governor-General which it is perhaps most difficult to excuse is his connection with the Palmer scandal in Hyderabad. Even here his general disinclination to interfere in the internal affairs of the Indian States might have added to the facility with which thoughts and convictions are moulded, too often unconsciously, by private wishes and interests.

The relations of the Indian States with the Government of India have been prominent among the topics now engaging the public attention in this country. While the Indian Princes have been complaining of the gradual encroachment upon their status and powers and pressing for a definition of their status once for all in terms of the old treaties which were entered into by Lord Hastings and his successors, the subjects of the Indian States have also been agitating for a recognition of their rights as against their rulers. The agitation by the Princes led to the appointment of the Butler Committee, whose report

has failed to give satisfaction to the Indian rulers or their subjects or to the people of British India. Two or three questions have specially come to the fore. Dr. Mehta does not enter into the question whether the political tie of the Indian States is with the Government of India or with the British Crown. But he discusses the question of the character of the internal sovereignty claimed by the Indian Princes. The precise category to be assigned to the Indian States in international law is to the academic lawyer as fascinating as it is baffling. The fact is that for various purposes including the administration of justice, the Indian States are treated as foreign territory beyond the jurisdiction of the British Indian Courts. They are in other respects subject to the suzerainty of the British Government with all its practical implications and corollaries. The body of law applicable to them can at best be spoken of only as quasi-international law. To the rulers themselves and to their counsel, the letter of the treaties may possess a predominant interest; but to the practical statesman and to the subjects of the Indian States, the vital issue is what are the rules and usages by which the relations of the British Government and the States are and have been, governed. The conclusions arrived at by Dr. Mehta, after an impartial examination of the facts must commend themselves as fair and reasonable. "How far the Indian States were subordinate in their internal concerns is a question the answer to which" as stated by Dr. Mehta "depends on the extent and character of the interference exercised in their affairs by the British Government through its political representative (called an Agent, resident or envoy) at the Court of the Indian Princes." He considers it far more helpful to examine the question of interference with a view of finding out whether and to what extent its exercise affected, impaired, or destroyed the sovereignty of the Indian Rulers, than to approach it for its justification or otherwise. According to the letter of the treaties and the declared views of the policy of the British Government at the time of the treaties, the Princes were in many of the States left absolute within their territories. Lord Hastings himself emphatically told Metcalfe, "The fact of maladministration is unquestionable and must be deplored. Does that however, decide the mode in which alteration is to be effected? Where is our right to determine that the amount of the evil is such as to demand our taking the remedy into our hands. His Lordship in Council observes that the necessity stated is altogether constructive. Were such a pretence allowable, a powerful State would never want a colour for subjugating a weak neighbour. The consequence is so obvious that no principle in the law of nations leaves room for acting on such a presumption."

But Lord Hastings himself felt compelled to interfere sometimes in the internal affairs of the State in the very interests of the rulers and their subjects. As pointed out by Dr. Mehta, the basic principles of the Company's engagements with the States were incompatible, if not illogical. Dr. Mehta arrives at the conclusion that "As regards the treaties it will be conceded that they alone can neither obstruct development, nor prevent a change in the relative position of the contracting parties. The actual relations therefore have to be estimated in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time of the interpretation of the treaties and not at the time when they were made. The equality of status of the earlier treaties and even the absolute rule guaranteed by Hastings' engagements would not accurately describe the actual relations, if they were not in practice regulated by these provisions." His final conclusion is that the States were sovereign to the extent and up to the time that they were allowed by the British Government to wield the powers of sovereignty and that therefore even in regard to internal Government, the States could only be considered semi-sovereign. His conclusion is fully in accord with the finding of the Butler Committee, who were unable to find some formula covering the exercise of paramountcy. Is it then wise at this stage to frame any rigid definition of the relations of the Indian States and the British Government? As observed by Sir William Lee-Warner "There is no question that there is a paramount power in the British Crown; but perhaps its extent is wisely left undefined. There is a subordination in the Native States; but perhaps it is better understood and not explained." Any definition of the relations at this juncture can only bring about the usual results of arresting a natural process of revolution.

One mournful reflection forced by a perusal of this monograph, as by the history of India generally, is how the system of personal rule with its tendency to promote personal allegiance to the ruler with its accompaniments of conflicting personal claims and mutual jealousy and enmity between the aspirants to sovereignty tends to weaken the State and hinder the growth of nationalism and renders a people unfit for survival in the struggle against a people whose patriotism and sense of nationality have been nurtured by a system of a constitutional rule.

P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer.

Mylapore, Madras

7-10-1929.

PREFACE

The present position of the Indian States is a difficult and indeed unique problem. The subject baffles the student of political constitutions, while the international lawyer excludes it from his province. The development of the relations of the States with British India has followed no "rule of law" or system, not even a uniform policy. The history of other countries, whether ancient or modern, furnishes no precedent or parallel to help the student of the Indian inter-statal relations. Moreover, "the confusing variety in their size, their origin and their development" (Lee-Warner) add greatly to the difficulties of subjecting the study to a scientific treatment. It is little surprising, therefore, that the great authorities on constitutional law and political science of to-day have not noticed the Indian States except in a most cursory manner. The ordinary citizen, the Indian ruler and the British administrator can derive no help from their writings in solving one of the most knotty of constitutional problems. And this is by no means a small or negligible affair.

A few figures which are familiar enough need only to be cited to show how important the matter is, and what a large proportion of the human family is affected in its discussion. There are over 650 odd States of varying sizes which are allied to, but, technically speaking, are beyond, British India. They contain a population of over 68 million souls and their area is nearly 825,000 square miles. It was inevitable that the social welfare and the political future of such a large portion of the human population as this, would come some day to the forefront of public discussion. This tendency is showing itself now. The Great War has hastened its pace, as it has done in many other directions.

In a person belonging to one of the most ancient and renowned States of India, and thus directly interested in their progress and prosperity, some eagerness and even a little impatience to approach the study of this perplexing problem may be perhaps more readily forgiven. This desire, cherished for a long time, is at once the apology of the author for adding one more volume to the millions already queuing up at the door of the unoffending general reader whose day of twenty-four hours, he cannot pretend to lengthen even by a second.

It was at the London residence of a keen scholar of social, political and international affairs (Dr. C. Delisle Burns) in the winter of 1925 that the suggestion was made to the author by his host to write on the

political position of the Indian States. This advice brought the subject from the realm of desire into that of action.

But this decision did not by any means clear away all the difficulties which had long deterred an attempt to write a book on the Indian States from the impartial standpoint of an unofficial student. The 'urge' within was for studying the "Relations" as they exist to-day, so that avenues might be opened for the discussion of this difficult problem and the line of its solution. This, however, proved to be an almost impossible ambition for a non-official, whether in India or in England. The material, useful and relevant to a study of this description, is not accessible to the public. After much disappointment and indecision, the author found himself gliding backwards along the course of historical development of these relations, until his foot rested in the small niche of the period of Lord Hastings' governor-generalship. Then followed a process of ruthless digging which dragged on for over a year and a half. At the end of that anxious period, with intervals of typical London fog and English weather, both in the physical and the mental world, he was advised by persons qualified to speak, that a room had been constructed out of the original small hole, into which the public could be invited. It cannot be predicted with any certainty whether the credulous visitor will return satisfied or feel deceived after examining the contents of this small unpretentious building. The author does, however, wish to warn the general public against a certain disappointment, if they expect the luxury and artistic decoration of rich literature in this humble simple cell of a student. And the partisan guest is bound to be annoyed if he seeks strong colours of one choice or another.

It is now not a matter of regret to the writer that his book should be confined to a period so remote from the present as Hastings' time is. This study has revealed to him the great importance of that period in the history of the constitutional relations of the Indian States with the British Indian Government. Hastings' Governor-Generalship marks the turning point in the course of these political relations. It was in his time and through his deliberate policy that the Indian States as a class finally and completely lost their international status.

When Hastings arrived in India in 1813, many independent States were unconnected with the British by treaties, others were their powerful rivals, whilst some predatory bodies disturbed the peace of the country. By their military ascendancy, as a result chiefly of Wellesley's policy, the British had already attained a position of superiority. Hastings aimed at raising it to one of supremacy. This was to be achieved by the suppression of the Pindaris, the subjugation of rival powers and

the conclusion of political alliances with other free States. He determined to accomplish his object by negotiation if possible, by war if necessary.

This ambitious scheme was opposed both by his colleagues in India and his employers in England. Military operations against the Pindaris were, however, permitted. But this did not satisfy Hastings. The break-up of the Maratha confederacy as well as their independence and roping the Rajput kingdoms within the pale of British protection were indispensable for the establishment of British paramountcy.

Rupture with the Marathas was inevitable. The Peshwa smarted under the provisions of the treaty of Bassein. His discontent and the influence of his position over other princes led to the war of 1817-18 resulting in British victory. The Maratha confederacy was finally destroyed and the Peshwaship abolished. The British acquired political supremacy. The Indian States (excepting, of course, the Punjab and Sindh, then regarded as external States, and nominally excluding Sindhia) accepted a relation of "Subordinate Co-operation". This was effected sometimes by military, at others, by diplomatic action. Thus, Hastings' ideal was fully realised. Before he left India in 1823 the British paramountcy over most Indian states was established, and thenceforward openly avowed. This necessarily and vitally affected the sovereign position of the Indian rulers.

The account of this significant change forms the subject matter of the following pages. In weaving this story the threads have been spun from the papers of the East India Company. There exists in these ample and authentic records, now carefully preserved at the India Office in Whitehall, some of the most valuable material for historians and research workers. Since the controlling authority of the English Company resided in London, they naturally called for and received an elaborate report of the activities of their agents in India. This fact to-day confers an invaluable advantage on the student of Anglo-Indian history. The correspondence of the British Political Agents and Residents with the Council at Calcutta, and also of the Governor-General with the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors (which, in reality, was under the dictates of the Board of Control), has been the chief source of this study. The text of the various Treaties is, of course, public property, but the study of the strategic and political factors influencing the negotiations was indispensable for understanding the course of events and in making up this narrative. Among the secondary sources the published works of contemporary and later writers were also very useful.

It is true that in writing this book the author depended almost entirely on British sources, and to that extent it can be considered onesided. He feels not a little disappointed that he could not, during his stay in England, utilise other (Indian and unofficial) sources to replenish, even to correct or confirm his information and conclusions. It is believed that there exist in Marathi some useful documents which might further illumine the subject of Anglo Maratha relations. But the place and authority of those papers, apart from the difficulty of language, must, by themselves form a separate subject of diligent research. The author's desire to finish the work in Europe before returning to the "daily round, the common task" of official life in India was responsible for this unfortunate omission to reach other sources. After making this admission, he feels free to affirm that, judging from the secret nature of the writings he consulted, the candid and unguarded language of those letters and also the character of the writers, it is not likely that his conclusions would have been substantially modified had he waited to examine other sources also. If this assertion proves wrong in the light of later research, nobody would be pleased more than he, as the discovery of his error would only mean the triumph of truth and the advance of historical knowledge.

To an ardent Indian nationalist this book is almost sure to prove depressing reading. The story of bitter dissensions and personal jealousies through which able, brave and even independence-loving princes and ministers sacrificed the true interests of their country cannot be pleasant to any one. India was certainly not at the height of moral or political power in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, and if history can teach some wisdom and if men can benefit by their own blunders, an earnest and honest study of even the dark periods of this nation's history is sure to be of great advantage at the present time of its trial and internal antagonism. A strictly truthful representation of the past, even when it was not glorious, can be of real service to the country.

In undertaking this work the inspiration came, as has been already acknowledged, from that kind friend, Dr. Delisle Burns, then of the London School of Economics and Political Science and now Professor of Citizenship at the University of Glasgow. But for his generous help and sincere friendship this thesis would never have been written. It is a pleasure for the author to tender him his sincere gratitude. The actual preparation of the work was conducted under the able guidance of Professor Henry Dodwell of the London School of Oriental Studies. He is a well-known authority on the British period of Indian History,

and it was a rare advantage to sit at his feet for learning methods of research. Week after week for nearly two years, that great master of historical perspective watched, guided and corrected the author's labours. To him, therefore, the writer owes a large debt of gratitude. Professor Harold Laski, the London School of Economics and Political Science put the author under a sense of deep obligation by consenting to go through the work just before it was finished. His suggestions were particularly helpful in writing the concluding portion of the chapter on Sovereignty. Prof. Laski has a large number of friends and admirers in all the continents of the world, and, therefore, an expression of this gratitude may be a very common-place business for him, but for the author it is the sincere performance of a pleasant duty.

In the manuscript stages of the work, the author received enormous help from another very kind friend, Miss K. M. Heilemann. For many months Miss Heilemann knew no leisure and had no spare time for anything else on account of the labour which she very generously undertook in order that the work might be completed early. She took over the drier and duller part of the task. It is difficult to find appropriate words for publicly expressing this gratitude for her noble sacrifices. This is a suitable occasion for the author to acknowledge the help he received from the Staff at the India Office, both in the Library and the Records departments. The kind permission given by the Under-Secretary of State for India to examine the numerous Secret Consultations, and the readiness with which the staff supplied and the attendants transported those bulky volumes backwards and forwards, were indeed most useful. Mr. Ottoweil, the Superintendent of Records, was ever ready to serve the author in every way open to him.

Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer, in consenting to introduce this book to the public, has conferred a great favour on the author, which he wishes gratefully to acknowledge. Even when other business pressed heavily on him, Sir Sivaswamy undertook to write his Foreword. It was no doubt a sacrifice for him to do that. It is no small satisfaction to an author that his effort should be appreciated by others, but when words of commendation fall from a man of the eminence, erudition and judgment of Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer one is particularly thankful for the encouragement.

This account of public acknowledgment of the author's gratitude cannot be closed without including another big item. The preparation and publication of this work would not have been possible without the gracious help that the author received from Maharaj Kumar Sir

Bhupal Singhji Sahib K.C.I.E., of Mewar. Leave on very liberal terms was sanctioned to the author by his orders, for travelling abroad and for studying social and educational institutions in foreign countries. It was during this time that this book was written. The Maharaj Kumar Sahib may not, in his princely generosity, realise under what an abiding debt of gratitude he has laid the author, but the latter feels it his duty to express respectfully and publicly his own deep feelings of thankfulness.

Udaipur,
October 2, 1929.

M. S. M.

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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

**LORD MINTO MAKES OVER CHARGE TO MOIRA - INDIAN
AFFAIRS - EXTERNAL RELATIONS - THE PUNJAB - NEPAL -
BURMA - INTERNAL STATES - SUBSIDIARY POWERS - PRO-
TECTED CHIEFS - INDEPENDENT PRINCES - PINDARIS -
PATHANS - DEFENCELESS STATES - RAJPUT KINGDOMS -
BHOPAL - SUMMARY.**

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

The statesman who succeeded and superseded Lord Minto was destined to effect a momentous change in the political position of the British Power in India, especially in its relation to the Indian States. The Earl of Moira (later the Marquis of Hastings) entered on his high duty on the 4th October 1813. He had seen service in the American War of Independence, and made it a condition of going out to India that he should be appointed Commander-in-Chief as well.

Immediately after his arrival, the new Governor-General began diligently to study the situation, and with that end in view, he enquired vigorously into all aspects of the administration. A few months later he undertook his first tour of Upper India.

This investigation did not take him long, and he soon came to the conclusion that the state of affairs required drastic treatment. He was convinced that the situation was fraught with danger, which could only be averted by prompt action.

Less than ten years had passed since the Marquis of Wellesley had left India. It is well-known that his policy had been condemned by the Court of Directors, and that strict instructions had been laid down for his successors to pursue a more moderate and pacific course towards the Indian States. They were required to maintain the *Status Quo* in political matters, to do nothing to embroil the Company in wars with them, more particularly with the Maratha States. No ambitious schemes of territorial aggrandisement or extension of spheres of influence were permitted. The treaties, which had already been concluded with the Princes, were to be maintained. But no measure was to be undertaken to increase the political responsibility of the Company. The guiding motive for that decided policy of restraint and withdrawal arose from the desire of the Directors to effect economy and also to avoid the appearance of aggressiveness in their Indian administration.¹

Therefore, probably in spite of himself, Lord Minto was not able to continue Lord Wellesley's work of making the British the paramount Power in the country. The result was that he witnessed the unwelcome spectacle of the increasing power of rivals and the spread of predatory associations. Whether it was owing to his desire

1) Proceedings of the Court of Proprietors approving the action of the Court of Directors. (*The Asiatic Annual Register* 1806 part II. p. 352. N. B. The order of pages is wrong in the volume.)

to conform to the wishes of his employers, or because he was pre-occupied with measures to counteract the possibility of a French invasion overland,¹ with quelling the mutiny of the Madras army,² and later with wresting from France and her Dutch friends, Bourbon, Mauritius and Java,³ the fact remains that there had been very little change of any great political importance in the Company's position in India since 1806.

While it is true that during Minto's time some Chiefs of Bundelkhand⁴ and the Sikh States south of the Sutlej⁵ had been taken under British protection, the latter with the object of setting up a barrier against the rising power of Ranjit Singh, the position remained substantially the same as had been determined by the Treaties of 1805 and 1806.

At the time of making over his charge, Lord Minto must have thought that the relations of the Company's Government with the external and internal States, were, with the exception of the Pindaris, in a state of security.

A Treaty of Alliance, with the object of preparing against the dreaded French invasion, had been concluded with the powerful Sikh ruler of the Punjab in 1809.⁶ Maharaja Ranjit Singh was a strong and ambitious sovereign. But he was too sensible to risk a rupture with the British arms. His strength and the position of his dominions were a security against aggression from the North-Western side. Between him and the British territory lay the Sikh States, taken under British protection by the Treaty of 1809.

In the North, the Gurkha Government of Nepal had become overbearing even in Minto's time. The dispute arose over the possession of the districts of Butwal and Seoraj in Gorakhpur.⁷ It led to the First Nepal War, 1814-16, which cost the British army and the Indian treasury a heavy price.

Beyond the frontiers of Bengal, on the Eastern side, were the dominions of the King of Burma. Relations with him had been

1) With that object he sent embassies (Malcolm) to Persia, (Elphinstone) to Afghanistan and (Metcalfe) to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. A treaty was also concluded with the Amirs of Sindh in 1809. (Aitchison's *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*—1909 Edition—Vol. VII. pp. 351-2.)

2) Minto to the Secret Committee 12th October 1809, Wilson: *Mill's History of British India* (1845) Vol. I. p. 288.

3) *Loc. Cit.* pp. 322 to 368.

4) The Rajas of Rewa (p. 238) Orchha (p. 84) Panna (p. 108) and other Chiefs of that Province—Aitchison *Op. Cit.* Vol. V.

5) Proclamation issued, May 1809 (Aitchison *Op. Cit.* Vol. VIII. pp. 196-7).

6) *Loc. Cit.* p. 144.

7) Prinsep. *History of the political and military Transactions in India during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings.* (1825) Vol. I. pp. 69-70.

difficult ever since the time of Sir John Shore. Negotiations and diplomatic missions were resorted to in order to smooth over the difficulties which arose from the immigration of thousands of refugees from the province of Arakan, belonging to Burma, into the British district of Chittagong. The relation with Burma continued in that state all through the period of Lord Hastings' rule.¹ At one time in 1818 the Burmese protest assumed a menacing aspect and led to an ultimatum on the part of the King to the Indian Government demanding the surrender of their province of Eastern Bengal up to Murshidabad. The Governor-General was able to avert a rupture by the humorous device of treating the letter as a forgery and returning it to Ava with a complimentary message.²

This was, briefly speaking, the state of the external relations of the Government to which Moira succeeded. But it is the position of that Government in relation to the Internal States, which concerns this study, and this subject is one which offers, to an inquirer of the period, great perplexities.

First among them may be taken the class of States which were bound by ties of subsidiary alliance. The Peshwa, the Nizam, the Gaekwar, the Maharajas of Mysore and Travancore, and the Nawab Wazir of Oudh fall in this group. British Residents were stationed at their Courts, supported by British forces, responsible for the external defence of the country. Internal order was also maintained, and in Oudh, even revenue collections were frequently made with the help of the subsidiary troops.³ The extent of the interference to be exercised by the British Resident in the government of individual States varied according to the provisions of the different treaties. But they were all more or less dependent on British support, and the letter of the treaties could seldom be observed in actual practice.

It can easily be imagined that the Princes concerned were keenly dissatisfied with the loss of their power and independence. They could not like a system which crippled them politically, restricted their freedom and lowered their prestige.

The Nizam was sullen and discontented. He had ceased to take an active interest in his Government when he saw that he was not free even to choose his own ministers.⁴ The Peshwa, however friendly he might appear to be out of self-interest, felt a desire to regain the lately lost supremacy of the Maratha Empire and to free himself from

1) Malcolm. *Political History of India*. (1826) Vol. I. pp. 549-573.

2) *Loc. Cit.* pp. 574-575.

3) Baillie's evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons. Parliamentary Paper (735-VI) 1831-32 Vol. XIV. p. 60.

4) Kaye. *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*. p. 222.

foreign control.¹ The Maharaja of Mysore, lately invested with ruling powers, was smarting under British control.² Even the Nawab Wazir of Oudh was bitterly complaining of the meticulous supervision exercised over his affairs by the Resident.³ There was all this discontent and bitterness.

But they realised the hopelessness of their cause and knew that they could not regain their former power or status. They submitted to the inevitable, either out of a motive of self-interest or in a spirit of resignation. They could feel themselves sinking slowly into political obscurity. The State armies, with the exception of the contingents commanded by the British officers, were poorly equipped and most inefficient.⁴ The rulers, themselves, felt that they were maintained on their thrones by their British allies, and so became increasingly irresponsible and unresponsive to the public opinion of their subjects.

Moreover, to some of them, British alliance, even British interference, was indeed welcome. The Gaekwar of Baroda surrendered his independence, in order that the British might restore him to security and rid his State of troublesome rivals, and violent mercenaries.⁵ Baji Rao was glad to utilise their help in reducing his rebellious Jagirdars and in stabilising his authority over them.⁶ The Nawab Wazir was obliged to seek the approval of the British Resident in matters of daily administration.⁷ Making allowance for the differences of degree in their respective positions, all the subsidiary States, it might be said, had begun to feel the British ascendancy as a hard fact.

Similarly situated, although not so important politically, as the subsidiary States, were a large number of Chiefs, who had been taken under British protection by formal treaties and engagements. They resembled the former in the matter of their dependence on the British Government, and, in common with the subsidiary States, they had surrendered their status of independence and freedom of intercourse with other States. The point of difference between them was that the

1) Wilson. *Op. Cit.* I. pp. 39-41. Prinsep. *Op. Cit.* Vol. I. pp. 14-15. Colebrooke. *Life of Elphinstone.* (1884) Vol. I. pp. 291-2 and 294.

2) Correspondence between the Resident, Arthur Cole and Govt. Fort St. George. Bengal Secret Consultations Feb. 18th, 1814.

3) Oude papers, *Home Miscellaneous Series.* Vol. 518 pp. 340-342 and 528.

4) Moira considered the forces of the Indian Powers combined with the Pindaris to be poor in strength. His Minute of December 1st 1815 *Home Misc.* Vol. 603 paras 19, 47, and 62.

5) Wallace. *The Guicowar and his relations with the British Government.* (1863) pp. 86-87.

6) Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone.* Vol. I. pp. 250-1.

7) Oude Papers. *Op. Cit.* pp. 531-534.

British Government did not maintain for their protection any specific force as it did for the subsidiary States. Nor did the protected States engage themselves to make any regular payment to the British Government. The Cis-Sutlej Sikhs, the Chiefs of Bundelkhand, the Maharajas of Kolhapur, Bharatpur and Alwar, the Nawab of Rampur, and many minor principalities in Gujarat belong to this category.

About three months prior to Lord Moira's arrival in India, the British Government had concluded a fresh agreement with the Raja of Rewa, the leading Chief of Baghelkhand. The relations with that State had at one time almost reached the breaking point. Raja Jai Dev Singh, it was alleged, had refused to let the British force pass through his territory or to establish the Dawk arrangement, and withdrew his Vakils from the headquarters of the Superintendent of Political affairs at Banda and of the commander of the British forces in Bundelkhand. He was obliged to accept a fresh treaty in June 1813.¹ While negotiations in connection with that treaty were in progress, fresh trouble broke out in Rewa. Some of the Raja's Jagirdars broke out in revolt against the British, who suspected them of assisting the Pindaris. The affair was concluded by another treaty in March 1814.²

The Jat Maharaja of Bharatpur was flouting the authority of the British Resident at Delhi by refusing to receive the British Vakil at his Durbar. This was just a minor incident which did not amount to an act of hostility, but became the subject of prolonged correspondence.³

Another Prince with whom treaty relations existed, the Maharaja of Alwar, had marched his army into Jaipur territory and taken possession of the two Forts of Dubi and Sikrawa, declining to return them to their owner, the Maharaja of Jaipur. When all threats and warnings failed, a British contingent was moved to compel the aggressive Maharaja to retire from the territory of Jaipur. This was a case of authoritative interference on the part of the British Government, to assert its control over the Raja of Alwar, who was in alliance with them.⁴

The above instances tend to prove that the Company's Government was already asserting its superiority in the country. Lord Moira himself entertained no immediate fears from the Subsidiary and

1) Aitchison. *Op. Cit.* (1909) Vol. V. pp. 243-245.

2) *Loo. Cit.* pp. 246-249.

3) Metcalfe to Adam—February 13th Bengal Secret Consultations, March 11th, 1814. (No. 9).

4) Sutherland. *Sketches of the relations subsisting between the British Government in India and the different Native States.* p. 98.

Protected States.¹ Besides the States included in these categories, there remained some others virtually independent, and a few wholly unconnected by treaties or engagements of any kind. To the former class belonged the three Maratha States of Sindhia, Bhonsla Raja and Holkar. British ministers resided at the Courts of the first two, and the Resident at Delhi was the channel of communication with the Holkar Durbar. These three States had retained their political freedom and military independence.

"The treaties with these three states were mere instruments of amity; their intercourse was completely unrestrained, and no control except in relation to the allies of the British Government, was to be exercised over them."²

These States and their position of freedom and irresponsibility constituted, according to Lord Moira, the immediate danger to the British interests in India.³

The wars of Wellesley's time had greatly shaken the Maratha States. Their Governments were disorganised, the revenue collection was very irregular, and general insecurity and disorder prevailed. Not only were they distrustful of the British ascendancy, but they continued to cherish mutual jealousies and dissensions amongst themselves.⁴

The Raja of Berar, Raghuji was the weakest of the three. He had never forgotten the loss of his territories to the British after the previous war. But he was too prudent to risk a rupture with them. He fully realised his own military weakness, and during his lifetime he maintained an attitude of outward friendliness with the British Power, showing his regard to them, for example, by re-instating Jaswant Rao Ram Chandra as his minister for foreign affairs, at the instance of Lord Minto, who had protested against his removal.⁵ Experience had taught him that for strategical reasons, the British were bound to assist him against external attack. In 1809, when Amir Khan, the Pathan Chief, and the Nawab of Bhopal, threatened to overrun Raghuji's territory, a force was sent out voluntarily under Colonel Barry Close to repel the intruders.⁶ It is quite possible that, had there been any chances of the revival of the Maratha Confederacy under the

1) His Minute of December 1st 1815. *Home Miscellaneous Series*. Vol. 603 paragraph 84.

2) Grant Duff's—*History of the Marathas*. (1912) Vol. III. p. 317.

3) His Minute of December 1st 1815. *Op. Cit.* paras 19, 47, 49 and 51, etc.

4) Prinsep. *Op. Cit.* Vol. I. p. 31.

5) Jenkins' Despatch 12th December 1812. No. 6. Bengal Secret Consultations 15th January 1813.

6) Hough. *History of Bhopal*. pp. 55-57.

Peshwa, the project would have received a hearty support from Raghuji. But he realised the futility of that ambition.

The condition of Holkar's Court was very far from flourishing. Jaswant Rao's mental derangement followed by his death on the 20th October 1811, left the Government of the country in an extremely precarious position. Tulsi Bai, one of his widows, assumed the regency, Malhar Rao, who had been adopted as Jaswant Rao's successor, being then only four years old.¹ Amir Khan, through his agent, Ghafur Khan, kept his hold on the military, and Tulsi Bai as Regent Mother managed the cunning intrigues of the Court. In this unsettled state of Holkar's Government after the death of Jaswant Rao, there was no consistent policy at all. Public concerns and political programmes were wholly subordinated to personal interests and petty jealousies. The army was often in open revolt, clamouring for its pay. The State was too disunited to aim at any studied opposition of the British Government, or to make any use of the political freedom which it then possessed.

Daulat Rao Sindhia was the most powerful of these independent Princes. He had a large army, and his resources were greater than those of the other two. But his State also was torn by internal dissensions. At times, his ministers proved too difficult for him. His military budget far exceeded his resources, thus reducing the finances of his Government to a miserable condition. The result was that his generals were often obliged to raise money on their own account to pay their contingents. This affected the *morale* of his army, and the sense of loyalty and discipline of its commanders towards the head of the State. The chief of them were Jean Baptiste Filoze, Bapu Sindhia, Jagu Bapu and Ambaji Pant. They each commanded from eight to ten thousand of all arms.² They yielded him little more than nominal allegiance and moved through their sovereign's country at will, levying contributions, and even plundering the dependent Chiefs.³ The petty Chiefs and Rajas were also a source of considerable embarrassment to Maharaja Sindhia, and for years he was constantly engaged in reducing those contumacious Chiefs. Some of them, such as the Raja of Raghugarh offered stubborn resistance even to the powerful army which Sindia sent out against them.⁴

Daulat Rao was naturally jealous of the rising power of the British. He remembered what a large Empire his illustrious prede-

1) Malcolm's *Central India*. (1824) Vol. I. pp. 260-262 and p. 283.

2) Prinsep. *Op. Cit.* Vol. I. pp. 26-27.

3) *Ibid* and Malcolm, *Central India*. (1824) Vol. I. pp. 138-139.

4) Resident with Sindhia to Moira 17th April No. 2. Bengal Secret Consultations 29th April 1814.

cessor, Mahadji Sindhia had left him, and what a large portion of this he had lost in his contest with the British. He might have cherished ambitions of regaining his lost power, but his undying jealousy of the Holkar house, and possibly also his consciousness of British superiority in military strength, deterred him from any far-reaching designs to consolidate Indian resources against the English.

"Although he could not resist the temptation of mixing himself up in the intrigues which were so rife, and no doubt had sufficient nationality to desire their success, Sindhia was evidently aware of the danger of provoking the resentment of the British Government, and in all probability never entertained any settled purpose of exposing himself to its irresistible infliction."¹

Although his pride and self-interest alike forbade his favouring the British interests, or wishing them success, he did not, it seems, desire any rupture with the Company. His attitude could not be considered as hostile to the British, in the second decade of the nineteenth century.²

The three States last mentioned had been able to retain their independence as a direct result of the Cornwallis-Barlow policy of 1805-06. Its indirect, and certainly unfortunate consequence, was the growth of the predatory bodies, the Pindaris and the Pathans.

From that date, the British Government withdrew from intervention in affairs outside its own territories and those of its allies. The independent Princes were weak, disunited and impoverished.³ They had no military projects for employing their loose bands of irregular soldiery, which developed into bodies of professional plunderers. The Pindaris aimed at no conquests. Their object was to secure booty and cash for themselves. General rapine was their occupation; and the weakness of the rulers of Central India allowed them to grow bolder day by day. By the year 1814 they had acquired a most menacing position. They were the terror of the population of all the States in Central India, and the enemies of the public peace in that quarter.

Their depredations were mostly directed against the territories of Bhonsla Raja, and those of the Peshwa and the Nizam. But although rendering lip loyalty to Holkar and Sindhia, they respected neither, and plundered their subjects without any fear or compunction. In fact, as Prinsep says:—"Sindhia himself, the Bhoosla Raja, and the

1) Wilson. *Op. Cit.* 11. p. 171.

2) Prinsep. *Op. Cit.* Vol. I. p. 27.

3) Moira's Minute of December 1st 1815 *Op. Cit.* para 51.

Hindoo Chiefs of Bundelkhund were the principal sufferers by their depredations at this period.”¹

So far, the Pindaris had abstained from making systematic incursions into British territory (with the exception of the solitary raid through Mirzapur and another attack on Surat in 1812), nor did they molest British subjects or their property.² But their growth was becoming a public danger to the whole country, and the British Government took alarm when they saw their activities extending.

In 1811, Lord Minto had reported to the authorities in England, that the Pindaris were ravaging the provinces of Central India, and that the population was suffering cruelly at their hands.³ It was feared that after exhausting these areas, their attention would be turned to the British provinces. The situation called for precautionary measures.

Besides taking proper military steps to drive the Pindaris away, should they venture an attack, full and accurate information about their strength and movements was essential. With this object in view, a close system of secret newswriters was employed to obtain that information. Captain Sydenham, the agent in Berar (under the Resident at Hyderabad) prepared detailed reports relative to the Pindaris, including statements regarding their various leaders, their homes, modes and weapons of attack and their strength in infantry and horse. He also kept the Government constantly informed of their movements.

Roughly speaking, they numbered about 27,000 strong, under different leaders. The most prominent of them, Karim Khan, had acquired remarkable strength, and “his land revenue at one time is said to have amounted to fifteen lakhs of rupees a year.”⁴ After a startling career, his fortune declined owing to dissensions among the other Pindari leaders, and he remained in easy confinement under Amir Khan until 1816. But other leaders, some of them his own lieutenants, were carrying on pillage and plunder with ruthless audacity. Chitu was the most powerful of these. Dost Muhammad, Khuda Baksh, Kushal Kunwar, Namdar Khan, were other conspicuous men who were at the head of bands of two to eight or ten thousand horsemen each.⁵

1) Prinsep. *Op. Cit.* Vol. I. p. 42.

2) Grant-Duff (1912) Vol. III. p. 330.

3) Home-Misc. Series. Vol. 516 A. p. 1. Despatch from Bengal Government dated 16th August 1811 to the Secret Committee.

4) Grant-Duff. *Op. Cit.* (1912) Vol. III. p. 326.

5) *Pindari Papers* Home Misc. Vol. 516 A. p. 24.

Reports had been received of their moving south of the Narbada and proposing to settle near Burhanpur and Asir round about Hundia in Sindhia's dominions. His Highness's attention had been drawn to the urgent necessity of frustrating those plans.¹ The need for vigilance, and for keeping forces in readiness to punish the Pindaris in case they should attack the British districts, began to be felt by the British Government.

The Pathan Chief, Amir Khan, was making full use of his opportunities. Ever since he had joined Jaswant Rao Holkar after the latter's escape from imprisonment in Nagpur, about the year 1799,² he had associated his activities with Holkar's Government. During the Regency of Tulsi Bai, he wielded real power in control of its forces. He had to stay away often from that Court, but his brother-in-law, Ghafur Khan, represented the Pathan interests and kept Amir informed of what was going on.³

Amir Khan was an able leader and a daring soldier. His forces were very efficient, and enjoyed the reputation of being the best equipped of all the Indian State armies.⁴ In 1814, Muhammad Shah Khan died, and his battalions passed over to Amir Khan. According to the latter's calculation, the joint forces when mustered at Merta in Marwar, under Amir's command, numbered 50,000 foot and 12,000 cavalry.⁵ Even if these figures exaggerate the real strength of the Pathan Chief, there is no doubt that he wielded considerable power in Central India. Nominally attached to Holkar's Court, Amir Khan acted quite independently. Since he had left Bhopal at Jaswant Rao's invitation, his activities lay mostly in Rajasthan, excepting when he desired to attack the Raja of Berar, in 1809 and again in 1814. His armies moved under his subordinates, levying contributions from the petty Chiefs and big Princes alike, destroying their forts and villages, if resistance was offered to their demands.⁶

Amir Khan intervened in the affairs of the Rajput States, whose ancient ruling houses had maintained themselves for centuries past, in the country round about the Aravallis. The leading States of Udaipur, Jaipur and Jodhpur were at the time reduced to a low condition of poverty indeed. The disturbed and disunited state of the

1) Strachey to Moira, January 8th No. 88 Bengal Secret Consultations. January 28th 1814.

2) *Amir Khan's Memoirs* by Busawan-lal (Calcutta 1832) p. 97.

3) Malcolm. *Central India*. (1894) Vol. I. pp. 284-286 and 300-304.

4) Prinsep: *Op. Cit.* Vol. I p. 48.

5) *Amir Khan's Memoirs*. *Op. Cit.* p. 432.

6) Prinsep: *Op. Cit.* Vol. I. pp. 48-50. Malcolm. *Central India*. (1894) Vol. I. pp. 327 and 335.

Rajput country furnished a wide scope for the genius of unscrupulous Amir Khan. His army was freely used in helping one Prince against another in their feuds, and, having once gained a footing for himself amongst them, he stayed to coerce them all to make regular payments to his hordes. These States, already weakened in the course of the past fifty years, while the Maratha Power was rising into prominence, were at this time a helpless prey to the oppressive visitations of the Pathans.¹

The Company had abrogated its engagement with Jaipur and so, with the exception of Alwar, all the States of the Rajput country remained outside British influence. Not only were they independent of British control, like Sindhia and Holkar, but they were not even under treaty relations with that Power, as were the Maratha States. The Rajput States and the principality of Bhopal were, at the time of Lord Moira's arrival in India, the scene of confusion and depredation. The British Government was bound by treaties with Sindhia and Holkar not to interfere with them,² whilst Sindhia and Holkar themselves levied tribute on them whenever possible. The Pathans, the Pindaris, and the Maratha armies had come to regard them as a rich field for plunder. The feudatory nobles of those States were either in open revolt, or secretly intriguing against the ruling powers.

In that condition the Rajput States felt the need of British assistance against the harassing Pathans. In the autumn of 1814, Bhopal showed the same desire, when it was heard that the united forces of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar had renewed their attack after their last unsuccessful attempt at reducing Bhopal.³

Such was the political situation in India when Lord Moira took up the reins of his office. The problem of political relationship with which he was faced was neither a simple nor an easy one. The new Governor-General very soon discovered that the situation around him was anomalous and possessed elements of insecurity. The whole country needed pacifying, and he believed that the British had the power to do this. The policy of "Ring Fence"⁴ that was imposed upon his predecessors, was responsible for producing the situation which he described in these words:- "We do not, in fact, at present, possess any complete system, but parts of two very incongruous systems and most of the inconveniences we experience are occasioned by the discordancy of the two.

1) *Amir Khan's Memoirs. Op. Cit.* pp. 424-429 and 436-439 and *Malcolm's Central India.* (1794) Vol. I. pp. 329-336.

2) The Treaty of 1805 with Sindhia and of 1806 with Holkar.

3) Hough. *Op. Cit.* pp. 93-94.

4) A term used by Lee-Warner. *The Native States of India.* (1910) p. 58.

"Our first plan was to avoid meddling with the native powers. The second was to control them all, and we have since attempted partially to revert to the first after having taken one half of the powers of India under our protection, and made the other half our enemies."¹

He thought the situation was full of danger, and that early action was needed to avert it. Not long after his arrival in the country he wrote (on 1st Feb. 1814):— "I see around me the elements of a war more general than any which we have hitherto encountered in India."²

The general situation as he found it, has been reviewed in this chapter. It is now necessary to state the remedies which he proposed to apply.

1) His Minute of December 1st *Op. Cit.* Paras 36 and 37.

2) *Private Journal of the Marquis of Hastings*. Vol. I. p. 47.

CHAPTER II

"REVISION OF OUR POLITICAL ALLIANCES"

LORD MOIRA'S EARLY OPINIONS ON INDIAN WARS AND GOVERNMENT-PINDARIS-THEIR PLACE IN POLITICAL STUDY OF THE TIME-MOIRA'S OUTLOOK-THE DEFECTIVE STATE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS-REVISION NEEDED-A LEAGUE PROPOSED-DISCUSSION-EDMONSTONE'S DISSENT-CRITICISED MOIRA'S SCHEME AS IMPRACTICABLE AND UNSUITABLE-MOIRA'S TOUR OF UPPER INDIA, 1814-15-MEETS METCALFE-AGREEMENT IN VIEWS-THE LATTER'S INFLUENCE-A MINUTE PREPARED FOR COUNCIL-FORWARD ACTION URGED-SUPPRESSION OF PINDARIS-ASCENDENCY OVER INDEPENDENT PRINCES-PROTECTION OF SMALLER STATES-REFLECTIONS ON MOIRA'S GENERAL POLICY, PARTICULARLY HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS SINDHIA-DISAGREEMENT IN COUNCIL-DISAPPROVAL FROM THE AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND-HIS OWN IDEAL UNCHANGED.

CHAPTER II

“REVISION OF OUR POLITICAL ALLIANCES”

The Board of Control and the Court of Directors, in appointing Lord Moira as their Governor-General in India must have expected that he would carry out the instructions laid down for and observed by his predecessors in office, Barlow and Minto.

Speaking in a debate in the House of Lords on the 11th April 1791, when the question of the war against Tipu Sultan was discussed, he had denounced that war in unmeasured terms, declaring that “A scheme of conquest, for the extension of territory, was not only held generally as an improvident act, but particularly so in India.” Referring to the Government of India, he said:— “That Government was founded in injustice and had originally been established by force.” He exclaimed further:— “The war which now subsisted was a serious calamity, whether favourable or adverse it was no less the subject of deprecation and regret.”¹

Although he expressed these views on the Mysore War of the days of Cornwallis, he was essentially different in temperament from men like Barlow in his general outlook on political affairs. It is not, therefore, surprising, that his opinions on Indian matters underwent a complete change soon after his arrival in India, and he became the advocate of that very policy that he had condemned in his earlier days.

As is well known, the Minto Government had begun to take action against the Pindari danger. These freebooters directed their attack against the territories of the allies of the British, the Rajas of Bundelkhand, the Nizam, the Peshwa, and also the Raja of Nagpur. The British were bound to protect those territories (with the exception of Berar) and were obliged to adopt precautionary measures for the safety of their own. With that end in view they organised a close watch on the activities and movements of the different Pindari leaders, and also undertook military measures to check their inroads into the British or allied areas.²

In a study of the political relations between the British Government and the Indian States, the Pindaris have obviously no proper place. They were a class of “free Companies” whose profession was plunder. They never became an organised political community in the sense of a territorial State. Therefore any space devoted to them

1) *Hansard*, 31, *George III*, pp. 145-7.

2) *Home Misc* Vol. 516-A. pp. 13-15 and 19.

here requires an explanation. It must be recognised that the very lawless, uncontrolled position which they came to occupy in the country, gave them a political significance. Although not a State themselves, they were the scourge of all the other States of Central India. Nominally residing in the jurisdiction of some Prince or other, they respected neither their government, nor their laws, nor their territorial frontiers.

As has already been remarked, the dominions of the Peshwa, the Nizam, Holkar, Sindhia and Bhonsla, suffered alike from their depredations. As they grew in strength and numbers, and as they extended their activity and organised their forces, they became the cause of serious concern to all the States. Some of them, as previously stated, were too weak to overpower them, and others (such as Sindhia) were too proud to admit that weakness, more especially to their rivals, the British.¹ It is obvious, therefore, that the Pindari problem must have assumed a political complexion of considerable perplexity, and provoked in the minds of the rulers of that time, political speculation of far-reaching consequence. The military measures initiated by the Minto Government, and continued after Moira's arrival, naturally attracted the latter's early attention. Then again, the peculiar methods of Pindari warfare, and the consequent difficulty and disadvantage of carrying on operations against them, led the Governor-General to examine the whole question of political relations. He saw that Central India was plunged into a state of serious disorder and insecurity. And the Pindaris were ravaging these areas without any systematic check on the part of their rulers. In the last Maratha war, the British had considerably broken the power of Sindhia, Holkar, and the Raja of Nagpur. This was, however, followed by the policy of withdrawal on the part of the British. Thus, the Pindaris found a free field in which to grow and spread. They became a peril to public peace and private property.

The consideration and the proper estimate of this Pindari danger led Lord Moira to form his own views as to how to meet the situation. It was thus that his former opinions underwent revision and transformation.

He was naturally eager to destroy the Pindaris and establish peace in the country. So far as the question of ridding the country of the Pindari evil was concerned, there was unanimity of opinion amongst the members of the Governor-General's Council. There was a genuine desire to extirpate them by all legitimate means.

1) Strachey to Moira January 8th No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations January 28th 1814.

But the means of achieving that purpose became a question of considerable controversy and discussion. The Governor-General maintained that the question of the extermination of the predatory bodies was intimately bound up with the larger problem of the relations subsisting between the States of India and the East India Company. He thought that the destruction of the Pindaris could be effected without much difficulty. But that would not do. "Having achieved your object, you cannot sit down without establishing such arrangements as would be necessary towards drawing a permanent benefit from the success, and if we once set forth on that ground we shall find that we have opened a field of questions of immense extent."¹ It was not sufficient to suppress the Pindaris. Their re-organisation must be prevented. Their support must be cut off. Similarly, it was necessary to break Amir Khan's power, and reduce his army. The Governor-General believed that Amir Khan's interests were identified with those of Holkar. He asked whether the destruction of Amir Khan, which would mean the dissolution of Holkar's Government, would not raise such issues as would excite the jealousy of the Peshwa and Sindhia. To him, the Pindari eruption was only the symptom, whereas he aimed at the destruction of the disease itself. The Pindari hordes must be extirpated, in order to confer peace and security on the country. He argued that no peace could be permanent, without one supreme Power to maintain it, a Power which would be acknowledged supreme by all the States, and to whom all questions of peace and war would be submitted for arbitration.

Since he considered the annihilation of the Pindaris inseparable from the revision of existing relations with the Indian States, he reviewed those relations in a minute, which he wrote on the 3rd April 1814.² He felt convinced that they were in a state of confusion, and that most of the embarrassments which faced the Government were the result of that confusion. There was resentment, friction and general restlessness on the part of those States. Neither side was satisfied. The British did not reap the full advantages of their position, and the States were keenly dissatisfied at the interference which the British Government exercised in their affairs, often in violation of solemn engagements. He complained in the same minute:—"We do not, in the connections we establish with them, either [allow] to the native princes spontaneity of action as independent rulers or exact from them obedience as feudatories."

1) Governor-General's Minute dated April 3rd, No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, June, 21st, 1814.

2) No. 4. Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 21st June 1814.

After serious reflection on the situation, he came to the conclusion that the case demanded a most speedy treatment. With the view of removing those serious disadvantages and difficulties, the Governor-General recommended that all the principal States should be invited to join a league which he proposed to form, with the British Government as its head. The members of the proposed confederacy would have to surrender the right of making war on one another, and would have to submit their differences to the arbitration of the British Power, as the acknowledged head of the League. He suggested that the proposal should be tactfully put before the Indian Princes, in a way that should not hurt their pride. According to his scheme, the States would enjoy real independence in their internal Government, and would also be free to regulate the succession to their sovereignties according to their own custom or desire. It would be a genuine federation of States, internally free, but deprived of the functions of external sovereignty.

The subsidiary States would remain almost unaffected by the formation of the League. He anticipated that they would welcome it on the ground that they would regain that freedom in their domestic concerns which had been promised to them in their treaties. The Raja of Nagpur would be forced by circumstances to join it, and Lord Moira was determined to impose on him the condition of a subsidiary alliance before admitting him into the Confederacy. "None but Sindhia and Holkar, to whose mode of existence it could not be reconcilable would have the folly to remain out of the pale of security."¹ And the Governor-General's proposals involved the severance of all relations with those States which declined to "improve their connection with us into the terms of the League."²

These were the views which in the early days of his office Moira formulated for his government. They display his powers of imagination and his earnestness of purpose. At the same time, a closer examination of those proposals reveals a lack of Indian experience, leading him to propound theories both impracticable and inapplicable to the situation he was attempting to remedy. Considered in the abstract, his ideas appeared sound, and it looked as if they might successfully remove the various inconsistencies which had arisen in the field of Indian politics. But they lost their charm and value when applied to the conditions for which they were intended.

As Moira himself admitted, the subsidiary States would have found their position practically unaffected by his proposals. It might be

1) *Ibid.*

2) *Ibid.*

expected that they would rejoice at the proposed restoration of their internal freedom. The fulfilment of that expectation, as Moira lived to learn, could not be attained, even under his own regime. In spite of his strong disapproval of this method of interference, Moira himself was forced to admit its necessity. Once a State was deprived of its independence, the loss of its military strength was a necessary consequence. The ruler was relieved of the primary responsibility of protecting his State against foreign aggression. Through that weakness, he almost invariably fell into a repose which was degenerating and demoralising in the extreme. Internal administration very generally suffered also, and trouble followed. Then the British Government sooner or later had to interfere to set matters right, often by force of arms.¹

But at that time the chief embarrassment of the British Government was not due to the Subsidiary States. The three independent Maratha rulers were the chief cause of anxiety, since they would not acknowledge the British supremacy or agree to be bound by subsidiary ties and reduced to a condition of political impotence like the Nizam and the Gaekwar. Sindhia and Holkar would not have found any advantage to attract them in Moira's League. As Edmonstone remarked, referring to Sindhia:—"It is not apparent in what way he could be in the slightest degree benefited by the arrangement. I perceive no basis of negotiation."²

Lord Moira was either unduly optimistic or else he failed to understand with whom he had to deal. He imagined that the full significance and meaning of his Scheme, namely, the acknowledgment of the British as the feudal overlord, with other States as vassals, would be agreed to, if only the States were approached in a tactful manner. "Were we to tell them," he wrote in his minute, "that they must become vassals, their pride would revolt, their apprehensions would take alarm." He was far from correct in his judgment, that only the form in which the plan was presented to the Princes mattered, and that they would readily assent to the arrangement, if the meaning of the proposed confederacy were suitably explained. He must have soon learned that his imagination had not helped him to a correct conclusion. The negotiations with the Raja of Nagpur and the Nawab of Bhopal, showed that even those Chiefs, in the days of their declining prosperity, were zealous to retain their independence.

1) The evidence of Sir Richard Jenkins. Parliamentary Papers, 1821-32. (VI) Vol. XIV. pp. 25-26.

2) Edmonstone's Minute, dated 29th April, No. 5. Bengal Secret Consultations 21st June 1814.

None of the rival States, which were jealous of British ascendancy, would have willingly supported the League. Therefore, for all practical purposes, it could not be brought into being without an appeal to arms, or, once formed, it would have remained no more than a name.

The Council of the Governor-General did not support him in his plan for a federation of States founded on feudal notions. The senior member of the Council, Edmonstone, a highly experienced civil servant of the Company, who had received his political training under Wellesley, vehemently opposed Lord Moira's proposals. He disputed Moira's contention that the subsisting relations were ill-defined and conducive of frequent irritation. From his long experience and local knowledge, he urged that the proposed scheme was unsuitable and impracticable, and declared that the suggested change in the existing relations would lead to anarchy, confusion and warfare.¹

The controversy that began in the early months of 1814 between Moira and his colleagues continued for close on two years. The opposition were strengthened in their attitude by the consciousness that they were acting in accordance with the declared wishes of the authorities in England, who had enjoined a policy of strict economy, and forbidden any steps likely to lead to hostilities with Sindhia and Holkar.

Lord Moira, although he was thwarted and opposed in Council, still remained firm in his views. In the summer of 1814 he decided to make a tour of Upper India. His extensive travel throughout the winter of 1814-15, afforded him an invaluable opportunity of making personal acquaintance with the various nobles, Rajas and Nawabs, and of understanding the customs and institutions prevailing in the country.² Amongst other things, this tour also brought him into contact with a person whose help he sorely needed at that time, and he was not slow to avail himself of this service.

Amongst many of his other notable deeds, the masterful and aggressive genius of Wellesley had, during his term of office, trained a few distinguished officers, who played a very important part in the annals of Anglo-Indian administration. Malcolm, Metcalfe, Elphinstone and Jenkins are famous figures on the pages of British history in India. Although Wellesley had been recalled, and his policy censured, yet, what one might term "the Wellesley School," survived in India long

1) *Ibid*, and Seton, another Member of the Council, also opposed the change in the relations with other States. His Minute dated 21st June 1814, No. 10. Bengal Secret Consultations of the same date.

2) His *Private Journal*. 2 Vols. Published 1868.

after his departure. And it is very interesting to note how this school influenced events in Moira's time.

In his journey through Hindustan, he learned to value and admire the services he received from one member of that talented group. Charles (later Lord) Metcalfe was, at that time, Resident at Delhi. Moira's first impressions of Metcalfe were derived from a perusal of the private letters which the latter wrote to the political secretary, John Adams, another disciple of the same school.¹ Ever since 1806, in the freedom of private correspondence, Metcalfe had, on many occasions, strongly condemned the policy laid down by the Directors, and so faithfully professed by Cornwallis and Barlow.² Such a person would be a tower of strength to the Governor-General in his disputes with his colleagues. Being obstructed by his Council, Moira threw himself into the arms of the Delhi Resident, whose political principles were so agreeable to him.

News of the British reverses in the Gurkha War distressed Metcalfe, and in November 1814, he wrote a note to the Governor-General on the proper mode of conducting operations.³ This was followed by another paper in January 1815, on the situation in India and his views on its treatment. His papers were very favourably received at the Governor-General's camp. A number of points were put down for discussion with him, and he was invited to the camp, where he spent several weeks of the winter of 1814-15.⁴

While Moira and Metcalfe agreed in their general outlook, it is clearly visible that the latter was largely responsible for giving further and final shape to Moira's views on the problem of political relationship. As the estrangement between himself and his Council, more particularly the vice-president, Edmonstone, grew deeper, his confidence in Metcalfe increased day by day. When, in the autumn of 1815, Moira returned to Calcutta, he took with him a lengthy minute prepared for him by his private secretary, Ricketts, based on the notes and opinions furnished by Metcalfe.⁵ The Governor-General put that minute before his Council on his return.⁶ It surveyed the whole situation exhaustively, from military and political standpoints, with regard to the Indian Princes and the Pindaris, and also contained an

1) Adam to Metcalfe. November 15th 1813, private letter. Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*. Vol. I. p. 382.

2) Kaye's *Selections from the papers of Lord Metcalfe*, pp. 1-11.

3) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*. Vol. I. pp. 386-388.

4) *Loc. Cit.* I. pp. 397-398.

5) *Loc. Cit.* p. 449.

6) Minute of December 1st 1815, No. 5. Bengal Secret Consultations, June 15th 1816.

elaborate exposition of the creed which Moira had, by that time, embraced for his political conduct in India. "The policy it inculcated was indeed emphatically Metcalfe's policy."¹ Not only were the arguments and the plan his, but in many parts his own words were reproduced, as admitted by Ricketts in a letter to Metcalfe.² In the opinion of Lord Moira, as expressed in that very interesting document, in order to avert the impending evil, strong and urgent measures were desirable in the interests of the British Government in India. The Marathas and the Pindaris constituted two great dangers. The former were disunited as a result of the Treaty of Bassein, but could and would, at any time, combine against the British by the impulse of their common hatred. "What in rivalry between themselves, could exist so strong as their dread and hatred of our power? What in the memory of wrongs could affect any one of them with such bitterness of animosity as the recollection of narrowed dominion, curtailed revenue, diminished reputation and extinguished preponderance suffered from us?"³

The Pindaris were strong and growing; they could command 20,000 fine horse, or even more. Amir Khan was able, clever and courageous, and had under his command a very efficient and well-equipped force⁴ which he was using to harass and oppress the defenceless States of Rajasthan. He was convinced that both Sindhia and Holkar were interested in maintaining the Pindaris and would in the long run be driven to go to war against the British, "as a relief from the still greater ills of poverty, hunger and despair" from which they were suffering.⁵

He complained that his Government did not enjoy the advantages which they had a right to expect. The evil could not be remedied by the Powers whose duty it was to remove it, for they were too weak for the task. The British should apply the remedy which would lead to the settlement of the Maratha Powers and the destruction of their irregular forces, an object which could not be accomplished under the existing relations. In its pursuit, a war with the Marathas was extremely probable. But the Governor-General had no hesitation in preferring the option of an immediate war, to that of a prolonged and

1) Kaye's *Metcalfe*, Vol. I. p. 449.

2) *Ibid.* (Footnote):—

Compare for instance, Metcalfe's remarks on Jaipur Alliance (Kaye I. p. 440) with the wording of the Minute on the same subject (paragraph 290), or his remarks on the acquisition of territory, (Kaye. I. p. 442) with the sentiments contained in (paragraph 196) the Minute.

3) Paragraph 20.

4) Paragraph 25.

5) Paragraph 51.

expensive system of defence against the predatory bodies.¹ Then there were the Rajput States in the west, whom he called, "our natural allies and the natural enemies of the Mahrattas."² The British would increase their military resources and gain a valuable strategic advantage by establishing their influence over them. Both policy and humanity united to require that those States should be brought under protection.³ But by the treaties with Sindhia and Holkar, the British were forbidden from entering into an alliance with these States. "It would be a fundamental part of this plan, that we should be liberated from those restrictions which now prevent our interference with some of the petty states."⁴

The plan was to effect a complete change in the political conditions of the country, making the British the unquestioned arbiters of its destinies. This purpose was to be achieved by military power, and he therefore advocated the maintenance of a strong army. "Our power depends," declared Metcalfe, "solely on our military superiority."⁵ Moira did not foresee a long war, for he estimated that the Indian Powers, (in which he included the Pindaris), could only muster a total force of 80,000 horse,⁶ and that their infantry was inefficient. He was quite hopeful of destroying it without much difficulty, in a possible contest, with his available resources. But he was earnestly of opinion that a reduction of military strength would be unwise.⁷ "It is necessary to keep afoot in peace, a force suited to a state of universal war."⁸

The whole of his policy could be summed up in his aim at the establishment of peace in India through the protection and guarantee of one supreme Power, which must be the British. "We should thus have a complete control over the politics of the Confederacy."⁹ This plan was to be achieved by effecting three things:—the complete suppression of the predatory system, the acquisition of ascendancy over the military Chiefs, which should preserve public tranquillity and restrict them within their own territories, and lastly, "the protection of all harmless states under our superintendence."¹⁰

1) Paragraph 71.

2) Paragraph 84.

3) Paragraph 89.

4) Paragraph 115.

5) *Kaye's Life of Metcalfe*. Vol. I. p. 399.

6) Paragraph 62, of Moira's *Minute Op. Cis.*

7) Paragraph 275.

8) Paragraph 196.

9) Paragraph 149.

10) Paragraph 273.

This long minute was a document with a military outlook and an anti-Maratha spirit. In tone, it was frankly aggressive, and both in the interests of the British power in the East, and the public peace of India, it pleaded for early and decisive action, even war, if necessary.

It is difficult to withhold a tribute of appreciation for that able and masterly state paper. It displayed a clear perspective of the conflicting political factors which complicated the situation, and a bold and vigorous spirit in grappling with them. Nor is it wholly necessary to agree entirely with the justness of its sentiments or the soundness of all its arguments in order to admire its sagacity and skilful draftsmanship.

It was undoubtedly true that the Pindari menace was growing worse every day, and that to keep up a defensive attitude against their light horsemen by guarding the passes on the frontier, was an extremely expensive and trying method.

The only Power which could succeed in extirpating them was the British Government. And if, as the strongest Power in the country, it desired to attain a paramount position over all other States, this was an excusable ambition, according to the prevailing political notions of inter-state relationship. There were three States left outside the pale of the British Confederacy, which were weak, impoverished and mutually antagonistic. Their own territories were the scene of depredations. The Pindaris oppressed their subjects and levied contributions from their tributaries. Their armies were disorganised. The Raja of Berar was in an almost defenceless state. Holkar's court was under the sway of the unscrupulous adventurer, Amir Khan. Sindhia was only comparatively better situated than the other two. However unwilling they might have been to surrender their independence, their pretended jealousy of the British Power was inconsistent with their actual military strength. Lord Moira rightly thought that the British were not reaping the full advantage of their superior position. He saw before him clearly, the opportunity of raising the position of his Government by breaking the independent power of the Maratha Princes. In other words, he simply wished to complete the work left unfinished by Wellesley. He had no scruples against achieving that end by warfare, if necessary, as he thought might be likely. As Metcalfe put it in his usual bold manner, "With regard to all the great military states, and all the predatory powers, it is clearly our interest to annihilate them, or to reduce them to a state of weakness, subjection and dependence."¹ On the grounds of self-interest, the Governor-General urged a forward policy.

1) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*. Vol. I. p. 434.

At the same time, it would not be correct to say that this policy was demanded by the need of preserving the British power. There was no serious rival to the British in the field. Moreover, the scheme for the extermination of the Pindaris was not so indissolubly connected with the subjugation of the independent Princes.

Holkar's Government, under its regent, Tulsi Bai, was far from cordial towards Amir Khan and his party at her Court, and would have been glad to get rid of the Pathan adventurer.¹ Many times their differences were openly avowed,² and they led to constant intrigues and assassinations.³

It was well-known that the Raja of Nagpur was too weak, and his country in too impoverished a condition to permit of any aggressive designs on his part against the British. Moreover, amongst them all, he was, perhaps, the worst sufferer from Pindari outrages,⁴ and could have no desire or interest in being their well-wisher.

Daulat Rao Sindhia was considered the nominal sovereign of the Pindari freebooters. But Lord Moira knew that Sindhia himself was engaging his arms against them.⁵ Close, the British Resident at his Court, considered that he was genuine in his anxiety at the rumoured release of Karim,⁶ and in the steps he took at the British Government's suggestion, to obstruct the passage of the Pindaris to the Deccan. Close reported the despatch of a letter (dated 17th Nov. 1816) from Sindhia to Chitu, in which the latter was forbidden to molest any country. In that letter, Sindhia also made professions of friendship for the Company. The Resident observed that this communication gave "a true and correct insight into his Highness' feelings."⁷

Moira was also afraid that their common distrust of the British might drive them into a confederacy for the purpose of overthrowing the British.⁸ On a little examination, one finds that his fears were unduly exaggerated.

1) Edmonstone in his Minute, dated 29th April 1814, No. 5, in Bengal Secret Consultations 21st June 1814, says:—"We have actually received from them (referring to the Regent and her minister) on more than one occasion, secret overtures to this effect."

2) Malcolm's *Central India*. Vol. 1. (1824) pp. 285-305.

3) Balaram Seth was cruelly murdered. He was Amir Khan's supporter. *Loc. Cit.* pp. 298-299.

4) Grant-Duff. *Op. Cit.* III. 325, and also Wilson, Vol. 11. p. 191.

5) Extract from a letter from Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 1st March 1812. Home Misc. Vol. 516A, p. 7.

6) Close to Moira, dated 12th Feb. 1814. No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, dated 4th March 1814.

7) Close's Despatch, Dec. 4th No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, Dec. 17th 1816.

8) His Minute dated Dec. 1st 1815, paragraph 19. *Op. Cit.*

He knew, that Sindhia and Amir Khan had always hated each other.¹ Amir Khan was all powerful at the Court of Holkar, and naturally exerted his energies to exclude Sindhia's influence from that State.² The traditional jealousy of the two houses of Sindhia and Holkar, must have been well-known to Moira. It was extremely improbable that they would unite for a common purpose.³

Moira attached rather undue importance to another attempted combination between Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsla with the object of crushing the Nawab of Bhopal.⁴ Sindhia and Bhonsla both had an old grudge against Bhopal.⁵ Their alliance did not appear to have an anti-British design, although it would be true that if they had succeeded in reducing Bhopal, their strategic position would incidentally have improved considerably.

There is fairly reliable evidence that Sindhia had no desire to ally himself permanently with the Bhonsla Raja of Nagpur. Gokul Parekh, the minister whose advice carried great authority in Maharaja Sindhia's Councils, was opposed to any proceeding which might interrupt the existing amity with the British Government. A friendly communication received from Nagpur met with no response. The Resident wrote:—"I understand Sindhia to have declared that from experience he could place no confidence in the alliance and support of the Rajah."⁶ This declaration of Sindhia's is all the more remarkable, since it was made subsequently to his annoyance in the previous November over the Bhopal affair, when he might have been expected to be especially unfriendly towards the British.⁷

Even if we suppose the improbable, that the independent Powers could combine their forces in a common cause, Moira was confident that they had not much chance of success. "Our means are ample against any combination," wrote the Governor-General.⁸

1) *Loc. Cit.* paragraph 26, and also his Minute dated 13th April 1816, *Home Misc.* Vol. 604.

2) Malcolm's *Central India*. (1824) Vol. I. pp. 283-285.

3) *Ibid* and Sindhia's attempt to establish his influence at Holkar's Court by means of armed forces. Also Prinsep's *Transactions*. Vol. I. p. 233.

4) Adam to Metcalfe. 14th Oct. 1814. No. 2. Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th Nov, 1814.

5) Hough. *History of Bhopal*. pp. 38, 41, 53, and Malcolm's *Central India*. Vol. I. pp. 373-4, 387, and also Jenkins' *Report on Nagpore Administration* (1827) p. 125.

6) Strachey's Despatch dated 26th Jan. 1815, No. 42, Bengal Secret Consultations, Feb. 14th 1815.

7) Hastings' Summary of the Operations in India from 1813-1823. Parliamentary Paper, Vol. VIII. 1831-1839. Political Appendix p. 96.

8) He wrote this in a Minute (of the 13th April 1816) in connection with the attempted alliance with Jaipur. (*Home Misc.* Vol. 604.) referring specially to combination between Sindhia and Amir Khan.

As Lord Moira was drifting fast into the Wellesley School of Indian Politics, it would not be altogether inappropriate to notice that concurrently with that evolution in his opinions, the possibility of a revival of the Maratha Confederacy, with Daulat Rao Sindhia as its effective leader, occupied the same position in his mind, as did the French in that of Wellesley. Just as the latter aimed at destroying the French, so Moira could not rest content without reducing Sindhia.

It is not to be wondered at that he should have developed that feeling against Daulat Rao. The latter must have appeared to him, more by his free position than by his actions, to be the chief obstacle to the establishment of British paramountcy. In addition to this, was the galling article of the Treaty of 1805,¹ by which the British were bound not to enter into treaty relations with his so-called tributaries in Malwa, Mewar, and Marwar. It seriously conflicted with the realisation of Moira's plans, and so the desire grew within him to break Sindhia's independent power. He must have felt with Metcalfe, that "India contains no more than two great powers, the British and the Marathas, and every other state acknowledges the influence of one or the other."² The independent status of Sindhia, who was apparently the most powerful representative of the Marathas, was inconsistent with British aims.

This naturally led Moira to become excessively suspicious of Sindhia. It is a matter of melancholy interest to compare his attitude towards Baji Rao with his dealings with Sindhia. It is not difficult to detect an unusual and undeserved confidence in the former, of whose treacherous nature he must have heard, as compared with his exaggerated distrust of the latter. Of course, there is an obvious explanation for this attitude of mind. Baji Rao was bound by ties of subsidiary alliance, and a British force was stationed in his territories. He could not, therefore, be so free to engage in hostilities as Sindhia was. Thus Moira's attitude towards the two Maratha rulers, though different, was characteristic enough. The degree of cordiality with which he treated the intriguing and unprincipled Peshwa, till about the last moment of his open hostility, is recorded in the following words:—"For some time after, the utmost cordiality seemed to prevail between His Highness (*i. e.*, Baji Rao) and the British Government. Frequent confidential communications passed between the Peshwa and the Resident, and His Highness received a striking proof of the confidence and friendship of the Governor-General in Council, in the communication to His Highness, of our intentions regarding the

1) Aitchison's *Treaties* - (1909) Vol. IV. p. 61.

2) Kaye's *Metcalfe Papers Op. Cit.* p. 4

Pindaries, and the negotiations actually pending with Dowlat Rao Sindhia on that subject, a disclosure which had not been made to any other of the allies of the British Government. On the other hand, no measure or proceeding was either in contemplation or progress which could have tended in the remotest degree to alarm or irritate His Highness' mind."¹

In contrast to this policy pursued towards Baji Rao, must be viewed Moira's remarks regarding the suggestions made to him by the Board of Control,² and Edmonstone,³ that, in the operations against the Pindaris, Sindhia's co-operation might be sought.

He declared:—"It will not do to sound Sindhia. I will not stain the character of my country so much as to try his dispositions and then shrink from the object in finding them unfavourablewere he to identify himself with the Pindaries he is at war with us, and further discussion is preposterous."⁴

The internal disorder in Sindhia's affairs, which could not have allowed him to offer any very serious resistance to the British, was well known to Moira.⁵ But he persisted in cherishing an ardent aspiration to break Sindhia's power completely. How keenly desirous he was to achieve that purpose can be gathered from what he recorded in his Private Journal on the 23rd Dec. 1816. "It is far better if he be resolved to risk his existence for the support of the Pindaries."⁶

But it was destined otherwise. It was Baji Rao who risked his existence, losing his dominions, and with them fell the hereditary throne of the Peshwas, of which he had been such an unworthy occupant. On the other hand, Sindhia emerged through these troubled years as the only Prince still retaining a semblance of independence. Not only did he not go to war with the Company, but he co-operated⁷

1) Secret Letter from Bengal to the Secret Committee, 19th April 1817. Home Misc. Vol. 516A, pp. 67-69.

2) Letter from the Secret Committee dated 26th Sept. 1816, p. 40. *Loc. Cit.*

3) In his Minute of 7th Dec. No. 10 Bengal Secret Consultations 28th Dec. 1816.

4) Governor-General's Minute 6th Dec. 1816. No. 9 *Loc. Cit.*

5) Governor-General himself wrote this about him in his Minute of 15th May 1814. No. 6. Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June 1814, referring to his proposed league of States under British Supremacy, "Sindhia could be relieved from a grievous tyranny over him by his own army, his sense of which he has several times expressed before servants of the Company. Were he assured of filling the Musnad tranquilly, I have no doubt of his preferring that to the frequent insults which he now undergoes from his troops."

6) Vol. II. p. 154.

7) Lord Hastings' *Summary of Operations in India*, printed in Political Appendix—Parliamentary Paper Vol. VIII. 1831-2. p. 101.

with them in the extirpation of the freebooters.¹ Whilst no one would assert that Sindhia was a loyal friend of the British, or devotedly attached to their interests, yet he was sensible enough to see that his security lay, not in opposing the British, but in avoiding a contest with them. The mutual distrust between them arose from Sindhia's dread of the British Power, and the British dislike of his independence. If the two had laid aside their false fears and false pride, and co-ordinated their efforts against the Pindaris, the task would have been comparatively simplified.

But that would not have solved the political problem. As has already been remarked, that constituted only a third, and by no means the most important part, of Moira's political programme. For him, it was an entire scheme, which could not be broken into fragments. "The settlement of Central India is necessary for the safety and stability of our Empire."² That was the one task before him, indivisible and urgent, and he meant the resources of his government to be applied to carry it out.

The policy formulated by the Governor-General and so earnestly recommended by him for adoption, failed to receive the support of his Council at Calcutta. Edmonstone, its vice-president, was not convinced of either its soundness or its expediency. He had the support of Seton (until 1816, when he changed his mind³) and Dowdeswell.⁴ Edmonstone disagreed with Moira in thinking that there was any great or imminent danger on the part of the larger Powers, which were internally too weak, and externally too disunited to open hostilities against the British. The interests and the financial condition of the Company alike demanded a peaceful policy.⁵ Edmonstone continued to hold this view of the situation.⁶ He was clearly of the opinion that Sindhia was genuine in his desire to suppress the Pindaris and to dissociate himself from their nefarious activities.

1) It can, of course, be argued with considerable force that Sindhia was left no choice in the matter by Moira's military arrangements. But, in a way, that would be only begging the question. If he had felt any inveterate hostility against the British, he could have taken up arms in 1814, 1815, or 1816, before those military movements began, or while the Nepal War was in progress. On the other hand, there was a subsidiary force stationed at the very door of Baji Rao.

2) His Minute of 1st Dec. 1815, *Op. Cit.* paragraph 270.

3) His Minute of 17th April 1816, No. 3 Bengal Secret Consultations, April 30th 1816.

4) His Minute of 19th April 1816. Home Misc. Series, Vol. 604.

5) His Minute of 22nd April 1814. Home Misc. Series Vol. 604.

6) His Minute of 26th Feb. No. 9 Bengal Secret Consultations 8th March 1817.

He urged that, even "if we could not obtain the co-operation, we might at least secure the neutrality of Sindhia."¹

The opposition in Council was not the worst of Moira's embarrassments in putting his plan into execution. The Board of Control and the Court of Directors were most reluctant to sanction any wholesale revision of the existing alliances, with a view to establishing a confederacy of the States of India under British supremacy.² The Secret Committee, in repeating their previous injunctions against undertaking extensive operations or forming new alliances, even with the Rajput States, laid down a purely defensive policy for their Indian Government. They were to protect themselves and their allies against specific inroads of the Pindaris, and to punish their aggressions. But "We are unwilling to incur the risk of a general war for the uncertain purpose of extirpating altogether those predatory bands," and further, "extended political or military combinations, therefore, for that purpose we cannot at the present moment sanction or approve."³

Hampered by his colleagues in Council, and discouraged by his employers at home, as Moira was, he adhered to his own opinions and plans with courage and perseverance. As he acquired greater experience and received outside influence, his opinions developed and were confirmed, although they underwent a partial modification. The keenness of the early days for the formation of a league was wearing away, the righteous indignation at the unjust interference in the affairs of States was losing its warmth when brought into contact with cold, hard facts, and the reaction of feeling produced by Pindari excesses was imperceptibly increasing his determination to crush, along with those freebooters, the power of Sindhia, whom Moira called "the most powerful and the most decided supporter of the Pindaris."⁴ This was a natural evolution of his policy, in the light of current events and experiences. It meant only a change in the emphasis from some parts of the plan to others, but in its basic principles it remained unchanged, growing stronger with the progress of time.

Within four months of his arrival in India, Moira wrote in his *Private Journal*:—"Our object ought to be to render the British

1) Edmonstone's Minute of 7th Dec. No. 10 Bengal Secret Consultations, Dec. 29th 1816.

2) Despatch No. 107 from the Secret Committee dated 29th Sept. 1815 to the Governor-General. *Board's Drafts*, Vol. 5.

3) Despatch No. 118 from the Secret Committee to the Governor-General dated 5th Sept. 1816. *Loc. Cit.* Vol. 5.

4) His Letter dated 1st March 1820 to the Court of Directors. Home Misc. Series, Vol. 516A, p. 386.

Government paramount in effect, if not declaredly so. We should hold the other states vassals in substance, if not in name, not precisely as they stood in the Mogul Government, but possessed of perfect internal sovereignty, and only bound to repay the guarantee and protection of their possessions by the British Government with the pledge of the two great feudal duties. *First*:—They should support it with all their forces on any call. *Second*:—They should submit their mutual differences to the head of the Confederacy (our Government) without attacking each other's territories."¹

This was the goal at which he aimed. Having defined his ideal, he began to apply it. The next chapter will be an attempt to review the first steps which he took in that direction.

1) Vol. I. pp. 84-85 on Feb. 6th 1814. Identical sentiments were expressed in his Minute of 3rd April No. 4. Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June 1814.

CHAPTER III

MOIRA APPLIES HIS POLICY

PREPARATION

PINDARIS-MEASURES ADOPTED BY MINTO GOVERNMENT-THEIR SETTLEMENTS SOUTHWARD OF THE NARBADA-MOIRA'S MILITARY MEASURES AGAINST THEM-THEIR PARTIAL SUSPENSION OWING TO RUMOURED ATTACK OF AMIR KHAN ON BERAR-PREPARATIONS AGAINST THE PATHANS-POLITICAL MEASURES THOUGHT NECESSARY-SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE WITH NAGPUR-SUSTAINED EFFORTS OF THE RESIDENT-FAILURE-OTHER ALTERNATIVES-BHOPAL THREATENED BY SINDHIA AND NAGPUR-NAWAB APPLIES FOR BRITISH PROTECTION-MOIRA FORTHWITH DECIDES TO TREAT WITH BHOPAL-SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE OFFERED-SIMILARLY SAUGOR ALSO OFFERED A SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE-MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO SUPPORT THESE ALLIANCES-SINDHIA'S VEHEMENT OBJECTION-HIS CLAIMS OVER BHOPAL-DENIED BY MOIRA-FURTHER MILITARY MEASURES-WARLIKE PREPARATIONS-SINDHIA'S WITHDRAWAL OF HIS FORCES FROM BHOPAL-NAWAB'S INDIFFERENCE-HIS DUPLICITY-MOIRA DISGUSTED-NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF-SAUGOR-NANA'S HESITATION-ATTEMPT ABANDONED-THE ARMIES DISPERSED-JAIPUR-MOIRA ADVOCATES ALLIANCE WITH THAT STATE-MAHARAJA'S APPLICATION - ENTERTAINED - INSTRUCTIONS TO METCALFE-AMIR KHAN'S SIEGE OF JAIPUR-MAHARAJA'S DEALINGS-SIMULTANEOUS DEALINGS WITH THE BRITISH, SINDHIA AND AMIR KHAN-NEGOTIATIONS-MILITARY MEASURES-ARMIES ASSEMBLED-JAIPUR GOVERNMENT'S INDIFFERENCE-TERMS AGREED-EXTRAVAGANT DEMANDS-NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF-SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER.

CHAPTER III

MOIRA APPLIES HIS POLICY

Passing mention has already been made that the Minto Government had ordered precautionary measures against the Pindaris. The Commander-in-Chief was instructed to take such steps as would prevent the marauders from making inroads into British territory. At that time, those arrangements were purely military safeguards and bore no political character either in plan or execution. The disposition of the troops had been arranged to meet the contingency of a possible Pindari raid, and was not ordered to provide against the hostility of any States of Hindustan. The latter were not believed to entertain designs against the British Power at that time.¹

This state of affairs continued from 1812 until the spring of 1814. The Government at Calcutta were kept in constant touch with the position and activity of the Pindaris, by their Residents with the Princes of Central India, and more particularly by Captain Sydenham. The latter was, at his own suggestion, transferred by the Resident at Hyderabad from Aurangabad to Sandurgaon, a place further north and nearer the Pindari settlements, so that he could obtain fuller and quicker accounts of their doings.² The Bengal Government, in their turn, reported regularly to the authorities in England, the intelligence received from their officers relative to the Pindaris.³ During that period, they had neither attacked the British territories nor molested their subjects in any way.⁴

The Pindari leaders were warring amongst themselves. Although Karim was under restraint at Holkar's Court, his lieutenants, Namdar Khan and Kushal Kunwar commanded strong contingents. Chitu was at that moment the most powerful of them, and was said to possess 10,000 horse, including 5,000 good cavalry, besides infantry and guns.⁵ He was attacked by the Karim Shahi Pindaris and obliged to fly. The ruler of Bhopal helped them in driving Chitu from his possessions (except Satwas and Champaner).⁶ While Chitu retreated to Ujjain to

1) Pindari Papers. Home Misc. Series Vol. 516A p. 13.

2) Russell to Moira—29th April 1814. No. 3. Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th May 1814.

3) Pindari Papers. *Op. Cit.* 516A. pp. 1-23.

4) *Loc. Cit.* p. 20. Letter to Secret Committee 7th Dec. 1813.

5) Sydenham to Russel. 24th April. No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th May 1814.

6) Secret Letters No. 6—Sydenham to Russell, 1st May 1814, Jenkins to Russell—No. II. 1st May 1814, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th May 1814.

recover his strength, his pursuers returned to Satwas and besieged that fortress, which contained his family. One of his lieutenants bravely defended it against the attackers.¹

While these internal dissensions were in progress between the rival parties of Chitu and Karim, other Pindaris under Shaikh Abdulla carried on plundering excursions into Berar and Hyderabad territories; the latter suffered heavily from the destruction of crops, property and villages.² It appeared that the Pindaris were steadily extending their settlements to the South. This movement became known in the closing months of the year 1813. Chitu's lands were resumed by Maharaja Sindhia, but Chitu retaliated by laying waste Sindhia's territories to the south of the Narbada.³ That movement of the Pindaris across the Narbada to the vicinity of Burhanpur and Asirgarh, towards Hundia, became a subject of negotiation between the Governments of Sindhia and the Company. The Resident conferred with the Maharaja's ministers and urged speedy action to frustrate Chitu's plans.⁴ The Maharaja was roused to action by the protests of the Resident, although he himself realised, without admitting it to the British Government, that his own army was too scattered and undisciplined to achieve that end.⁵ He ordered his generals, (Baptiste and a Maratha commander) to lead an expedition against the Pindaris, and also called upon Raj Rana Zalim Singh, the powerful manager of Kota, to furnish an auxiliary force for the purpose.⁶

As has been remarked a little while ago, the Company's Government had until then pursued a military policy, against the Pindaris, which did not include any political plan. Exceptions to this were the two minor treaties concluded with Rewa and Orchha (also called Tehri), both in Bundelkhand, and the negotiations undertaken to bring the Bhonsla under a subsidiary alliance, which will be noticed hereafter. Until this time, the British Government had not contemplated any general action of an extended nature, for the extirpation of

1) Akhbar (News) received by Sydenham dated 29th April 1814, No. 9, in Bengal Secret Consultations - 20th May 1814.

2) Sydenham to Russell - 26th March, No. 6. Bengal Secret Consultations of 18th April 1814.

3) Resident at Sindhia's Court to Moira dated 16th Nov. 1813, No. 12. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th Jan. 1814.

4) Resident to Moira - of 8th Jan. No. 8. Bengal Secret and Political Consultations of 28th Jan. 1814.

5) See for instance:—(a) The Resident's Letter dated 16th Nov. 1813. No. 12. The Secret Consultations of 7th Jan. 1814. (b) Another Letter from the same gentleman of 20th Jan. 1814. No. 7. Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th Feb. 1814. (c) Another Letter from him of 19th May - No. 6. Secret Consultations of 3rd June 1814.

6) Resident to Moira - 17th April, No. 2. Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th April 1814.

the Pindaris. There had even been a time when it had shrunk from arousing expectations in Sindhia's mind of such co-operation with him in that matter as would involve undefined liability on their part.¹

The Pindaris' movement across to the left bank of the Narbada, and the uncertainty of Sindhia's ability or anxiety to drive them back, led to a change in British policy. Whilst still abstaining from adopting any political scheme which might lead to hostilities with other States, they decided to employ the subsidiary force of the Nizam at Jalna to attack the Pindaris and prevent their settling on the southern side of the river. With that object, orders were issued on the 8th February, 1814, to the Resident at Hyderabad.² A few days after this decision to take the offensive against the Pindaris, Moira's Government reconsidered that order in view of the persistent rumours that Amir Khan was contemplating an attack on the territories of Raghuji Bhonsla.³ On February 26th fresh instructions were issued to the Resident suspending the former orders in view of these rumours about Amir Khan's designs on Nagpur. The Nizam's subsidiary force was to be kept in readiness to cover Berar from the Pathan incursion. Although the projected attack on the Pindari positions was suspended, (not abandoned), yet the Resident was instructed to block the passes of the Deccan against the Pindaris.⁴ News of Amir Khan's hostile designs on Berar continued to pour in all through the first half of 1814.⁵ The British Government was naturally desirous of defeating his evil designs, not only as an act of far-sighted sagacity, but also in order to protect the dominions of their ally, the Nizam. These adjoined Nagpur territory, which they were bound to defend against all foreign aggression. Brisk military preparations were undertaken, the Peshwa's subsidiary force being ordered to be kept in readiness at Serur. Simultaneously, the available force in Bundelkhand was to assemble at an advanced

1) Letter to the Resident at Sindhia's Court, 28th Jan. 1814. No. 9. Bengal Secret Consultations 28th Jan. 1814.

2) Pindari paper. *Op. Cit.* pp. 21-22.

3) Letter from the Resident with Sindhia 3rd Jan. (containing reports of Dec. 24th, 26th and 27th 1813) No. 8. Bengal Secret Consultations 21st Jan. 1814. Also *Memoirs of Amir Khan*. p. 426.

4) Letter to the Resident of 26 Feb. 1814. No. 11. Bengal Secret and Political Consultations of 4th March 1814. Also see Pindari Papers (Home Misc. No. 516A) p. 23.

5) (a) Letter from Sydenham to Russell of 28th Feb. 1814. No. 6. Bengal Secret Consultations of 25th March.

(b) Despatch of Jenkins to Bengal Government of 3rd March 1814. No. 9. *Loc. Cit.*

(c) From Wauchope, Superintendent Political Affairs in Bundelkhand, of 16th April 1814. No. 3. Bengal Secret Consultations, of 29th April 1814.

(d) Russell to Moira, of 29th April 1814. No. 3. Bengal Secret Consultations, of 20th May 1814.

position on the frontier of that province.¹ The Government of Bombay was also asked to despatch the force under Lieutenant-Colonel Dowse to Jalna, and to be prepared for any further military and political action that might be taken. The troops from Bombay were required to reach Jalna by the 1st September.²

From this military activity the Pindaris and the Indian States must have gained the impression that something decisive was in contemplation. Lord Moira, on his part, felt that his Government had to protect its vast dominions against so many dangers that its military strength was insufficient for the purpose.³ On the 1st Feb. 1814, he wrote that the frontiers of the British provinces were exposed to constant danger from the Pindaris, more particularly the unprotected part bordering on Raghuji's territory.⁴ These strategic defects in the military position led him (Lord Moira) to the conclusion that he could not wisely restrict himself to measures of a military nature only. Political action appeared to him to be necessary also. He himself had formulated the principles on which that action should be based,⁵ but since his policy and programme were unacceptable both in the Council and in England, he could not bring his plan into systematic operation at once.

But there was one political step which he found himself at liberty to take. He approved it, as it had the merit of strengthening the strategic position of the Company's territories. It consisted of persuading Raghuji Bhonsla of Nagpur to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the Company.

In 1809—10, the Raja's territories had been attacked by the forces of Amir Khan, the Pathan Chief, and Wazir Muhammad of Bhopal. Without any request on the part of the Bhonsla, the Minto Government sent a force under Colonel Barry Close, to save his State. The Raja was consequently able to repulse his enemies.⁶ As a result of their unsolicited assistance the British Government expected the Raja to accept a permanent British contingent in his country, and bind himself by ties of subsidiary relations. A draft treaty was sent down

1) Letter to the Resident at Hyderabad, of 26th Feb. 1814 No. 8. Bengal Secret Consultations, of 4th March 1814.

2) Despatch to the Governor in Council, of 20th May 1814 No. 9. Bengal Secret Consultations, of 20th May 1814.

3) His Private Journal. Vol. I. pp. 40-48.

4) *Loc. Cit.* p. 42.

5) His Minutes of the 3rd April and 15th May 1814. *Op. Cit.* (In the last Chapter.)

6) Report on Nagpur by Jenkins. *Op. Cit.* p. 125.

to the Resident at the end of 1812¹ and for a time it appeared² to Jenkins that the attempt would succeed. If that plan had come about, the British line of unprotected frontier would have been greatly reduced. A British subsidiary force would have been stationed in Nagpur-territory, and consequently some of the richest of the British districts would have been better guarded against the Pindari menace. The Raja's territory, too, would have been saved the almost annual visitations of their plundering hordes. "The objects of the proposed arrangement are to secure the military command of the territories and resources of Nagpur for purposes of general defence," wrote the Bengal Government approvingly to their representative at Nagpur.³ The efforts to realise this purpose began in the time of Minto, and continued unremittingly for nearly two years. The Moira Government pressed them with great keenness. All kinds of political pressure, and a full measure of diplomatic skill, were employed to achieve that end, on which the Bengal Government had set its heart, and which was obviously of great importance to their interests.⁴ Amir Khan's projects against the Raja afforded a suitable occasion for the renewal of those efforts, while the timid Raja was under the fear of that invasion, and the knowledge of the wretched condition of his own army.⁵ But he remained indifferent, and evaded the demands made of him, even when threatened by the Pathan Chief. Jenkins, an exceedingly able and sagacious officer, continued in his optimism for some time. Those of the ministers who were favourable⁶ to the proposed alliance with the Company's Government, also cherished similar hopes. The Raja, however, remained unmoved, and turned a deaf ear to all the suggestions and advice which were pressed on his attention by the Resident and by his ministers. Nothing would persuade him to accept the suggested course. By the middle of June, Jenkins informed Moira that the Raja seemed determined to resist his overtures. Neither political pressure nor diplomatic entreaties, nor even a sense of immediate danger, could persuade him to change his mind. He was

1) See Jenkins' Letter to Bengal Government, of 1st Feb. 1813. No. 24. Bengal Secret and Political Consultations of 19th Feb. 1813.

2) *Ibid.*

3) Letter to the Resident at Nagpur of 19th Feb. 1813. No. 25. Bengal Secret Consultations of the same date.

4) Jenkins to Moira of Jan. 20th. No. 15. Bengal Secret Consultations 11th Feb. 1814.

5) Despatch from the same to the Government of 3rd March 1814. No. 9, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 25th March 1814, and another Letter from the same to Moira 23rd March 1814. No. 7, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 15th April 1814.

6) *Ibid* and also his long Despatch to Moira of 14th June 1814. No. 14, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 5th July 1814.

prepared for the worst, and would "rather resign his dominions, and go to Calcutta" than submit to the hateful alliance. "Jealousy of his independence is the leading principle that prompts that repugnance." The Resident informed the Governor-General in the same long letter how the "ministers Sreedhur Pundit and Juswunt Rao, the Rajah considers, as wholly devoted to our interests," and the latter whom he had taken back in his service at Lord Minto's insistence, "has not only lost the Raja's confidence, but is the object of His Highness's aversion." Jenkins believed that the adverse influence which swayed the Raja's mind came from the opposite party, which favoured his allying with the Peshwa.¹ Although Jenkins assured the Governor-General that he would do his utmost to continue in his efforts, he had by that time lost all hopes of any success; and a few weeks later, on the 26th September, he apprised Moira of Raghuji's final refusal to enter into a subsidiary alliance.² This news reached Moira when he was proceeding up the river for his tour of the upper provinces.

As chances of the Nagpur alliance became less hopeful, the Governor-General looked round for another plan to realise the same political object and acquire the same military position in Central Indian affairs, which would have been acquired by that eagerly-sought alliance.

The great influence which Metcalfe exerted on Moira's mind in shaping his policy, has already been noticed. It is very interesting to see how, in the selection of a plan which could be an adequate alternative to the Nagpur treaty, and equally beneficial in its effect, the first suggestion came from another disciple of the Wellesley school. It was Mr. (later Sir Richard) Jenkins, the able Resident, and eventually the Administrator, of Nagpur who was the author of the idea.

Long before the British Government had thought of undertaking any great political measures to strengthen their position in Central India, before Moira had shaped his own policy, and certainly before his Government was prepared to approve that forward step,³ Jenkins informed the Bengal Government that he had hinted to the Raja of Nagpur that in the event of his remaining obstinate, the British might adopt other measures, in the determination of which the interests of

1) *Ibid.*

2) Jenkins' Despatch of 26th Sept. No 37. Bengal Political Consultations of Oct. 18th 1814.

3) Their Letter to Jenkins of 11th Feb. 1814 clearly discouraged him from giving out that hint of dealing with Bhopal which the British Government could not fulfil. No. 16, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th Feb. 1814.

the Raja would not be consulted. The Resident had in view the plan¹ of forming a connection between the British and the Chiefs of Bhopal and Saugor.²

These two principalities lie in the heart of Central India, on the northern side of the Narbada, in a region adjoining the Pindari homes, and included in the scene of their activity. By an alliance with these Malwa States, the British Government could realise the same advantages against the Pindaris, as it expected from the Nagpur alliance, with the additional gain of isolating the Raja of Nagpur, and cutting him off from Sindhia's territories.

The principles of Moira's political programme, formulated at an early period of his term of office, included the scheme by which Bhopal was to be taken under British protection. Since the Bhonsla remained so obstinately indifferent to British overtures of alliance, it was proposed "to annex to the dominions of the Nawab of Bhopal those territories of the Rajah of Nagpore which lie to the north of the Narbada. That boon and the security to be derived from our protection would make the Nawab very ready to place his state on the footing of dependence on our Government, with the obligation of resisting any force hostile to us which should attempt to pass through his country."³

Consequently, on receipt of the long letter from Jenkins of the 14th June, already referred to, reporting the repugnance of the Nagpur Government towards the British alliance Moira confidentially directed that the Nawab of Bhopal should be secretly sounded. Care was to be taken not to precipitate hostilities with the Pindaris, or excite Sindhia's suspicion, whilst Jenkins was to attempt to discover what inducements would be required to render Bhopal a useful ally.⁴

This was the first practical step which Moira took in the direction of the ideal that he set before himself. The negotiation with Nagpur had been opened by his predecessor, and had that alliance matured, it would have received the approval of the Board of Control in England also,⁵ although they were unwilling to sanction the

1) Jenkins to Moira of 20th Jan. No. 15. Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th Feb. 1814.

2) There is a noticeable family resemblance in the views on the subject of Jenkins in his Despatch, paragraph 26 (of 3rd March 1814. No. 9, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 25th March 1814) and those employed by Moira in his Minute of 3rd April 1814, quoted in the text.

3) His Minute of 3rd April 1814, No. 4. Bengal Secret Consultations of 21st June 1814.

4) Adam to Jenkins of 8th July. No. 7. Bengal Secret Consultations 19th July 1814.

5) Vol. 16. *Bengal Secret Letters*, p. 389 - "had received the entire approbation of your honourable committee and the honourable court of Directors" - paragraph 2. Secret Letter from Governor - General to the Secret Committee 11th Aug. 1815.

dismemberment of the Raja's dominions to secure that object.¹ This alternative plan of attaching Bhopal and Saugor and interposing British influence in the very centre of the disturbed region had no sanction from England. Jenkins was told clearly that, although, for the time being, objections existed against the proposed arrangement with Bhopal, it was the wish of the British Government, as soon as a favourable opportunity occurred, to improve its means of operating against the marauders with vigour and success on a comprehensive scale.²

By the combination of certain events the plan of extending protection to Bhopal and Saugor, which was thus seriously under contemplation at the headquarters of the Governor-General, came up for a speedier decision than he had intended. The chief of them has already been noticed. The Bhonsla Raja, after two years of evasion and vacillation, finally refused to accept the British subsidiary treaty. This news reached Moira in October. Another event, the reported alliance between the Nagpur Raja and Sindhia, also precipitated that decision. In view of the confused condition of Central India, and the jealousy which the independent Princes and the Pindaris undoubtedly felt for the British power, Moira greatly feared this alliance.

He had been informed by Jenkins that Raghuji would look to Sindhia for help against Amir Khan,³ and had assurance of support from the Peshwa.⁴ Moreover, he knew that Sindhia was meditating another attack on Bhopal, and if that had succeeded, the Governor-General's plans, as a prelude to a more comprehensive political programme, which he had in mind, would have been frustrated.

So he made up his mind to take a bold step without any further hesitation. Just at the time when unfavourable news came from Nagpur, the Nawab of Bhopal transmitted to the British Resident at Delhi⁵ overtures for an alliance. He wished to secure protection against Sindhia's forces.⁶ Without any loss of time, Moira instructed Metcalfe at Delhi, to avail himself of the Bhopal Vakil's presence and conclude

(1) Despatch No. 107. 29th Sept. 1815 of the Secret Committee to the Governor-General.

(2) Letter to Jenkins 8th July, already referred to.

(3) Resident's Letter of 23rd March 1814. No. 7, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 18th April 1814.

(4) His Letter of 14th June. No. 14, in Bengal Secret and Political Consultations of 5th July 1814, addressed to Moira.

(5) Letter from the Resident at Delhi of 20th Oct. 1814. No. 24, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 19th Nov. 1814.

(6) In 1809 Wazir Muhammad had applied for the same protection. But the British Government desired to avoid the embarrassment which an alliance would involve and therefore rejected the overtures. (See Malcolm's *Central India* Vol. I. pp. 393 - 5.)

an agreement with that State.¹ He furnished the Resident with an outline of the proposed engagement containing the conditions on which the final treaty would be based. The terms included the dependence of Bhopal on the British Government in all external relations and disputes, freedom for the British troops to enter into the Nawab's territory at all times, and the eventual reception of a permanent British force and cession of a fort as a military depot within his State. The British Government was to undertake to protect it against its external enemies.²

Similar instructions were issued in the similar though less important case of Saugor, to Wauchope, the Superintendent of Political Affairs in Bundelkhand. Govind Rao, Nana of Saugor, occupied nearly the same position, both politically and strategically, as Bhopal, and so received a like treatment.³

Without loss of time, the Residents with Sindhia and Bhonsla were informed of the decision.⁴ Strachey, at Sindhia's Court was directed to act immediately on the receipt of intimation from Metcalfe and Wauchope, of the adjustment of the preliminaries with the agents of Bhopal and Saugor. He was to signify to Daulat Rao's Government that Bhopal had been taken under British protection, and that he was to desist from his enterprise against that State. A similar demand was to be made by Jenkins to the Raja of Nagpur. At the same time, both these Princes were to be assured that the British Government did not contemplate any aggression against them, and that those measures were directed chiefly against the Pindaris.

It was a bold stroke of policy indeed, and Lord Moira fully realised the seriousness of the course he had taken, particularly, in its consequences on Sindhia's mind. It would effectively curb his influence and give a blow, as was intended, to his power in Deccan politics.

Moira, therefore, ordered the military forces of the British Government to advance towards Bhopal in order to support the alliance which was under negotiation with that State. A direct communication was made to Colonel Doveton, Officer Commanding Nizam's Subsidiary Force, to march to Ellichpur to defend Bhopal against Sindhia and the Raja of Berar, although this object was not made public. The

1) Adam to Metcalfe marked "most secret" dated Cawnpore 17th Oct. 1814. No. 2, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 4th Nov. 1814.

2) *Ibid.* and also Prinsep. *Transactions* etc. Vol. I. p. 238.

3) Adam to Wauchope of 17th Oct. 1814. No. 9, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 4th Nov. 1814. (Conditions in paragraph 4.)

4) These "most secret" communications were issued on the 17th Oct. 1814, from the Governor-General's Camp at Cawnpore. Secret Consultations of 4th Nov. 1814 to Nagpur Resident. Nos. 3 and 4, the former in Moira's own handwriting, and to the Resident with Sindhia, No. 5.

ostensible cause of the movement was to be the protection of the country against the Pindaris.¹ Similarly, Lord Moira addressed urgent letters to the Governors of the two presidencies of Bombay² and Fort St. George,³ to prepare for the emergency.

Moulvi Nizam Udin, who had gone to Delhi on his private business and who was authorised by Wazir Muhammad Khan, the ostensible Nawab of Bhopal, to transmit his overtures to the Resident there, stated that he was not authorised to conclude an agreement in the name of the Nawab. The Resident could not, therefore, confer with him on the subject of the desired alliance.⁴ On account of the nearness of the seat of the Superintendent of Political Affairs in Bundelkhand, the negotiations with Bhopal were also entrusted to that officer (Wauchope), who was to open direct communications with the Nawab.⁵ Wauchope lost no time in disclosing the terms to Wazir Muhammad Khan, and asked him to depute his agent to discuss them.⁶ He received a hopeful answer from the Chief of Bhopal, in which it was represented that he was awaiting the return of Moulvi Nizam Udin from Delhi. All the conditions of the proposed agreement save two, were acceptable to him. The question of the situation of the British troops and their depot for supplies, and that relating to the expenses of the troops, were the two points which needed deliberation and discussion. He therefore informed the British officer that he would depute a trusted agent to proceed to Banda and confer with him⁷ soon after the Moulvi's arrival.

Wauchope informed Strachey of Wazir Muhammad Khan's general acceptance of the terms, for such he took to be the meaning of the latter's communication. The Resident at Sindhia's Court waited on the Maharaja and broke the news that the British Government had taken Bhopal under their protection, and therefore demanded that his general, Baptiste, should forthwith be ordered to refrain from an attack

1) Adam to Colonel Doveton of 17th Oct. No. 8, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 4th Nov. 1814.

2) Moira to Governor of Bombay. No. 10. *Loc. Cit.*

3) Moira to Governor of Fort St. George. No. 11. *Loc. Cit.*

4) Metcalfe to Adam of 20th Oct. No. 24, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 19th Nov. 1814.

5) From Adam to Wauchope, of 26th Oct. 1814. No. 11. Bengal Secret Consultations of 19th Nov. 1814.

6) Wauchope to Adam. Bengal Secret Consultations. No. 27, of 29th Nov. 1814.

7) Translation of the Nawab's letter to Wauchope - received 24th Nov. 1814. No. 44. Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th Nov. 1814.

on that principality.¹ On the 29th November² the conference took place in which the ministers, Gopal Rao Bhao, Anaji Bhaskar and Gokul Parekh took part, the Maharaja himself showing keen interest. The discussion, which grew warm on Sindhia's side, was led by Gopal Rao.³

The ministers questioned the right of the British Government to interfere with Bhopal, which had been a dependency of Sindhia's. That action of the British Government was described by Sindhia's Durbar as a violation of the treaty between the two States, which clearly laid down that the English should have nothing to do with the tributaries of the Maharaja in Malwa. It was asked, what was the meaning of the friendship that was declared to subsist between the two Governments when the British were trying to detach Bhopal, Sindhia's dependency, from his Government. Gopal Rao added that the petty state of Bhopal alone was of no use. The British were using it as a step to further aggrandizement. The British Resident denied the right of the Durbar to prevent his Government from entering into an engagement with Bhopal. It was, and had been, an independent State, which did not come under the Treaty of 1805. Therefore, the British were at full liberty to conclude a separate alliance with it. The conference ended without any understanding or agreement on the contended issue. The Maharaja did not concede to the Resident's request, further repeated through his Munshi three days later,⁴ that the Maharaja's forces under Baptiste should be ordered to withdraw from Bhopal. Sindhia declared to Munshi Aisudin:—"Very well, if this is the case, each party will act according to its own views of expediency."⁵

From the prevailing condition of public law, and the rules governing inter-state relations in India at that time, the legal issue raised in that controversy over Bhopal could not be easily settled.

1) The communication was premature. The agreement had not been concluded. Moira himself regretted later (his Letter of 11th Aug. 1815 to the Secret Committee, paragraph 22, in *Bengal Secret Letters* Vol. 16) that the discussion was brought about earlier than he expected and before he was prepared to meet it.

2) Both Prinsep (Vol. I. p. 244) and Hough (in his *Brief History of Bhopal* p. 97) give the 30th Nov. as the date of the Conference. But it appears that it took place not on that date but on the 29th Nov. as Strachey used the words "last night" for it in his Despatch which was written on the 30th Nov.

3) Strachey to Lord Moira of 30th Nov. 1814. No. 33, in *Bengal Secret Consultations* of 30th Dec. 1814.

4) Strachey to Lord Moira of 2nd Dec. 1814. No. 34, in *Bengal Secret Consultations* of 30th Dec. 1814.

5) The residency Munshi had that interview on the 1st Dec. reported by Strachey in the Letter of 2nd Dec. *Loc. Cit.*

Between this principality in Malwa, and Maharaja Sindhia, there had always existed an "implied connection," according to Malcolm. He says:—"Madhajee Sindhia had been throughout his life, looked upon as the friendly protector of the Afghan principality; and though no actual supremacy was either asserted or admitted, still there was, from the policy of both parties, an implied connection. This led to a considerable importance being attached to the Khelaut or honorary dresses, which Dowlet Row Sindhia sent to the Nabob and to Vizier Mahomed Khan."¹ Sindhia was known to demand and levy tribute from the Chief of Bhopal.² The Duke of Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) thought that "there is no doubt that he (Sindhia) had a claim upon the Nabob of Bhopal, and it is more than probable that he had one upon Saugor."³ This long-standing claim of Sindhia over Bhopal, maintained from the time of Mahadji, combined with the undefined provision of the treaty,⁴ strengthened the force of the arguments on Sindhia's side. That treaty specifically allowed Sindhia to count the ancient and autonomous ruling houses of Mewar and Marwar among his tributaries, to the exclusion of British interference in their affairs. Therefore, according to the prevailing notions of Maratha sovereignty, he could, with justice, lay his pretensions over the more recent and less important State of Bhopal also.

But the Governor-General was not prepared to give Sindhia the benefit of the doubt, by interpreting the clause of the treaty in his favour. Bhopal was not mentioned in the treaty, nor had the British ever clearly admitted Sindhia's claim of suzerainty over that Afghan principality. It was notorious that it had heroically resisted Sindhia's encroachments.⁵ And Bhopal had never admitted Sindhia's supremacy. In these circumstances, Moira felt justified in believing

1) Malcolm. *Central India*. Vol. I. p. 387. But from this it is not to be supposed that Malcolm would have accepted Sindhia's claim. Elsewhere he writes:—"The Nabobs of Bhopal had never been tributary to the family of Sindhia, though they had been occasionally obliged to pay large sums to its chiefs for aid and protection against the attacks of other states." His *Political History*, Vol. I. p. 449.

2) *Ibid.* p. 389, Prinsep I, 243, and also Letter from the Resident with Sindhia of 15th Nov. 1813, No. 12. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th Jan. 1814.

3) *Wellington Despatches*, (1837 Edition) Vol. III. p. 665, his Letter to Colonel B. Close of 4th March 1805.

4) Appeal was made to Article 8 of the Treaty of Nov. 1805 between Daulat Rao Sindhia and the East India Company, which runs thus:—"The Honourable Company engage to enter into no treaty with the Rajahs of Odeypur, and Jodhpur, and Kotah, or other chiefs, tributaries of Dowlat Rao Sindhia, situated in Malwa, Mewar or Marwar, and is in no shape whatever to interfere with the settlement which Sindhia may make with them." Aitchison. *Op. Cit.* Vol. IV, p. 61. (1909).

5) See the graphic description of the last Siege of Bhopal by Malcolm in his *Central India*. Vol. I. pp. 396 - 410, (1824).

that the British Government was not in any way precluded from entering into an agreement with Bhopal. This view of the issue was maintained by the Governor-General throughout the difficult discussions that ensued. Sindhia followed up his oral protest to the British representative at his Court, by a written complaint. He despatched two letters to Moira with his agent, Raja Kamal Nain, through the Resident at Delhi.¹ But Moira remained firm and denied Sindhia's claim to sovereignty over Bhopal.²

The issue involved was not simply a question of the interpretation of treaties for the settlement of the rights of the contending parties. It was very largely a political problem, involving the relations of powerful and mutually suspicious rivals. The ground relinquished by one was not merely a simple loss to that side, but was feared to be the positive gain of the other.

How clearly Moira foresaw the fury with which his policy would be received by Sindhia, can be judged from what he wrote in that connection:—"I desired that this communication be made in the most conciliatory tone, and the Resident would not report to me the violent language with which it would probably be met by Scindia, so as there might not be any affront to discuss Scindia, as was unofficially imparted to me, received the intimation with all the vehemence of language which I had expected."³

Moira was therefore not wholly unprepared for the threats which issued from Sindhia. In October he had ordered the armies from Madras, Bombay, Poona, Hyderabad, and Gujarat, to support his plans in Bhopal.⁴ When the account of the interviews of Strachey and his Munshi with Sindhia arrived, the former plans were enlarged, and vigorous measures were ordered to bring into play the full strength of the British Government in the Deccan.

Since October, events in another quarter had been increasing the British difficulties. The serious reverses in the first campaign of the Nepal War demanded the concentration of the resources of the Bengal Army in the hills, against the Gurkhas.⁵

Undeterred by these obstacles, however, Moira adhered to his plans. He wrote to Strachey to assure Sindhia in a courteous and conciliatory

1) Substance of which was reported by Metcalfe in his Despatch of 31st Jan. 1815. No. 85, in Bengal Secret Consultations of Feb. 25th 1815.

2) Adam to Strachey, of 29th March 1815. No. 60. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May 1815.

3) Summary of Operations, etc., Parliamentary Papers—Vol. VIII. 1831-32. Political Appendix, p. 96.

4) On the 17th October. *Op. Cit.*

5) Prinsep. Vol. I. pp. 86-90.

manner that no aggression on his rights was contemplated by the negotiations with Bhopal, and that his claims would be given full consideration by the British Government. The Governor-General wanted to afford him every opportunity of calmly reflecting on the consequences of his obstinacy on an untenable point. The Resident was instructed to ask for a promise not to attack Bhopal, but at the same time, not to insist on the immediate fulfilment of this promise.¹ Moira wanted a little time to collect his forces and improve his position in the possible contest for which he was providing. In the same despatch, he wrote to the Resident, that the interval which would occur would be a gain on the British side.² With the same object, he issued instructions to Wauchope, who was directed to require Wazir Muhammad candidly and explicitly to avow his relations with Sindhia. No means were to be adopted to expedite the deputation of the Vakil from the Nawab, and, lastly, he was told not to execute a preliminary Agreement, but to conclude a definite treaty. Instructions were also laid down on the two points raised by the Nawab in his letter to Wauchope (already referred to). He was to be asked to cede the Fort of Raisen, and the amount of subsidy to be paid by Bhopal was fixed at four lakhs and a half. But on both these points, the Nawab's counter-proposals were to be admitted, if put forth.³ Appended to the despatch was a draft treaty containing the conditions of the alliance, with secret articles at the end, by which the Company engaged to endeavour to recover the lands wrested from the Nawab by Sindhia and the Pindaris.⁴

In the meantime, extensive and very efficient military preparations were being carried on. The largest possible force which could be drawn from all parts and presidencies of India, was ordered to assemble on the northern border of the British Deccan. The resources of Madras⁵ and Bombay,⁶ the subsidiary forces of the Peshwa,⁷ and the Nizam,⁸ were marshalled out in full force to meet, what Moira

1) Letter to the Resident of 6th Dec. 1814. No. 9, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th Dec. 1814.

2) As Hastings wrote about it some years later "The gain of time was everything to me, when I was disciplining recruits in all quarters for the augmentation of our force." His Summary of Operations, etc., Parliamentary Papers. Vol. VIII. 1831-32. Political Appendix p. 96.

3) Adam to Wauchope of 6th Dec. No. 11. Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th Dec. 1814.

4) No. 12. *Loc. Cit.*

5) Moira's Letter to the Governor, Fort St. George, marked "most urgent", of 6th Dec. 1814. No. 4. Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th Dec. 1814.

6) *Loc. Cit.* No. 5. Moira to Governor of Bombay.

7) *Loc. Cit.* No. 7. Adam to the Resident at Poona.

8) *Loc. Cit.* No. 8. Adam to the Resident at Hyderabad.

considered, "the Crisis."¹ The Bengal Army was fully occupied in the Tarai and the hills against Nepal in the North. The Deccan and the Gujarat Armies were, therefore, to be relied upon to deal with the Marathas. Moira viewed the situation with great seriousness, and doubted whether the British resources were sufficient against the enemies whom he was preparing to encounter. He complained that even on a "peace" establishment, the British Army in India was inadequate, and that at that particular moment it urgently needed augmenting.² He took upon himself the responsibility of adding three Regular Regiments of Indian Infantry to the Bengal Army.³ He further strengthened his available resources by instantly relieving the regular army from civil duties, by calling out the Grenadier Companies of the regiments of the line, and forming them into separate battalions, and lastly, by ordering the recruitment of considerable levies of Irregular horse and foot.⁴ In order that nothing might be left to chance, in addition to the grand preparation and the efficient military equipment already described, Moira applied to the Governors of Ceylon,⁵ the Cape of Good Hope, and Mauritius,⁶ for the help of their spare forces to support him in meeting the danger in India.

The plan of operations which he sketched out for the British army was revealed in his letter to the Governor of Madras. Besides the defence of British and allied territory, the object was to reinforce the divisions of Colonels Doveton and Smith, and enable them to attack Sindhia's territories with vigour and effect. The Deccan forces were to advance to a position from which they could operate against his southern possessions, and watch the Raja of Nagpur, with the view of menacing his territory and, if necessary, opening hostilities against him.⁷

These plans and preparations on a grand scale, were produced by the attitude adopted by Sindhia in the Bhopal affair. The Governor-General laid more importance on Sindhia's indignation and

1) His Minute to the Council of 9th Feb. 1815. No. 1. Bengal Secret Consultations of 21st March 1815.

2) His Despatch to the Court of Directors (also meant for the Secret Committee) of 26th Oct. 1814. *Bengal Secret Letters* Vol. 15. pp. 405-13.

3) Moira's Despatch to the Secret Committee of 9th Dec. 1814. *Bengal Secret Letters* Vol. 15. p. 435.

4) Prinsep. Vol. I. pp. 248-9.

5) His Letter to Governor Fort St. George of 6th Dec. No. 4. Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th Dec. 1814.

6) Moira to Lord Somerset, the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. No. 37, and to Governor of Mauritius. No. 38, both of 17th May, Bengal Secret Consultations of June 6th 1815. These communications indicate that Military aid had been requisitioned from these quarters.

7) Despatch of Dec. 6th. No. 4. Bengal Secret Consultations of Dec. 29th 1814...

credited the Maratha Powers, particularly Sindhia and Bhonsla, with a greater sense of unity, than was perhaps warranted by their antecedents. It was only natural for him to imagine that the rulers who, in common, had suffered from the British the loss of their territory, and were "wounded by the same degradation of their dignity" should cherish a "common object".¹ The correspondence that took place at the time of the Bhopal discussion between Raghuji and Daulat Rao Sindhia confirmed him in his conviction.² Any reasonable person in his place would have *a priori* been led to the same conclusion. Little could he understand that disunion and mutual jealousy were strongly ingrained in the very nature of the Indian Princes, even on occasions when from common interest, they might be expected to join forces in common action. Bringing a fresh outlook with him, born of his experiences in Europe and America, it is no wonder that Moira took that view. And it is equally natural that his colleagues in the Council, who had known India longer and more intimately, should have disagreed with him in that opinion. They admitted that if the Indian States "combined, they must perhaps be accounted irresistible," but they pointed out to him in their reply to his minute of the 9th February, 1815,³ that their combination was difficult and highly improbable. The collision of their strongly conflicting interests and natural enmities would always prevent them from combining against the British. Before opening hostilities against the British, each State would fear the alliance of its rivals with the British against itself.⁴

When the Residents at the Courts of the Indian Princes acquainted them with the plans of taking Bhopal under British protection, the Peshwa expressed his utmost satisfaction,⁵ the Nizam was quite indifferent, and took no interest either way,⁶ "the minister, Chandoo-

1) As he wrote in a Letter to the Secret Committee of 26th Oct. 1814,—*Bengal Secret Letters*. Vol. 15. p. 407.

2) (a) Jenkins to Moira of 11th Dec. 1814. No. 11, in *Bengal Secret Consultations* of 3rd Jan. 1815.

(b) Resident with Sindhia's Despatch to Moira of 15th Jan. 1815. No. 29, of 7th Feb. 1815.

3) No. I. *Bengal Secret Consultations* of 21st March 1815.

4) Council's Minute to the Governor-General of 21st March No. 17. *Bengal Secret Consultations* of 21st March 1815.

5) Elphinstone to Moira of 18th Jan. No. 116. *Bengal Secret Consultations* of 5th. Feb. 1815: and see also, Moira's Letter to the Secret Committee of 11th Aug. 1815, paragraph 53.

6) Russell to Moira of 22nd Jan. 1815. No. 93. *Bengal Secret Consultations* of 26th Feb. 1815.

Lall, however, entered into the affair with the greatest zeal and cordiality."¹

Even the Raja of Nagpur, with his show of claims over Bhopal,² did not indicate greater dissatisfaction than was expected from his disappointed hopes and his sacrifices to Sindhia.³ He even agreed in a good humoured manner, to send clear orders to his general, Sadik Ali Khan, to withdraw his troops from Bhopal.⁴

The military preparations of the Company's Government must have alarmed the Indian Powers,⁵ and it can be imagined that if their traditional jealousy and perpetual distrust of each other had allowed, Sindhia, Holkar and Bhonsla would have agreed to unite in a defensive coalition against the British. When the financial and other distresses ⁶ of Holkar's Government led to the mission of its minister, Tantia Alekh, to Sindhia's Court,⁷ his ministers suggested that as an expedient policy an appearance, at least, of the union of the three States might be announced.⁸ But it seems that they could not make even a show of unity.⁹

1) Moira to the Secret Committee of 11th Aug. 1815, paragraph 55. The Resident at Hyderabad in his Letter to Moira, had reported also that his Communication to Chandu Lal, had been full and confidential regarding the British plans about Bhopal. (Also last Footnote.)

2) Raja's Paper showing his claims, received by the Resident on Jan. 15th. No. 38. Bengal Secret Consultations of 14th Feb. 1815. (See also Jenkins' Letter to Moira of 14th Dec. 1814. No. 14. Bengal Secret Consultations of 3rd Jan. 1815.)

3) Adam to Jenkins of 2nd Jan. 1815. No. 6. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th Feb. 1815, and also Moira to Secret Committee 11th Aug. 1815, paragraph 50.

4) Jenkins' Secret Letter to Moira of 21st Dec. 1814. No. 88. Bengal Secret Consultations of 10th Jan. 1815., and more particularly, his Letter to Adam of 24th Dec. 1814. No. 98. Bengal Secret Consultations of 6th June 1815, where Jenkins says:—"Nothing seems further from the thought of the Rajah at the present moment than any attempt to oppose our plans by force of arms."

5) For example—Jenkins' Letter to Moira of 16th April 1815. No. 127. Bengal Secret Consultations of 16th May 1815—chiefly paragraph 3.

6) Metcalfe to Adam. No. 31. Bengal Secret Consultations of 14th Feb. 1815.

7) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 1st March. No. 131. Bengal Secret Consultations of 21st March 1815.

8) *Ibid.*

9) Lord Moira, himself, reported in his Minute (11th Aug. 1815) to the Secret Committee that in the Bhonsla - Sindhia correspondence, each discouraged the other—(paragraph 46) and that the Sindhia - Holkar communications took no definite shape either. (Paragraph 47.)

Prinsep gives greater importance to this combination than it perhaps deserves. In his excellent narrative he declares, (Vol. 1. p. 245):—

"There was still reason to doubt that both these Courts (referring to Sindhia and Bhonsla) were heartily bent upon the combination, which accounts from every quarter, during the months of November, December and January, reported to be organising against British Power. Mahrattas, Putans, and Pindaries, seemed for the moment to have forgotten all their mutual jealousies, under the notion that the moment was near at hand, which would give the opportunity of a successful rise against our gallant superiority."

That this language is an over-statement of the situation can be gathered from the reports received during those months of November, December and January about the same Powers.

The threatening attitude adopted by Sindhia in resenting British intervention with Bhopal and the other Malwa Chiefs, amounted to little more than mere wordy indignation. Although he had refused to refrain from attacking Bhopal, when requested by the Resident, Sindhia took the first opportunity of quietly withdrawing his forces from that region.¹ A suitable occasion soon arose for this retirement. The two generals, Jaswant Rao Bhao and Jean Baptiste, fell out, owing to Baptiste's refusal to advance money for Jaswant Rao's disorderly troops.² The result was, that Baptiste attacked the latter and in an action that took place on the 18th November, 1814, Jaswant Rao was beaten, and forced to fly, losing many guns and leaving three hundred and fifty killed on the field. Chitu and Karim's party fought for Jaswant Rao in that battle.³

It is known, for instance, that the Pathan leader was applying for a Jagir under the British. (Adam to Metcalfe of 7th April 1815. No. 15. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May 1815.) And so were the two foremost Pindari Chiefs, Chitu and Namdar, to serve under the British. (Resident with Sindhia to Adam of 15th Feb. 1815. No. 58. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th March 1815.)

The Pindaris were still sharply divided amongst themselves, and the quarrel between Jaswant Rao and Baptiste, Sindhia's generals, drew Chitu to the former's side, and Dost Muhammad to that of the latter. Jaswant Rao and Chitu attacked one of Baptiste's posts at Tal, burned the town, and put the garrison to the sword. (Wauchope to Adam of 29th Dec. 1814. No. 97. Bengal Secret Consultations of 10th Jan. 1815.)

Then again, the Holkar-Sindhia relations were no better. Ram Din, a Holkar officer, was molesting Sindhia's territory. (Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 15th Jan. 1815. No. 29. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th Feb. 1815.) Far from joining in an anti-British confederacy, the Regent of Holkar's Government (Tulsi Bai), was making overtures to the British Government for a closer alliance, in order to free herself from the thralldom of Amir Khan. (Sydenham's Letter to the Resident at Hyderabad of 9th April. No. 123. Bengal Secret Consultations of 16th May 1815.)

From the Raja of Nagpur, according to the very reliable judgment of Jenkins:—"there was no fear of any armed opposition His Highness has given every proof that would have been expected, of his determination to avoid any measure calculated to give us offence He feels he is at our mercy He has no confidence in Sindhia's character and little in his own power." (His Letter to Secretary Adam of 24th Dec. 1814. No. 98. Bengal Secret Consultations of 6th June 1815.)

Moreover, Raghuji was bitter in his complaints against Sindhia's policy towards him. (Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 1st March 1815. No. 131. Bengal Secret Consultations of 21st March 1815.)

From all these facts, there appears to be a greater measure of truth in the view taken by Edmonstone, the Vice-President, and other members of the Council, who thought a combination amongst the Powers highly unlikely, certainly not of an offensive nature.

(Besides the Council Minute already referred to, see also Edmonstone's Minutes of 31st July, 1815 and 2nd Oct. 1815.) No. 2. Bengal Secret Consultations 7th Oct. 1815.

1) Prinsep, Vol. I. p. 251, also Sindhia's Letter to Moira of 6th Jan. 1815. No. 41. Bengal Secret Consultations of 24th Jan. 1815.

2) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 21st Nov. 1814. No. 113. Bengal Secret Consultations of 6th Dec. 1814.

3) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 3rd Dec. 1814. No. 86. Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th Dec. 1814., also from the same to Adam dated 26th Nov. 1814. Bengal Secret consultations of 13th Dec. 1814.

For some time Baptiste pursued Jaswant Rao towards Bhopal,¹ lingering for a while in that vicinity. During this time he received loyal communications from Wazir Muhammad,² and later withdrew towards Ujjain.³

Although he abandoned his plans against Bhopal, Sindhia, it is obvious, must have noticed the movements of the Company's forces with considerable apprehension. The alliance with Bhopal, proposed by the British Government, followed by military preparations, proved a signal of alarm for Daulat Rao Sindhia. His jealousy of the British was redoubled by these grand preparations,⁴ and although he did not make any effort to oppose the British by an open rupture, the two Governments thenceforward drew steadily apart. The British thought that war with Sindhia was "a contest not long to be avoided."⁵ Sindhia on his side, was affected in his attitude towards the Pindaris. Whatever might have been his former intentions against them, his reluctance against co-operating with the British in their suppression, must have increased after the incidents of the winter of 1814-1815. His general, Jean Baptiste, actually made efforts to bring the Pindaris under the control and discipline of the Maharaja's Government. Written engagements were concluded with their leaders to abstain from plunder; they were given lands, and were also required to maintain a body of horse attached to the Maharaja's army.⁶ These engagements conferred five, three and seven *mahals* on Chitu, Namdar Khan, and Muhammad Wasil Khan respectively. They were ratified by Daulat Rao in June.⁷ These measures of doubtful utility, were the only military preparations undertaken⁸ by Sindhia during the critical period of those discussions.⁹

1) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 3rd Dec. (in the last Footnote).

2) Wauchope to Adam of 25th Dec. 1814. No. 95. Bengal Secret Consultations of 10th Jan. 1815.

3) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 15th Jan. 1815. No. 29. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th Feb. 1815.

4) Prinsep - Vol. 1. p. 232.

5) As Moira wrote to the Secret Committee on 26th Oct. 1814, in *Bengal Secret Letters*. Vol. 15.

6) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 20th May 1815. No. 89. Bengal Secret Consultations of 6th June 1815.

7) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 13th June 1815. No. 75. Bengal Secret Consultations of 4th July 1815.

8) "No military preparations are going forward in this camp," reported the Resident at his Court to Moira on 16th Dec. 1814. No. 25. Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th Dec. 1814.

9) Except an order to Anand Rao, the Chief of cavalry in Baptiste's camp to increase his force. But the Resident who reported about it in his Letter to Lord Moira (last footnote) thought that it might have been with a view to collect Jaswant Rao's scattered fugitives and thus weaken the force of that rebellious commander.

During the months, November 1814 to March 1815, the two Governments were carrying on irritating negotiations about the control of Central India, and thousands of armed men were consequently assembling in the Deccan and Gujarat. Yet the ostensible cause which had provoked these events was silently disappearing from under their feet. Wazir Muhammad, the ruler of Bhopal, was biding his time, and playing off one rival against the other. By offering to accept British protection, he saved his small estate from an attack by the united forces of Sindhia and Raghuji. After Baptiste's withdrawal and Sadik Ali's diversion from Bhopal, he found that the immediate danger had been removed. He next wished to see if he could further save his own independence also by avoiding an alliance with the Company's Government. As the armies of the Maratha States were withdrawing, and those of the British Government were advancing, he kept in constant correspondence with the commanders of both the withdrawing and advancing armies. Even after Baptiste had definitely withdrawn from Bhopal, he negotiated with him. Lord Moira was informed of a ceremonious meeting between Wazir Muhammad and Baptiste, at which Wazir presented the latter with a horse and a Khilat.¹ News also arrived that he had accepted Baptiste's terms, and sent a Vakil to Sadik Ali Khan, the commander of the Berar forces.² While these secret communications were in progress, the Chief of Bhopal was keeping up an appearance of the utmost friendliness and loyalty towards the British. He addressed letters to the Residents at Delhi,³ and at Sindhia's Court,⁴ and also to Major-General Marshall,⁵ and Colonels Smith⁶ and Doveton.⁷ All these letters were replete with expressions of gratitude and attachment. He professed in every one

1) Wauchope to Adam of 25th Dec. 1814. No. 95. Bengal Secret Consultations of 10th Jan. 1815, also reported by the Resident with Sindhia to Moira dated 6th Jan. 1815. No. 41, Bengal Secret Consultations of 24th Jan. 1815. And his deputing an agent, Syed Inayet Massih, to Baptiste, was reported by Superintendent Political Affairs in Bundelkhand to Adam, 4th March 1815. No. 133. Bengal Secret Consultations of 21st March 1815.

2) Jenkins to Moira of 17th Jan. 1815. No. 37. Bengal Secret Consultations of 14th Feb. 1815.

3) Metcalfe to Adam of 26th March 1815. No. 52. Bengal Secret Consultations of 18th April 1815. Another Letter from his agent, Moulvi Nizam Udin, also contained the same sentiments as his master's.

4) Received on 25th Dec. 1814 by the Resident. No. 116. Bengal Secret Consultations of 10th Jan. 1815.

5) Letter from Wauchope to Adam of 4th March 1815. No. 133. Bengal Secret Consultations of 21st March 1815.

6) Elphinstone to Adam of 16th March 1815. No. 50. Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th April 1815.

7) Doveton to Jenkins of 13th March 1815. No. 100. Bengal Secret Consultations of 6th June 1815.

of them his great eagerness to become an ally and a dependent of the Company.

To Wauchope, Superintendent for Political Affairs at Banda, he wrote that he would send a Vakil to settle the terms of the treaty, after the remaining thirteen days of the month of mourning (*Ramsan*) were over.¹ But none was sent until the 18th March, or more than five weeks after the expiry of that month, and over four months after the receipt of Wauchope's first letter to him.²

In the meantime, Moira received reports of Wazir Muhammad's secret relations with Baptiste. This disgusted the Governor-General, who decided to put an end to those negotiations in which the British Government had been so insincerely treated.

On the 29th March, orders were issued to Wauchope to discontinue the discussion with Bhopal, whose ruler had acted in an indefensible manner. The Nawab's secret dealings with Baptiste after the removal of the immediate danger of the latter's attack, together with his repeated evasion and delay in sending a Vakil to Banda, naturally produced this result. The Vakil was to be told that the Governor-General was convinced that the Nawab had endeavoured to gain the favour of both sides by a double negotiation. The conduct of Wazir Muhammad Khan was summed up in these three words, "duplicity, insincerity and evasion." The Vakil was therefore to be dismissed after the assurance that no resentment or unfriendliness would be shown to his State. Wauchope was also told to receive any representation or explanation that the Vakil had to offer.³ As was expected, the Nawab renewed his requests with explanations of his delay in sending a Vakil. However, Moira saw no ground for modifying his former resolution, and the negotiations were broken off for the time being.⁴

The attempt to take Bhopal under British influence still appeared to Moira to be a sound and desirable policy. However, the Nawab's insincere attitude left him no option but to close the affair. The British had contested Sindhia's claim over the Nawab on the ground that he could not advance any evidence to prove that Bhopal was his tributary. "But this absence (of) testimony," wrote Moira,

1) Wauchope to Adam of 18th Feb. 1815. No. 60. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th March 1815.

2) All these dates were carefully examined by the Governor-General. (Adam to Wauchope, 18th April 1815. No. 19. Bengal Secret Consultations of 9th May 1815.)

3) Adam to Wauchope of 29th March 1815. No. 27. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May 1815.

4) Adam to Wauchope of 18th April. No. 19. Bengal Secret Consultations of 9th May 1815.

"was remedied by the Nabob of Bhopaul. In a paper delivered by him to Baptiste he acknowledged by implication Sindhia's rights over him, by stating that he had always faithfully discharged the military service which he owed to the Maharajah, thereby invalidating our argument of his owing no such duty."¹ It cannot be wondered at that after such a response from the Nawab, Moira decided to let matters stand on their former footing.

Whilst the Bhopal correspondence was proceeding, the Superintendent at Banda was conducting allied negotiations with the State of Saugor, of which Govind Rao was the nominal ruler. The real power was wielded by Binayak Rao, the manager. He had allied himself with Rukmini Bai, the widow of the late Nana Abba Sahib, who had held the chief authority since her husband's death.² At first the Nana, with whom the subject was opened, showed great eagerness to avail himself of British protection,³ but this was followed by dilatoriness and evasion.⁴ There were three chief points on which agreement could not be reached with the Nana. Firstly, he was unwilling to surrender lands in Mahoba province,⁵ adjoining British territory, to which Lord Moira attached a great importance.⁶ Secondly, he would not abstain from correspondence⁷ with all the other States (including the Peshwa). And lastly, the Nana desired that the British army should be available when required to uphold his authority within his State.⁸ It was felt that the Nana would not agree to the treaty, unless the manager were reduced or expelled.⁹ Wauchope sounded the manager separately,¹⁰ but his terms also were extravagant, and

1) Governor - General to Secret Committee dated 11th Aug. 1815. *Bengal Secret Letters*, Vol. 16, paragraph 65.

2) Wauchope to Adam of 26th Dec. 1814. No. 91. Bengal Secret Consultations of 17th Jan. 1815.

3) Wauchope to Adam of 22nd Oct. 1814. No. 30. Bengal Secret Consultations of 19th Nov. 1814.

4) From same to same of 30th Nov. 1814. No. 27. Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th Dec. 1814, also see from the same to same of 15th Dec. 1814. No. 16. Bengal Secret Consultations of 3rd Jan. 1815.

5) Same to same of 5th Dec. 1814. No. 30. Bengal Secret Consultations of 29th Dec. 1814, and also 15th Dec. 1814. Nos. 16 and 17. Bengal Secret Consultations of 3rd Jan. 1815.

6) Adam to Wauchope of 30th March 1815. No. 58. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May 1815.

7) Wauchope to Adam of 15th Dec. 1814. (*Op. Cit.*), and also same to same of 11th Jan. 1815. No. 43. Bengal Secret Consultations of 24th Jan. 1815.

8) *Ibid.* This object was described in these words:—"Intizam Amurat Mutalik Khangi," implying domestic management of Saugor.

9) Wauchope to Adam of 26th Dec. 1814. No. 91. Bengal Secret Consultations of 17th Jan. 1815.

10) *Ibid.*

therefore unacceptable to the British Government.¹ In these circumstances, Moira decided to give up his plan regarding Saugor also, particularly since there was no great advantage to be gained in pursuing it apart from the Bhopal alliance. Therefore, Wauchope was instructed not to proceed further.²

The decision was conveyed to the Residents with Sindhia,³ Bhonsla,⁴ and the Peshwa,⁵ who were directed to inform those Princes that owing to Wazir Muhammad's fickle conduct, the Governor-General had decided to withdraw from the arrangement. Nevertheless, the British claimed a perfect right to enter into negotiations with Bhopal and reserved full liberty to avail themselves of it, if it should be expedient in the future. Sindhia, in particular, was to be assured of the British desire to remain on friendly relations with him, but he was to be told quite clearly that the eighth article of the Treaty of 1805 could not be applied to Bhopal, which was not recognised as his tributary.

The crisis having thus subsided, Moira ordered the "grand army" of the Madras Government, which had assembled at Bellary under Sir Thomas Hislop,⁶ and the Gujarat force under Colonel Holmes,⁷ to retire to their ordinary stations from the advanced positions which they had taken up. All the extra staff appointed as a consequence of the assemblage of these forces, was to be reduced. The Mysore Silladars were also to be returned and the Karnul Regiment to be disbanded. Only the forces under Colonels Doveton and Smith were required to maintain their forward positions in the following monsoon.⁸ By the end of the spring, the threatening war-clouds which had hung so heavily over Central India in the winter months of 1814-15, began to disperse. Apparently, mutual confidence was restored, and normal relations resumed their course.

In the meantime, the information relative to the Bhopal-Saugor negotiations reached the authorities in England,⁹ who did not concur

1) Answers put down by Binayak Rao to the questions sent by Wauchope. No. 44. Bengal Secret Consultations of 24th Jan. 1815.

2) Adam to Wauchope of 30th March 1815. No. 58. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May 1815.

3) Adam to the Resident of 29th March 1815. No. 60. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May 1815.

4) Of same date No. 63. *Loc. Cit.*

5) Dated 30th March 1815. No. 70. *Loc. Cit.*

6) Moira to the Governor, Fort St. George, 30th March 1815. No. 67. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May, and also Moira to Hislop. No. 69. *Loc. Cit.*

7) Moira to the Governor, Bombay. No. 68. *Loc. Cit.*

8) Moira to the Governor, Fort St. George, 30th March No. 67. Bengal Secret Consultations of 2nd May 1815.

9) Moira's Despatch to the Court of Directors (also meant for the Secret Committee) of 26 Oct. 1814. *Bengal Secret Letters*. No. 15. p. 405 onwards.

with their Governor-General. They ascribed the preparations of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar, not so much to an intention of attacking Bhopal, as to the alarm caused by the movements of the British troops, and the rebellion amongst the followers of Sindhia himself. They declared plainly that if the engagements with Bhopal and Saugor had not been concluded, and "if the state of negotiations admit of it, we desire that no further steps may be taken for the purpose of concluding the engagement." Even if Sindhia and the Raja of Nagpur should be reconciled to these projects, they said, they did not favour them, and considered them as having a tendency to produce embarrassments, which it was their earnest wish to avoid.¹ On the receipt of these clear views of the Board of Control, Moira had no alternative but to carry out their declared wishes. He felt bound² to acquaint the Resident with Sindhia, of the new policy. Instructions were accordingly issued, and the Resident, Captain Close, was told that while he was not to make any gratuitous announcement (which would amount to an invitation to Sindhia to conquer Bhopal),³ he was to understand clearly that the policy of the British Government would be, not to interfere in any way between Sindhia or any other Power and Bhopal. He was to regulate his proceedings in conformity with that resolution.⁴

Another step, which Moira advocated in accordance with his political principles described in the last chapter, was the alliance with the Rajput State of Jaipur.⁵ To his mind, it had practically the same advantages, and it commended itself to Moira's favour in almost the same manner, as the other attempted alliances with Nagpur and Bhopal. In its many features, it particularly resembled the case of Bhopal, already discussed. And since it bears that family likeness to the Bhopal affair, its logical place is in this chapter, in spite of its belonging chronologically to a later time.⁶ It was expected that by taking Jaipur under British protection, the Company would derive in Western India the same strategic advantages that the Bhopal Treaty would have afforded them in Central India. The British troops could

1) Secret Committee to the Governor-General (*Board's Drafts* Vol. 5. Despatch No. 107 of 29th Sept. 1815.)

2) Governor-General's Minute of April 5th 1816. No. 13. Bengal Secret Consultations of 6th April 1816.

3) Moira's Minute, *Ibid.*

4) Adam to Close of 5th April 1816. No. 14. Bengal Secret Consultations of 6th April 1816.

5) Moira's Minute of 1st Dec. 1815, paragraph 152 and again paragraphs 276 and 347. *Op. Cit.* (Chaps. 1 and 2.)

6) Bhopal Negotiations already discussed were broken off in April 1815. Jaipur Negotiations were begun in April 1816.

advance westward up to Ajmer and southward to the vicinity of Bundi without having to seek the leave of any foreign Power.¹ The territory and resources of Jaipur would thus be rendered available for supplies, and the co-operation of the Bombay and Bengal armies would be facilitated.² Valuable advantages would be reaped in the facility of attacking the territories of Sindhia and Holkar,³ and protecting those of the other Rajput States.⁴

Moreover, the Company's Government was not restrained by any treaty from extending their alliance to Jaipur.⁵

The Treaty concluded with Jaipur in 1803 by Wellesley had been denounced in 1806 under Sir George Barlow's orders, in spite of the warm protests of Lord Lake, then Commander-in-Chief of India.⁶ The justice of that step, especially in view of the fact that the Jaipur Government, on Lake's testimony, had rendered very willing help to Major-General Jones' force,⁷ had been considered "extremely questionable."⁸ On these grounds, the Secret Committee, after considering the matter, directed their Government in India to enter into a subsidiary engagement with Jaipur.⁹ That order arrived in Bengal in June 1814. The Government was then engaged in a general discussion of political relations, and of the best mode of meeting the menace of the Pindaris. That reason, combined with the entanglements arising out of the Nepal War, led to the postponement of the execution of this alliance to a later date, as part of a more comprehensive scheme dealing with the situation as a whole.¹⁰ This postponement was approved by the authorities in England.¹¹

At the end of 1815, when the War with Nepal was drawing to a close, and Moira's views had taken a more decided and final form, he urged the adoption of the plan of the Jaipur alliance. As it happened, the Maharaja of Jaipur, at that very time, renewed his request for the formation of that alliance.¹² His earnest requests were

1) Lord Moira's long Minute of 1st Dec. 1815, para. 302.

2) *Loc. Cit.* Paragraph 152.

3) *Loc. Cit.* Paragraph 302.

4) *Loc. Cit.* Paragraph 304.

5) *Loc. Cit.* Paragraph 288.

6) Malcolm's *Political History*. Vol. 1. p. 369.

7) *Ibid.*

8) Letter of Court of Directors, of 2nd Sept. 1807.

9) Secret Committee's Despatch of 23rd Dec. 1813. (*Board's Drafts*.)

10) Prinsep. *Op. Cit.* Vol. 1. p. 370.

11) *Board's Drafts*, Secret Committee to Governor-General-in-Council. No. 104. of 19th May 1815.

12) His Letters to Moira received on 15th Dec. 1815. Nos. 58, 59 and 60. Bengal Secret Consultations of 19th March 1816. He deputed Rai Ram Singh to convey his wishes to the Governor-General. Another letter was received on 15th March 1816. No. 61. Bengal Secret Consultations of 19th March 1816, expressing the same sentiments.

occasioned by the return of Amir Khan to Jaipur on a round of his usual extortions. The ex-minister,¹ who had lost power in the State, intrigued with the Pathan leader, inviting his aid to regain his position. Amir Khan took advantage of the internal dissensions of Jaipur, to advance against the capital, and lay siege to it. The Jaipur army resisted the attack with great pertinacity.²

Moirra strongly wished to seize the opportunity of Jaipur's difficulties to open negotiations with that Government. The occasion was most opportune, since both parties were willing. "The political interest which turns on the fate of Jaipur is very important."³ It was not only important, but very urgent. "The matter requires immediate decision. If we are to act at all for the rescue of Jaipur, we must act instantly, for it is on the brink of perdition. There is no time for asking orders from home."⁴ In these words, Moirra showed his anxiety to conclude the agreement with Jaipur before the strength of that State was added to that of Amir Khan, "which was better composed, higher disciplined, and more fashioned to service than is professed by any other Chieftain in India." Moirra did not fear a union between Amir Khan and Sindhia; he regarded the British strength as ample against their combination. But he thought it highly unlikely that Sindhia would oppose the British plans about Jaipur.⁵ The question was fully discussed at the Council Board. Moirra's colleagues did not all fall in with his views on that important question. The Vice-President, Edmonstone, recorded his dissent on the ground that the alliance was not a necessary step for the suppression of the Pindaris.⁶ Since the Governor-General desired it to pave the way for a general scheme for the revision of political relations, he (Edmonstone) felt bound to oppose its immediate adoption. In his view, that matter came by implication under the spirit of the orders of the Secret Committee, which clearly laid down that their affairs were "to be maintained in the same relative state under which our possessions have, now for ten years, continued in a state of tranquillity."⁷ Edmonstone thought that the Jaipur question could not be raised without disturbing the

1) Rai Chaturbhuj approached Amir Khan to remove Manji Das from the ministry (pp. 447-448, *Memoirs of Amir Khan*.)

2) *Loc. Cit.* pp. 449-453.

3) Moirra's Minute of 13th April 1816, paragraph 24. No. 1. Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th April 1816.

4) *Loc. Cit.* Paragraph 23.

5) *Ibid.*

6) Who were, he urged, to be distinguished from the Pathans under Amir Khan.

7) Of 29th Sept. 1815. (No. 107. *Board's Drafts*. Vol. 5.)

system which it was desired to maintain.¹ With this view another member, Dowdeswell, agreed in thinking that Moira's plans were opposed to the policy of the Court of Directors. Seton, although he had opposed the Jaipur alliance in 1814, changed his mind in 1816.² He saw that the conditions had altered, and since no danger was to be feared from the side of Nagpur,³ since acute internal dissensions were threatening Jaipur at the moment (in 1816), and since the Pindari evil had been greatly aggravated, he emphatically supported Moira.⁴

After a sharp discussion, Moira's view was carried by a majority vote, and it was forthwith decided to entertain the overtures of the Maharaja of Jaipur. Metcalfe, the British Resident at Delhi, who had also received solicitations from that Court, was entrusted with this important duty. He was fully acquainted with the principles on which the agreement with the Jaipur Government was to be concluded. A subsidiary force was to be established in the State, the expenses of which (in whole or part) were to be met by that State. The external relations of Jaipur were to be controlled by the British Government, excluding all foreign influence or authority. The military power and resources of the State were to be at the disposal of the British Power, to be utilised for all purposes connected with the Alliance, and the welfare of the two States. The Jaipur Raj was to maintain a contingent of horse, to be disciplined by British officers, and open to occasional inspection and muster by British authorities. Exclusive of the stipulated contingent, the Maharaja's Government was to engage to bring forward his whole military force and employ all the resources of his country in case of a joint war. Provision was to be made that all questions arising between Jaipur and other States, embracing Sindhia's and Holkar's claims to tribute, were to be referred to the arbitration and award of the British Government. And lastly, a fort, conveniently situated, was to be demanded from the Jaipur Durbar to be used as a depot for the supplies of the British force.

On its part, the British Government was to agree to defend Jaipur against all enemies, foreign and domestic, to guarantee its integrity and the independence of its Government, and to afford the aid of British troops in restoring the Maharaja's just authority in case

1) Edmonstone's Minute of 16th April 1816. No. 2. Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th April 1816.

2) His Minute of 17th April 1816. No. 3. Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th April 1816.

3) Subsidiary alliance with that State which was unsuccessfully attempted in 1814, was then being favourably negotiated with the Regent, (the Raja having expired) and was concluded in May 1816. (Next Chapter.)

4) Seton's Minute of 17th April 1816. No. 3. Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th April 1816.

of rebellion. He was to be assured that the British Government would exercise no interference in his internal administration, nor in any way interpose between him and his subjects, except at his express desire.

The strength of the Subsidiary force, would, it was suggested, consist of six battalions of Infantry, two regiments of Cavalry, and a field train with suitable strength of artillerymen. The right to increase the Force was to be retained, but the Raja of Jaipur would not have to bear the extra expense.

These were the principles which were enunciated for the guidance of the Resident at Delhi, who enjoyed the full confidence of the Supreme Government, and was therefore given ample discretion to settle the details of the treaty including the amount of subsidy to be charged.¹

The negotiations with Jaipur to which Moira attached so much importance, were to be adequately supported by military preparations. A strong force at each of the two stations, Rewari and Muttra, on the frontiers of Jaipur, was to be posted, fully equipped and ready to enter into Jaipur. The troops at these two places were to number no less than 18,000 effective fighting men, placed under the command of Sir David Ochterlony and Major-General Marshall respectively. A reserve corps was to be formed at Cawnpore, to act as a check on Sindhia, and if necessary, to take the offensive against his possessions in that region. Sir John Horsford was appointed an extra Major-General on the Field Staff, and placed in charge of the force at Cawnpore.² The subsidiary forces of Poona, Hyderabad, Baroda and Nagpur, were to be kept in readiness for action and to be moved forward. A strong force was to be assembled in Bundelkhand thus connecting up the whole line of defence right across the country. Besides this, the frontiers were to be strongly guarded, both on the Punjab side (at Karnaul and Firuzpur) by the contingents of the Chiefs of Dadi and Firuzpur, and on the Gujarat side by the Bombay army. The strength of the fighting forces which were to assemble at all these places, Muttra, Rewari, Cawnpore, Bundelkhand, Jalna, Ellichpur, Hushangabad, and in Gujarat, came to roughly 40,000 Infantry, 12,000 Cavalry and appropriate artillerymen, exclusive of the contingents of

1) The instructions issued to Metcalfe embodied the principles, on which the Treaty was to be concluded. Secretary Adam's "most secret" Despatch to him, 20th April. No. 6. Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th April 1816.

2) Governor-General's Minute of 5th June 1816. No. 5. Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th June 1816, contains these proposals, which were adopted by the Council and executed accordingly.

the States of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dadi and Firuzpur, the rulers of which were also to be invited to co-operate with the British Army.¹

While these grand arrangements were ordered, and great expectations were entertained of extending British influence in Western India, it became apparent, soon after the negotiations had been opened, that the Jaipur Government was not so keen to seek British protection, as it had been when the first offer was made.² The history of the previous year was repeating itself, and Bhopal experience was reproduced in many ways. As has been already noticed, the two were remarkably alike. Not only were Moira's motives similar with regard to Bhopal and Jaipur, but the conduct of these States and their dealings with the British Government also resembled each other. Bhopal's duplicity played Sindhia against the British. Jaipur used the same tactics with Amir Khan. The Maharaja's Government sought help from Sindhia³ against the immediate danger of the Pathan Chief, at the same time using the show of British alliance for the same purpose. Moreover, concurrently with the conversations at Delhi between the British Resident and Maharaja Jagat Singh's agents, overtures were made to Amir Khan, dissuading him from molesting the country.⁴ The British attempt to bring Jaipur within the sphere of its political influence had the same result as the attempted alliances with Bhopal and Saugor. The engagement did not come about in 1816.

The one point in which the Jaipur case differed from that of Bhopal was that Sindhia, although his political and material interests were affected in the same manner, could not object to British interference in Jaipur. It was feared that he would claim his right to collect tribute from the latter State. But he could not invoke any provisions of the standing engagements between his State and the

1) These military arrangements were explained to Metcalfe in the Despatch to him of 20th April, already referred to; also in Moira's Minute of 5th June, (last footnote) and in the Despatches addressed on 20th April 1816 to Sir D. Ochterlony, No. 7, to the Adjutant-General, No. 8, to Resident with Sindhia, No. 9, Resident at Nagpur, No. 10, Resident at Poona, No. 11, Resident at Hyderabad, No. 12, Governor of Fort St. George, No. 13, Governor of Bombay, No. 14, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th April 1816. The figures as reported by the Governor-General to the Court of Directors, for the different arms of the British forces to be mobilised on this occasion were:—6 Troops of Horse Artillery, 3 Regiments of European Dragoons, 13 Regiments of N. Cavalry, 4 Companies of Independent Cavalry, 7 Battalions of European Infantry, 41 Battalions of Native Infantry. (Despatch of 28th Sept. 1816) also Prinsep *Op. Cit.* Vol. 1. pp. 374-5.

2) Metcalfe to Resident with Sindhia of 26th May 1816. No. 8. Bengal Secret Consultations of 15th June 1816.

3) Resident with Sindhia to Moira of 22nd May 1816. No. 28. Bengal Secret Consultations, June 11th 1816.

4) Metcalfe to Adam. 19th Aug. No. 7. Bengal Secret Consultations of Sept. 7th 1816.

British, which could restrict the latter's freedom to treat with Jaipur. The Treaty with that State was dissolved in 1806, while the engagement with Sindhia had been concluded in 1805. The British Government could not, therefore, be restricted from renewing the relation which subsisted between it and Jaipur at the time, and after the conclusion of the Treaty with Sindhia.¹ Sindhia's jealousy of the British and his alarm must of course have been increased by the attempt to establish their authority over Jaipur, but no open attempt at obstructing the British plans in that quarter was apprehended.² Not only was it impossible to urge any plea of violated agreement, but the general condition of Sindhia's Government, and of his political relations, also made it highly unlikely that he would attempt a conflict with the British.³

When entreated by the Maharaja of Jaipur, Sindhia sent a small force⁴ to act under Bapu Sindhia, with the object of rescuing Jaipur from the extortion and oppression of Amir Khan.⁵

While the Pathans were besieging Jaipur, the Maharaja's Vakils were engaged, with a great show of earnestness, in conducting negotiations with Metcalfe. After prolonged discussions which lasted several weeks, the parties arrived at an agreement on the terms, and proceeded to draw up a treaty. The amount of the subsidy formed a subject of keen dispute and controversy. Metcalfe demanded twenty-five lakhs as the annual charge. The Maharaja's Vakils said that their State could not afford more than two and a half lakhs of rupees. The Resident offered to accept fifteen lakhs as the permanent annual amount, and to admit reduction of it for the first few years. It was then agreed that there should be no demand for the first year, five lakhs each for the second and third years, ten lakhs for each of the

1) Adam to Resident with Sindhia of 20th April 1816. No. 9, in Bengal Secret Consultations of 20th April 1816.

2) Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 22nd May 1816. No. 28. Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th June 1816.

3) This was Moira's opinion, and also that of the Resident at Sindhia's Court. Governor-General's Minute of 5th June 1816, Adam's Despatch to Metcalfe of 20th April 1816, Adam to Resident with Sindhia, 20th April, and the latter's Despatch to Moira, (last footnote).

4) Bapu Sindhia had with him 3,000 men, to which were to be added the contingents of the other Commander, son of Hindaul Khan, 2,000 men. Jaswant Rao was ordered to join Bapu with his force of 3,000 men. Sindhia sent from his camp a body of 1,500, bringing the total to 9,500. (Resident with Sindhia to Moira 22nd May. No. 28. Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th June 1816.)

5) It was feared, however, that Bapu Sindhia and Amir Khan had an understanding between themselves, since they maintained Vakils at each others' camps, and that therefore Bapu might not act effectively against Amir. (Resident with Sindhia to Moira, of 9th May 1816. No. 32. Bengal Secret Consultations 25th May 1816. and 2nd May 1816. No. 28. Bengal Secret Consultations of 11th June 1816.)

next five years, and fifteen lakhs thereafter.¹ On renewed representations, the amount for the fourth and fifth years was further reduced by two lakhs. When no apparent obstacle remained to hinder the immediate conclusion of the treaty, the representatives of Jaipur demanded the provinces of Rampura and Tonk, which had formerly belonged to Jaipur, and were then in Amir Khan's possession.² The Resident naturally rejected this demand, and consequently, the negotiations were broken off. A party at the Jaipur Court was opposed to British connection, and its influence, in Metcalfe's opinion, brought about that attitude on the part of the Jaipur Government.³

That party was further strengthened in its confidence by the success with which the Jaipur forces were able to harass Amir Khan. Even after maintaining a persistent offensive against the capital of the State, he did not succeed in reducing it, and was compelled to raise the siege and retire from Jaipur.⁴ With that event came the much needed and desired relief for Jaipur State. But it was found that the Maharaja's Government continued to negotiate with the Pathan Chief and Bapu Sindhia, even after the former's withdrawal.

Realising that Jaipur Durbar was no longer in earnest about its alliance with the British Government, Metcalfe did not wish to protract the negotiations. He discontinued the conferences with the Jaipur Vakils, and requested Major-General Marshall to reduce the military establishment.⁵

The Maharaja of Jaipur again expressed a desire to form an alliance,⁶ and negotiations were renewed in November with the arrival of the agents from Jaipur. Some difficulty arose on the question of referring all disputes to British arbitration and award. The Jaipur

1) Private Correspondence, Metcalfe to Adam. 3rd July. No. 3. Bengal Secret Consultations 3rd Aug. 1816.

2) *Loo. Cit.* Metcalfe to Adam. 7th July 1816.

3) Metcalfe to Adam. 7th Aug. No. 5. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th Sept. 1816.

4) *Ibid.* His decision to withdraw might have been due also to the fear of Ochterlony's Division moving against him, and he might have feared the loss of his 200 cannon. Amir himself, found an excuse, as he gave it, in the request that the Rani (Maharaja Jagat Singh's wife, and the daughter of Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur, Amir Khan's friend and patron) addressed him not to destroy her State. Similar instruction was also issued to him by Tulsi Bai. (*Memoirs of Amir Khan*—pp. 449-53.)

5) The negotiations were begun in May (Resident's Despatch 26th May. No. 7. Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th June 1816.) Amir Khan withdrew his forces in July (3rd July 1816. No. 3. Bengal Secret Consultations 3rd Aug. 1816) and negotiations were broken off in August (19th Aug. No. 7. Bengal Secret Consultations of 7th Sept.) These negotiations were also reported to the Court of Directors in Governor-General's Letter of 28th Sept. 1816.

6) His Letters to the Governor-General and Edmonstone. Nos. 17 and 18. Bengal Secret Consultations 18th Oct. 1816.

Vakils suspected that the British Government might thereby acquire the claim of adjudicating on the right of the Maharaja, Jagat Singh, to his throne, more especially since there was a rival claimant living. When Metcalfe had cleared up this misunderstanding, negotiations finally broke down on the question of the ratification of the treaty.¹

Thus ended another great measure by which Lord Moira attempted to improve the political relations of the Company's Government with a view to bringing about its ascendancy in the councils of the Indian States, and enabling it to suppress all predatory bodies.

With that single end before him, he endeavoured to effect subsidiary alliances with the Raja of Berar, with the Nawab of Bhopal, with the Nana of Saugor, and with the Maharaja of Jaipur. All those successive attempts failed one after the other, and the projected engagements could not be concluded. The indifference manifested by those States to a closer union with the British Power was attributable to "the general reluctance felt by the petty independent Princes to make any indissoluble alliance on terms calculated to interfere with the unrestrained latitude of political action they had hitherto enjoyed."² This was as true of Nagpur and Jaipur as it was of Bhopal and Saugor. They realised fully that an alliance with the Company involved a character of helpless dependence on its Government, and consequently it was not palatable to them.

It has been seen how the first steps taken by Moira in pursuance of his own outlook failed, and also, why they failed. Yet these attempts were not entirely without result. While it is true that the desired treaties were not effected, and that the British political influence could not be authoritatively established in the regions of the Narbada and the Chambal, one must not, however, overlook the fact that the diplomatic efforts which were made, produced indirect results of considerable significance. Bhopal was saved from possible destruction at the hands of Sindhia and Raghuji, and these Powers were arrested from carrying their aggressions further into Central India. But more than even that was the important moral effect produced by those events. It became quite evident that the British Government was no longer willing to remain behind the "Ring Fence" which it had set up in the time of Barlow and Cornwallis in 1805 and 1806. It had abandoned that position, and was vigilant and ambitious, ready to advance to those positions, where dissensions called for settlement and disorders needed suppression.

1) Metcalfe to Adam, of 27th Nov. No. 2. Bengal Secret Consultations 17th Dec. 1816.

2) Prinsep. *Op. Cit.* vol. 1. p. 378.

Of course this change of attitude was disquieting to all the independent Sovereigns, particularly to Sindbia. Their interests and those of the British Government at that time of its undoubted predominance but unacknowledged supremacy, were not wholly consistent. This incongruity and clash of interests became more clearly emphasised by these events.

The controlling authority in England, the Board of Control, was still closely wedded to its old policy of maintaining the existing relations. They reminded the Governor-General that they were against "undertaking extensive operations with the view of remodelling our political relations and extending our influence or control.....We feel it, therefore, necessary to repeat our injunction against the formation of new Alliances without our previous sanction." They did not favour any extended system of alliances with the Rajput States, and even with Nagpur they preferred "an ordinary defensive Alliance" to the permanent establishment of a Subsidiary Force in the Raja's dominions.¹ Though the Board were not converted to Moira's views, the accounts of the vigorous measures pursued in India must have prepared them for the inevitable change which was destined to come, and which Moira was eager to bring about. On these grounds, the events narrated in this chapter are more correctly a record of political preparation than one of political failure.

Within his own Council, Moira's difficulty was partially reduced by the change of views in Seton's mind, thus enabling the Governor-General to carry his projects against the powerful and deliberate opposition of his able Vice-President, Edmonstone.

After more than ten years of break and reaction following Wellesley's period, Moira could not be expected to start building where his great predecessor had left off. The first two years and a half were naturally occupied with these attempts, which certainly succeeded in preparing the ground for his measures in warning the Indian Princes, in trying to convert his employers in England and his colleagues at Calcutta, and in infusing a new spirit into the political outlook of the Bengal Government.

1) Despatch of the Secret Committee to Governor-General of 5th Sept. 1816. No. 118. *Board's Drafts*.

CHAPTER IV

POONA AND NAGPUR

ADVANCE

MARATHA POWER - PESHWASHIP - A CENTRE OF ATTACHMENT - BAJI RAO - CHARACTER - CONFLICTING QUALITIES - DISTRACTED STATE OF HIS COUNTRY IN 1803 - USES BRITISH ALLIANCE TO RESTORE HIS AUTHORITY AND STABILISE HIS GOVERNMENT - ELPHINSTONE APPOINTED RESIDENT - SOUTHERN JAGIRDARS - SETTLEMENT (1812) - PESHWA FORMS A CONTINGENT - TRIMBAKJI DANGLIA - POONA - BARODA DISCUSSIONS - SHASTRI'S MISSION - SHASTRI'S MURDER - RESIDENT DEMANDS ENQUIRY - TRIAL AND SURRENDER OF DANGLIA - PESHWA'S EVASION - SECRET PREPARATION - INDECISION - SUBMISSION - TRIMBAKJI DELIVERED - CONFINED - NAGPUR - RAGHUJI BHONSLA'S DEATH - PARSOJI SUCCEEDS - HIS INFIRMITY - INTRIGUES FOR REGENCY BETWEEN THE DOWAGER BAI AND APPA SAHIB - APPA SAHIB SEEKS BRITISH SUPPORT - COURT INTRIGUES - ATTEMPT AT RECONCILIATION - FAILURE - APPA SAHIB SEIZES POWER - SECRETLY CONCLUDES SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE WITH THE BRITISH - TREATY - TERMS - FORCE ARRIVES - BRITISH POSITION AT NAGPUR - POONA - TRIMBAKJI ESCAPES - RESIDENT'S PROMPT MEASURES - PESHWA'S OUTWARD FRIENDLINESS - DANGLIA ASSEMBLES FORCES - RAISES A REBELLION - PESHWA'S SECRET ENCOURAGEMENT - GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S INSTRUCTIONS - SECURITIES TO BE DEMANDED FROM PESHWA AFTER TRIMBAKJI'S UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER - PESHWA'S HESITATION AND COWARDICE - YIELDS - TERMS DISCLOSED - REPUGNANCE - SUBMISSION TO DEMANDS - NEW TREATY SIGNED - CONCLUSION.

CHAPTER IV

AFFAIRS AT POONA AND NAGPUR

At the time that Moira was striving to establish the supremacy of his Government over the Indian States, it became abundantly clear to him that the greatest rivalry to the British Power was to be expected from the Marathas. The ancient Rajput Kingdoms were in a distressed condition. The Muhammedans, though bold and turbulent, had become too indolent to be dangerous. The Power that had successfully organised itself as a menace to the Great Mughal Empire, being the youngest and freshest in the field, was still active, vigorous and restless.¹

This factor gives to the Treaty of Bassein its great importance. By it Wellesley aimed a blow at the very centre of the Maratha Confederacy. The Peshwa, its ostensible head, was reduced to the position of a dependent on the British Government, and expressly forbidden to deal directly with Foreign States. Thus the other branches of the Maratha Confederacy were boldly separated from the centre, and formally released from the Peshwa's authority.² While he was obliged by circumstances to accept those terms out of a sense of self-preservation,³ it is evident that he could not have liked or welcomed the restrictions they imposed upon his independence.⁴ Not only was the British control of the Peshwa's foreign affairs irksome to him, but the Maratha Chiefs themselves were attached to the Peshwa's Masnad, and partly by policy but largely by habit, were "constantly professing their devotion to His Highness and pressing to acknowledge him for their sovereign."⁵

1) Malcolm's views on this in his letter to Lord Moira d. 17th July, 1817, reproduced in his "*Political History of India*" Vol. II, Appendix No. IV, page clxi, he writes:—"We shall complain most of our Mahomedan Allies; we shall suffer most from the Mahrattas." For Elphinstone's opinion, see Colebrooke's "*Life of Elphinstone*," Vol. I, p. 292. Metcalfe's views have already been noticed in Chapter 11.

2) Articles 12, 13, 14 and 17 of the Treaty of Bassein, Aitchison, Vol. VI. pp. 55-7 (1909 Ed.) and Grant-Duff *Op. Cit.* (1912) Vol. III, p. 208 and pp. 224-6.

3) Malcolm: *Political History of India*, I, p. 466.

4) Elphinstone's letter to Moira d. 20th Nov. 1815, No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultation 30th Dec. 1815, and also Grant-Duff *Op. Cit.* III, p. 226.

5) Elphinstone to Moira 20th Nov. 1815, *Loc. Cit.*

Such was the importance still attached to the position of the Peshwa in the eyes of the people and the Princes of India, in spite of the paper provisions of the Treaty.¹ "The state of our relations to the Peshwa has always been much influenced by His Highness's personal character, and it might be interesting to speculate on the form they might assume if the numerous claims and pretensions of this Government were to fall into the hands of an active and warlike Peshwa, who would attend to the improvement of his army, conciliate his Jagirdars, and encourage the former great feudatories of the Empire to look on him as their Chief. It is obvious that in the present state of India, there are fine materials for a powerful confederacy under such a leader; but he must be an extraordinary genius, who could start up with such a character from the midst of a long peace and a Brahmin education."² In the above extract we have from the pen of a distinguished Anglo-Indian statesman, who was, during the eventful years 1811-1817, the British Minister at the Poona Court, a picture of the Peshwa's position in the country, and the possibilities that lay before an enterprising and able occupant of that position. Baji Rao filled that Gadi at that time, and it is obviously a matter of considerable interest to the student of this period to estimate the character of the man who was placed in that exalted position.

According to the accounts left by contemporary writers and diplomats, who had opportunities of judging Baji Rao and his actions,³ his character must have been a curious combination of opposing attributes, perplexing those who desired to study his sentiments or foresee his conduct. He possessed many qualities which were wholly inconsistent with "his ruling passion of fear." But for his timidity, he would have been "ambitious, imperious, inflexible and persevering, and his active propensities would probably have overcome his love of ease and pleasure, which are now so strong, from their alliance with

1) This is evidenced by the desire, for example, of Appa Sahib to receive his robes of investiture from the Peshwa in 1816, and again in 1817, of the Nana of Saugor to be allowed to maintain his correspondence with the Peshwa. of the Gaekwar (as shown by Elphinstone in his letter of 20th Nov. 1816) to adhere to those forms of allegiance to the Peshwa, although his interests suffered by doing that, and finally Sindhia, in spite of his being independent and comparatively speaking superior in strength, always addressed to the Peshwa messages in which he made a show of compliance to his orders. Sir J. Malcolm speaks of them as "Mahratha Princes and Chiefs, who were before nominally subject to his power, and who still recognised him, in all forms and public acts, as the head of the nation." His *Political History*, Vol. 1, p. 467.

2) Elphinstone to Moira, in his letter of 20th Nov., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Dec. 1816.

3) Such as Sir John Malcolm, Captain Grant-Duff, Prinsep, and the Hon. M. Elphinstone. The account of the last-named gentleman was based on close personal observation and has been relied upon in the brief sketch given here. All the accounts agree in their general tenor.

his timidity." Eager for power, although lacking in boldness to acquire it, tenacious of authority, though too indolent to exercise it, master of the art of dissimulation, vigilant and vindictive, suspicious and insincere, Baji Rao was not found to be unmixed and pure in anything. He was capricious and changeable, yet showed steadiness in serious designs. Nothing was too low or too crooked, if it satisfied his purpose, or was necessary to ruin the object of his vengeance. His haughty and overbearing nature made him fond of low favourites. He was proud and lofty, but when occasion so required, he could be mean and cringing. His time was divided between fasts, prayers and pilgrimages conducted, as Elphinstone says, with slavish superstition, and scenes of the most disgusting debauchery and coarsest buffoonery.

Against these vices, the Peshwa possessed considerable ability, and was "scrupulously just in pecuniary transactions." Humane, frugal, courteous, and dignified in his manners, he devoted considerable sums of money to public and charitable objects. He was in "a great measure his own minister" and showed considerable ability and statecraft in restoring the government of his country, and in strengthening the central power against the disturbing and rebellious feudatories of his extensive dominions. He smarted under the oppressive alliance with the British, which took away his independence and political prestige. A person such as Baji Rao, could not but have a general distrust of others, and nobody could trust him.¹

Such was the character of the person who had been driven out of Poona by Jaswant Rao Holkar in October 1802,² and whom the British had restored to the Peshwaship on 18th May, 1803, after the Treaty of Subsidiary Alliance had been concluded on 31st December at Bassein.

However unpalatable this dependence on his new allies might have been, Baji Rao utilised it to consolidate his power and the authority of his Government. At the time of his restoration, he took over the charge of a Kingdom which was only "a dreary waste, overrun by thieves,"³ over which he had nothing but nominal control. Gujarat and Konkan were the only parts of his territory which were at all settled, and even they were under subedars who disregarded his orders and assumed absolute powers. Even the country along the Bhima—about five miles from Poona—was subject to these ravages.⁴ His

1) Elphinstone's Despatch to Moira of the 20th Nov. 1815, *Op. Cit.* also Malcolm's *Political History* Vol. I, 468. Grant-Duff (1912 edition) *Op. Cit.* III, Chap. XVI, and Wilson *Op. Cit.* II, pp. 148-9.

2) Grant-Duff; Vol. III, pp. 206-8, and 226-31.

3) The unsettled condition of the country was described by Arthur Wellesley to Marquis of Wellesley, the Governor-General, in a letter d. 15th Jan. 1804. (*Wellesley Despatches*: 1837 Edition, Vol. II. p. 673.)

4) *Ibid.*

authority was scarcely known south of the Krishna. "Nobody would rent the lands round Poona, because, being near the seat of government, they were liable to disturbances which His Highness was too weak to restrain." The Forts of Lohagarh and Purandhar were held by rebels. "His Highness was destitute of either power or wealth,"¹

Situated as he was, it was neither his interest nor his desire to throw off the alliance which had supported him against his victorious enemies. He devoted his energies to settling his country and restoring order in his administration. He began by reducing the weaker Jagirdars who were unable to resist him, confiscating the lands of the refractory among them. At the same time, he gradually drew the whole power of the State into his own hands.² The Treaty of Bassein included a provision that the Subsidiary Force was to be available "for the overawing and chastisement of the rebels,"³ and the Peshwa always relied on the assistance of this force in his designs against his recalcitrant nobles.

In 1810, Mountstuart Elphinstone was appointed Resident at the Peshwa's Court, where he arrived in the following year. "When Mr. Elphinstone returned to Poona in 1811, he noticed a marked change in the condition of the country, and the authority of the Prince was gradually restored throughout the territory under his immediate administration."⁴

When Baji Rao had completed the confiscations of the minor nobles and put his authority on a somewhat more secure basis, he looked abroad and contemplated the reduction of the Southern Jagirdars,⁵ an object very near his heart indeed. He further repeated his claims on the Gaekwar and the Nizam, and asserted sovereignty over the territories in Hindustan and also over Sindhia, Holkar and Berar. The Peshwa artfully put forward these pretensions but never showed any keenness to bring them up to a speedy settlement.⁶

His relation with the powerful Southern Jagirdars, was, however, a matter which the British Government was not prepared to leave either to be settled by the Peshwa according to his own free

1) Another description of the chaotic condition of the Peshwa's country at the same time:—letter of Sir B. Close to Governor-General Wellesley, 18th Dec. 1803, quoted by Elphinstone in his letter to Moira, 20th Nov. 1815, in Bengal Secret Consultations No. 19, 30th Dec. 1815.

2) Elphinstone's Despatch to Moira of 20th Nov. 1815. *Loc. Cit.*

3) Art. 9 of the Treaty. (Aitchison, *Op. Cit.* Vol. VI. p. 54, 1909 Ed.)

4) Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I, p. 246, also Malcolm *Political History*, I. 466.

5) Greater Jagirdars, "particularly the Putwurdhuns, Rastia and the Dessaye of Kittoor." Grant-Duff Vol. III, p. 348.

6) Grant-Duff *Op. Cit.* Vol. III, p. 356 and Prinsep *Op. Cit.* Vol. I, pp. 276-7.

will, or to remain as an open source of trouble and civil strife. It was a thorny issue. Those Jagirdars were, as a class, useful to the country, which, according to Elphinstone,¹ would have been thrown into confusion by their destruction. Moreover, they had loyally fought² with the Duke of Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley), and the British Government could not stand by and see them wiped out by their vindictive Sovereign. At the same time, it would have been obviously unjust to encourage them to flout the Peshwa's authority, or assume independence from his control.

Minto's Government again went into the whole question and decided to settle it by direct intervention. Elphinstone made minute enquiries into the matter, examining their tenures, and the origins of their various families.³ Finally he was fully⁴ empowered to carry out the measures he proposed. The service which the Jagirdars owed to the Peshwa was enforced by the attendance of their troops. They were made to restore the lands which they had usurped. The British Government guaranteed them their territories so long as they fulfilled the terms of the agreement and rendered service to the Peshwa. Both sides were very difficult to manage, and it required all the tact and firmness of the able Resident to bring about the settlement between them. This was not finally achieved without putting armies into motion.⁵

As a result of the security which this arrangement conferred upon his vassals Baji Rao grew jealous of their power. He had often expressed a desire to raise a new force which was to be independent of the feudal militia furnished by the Jagirdars. The Minto Government had been keen on that project, and had instructed the Resident to encourage the Peshwa in that desire. The contingent was accordingly formed, and Captain Ford was selected by the Peshwa himself to command it. This was another achievement of Elphinstone for his Government, who, of course, welcomed the proposal.⁶

1) Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I. p. 250.

2) Malcolm *Political History*, Vol. I, p. 467. Grant - Duff, *Op. Cit.* III (1912 Ed.) pp. 348-9, Prinsep, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 275.

3) He submitted his Report in October 1812, Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, *Op. Cit.* Vol. I, p. 248.

4) "I had a *carte blanche* for all the disposable force of the Deccan." Elphinstone to Strachey, 12th July, 1813, *Loc. Cit.* Vol. I, p. 252.

5) *Loc. Cit.* Vol. I, pp. 250-55, Grant-Duff *Op. Cit.* Vol. III, p. 349. On this occasion, the Resident made another settlement by which the Rajas of Kolhapur and Sawantwari, were made independent of the Peshwa's sovereignty (Prinsep I, p. 275), and those two States were bound down to suppress piracy, and Kolhapur had to cede to the British the port of Malavan. Grant - Duff, *Op. Cit.* Vol. III, pp. 350-1 and Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I, pp. 250-1.

6) Elphinstone's Despatch d. 16th Jan. No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations 19th Feb. 1813. Also Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, pp. 251 and 253.

The formation of the contingent under British officers, following the settlement of the Southern Jagirdars, increased the Peshwa's dependence on the British, and served to draw closer his alliance with that Government. The Peshwa had often declared and "for a time with sincerity"¹ that the alliance was the most fortunate of events for his security. "I doubt," wrote Elphinstone, "whether he ever maintained a thought of obtaining an increase of his power at the risk of losing his Alliance with us. That Alliance was, in most respects, exactly suited to His Highness's disposition. It afforded him safety and power of pursuing his favourite plans without any great sacrifice of his ease."² The presence of the British Force at his capital had not only afforded the Peshwa a safe shelter under which to carry on his schemes of systematic suppression of the nobility, but it also served to give him the strength with which to stabilise his own authority and Government. Baji Rao understood this advantage of the alliance and, as has already been noted, exploited it to the fullest extent.³

He continued in this outward friendliness to the British Power for some time, until he raised a low favourite, Trimbakji Danglia, to be his minister. This man had been a spy and courier, and became Baji Rao's associate in his base intrigues and private pleasures. He humoured the Peshwa's avarice by farming the revenues of districts at high figures, indemnifying himself by extortion and oppression of the tenants. He was illiterate, unprincipled and arrogant, and of coarse manners. Trimbakji was strongly prejudiced against Europeans. He rose high in the Peshwa's confidence, and was perhaps the only one to enjoy his affection.⁴ Although nominally Sadasheo Mankeshwar⁵ continued to be the Prime Minister of the Peshwa, Trimbakji held the real influence over the Prince. He was first introduced to the Resident in 1814, and to the latter's keen observation and sound judgment, the first impressions of that vicious person revealed his true nature.⁶ Danglia had acquired such a hold over his master that the policy of the Peshwa's Government underwent a great change, particularly in

1) According to Grant-Duff, Vol. III, p. 335.

2) His Despatch of 20th Nov. 1815, *Op. Cit.*

3) Grant-Duff, *Op. Cit.* (1912) Vol. III, pp. 335-6.

4) Colebrooke, *Op. Cit.* Vol. 1, pp. 292-3. Grant-Duff, III, pp. 356-7, and Wilson, Book II, p. 150.

5) Sadasheo was "a great musician and a composer and as a statesman possessed of considerable ability." Grant-Duff, III, pp. 334-5, but according to Elphinstone (his Despatch to Moira of the 21st Mar. 1817. No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations 7th Apr. 1817) he had "not sufficient courage or abilities."

6) Prinsep, *Op. Cit.* Vol. I, pp. 279-280.

his relations with the British Government.¹ Trimbakji became the centre around which the events of the next three years developed, leading finally to the Peshwa's fall and the disappearance of the dynasty itself.

The discussions which brought about those grievous consequences arose out of the old claims which the Peshwa had over the Gaekwar of Baroda, and these he was pressing with increasing earnestness for a final settlement. The basis of these longstanding claims rested on two agreements, one entered into by Damaji Gaekwar with a former Peshwa in 1751 and another made with the Peshwa by Fateh Singh Gaekwar, who contested the succession after Damaji's death in 1768. Under the first agreement Damaji resigned half his possessions in Gujarat to the Peshwa, holding the other half as a tributary of the Poona Court. Under the arrangement of 1768, Fateh Singh agreed to pay the increased annual tribute of seventy-nine thousand nine hundred Rupees. In the meantime, under the Treaty of 1802, and in the course of the settlement of Gujarat which was undertaken after this Treaty the British Government had established its ascendancy over the Government of the Gaekwar. The Peshwa's claims to tribute from Kathiawar and Baroda had been wholly neglected. These debts amounted to over a crore of rupees, out of which Baji Rao was prepared to relinquish sixty lakhs. The Baroda Government instead of claiming that exemption, advanced counter claims against Poona for the revenues of Broach, which without right the Peshwa had alienated to the East India Company, and also for the expenses incurred by the Gaekwar in reducing the rebellious districts of Aba Shelukar for the Peshwa. Then again, the farm of the Peshwa's share of Ahmadabad, which he had been induced to grant to the Gaekwar in June 1804 for a further period of ten years, was also due to expire in 1814.²

The Governor-General decided that the settlement of all these disputes on intricate claims and counter claims should be attempted by direct negotiation between the two States, without resorting to the undoubted right of arbitration possessed by his Government under the subsisting Treaties with both these States. Accordingly, Gangadhar

1) Prinsep, Vol. I, pp. 319-20, Footnote. Elphinstone protested against Trimbakji's measures in a note to the Peshwa d. 27th May 1815 (reference to which is also found in the appendix to Minute of 1st Dec. 1815. No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultation 15th June 1816). For Trimbakji's measures indicating his anti-British attitude see also Elphinstone's Despatch to Moira d. 16th Aug. 1815, No. 36, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th September 1815.

2) Grant-Duff, Vol. III, pp. 365 and 369-70, Prinsep, Vol. I, pp. 270-3 and 278. According to Prinsep the total claims of the Peshwa amounted to over three crores of rupees, and "the Gaekwar had little to set off against these claims." p. 278; Wallace, *The Guicowar and His Relations with the British Government*, pp. 193-6 and 204-5.

Shastri,¹ the able Minister of Baroda, was deputed to Poona, to which place he proceeded under the declared guarantee of the British Government for his safety.²

The renewal of the lease of Ahmadabad in which the British Government was equally interested³ with that of the Gaekwar was positively rejected by the Peshwa, who consequently resumed its control, appointing Trimbakji the Governor of that area.⁴

Other disputes formed the subject of negotiations in which Gangadhar Shastri was engaged on his arrival at Poona. But in them also, the Shastri's efforts produced no better results. The Peshwa maintained his demands with unyielding tenacity. Evasion and intrigues were employed to defeat the purpose of the Shastri's mission. Months rolled away, and still no solution of the outstanding questions was in sight.

At the same time, the Peshwa's energies were directed towards fomenting trouble against the Shastri at Baroda, where he was unpopular and certainly detested by a party headed by Sita Ram, the adopted son and successor in office, for some time, of the former Minister, Raoji Appaji. Sita Ram, who was considered incapable and weak, had been intriguing against the British Government, and had been removed from office.⁵ Since his effort to regain power had failed with the British Resident at Baroda, he was now engaged in secret dealings with the Poona Court, to bring about the destruction of his enemy, the Shastri, and to obtain the Peshwa's support in his schemes. He had secured for his side the co-operation of Takhti Bai, a Rani of Baroda. Two agents, Bundoji and Bhagwant Rao, had been carrying messages between Poona and Baroda, and at one time, the Gaekwar himself had been made an instrument in the hands of this faction. They also attempted, in union with Trimbakji's agents in Ahmadabad, to arouse a rebellion in Gujarat by inviting the forces of

1) "A person of great shrewdness and talent, who keeps the whole state of Baroda in the highest order." Elphinstone, (Colebrooke, Vol. I, p. 276). At Baroda he was a supporter of the British influence, and was considered its agent. (Wallace, *The Guicowar*, p. 208). The Shastri was formerly the Bombay Government's Agent at the Durbar of Baroda, and in May 1813 raised to a confidential position by Fateh Singh Gaekwar. (Bombay Government's Despatch to Moira, 26th July, 1815, No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th September 1815.)

2) Grant-Duff, Vol. III, p. 371, also No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations 15th June, 1816, appendix to Governor-General's Minute of 1st Dec. 1815, *Op. Cit.*

3) Grant-Duff, Vol. III, p. 368, and the Despatch of the Secret Committee to the Governor-General in Council of Oct. 26th, 1816, Board's draft No. 120, Vol. 5.

4) Prinsep, Vol. I, p. 279. Grant-Duff, Vol. III, pp. 372-3.

5) Wallace's *Guicowar*, pp. 139-154.

Dhar.¹ All these plans had been laid out to divert the attention of the British Government and defeat Gangadhar Shastri's object.

Seeing this, the latter decided, with Elphinstone's approval, to return to Baroda. That decision produced an immediate change in the Peshwa's attitude. The Shastri was treated with marked favour, and even cajoled into the belief that he would be offered the minister-ship at Poona. The Peshwa's sister-in-law was offered in marriage to the Shastri's son, an honour which the Baroda minister accepted with more haste than discretion. It was proposed to adjust the Peshwa's claims on the Gaekwar by the cession of territory yielding seven lakhs of rupees a year. This proposal was referred to the Gaekwar at Baroda. In the meantime, preparations for celebrating the nuptials were made. When the Shastri did not receive his master's assent to the terms of the settlement he desired the postponement of the marriage. This gave mortal offence to the Peshwa and was a slight which he seemed determined to avenge. Trimbakji became thenceforward more intimate than ever towards the Shastri, and treated him with an uncommon show of affection. The Peshwa proceeded from Nasik, whither he had gone for the purpose of celebrating the proposed wedding, to Pandarpur on pilgrimage. The Shastri, who little realised the trap into which he was walking, accompanied the party, sending away his assistant, Bapu Mairal, and his escort, to Poona. Bundoji, Sita Ram's agent, also proceeded to Pandarpur. A deep plot had been laid by the treacherous Trimbakji to take the Shastri's life. On the night of the 14th July, 1815, after an entertainment given by the Peshwa, Gangadhar Shastri was trickily called back to the temple, at the insistent entreaty of Trimbakji, to join in the worship, and on his way home, the Shastri, who was meagrely attended, was murdered by assassins hired for the purpose by Trimbakji Danglia.²

The general voice of the country pointed to Trimbakji as the instigator of that crime, made far more heinous in the public eye by the manner and place of the deed and the fact that the victim was a Brahmin. The Peshwa was widely suspected of being involved also.

1) Chief Secretary, Bombay Government to Capt. Carnac, Resident at Baroda, 18th Oct. 1815, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 26th Nov. 1815. In one of the letters which were intercepted these words occur:—"Shastri cannot come back again." It was written by one of Sita Ram's agents to him, on 23rd Aug., 1814.

2) Elphinstone to Moira, Despatch dated the 16th Aug., 1815, No. 36, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Sept. 1815; also Grant-Duff, Vol. III, pp 373-5; Prinsep, Vol. I, pp. 282-92; Forrest's *Selections from the Official Writings of M. Elphinstone*, pp. 134-143.

Elphinstone who was at Ellora, forthwith repaired to Poona¹ and addressed a prompt and spirited note to the Peshwa, demanding diligent measures to discover and punish the culprit of that atrocious crime.²

The Resident extended protection to the Gaekwar's Vakil Bapu Mairal, in whose escort the intriguers of Poona incited a mutiny for pay, endangering the life of Bapu himself. Elphinstone advanced him 125,000 Rupees, and gave him full assurance of security.

The Peshwa was filled with alarm, and could not make up his mind. At first he denied Trimbakji's complicity in the murder, for want of adequate evidence, then expressed his helplessness since Trimbakji was powerful, being then in command of his 10,000 horse and 5,000 foot, and in possession of his treasure and jewellery. While he was making evasions and professions of friendliness to the British Government, the Peshwa was secretly raising troops. It appeared to the Resident that the Peshwa was determined to shield his favourite, and might possibly let him escape into the country to raise a rebellion.³

Elphinstone was fully prepared for every contingency. He had requisitioned the subsidiary force to Poona⁴ and had arranged for Trimbakji's pursuit should he decide to fly.⁵ The Bombay⁶ and Madras⁷ armies, and the Nizam's subsidiary force,⁸ were placed at his disposal. He was given ample discretion to adopt suitable measures on the spot. If the Peshwa attempted to defy the British demand for Trimbakji's trial, and if persuasions failed, the Resident was authorised to secure Baji Rao's person, and prevent his flight from Poona.⁹

1) Arrived there on 6th Aug. and the Peshwa himself quietly entered the Capital on the 9th in a closed palanquin. (Elphinstone to Moira 16th Aug., No. 36, Bengal Secret Consultations 27th September, 1815).

2) On the 25th July 1815, from Ellora, No. 35, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd Aug. 1815. It was followed by another paper sent to the Peshwa on the 15th Aug., in which he protested that the Peshwa had not taken any steps to bring the culprits to trial, and that Trimbakji's guilt had been fully established.

3) Elphinstone to Moira, 18th Aug. 1815, No. 133, 20th Aug., No. 135, also Despatches to Moira, 23rd Aug., No. 139, 28th Aug., No. 142, and 29th Aug., No. 144. Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Sept. 1815, and another of 6th Sept. No. 70, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct. 1815.

4) Despatch of 18th Aug., No. 133, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Sept. 1815. The first detachment reached Poona on the morning of the 17th August.

5) Private letter from Elphinstone to Doveton, 27th Aug. No. 30, Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th Oct. 1815.

6) Secretary Adam to Bombay Government, 15th Aug., No. 28, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Sept. 1815.

7) Another Despatch, No. 29, *Loc. Cit.*

8) Another, No. 30, *Loc. Cit.*, and also Russell to Adam, 7th Sept. 1815, No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th Oct. 1815.

9) Adam to Elphinstone, 15th Aug., No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations 20th Sept. 1815.

These instructions did not arrive until 1st September.¹ In the meantime, the Resident could not wait. He maintained a pressing demand for Trimbakji's arrest and confinement.² On grounds of general policy it was found expedient to confine the accusation to Trimbakji³ and it was pointed out to Baji Rao that the safest course for him was to surrender his guilty minister to the British Government, who undertook not to inflict capital punishment on him. The Peshwa evaded the Resident's demand with excuses and entreaties. At last, Elphinstone drew up a strong note in the name of the British Government, warning the Peshwa of the serious risk he was running in resisting the just demand of the Governor-General. He told Baji Rao's Government that the subsidiary force would wait four miles outside Poona, to take charge of Trimbakji. Baji Rao's timid mind had already been alarmed. On the night of the 5th September, Trimbakji had been removed to the hill fortress of Wasantgarh, in the expectation that the Resident might consent to that compromise. Elphinstone, of course, was not to be so easily shaken from his resolution. Finally, the Peshwa submitted, and on the 19th September, Captain Hicks, of the Peshwa's Brigade, received charge of Trimbakji and delivered him to British troops on the 25th September. He was confined in the Fortress of Thana, and placed under a European guard. Bhagwant Rao Gaekwar, and Govind Rao Bundoji, Trimbakji's two accomplices, were also surrendered at the same time, and made over to the Gaekwar's Government, by whom they were thrown into the Forts of Bamapur and Gondvaripur⁴ in chains.

Thus ended an ugly episode in the relations of the British Government with the Peshwa Baji Rao, which for some time threatened to develop into an open rupture, but which was finally settled without resort to arms, through the most skilful handling of the delicate situation by Elphinstone. The Peshwa's indecision and timidity also contributed to this result. Normal relations between the two States were resumed, and the levying of troops was also abandoned after a few

1) Elphinstone to Moira, 6th Sept. No. 70, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct. 1815.

2) Elphinstone to Moira, 28th Aug., No. 142, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Sept. 1815.

3) Adam to Elphinstone, 10th Sept., No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Sept. 1815.

4) Elphinstone to Moira, 6th Sept. 1815, No. 70, Elphinstone's note to the Peshwa on 4th Sept. No. 71, Elphinstone's despatch to Moira of the 10th Sept., 1815, No. 73, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct., 1815. Captain Hicks to Elphinstone, 19th Sept., No. 32, and Elphinstone to Moira, 26th Sept., No. 33, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Oct. 1815. Resident at Baroda to Chief Secretary at Bombay, 16th Oct., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th Nov. 1815, and Chief Secretary Bombay to Secretary Adam, 17th Oct. 1815, No. 1 Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th Nov. 1815.

months.¹ Moira wrote to Baji Rao a friendly letter on 20th January, 1816, in which he congratulated the Peshwa on surrendering Trimbakji "The undoubted author of that atrocious crime," and assured him that he could rely on the cordial alliance of the British Government.²

After the thick, dark clouds, which had for some time assumed a threatening look at Poona, had dispersed, and the atmosphere there was clear, the British Government's political interests attracted its attention elsewhere.

Raghuji Bhonsla, the old Raja of Nagpur, died on the 22nd March, 1816, at the age of 58 years.³ He left a son, Parsoji, who suffered from mental and physical infirmities. Whilst, by right, he succeeded to his father's throne, it was quite clear to all that the state of the new Raja's health, and his mental imbecility, would necessitate the appointment of a Regent to carry on his administration. Mudhoji Bhonsla, better known by his other name, Appa Sahib, son of Venkaji Munia Bapu, was the young Raja's cousin and, therefore, the heir presumptive to the Masnad of Nagpur, being the next male member in the reigning family.

Intrigues, engendered by personal and political motives, began soon after Raghuji's death and, for a time, the whole Court of Nagpur was enveloped in an atmosphere of uncertainty and factious rivalry, threatening to bring about civil strife. Shridhar Pandit, the aged and respected ex-minister had retired to Benares. Buka Bai, as Raghuji's widow, had a strong claim to the Regency of the State, and to the protection of the Raja's person. Dharmaji Bhonsla, a trusted official of the deceased Raja who was in possession of his treasure amounting to about a crore of Rupees, was in great favour with the Dowager Rani. They seemed to have agreed that, with the Rani as the Regent, Dharmaji would manage the internal government, while Nairoba, who was the Foreign Minister, and Sadik Ali Khan, the head of the army in Raghuji's Government, were to continue in these offices. This would have excluded Appa Sahib from the Regency. It was also rumoured that the Raja was to adopt Raghuji's grandson by his eldest daughter to succeed after Parsoji. With this motive, an unsuccessful attempt was made to exclude Appa Sahib from performing the *Shradh*⁴ of

1) Elphinstone to Moira, 25th Oct., No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th Nov., 1815, despatch 10th Dec. 1815, NO. 83, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Jan. 1816, and of 20th Feb., 1816, No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd March 1816.

2) Moira to Baji Rao, No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Jan., 1816.

3) Jenkin's report, *Op. Cit.* submitted to Lord Amherst, (printed 1827), p. 127.

4) Some rites and ceremonies performed for the dead, according to Hindu custom, by the son, and, in his absence, by the nearest relative of the deceased.

Raghuji. Appa Sahib, however, asserted his right, and defeated that object.¹

The British Resident watched this situation of internal dissension and rancorous intrigue with keen interest. He deliberately refrained from a hurried association with either faction, but reported everything to Moira. He saw clearly that the state of things was very favourable for the negotiation of a subsidiary treaty, which, after sustained and repeated efforts, it had been found impossible to persuade Raghuji to accept. He very soon received secret messages from Appa Sahib, and was expecting to hear from his opponents, seeking British support.² Whilst he was not willing to take a hasty step, at the same time, he did not wish to lose that golden opportunity of establishing a British force in Berar, and British influence at the Nagpur Court. It was certain that the British Government would be appealed to for help (as had already been secretly done), and if a dispute arose, Sindhia, or Holkar, or Amir Khan might be called in. Appa Sahib appeared to him to possess the strongest claim to the Regency, since he was the heir-presumptive. Buka Bai had undoubtedly the right to the Raja's person and Appa Sahib to the Government of the country; but the two rights were indivisible, and therefore he advocated Appa Sahib's cause. Moreover, reported the Resident, the principles of the opposite party were averse to the British connection. Any alliance formed with it would not be acquiesced in by Appa Sahib on his accession. The latter appeared friendly to British interests, and had desired British support. "In supporting Appa Sahib, therefore, we should keep our own party in power." Even if the Bai and Dharmaji succeeded in excluding Appa Sahib, it would be advisable to support him, on the condition of a subsidiary treaty previously concluded with him. Jenkins very ably represented the whole situation to his Government, suggesting that he might "be authorised to take advantage of the earliest offer on the subject."³

The matter was promptly taken up, and fully discussed at Calcutta,⁴ and immediate instructions were issued to Jenkins for his guidance. He was authorised to avail himself of any overtures from the "legitimate Government of Nagpore." That phrase was explained to

1) Jenkins to Moira, despatches of 25th Mar., No. 1, and 29th Mar. No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Apr. 1816.

2) Despatch to Moira of 29th March, *Loc. cit.*

3) To Moira, 29th March 1816. *Loc. Cit.*

4) Minute of the Governor-General, 13th Apr. 1816, No. 3, of Edmonstone, 13th Apr., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Apr. 1816. Moira strongly urged the advantages of concluding the agreement with Nagpur by supporting the cause of Appa Sahib, on grounds both of justice and of expediency. Edmonstone concurred with him in almost everything.

imply either the Raja's Government, or in the case of his imbecility, the Government deriving its authority from an individual who had the natural right resulting from the situation, in the State, or in the family of the sovereign, or both. So that, if the Raja's mind were considered unfit, Appa Sahib, as the nearest male relative of competent age and qualification, was to be supported, and the Resident was to receive proposals from him. The draft of the treaty sent down in December 1812, was to serve as a model for the new engagement.¹ Colonel Doveton's force was placed at the disposal of the Resident at Nagpur, to be requisitioned when necessary.²

In the meantime, affairs at Nagpur remained in suspense. Efforts at reconciliation between the rival parties were proceeding, but no agreement was reached.³ Appa Sahib continued to solicit earnestly the support of the Resident,⁴ who gave general friendly ear to those requests, but did not commit himself to any definite course.

Raja Parsoji, who had been formally installed on the throne with proper ceremonies, became reconciled with Appa Sahib, whom he declared as the Regent of the State.⁵

Negotiations having failed, Appa Sahib took a bold course, and had Dharmaji arrested at his own house on the afternoon of the 11th April. On Dharmaji's imprisonment, his comrade, Nairobi Chitnavis felt alarmed, and fled from Nagpur.⁶ Appa Sahib thus made his position secure, and in that security, took severe measures to extort the last farthing of the hoard of wealth which Dharmaji possessed.⁷ Nairobi and Sadik Ali, in their alarmed condition, showed their willingness to serve under Appa Sahib, provided he agreed to maintain the foreign policy of Raja Raghuji, and refrained from entering into closer union with the British Power. Appa Sahib kept up a show of friendliness with his opponents, but was at the same time carrying on

1) Adam to Jenkins, 15th Apr. No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Apr. 1816. In another Despatch the Resident was also asked to enquire and report what claims Appa Sahib had to the Masnad in preference to Raghuji's grandson. (Adam to Jenkins, 18th Apr., No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Apr. 1816.)

2) Adam to Doveton, 13th Apr., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Apr. 1816.

3) Jenkins to Moira, 2nd Apr. No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Apr. 1816.

4) Jenkins to Moira, 5th Apr., No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Apr. 1816, 13th Apr. 1816, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th May, and 22nd Apr., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th May, 1816.

5) Jenkins to Moira, 14th Apr. 1816, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th May 1816.

6) Jenkins to Moira, 13th Apr., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th May 1816.

7) Jenkins to Moira, 22nd Apr., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th May 1816.

secret conversations with Jenkins, through the medium of Jaswant Rao.¹

On the 25th of April,² the Governor-General's instructions reached the Resident, but owing to Appa Sahib's impatience negotiations had been opened earlier.³ On the receipt of these clear orders, the Resident continued the discussions,⁴ and after a series of conferences conducted with great secrecy, mostly at the house of Appa Sahib's Diwan, Nagu Pandit, the draft of the Subsidiary Treaty was drawn up. The principle of the engagement, as laid down by the British Government was readily accepted. The discussion dealt only with the matters of detail, relating to the strength of the Subsidiary Force, the amount of subsidy to be paid, as also the form of security and support which Appa Sahib was to receive from the British Government. The Treaty was concluded on the 27th May, and on the following day it was forwarded by the Resident to Calcutta for ratification.⁵

In concluding this Treaty, the British Resident was naturally able to secure more favourable terms than for other engagements of its type, such as the Treaties of Bassein and Hyderabad. Advantage was taken of the internal jealousies in the State, and consequently, the Treaty of Nagpur had more of the protective element, as explained by Jenkins, and less of equality and reciprocity.⁶ In order to appease Appa Sahib's fears it was concluded with him, though in the Raja's name. The Subsidiary Force was to consist of six battalions of Infantry, and a Regiment of Cavalry, with one Company of European Artillerymen. At the special desire of Appa Sahib two battalions were to be stationed at Nagpur, the British Government having the right to requisition one in emergency. The subsidy was settled at Rupees seven lakhs and a half, payable in two half-yearly instalments of equal amounts. The Raja was to abstain from hostilities against other Powers, and to refer his disputes with them to British arbitration. The Nagpur Durbar were not to keep up any communication with

1) *Ibid.*

2) Prinsep, Vol. I, p. 369.

3) Jenkins' Despatch of 22nd Apr., Minutes of the Conferences, No. 23, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June 1816, also Prinsep, Vol. I, pp. 360-1.

4) Jenkins to Adam, 28th Apr. 1816, No. 9 and No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th May 1816.

5) Jenkins to Moira, 28th May 1816, No. 21, enclosing with it the copy of the Resident's letter to Appa Sahib, assuring him of British support, and another to Adam, 28th May, No. 22, also enclosing the full Minutes of the Conferences during negotiations from 22nd Apr. till the conclusion of the Treaty, No. 23, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June, 1816.

6) Jenkins to Moira, *Loc. Cit.*, also articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty (next footnote).

foreign States, and the British Government engaged not to interfere in the Raja's internal affairs. The State of Nagpur was to maintain a contingent of 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot, subject to the muster, inspection and general control of the British Resident. The Treaty¹ was ratified by the Governor-General, and returned to Nagpur on the 15th June. It was formally presented to Appa Sahib at a ceremonious Durbar.² The pensions which the Resident had promised to Nagu Pandit (Rs. 25,000) and Narain Pandit (Rs. 15,000) were sanctioned by the Governor-General in Council.³ The Resident was warmly congratulated on his ability and judgment in successfully effecting "the accomplishment of an arrangement so long and earnestly desired by the British Government" and the Governor-General permitted him to retain and wear the diamond ring presented to him by Appa Sahib in grateful recognition of his helpfulness.⁴

The Treaty had been kept secret, and was made known at Nagpur just after the Subsidiary Force, under Colonel Walker, had arrived near the Capital, and the brigade which was to be stationed there had taken station near the Residency.⁵ The great indignation which arose in the opposite camp alarmed Appa Sahib. The Bai felt aggrieved at the way in which Appa Sahib treated her, and signified to the Resident that she was prepared to offer better terms, if a treaty were concluded with her. Appa Sahib, thinking his life was in danger, retired on the 27th June to a garden house outside the city, and resided there until he could overpower his opponents. The Subsidiary Force had been stationed at Pandurna, and the brigade was cantoned about three miles from the city on the 18th June.⁶

The conclusion of the Subsidiary Alliance with Nagpur was an event of very great political importance. Its achievement after Raghuji's death, since it had so long been attempted during his lifetime, was of immense advantage to the British position in the country, both for defence and offence. "In the actual condition of India, no event could be more fortunate" according to Malcolm "than the Subsidiary Alliance

1) Consisting of 15 Articles, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th June 1816.

2) Jenkins to Moira, 13th July, No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th August 1816.

3) Adam to Jenkins, 15th June, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th June 1816.

4) *Ibid.*

5) Jenkins to Moira, 10th June, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations 29th June 1816, and Jenkins to Walker, 30th May, No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd June, 1816.

6) Jenkins to Moira, 10th June, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, 29th June, and 29th June, No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd July, 1816.

with Nagpur. It struck a serious blow at the power of the Maratha Confederacy."¹

The other Powers did not in any way hinder or oppose the removal of Nagpur from the class of independent, to that of Subsidiary States, with the introduction of a British force into it, and the establishment of British control over its strategic position and its military resources. The cycle of political events at the time moved with rare good fortune for the British interests. The Nagpur situation arose after the Poona trouble had been satisfactorily settled at the end of 1815, and it concluded favourably for the British Government just before another storm appeared on the Poona horizon.

After Trimbakji had been safely incarcerated at Thana, the relations of the Peshwa's Government with the British Power resumed their ordinary cordial course. He began again to look to his allies to support his authority over his disobedient nobles.² At the same time, he had not forgotten his friend Trimbakji, the one object of his affections. The Peshwa more than once requested the Resident for his release,³ and renewed these requests with the servility and allurements⁴ of which he alone was capable. At times he promised to pay as heavy a price in money for the liberation of Danglia as might be demanded, and at others, represented it as his disgrace in the public eye that his subject and minister should be imprisoned under a foreign Power.⁵ Elphinstone remained quite firm, and never allowed Baji Rao to imagine that the British Government would ever set at liberty the person whom they considered to be the author of an atrocious, cold-blooded assassination.⁶

While the repeatedly expressed desire of the Peshwa for Danglia's release or restoration to the Poona Government had been steadily resisted, news suddenly arrived from Thana that Trimbakji

1) His *Political History*, Vol. I, p. 465.

2) Appa Desai was again in revolt, and Elphinstone encouraged Baji Rao in assuming a decided tone in suppressing him. (Elphinstone to Moira, 20th Feb., No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd March 1816.)

3) Elphinstone to Adam, 27th Oct. 1815, No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations 27th Nov. 1815. This request was indirectly made.

4) Same to same, 30th Nov. 1815, No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Jan. 1816.

5) Same to same, 24th Feb. 1816, No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations 23rd Mar., and also 14th June 1816, No 13, Bengal Secret Consultations 13th July, 1816. The Peshwa was even reported to depute a Vakil to Calcutta for obtaining the redress of his grievances, including the liberation of his favourite. (Elphinstone to Adam, 19th Aug. 1816, No. 24, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th Sept. 1816.)

6) Elphinstone's Despatches 27th Oct. 1815, 30th Nov. 1815, 24th Feb. 1816, and 14th June 1816, referred to in the preceding footnotes.

had effected his escape from that fortress on the 12th September, in the disguise of a common labourer.¹

This incident naturally attracted serious notice. By chance, the Peshwa was at that time absent from Poona—a matter of additional anxiety to the British Resident. The latter promptly dispatched a message to Baji Rao telling him that no blame would attach to the Peshwa if he would seize Trimbakji and re-deliver him into British custody, at the same time warning him against the serious consequences of any attempt or inclination on his part to shield him.² The Peshwa showed his readiness to apprehend Trimbakji.³ But the British Resident was too shrewd and too experienced in Baji Rao's ways, to rely merely either on his own warnings to the Peshwa, or on the latter's professions. He took full military precautions lest Trimbakji should incite an insurrection, and the Peshwa should aid it.⁴

The efforts made to re-arrest Danglia failed. No definite information as to his whereabouts was available for some time.⁵

While the Peshwa was anxious to preserve a show of friendliness and goodwill towards the British, he was reported to be carrying on secret intercourse with the other States, with the view of forming defensive alliances amongst the Maratha Powers.⁶ At that very time the Pindaris were committing cruel ravages against peaceful citizens, and Moira indignant at Sindhia's supineness in not checking the evil, had addressed a strong remonstrance to that Prince, asking whether he was at war with the British Government.⁷ At the same time, the Governor-General did not wish to lose the support and co-operation of the Peshwa if he could avoid doing so. He wrote to Elphinstone, assuming that the intrigues which were carried on in the Peshwa's name, perhaps did not receive his support. The Resident was

1) From Judge and Magistrate Thana to Elphinstone, 12th Sept., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 12th Oct. 1816.

2) Elphinstone to Moira, 14th Sept., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 12th Oct. 1816.

3) Elphinstone to Adam, 19th. Sept., No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th Oct., 1816.

4) Elphinstone to Col. Smith, 15th Sept. 1816, No. 61, Bengal Secret Consultations, 12th Oct. 1816, Elphinstone to Smith, No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th Oct. 1816. Smith to Colonel Kingscote 17th Sept. No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th Oct. 1816.

5) Elphinstone to Smith, 27th Sept. No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 26th Oct. 1816, and Elphinstone to Moira, 3rd Nov. No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Nov. 1816.

6) Elphinstone to Adam, 21st Dec. 1816, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Jan. 1817. Resident at Poona also enclosed a copy of an *Akhbar* showing how the Peshwa's Vakils had been sent to Holkar's Court, and to other Maratha Princes. (No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Jan. 1817.)

7) Adam to Resident with Sindhia, 14th Jan. 1817, No. 1, and also No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th January 1817.

desired to acquaint the Peshwa with the policy adopted towards Sindhia. Baji Rao was also to be assured that Trimbakji's punishment was out of no acrimony against him, but was undertaken to save the Peshwa's reputation from being tarnished with the blame for the Shastri's murder.¹

This method of winning the Peshwa's confidence did not succeed. It was soon heard that Trimbakji was assembling troops in the country, about fifty miles from Poona. During the whole of January and February the recruitment was continuing. The Resident demanded that the Peshwa should quell the insurrection, and that Danglia should be arrested. The Peshwa would not admit any rebellion, but the Resident's information confirmed him in the belief that the Peshwa was secretly helping and encouraging Trimbakji's activities.²

All this time, the forces of the insurgents were growing in the neighbourhood of the Mahadeo Hills. Elphinstone sent repeated demands for their suppression, and received answers which professed readiness to act, but evaded compliance.³ This attitude on the part of the Peshwa aroused the deepest suspicions of the Resident, who felt convinced that he was attempting to stir up war against the English, and restore Trimbakji to power. He immediately explained the situation to the head of his Government, advising him to deal with Baji Rao as an enemy. In that despatch, he discussed the question of the arrangements of the Peshwa's Government.⁴

The Marquis of Hastings (as the Earl of Moira had now been created in recognition of his services in the Nepal War)⁵ and his Government, took serious notice of the Peshwa's dubious attitude towards Trimbakji, and his game of duplicity towards the British Government. Elphinstone was at once ordered to deal with him in a severe manner. He had forfeited the confidence of the British Government, and could no longer be trusted without adequate securities. As a preliminary to any other arrangement, Baji Rao was to be required to surrender Trimbakji within a stated time, to be fixed by the British Resident.

1) Moira to Elphinstone, 17th January 1817, No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th January 1817.

2) Elphinstone to Moira, 11th March No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th April 1817.

3) Elphinstone sent notes to the Peshwa on 9th and 25th February and 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 7th March No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th April 1817.

4) Elphinstone to Hastings, 21st March No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th April 1817. This was an important Despatch as it contained the suggestions which formed the principles of the drastic instructions that were issued on the 7th April and on which the Treaty of Poona was eventually based.

5) On 18th February 1817, *Dictionary of National Biography*, (1891), Vol. XXV, p. 119.

Should he not submit to that preliminary condition, or should he attempt to leave Poona during the negotiations, or should there be any movement of troops in any part of his country, the Peshwa was to be treated as an enemy, his person was to be seized, and war declared on him. But if, on the other hand, the Peshwa agreed unconditionally to deliver up Trimbakji, the Resident was to disclose to him the nature of the securities which would be required as a condition of continuing him on the *Masnad*. They were to consist chiefly in the "maintenance of a preponderating military force in our interests in His Highness's territory, and the appropriation to its payment of a larger portion of His Highness's resources than has hitherto been the case." It was determined to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Bassein, by requiring the Peshwa to keep up the full body of 5,000 horse and 3,000 foot. "This direct augmentation of a force which, though nominally in the service of the Peshwa, will be, in effect, under our exclusive control" was to be made at a total cost of twenty-nine lakhs of Rupees, to be charged to the Peshwa.

Moreover, Baji Rao was to be requested to renounce for himself and his successors all connection whatsoever with other Maratha States, and to recognise the complete dissolution, both in form and substance, of the Maratha Confederacy, to maintain no vakils or agents at Foreign Courts, and to carry on no communications with them, except through British Ministers. He must renounce all claims over the Gaekwar and all rights and pretensions in Hindustan and over the Chiefs of Malwa and Bundelkhand. He must agree also to the lease, to the Gaekwar, of Ahmadabad in perpetuity. The fortress of Ahmadnagar was to be made over to the British Government, and a territorial cession in the Konkan or Kandesh was to be demanded to make up the fund of twenty-nine lakhs for the upkeep of the contingent. These directions were issued to Elphinstone on the 7th April.¹

The Governments of Madras² and Bombay³ and the Resident at Hyderabad⁴ were at the same time requested to support his measures by assembling armies against the Peshwa's possessions without delay whenever the Resident might require that assistance. Since these armies were to be moved towards the Peshwa's dominions, it was thought desirable to co-ordinate and strengthen them by putting them under the single command of Sir Thomas Hislop, who was to be assisted in political duties by Sir John Malcolm, as Agent to the

1) Adam to Elphinstone, No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Apr. 1817.

2) No. 11, *Loc. Cit.*

3) No. 12, *Loc. Cit.*

4) No. 13, *Loc. Cit.*

Governor-General in the Commander-in-Chief's Camp.¹ Even if it were necessary to declare war on mature deliberation, the Governor-General thought that the re-establishment of Baji Rao under the prescribed conditions would be the most expedient arrangement.²

Owing to an insurrection in Cuttack, the Despatch of the 7th April did not reach Poona until the 10th May. In the meantime, affairs at Poona were taking a serious turn. In the country, Baji Rao was believed to be supporting Trimbakji's forces.³ The Resident was informed by secret agents that the Peshwa had given six lakhs of Rupees to Gokhale to raise men.⁴ The repair of forts, and the recruitment of horse and men were proceeding. Trimbakji's forces were almost becoming identified with the Peshwa's. Preparations were also being made for the Peshwa's departure from Poona.⁵

Under the circumstances, the Resident did not think it prudent to await the arrival of official instructions,⁶ and when he saw that his clear strong warnings to the Peshwa on the 1st and 3rd April⁷ did not produce the desired change in Baji Rao's policy, he resolved on a more severe course of action. He interviewed the Peshwa on the 6th, and on the 7th May he sent a note to his ministers demanding a clear undertaking within twenty-four hours, to the effect that Trimbakji would be surrendered within a month from that day, and that the forts of Raigarh, Simhagarh and Purandhar would be made over to the British Garrisons as pledges for the fulfilment of the engagement. The Peshwa passed a night of anxious wavering between flight, resistance and submission. The city was surrounded by Colonel Smith on the morning of the 8th. The forts were occupied by British troops.⁸ The Peshwa's indecision, which had lasted long enough, was soon brought to an end. On the

1) Governor-General's Minute of 10th May, No. 1, Despatches of the same date to Governor, Fort St. George, No. 2. Sir Thomas Hislop, No. 3, Sir John Malcolm, No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th May, 1817.

2) Adam to Elphinstone, 17th May, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations 17th May, 1817.

3) Elphinstone to Hastings, 9th April, No. 29, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th May, 1817.

4) Elphinstone to Hastings, 7th Apr. No. 25, *Loc. Cit.*

5) Elphinstone to Hastings, 26th Mar. No. 3, Elphinstone to Adam 28th Mar. Nos. 4 and 5, Bengal Secret Consultations 19th Apr. and Elphinstone to Hastings. 19th Apr. Nos. 29 and 30, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th May, 1817.

6) Elphinstone had fortunately found out through private letters from Adam what the nature of these instructions was going to be. (Secret letter from Bengal Government to the Secret Committee 9th June, 1817, Forrest, *Official Writings of M. Elphinstone*, p. 175, also Elphinstone's Despatch to Hastings 9th May, No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 31st May, 1817.)

7) Nos. 27 and 28, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th May, 1817.

8) Elphinstone to Hastings, 9th May, 1817 (Forrest, *Op. Cit.* pp. 209-20. Conference between Baji Rao and Elphinstone, pp. 220-228. Note of 7th May, pp. 229-31).

14th May, the Resident presented to him the substance of the conditions which the Governor-General desired to be imposed on Baji Rao, as a condition of his restoration to the former relations of goodwill with the British Government.¹ After a few days of further reluctance, Baji Rao yielded to the demand and issued a proclamation offering a reward of two lakhs of Rupees and a village of one thousand Rupees revenue, to any person who would produce Trimbakji, dead or alive.²

After this, the full demands of the British Government were made known to Baji Rao on the 28th May. He was shocked at the magnitude of the sacrifices demanded of him, and showed considerable aversion to several of the conditions.³ Resistance was futile. The Resident was not prepared to listen to any objections urged by the ministers⁴ of the Peshwa, and refused to modify his demands. The discussion⁵ on the draft of the new treaty did not last long; and the Peshwa signed the definitive Treaty on the 13th June, the same being returned duly ratified by the Government on the 5th July.⁶

It would not be out of place to relate briefly a few salient features of this agreement of far-reaching importance. In the first place, the Peshwa engaged to seize and deliver Trimbakji to the British Government, and to hold his family as hostages.⁷ What might be considered politically the most important clause, was the recognition by the Peshwa of the dissolution of the Maratha Confederacy, and an undertaking by him to hold no communication with other Powers, except through the British Resident.⁸ His claims on Anand Rao Gaekwar were commuted to an annual payment of four lakhs of Rupees, and no further demands were to be made by the Peshwa on the Ruler of Baroda.⁹ Baji Rao agreed to cede territory for the upkeep of the contingent to the value of thirty-four lakhs of Rupees a year,¹⁰ which sum included the Peshwa's

1) Elphinstone to Hastings, 24th May, 1817, Forrest, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 233-38.

2) Issued on the 21st May, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th June, 1817.

3) Elphinstone to Hastings, 6th June, No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th July, 1817.

4) Elphinstone to Hastings, 15th June, No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th July, 1817.

5) Notes of Conference, Nos. 13, 14, 15, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th July, 1817.

6) Elphinstone to Adam, 14th June, No. 24 and No. 25, (Text of the Treaty) Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th July, 1817, also Aitchison, (1909 Ed.) Vol. VI., pp. 64-70.

7) Art. I, *Loc. Cit.*

8) Art. 4, the Peshwa also renounced all claims over Sawantwari and Kolhapur, whose independence of the Peshwa was further confirmed.

9) Art. 5.

10) The Resident suggested this increase over the original figure of twenty-nine lakhs laid down by the Governor-General in Council. (Elphinstone to Adam, 4th June, No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th July.)

tribute from the Kathiawar Chiefs.¹ The Fort of Ahmadnagar was to be ceded in perpetuity to the British Government.² The Peshwa engaged to admit into his dominion any additional number of British troops which the British Government might think necessary, and to permit them to pass through all parts of his country.³ Other important parts of the Treaty related to the Peshwa's rights over Bundelkhand,⁴ Malwa and Hindustan,⁵ which he transferred in entirety to the East India Company. The Peshwa's share of the farm of the City and Province of Ahmadabad was leased in perpetuity to the Gaekwar of Baroda, for four-and-a-half lakhs of Rupees annually.⁶ And lastly, this occasion was utilised to confirm the Six Articles of Agreement ratified by the Peshwa on the 7th July, 1812, concerning the settlement under British guarantee with the Southern Jagirdars.⁷

These are the main features of the Treaty which Baji Rao was obliged to accept, as a punishment for his past actions, and a security for future behaviour. It greatly diminished his resources, dismembered his dominions, and degraded his position. His power was curtailed, his influence reduced and his prestige in the country destroyed. The stern stipulations which he had to sign must have rankled within him as the source and symbol of that degradation and injury which he suffered.⁸ Never happy at his dependence on the British, much less friendly with them since Trimbakji's influence, Baji Rao must have become still more bitter towards them after the Treaty of Poona. But, for the time being, since it suited both his dissimulating nature and his crippled condition, his discontent was driven underground.

The Treaty was promptly executed,⁹ and to all appearances the diplomatic relations were restored to their friendly footing; Hastings addressed a letter to Baji Rao consoling him in his new situation and expecting a peaceful attitude from him in future.¹⁰

The whole transaction which terminated in such utter humiliation for the Peshwa, further raised the reputation of the Resident at his Court with his own Government. Elphinstone, to whose judgment

1) Art. 7.

2) Art. 12.

3) *Ibid.*

4) Art. 13.

5) Art. 14.

6) Art. 15.

7) Art. 16.

8) Elphinstone to Hastings, 15th Oct. No. 36, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Nov. 1817.

9) Adam to Elphinstone, 5th July, No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th July, 1817, and 25th July No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations 15th Aug. 1817.

10) 25th July, 1817, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th August 1817.

and ability must be largely ascribed the avoidance of open war between the Peshwa and the British,¹ emerged with laurels which enhanced his fame for diplomatic skill. His success and conduct at this juncture were reported in terms of high eulogy to the Court of Directors.²

The Treaty of Poona, like that of Nagpur, conferred great political and military advantages on the East India Company. The Maratha Confederacy was finally destroyed, although its foundation had been considerably undermined by the Treaty of Bassein and other agreements with the several Princes. But the latter had at heart continued to regard the Peshwa as their head. He was now publicly debased from that position, and that constituted no small political gain to the Company's Government. The territorial cessions obtained from the Peshwa added to that Government's strength and resources. This Treaty afforded the Bombay Government an opportunity of consolidating and improving its territories, and of obtaining for itself from the Gaekwar's Government the most important and promising City of Gujarat.³ The transfer of his claims and rights over the Chiefs of Bundelkhand was even a greater gain to the British Government than a loss to the Peshwa. In the general scheme of extensive operations which Lord Hastings was about to undertake, the acquisition of the rights which the Peshwa had over the Chiefs of Saugor, Jhansi, Jalaun and others, was decidedly favourable to the British plans.⁴

The Treaty with the Peshwa was indeed a substantial step forward towards the goal which Hastings aimed at, and which, in his opinion, constituted the most satisfactory solution of the political problem facing his Government, namely, the establishment of British paramountcy over all the States of India.

Whilst it was an achievement and success which must have gratified Hastings, it was not, of course, in accordance with the policy of the Board of Control. The principles of the Treaty were at clear variance with their settled conviction and declared views. "We feel all the objections" wrote the Secret Committee on hearing of the conclusion of the Treaty "which lie against measures tending to reduce or humiliate those native States which, from the extent of their dominions and from their military habits, were formerly ranked as

1) His motives for not attacking the Peshwa at Poona do him great credit (His Despatch of 9th May, Forrest, *Op. Cit.*, p. 210.)

2) Adam to Elphinstone, 25th July No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Aug. 1817.

3) This transaction will again be noticed later. See the opinion of Captain Carnac, the Resident at Baroda, on the beauty, promise and prosperity of Ahmadabad. (Carnac to the Chief Secretary, Bombay, 26th Aug. 1817, No. 20, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th Oct. 1817.)

4) Prinsep, Vol. II, p. 10.

substantive and protecting powers." But it was too late for them to modify the Treaty. They received it as a settled fact. However, they acknowledged, though reluctantly, the necessity for giving new efficiency and solidarity to the connection with the Poona State, and sanctioned the political and military measures involved in the Treaty, declaring it at the same time as "an unwelcome though justifiable exception of the general rule of our policy. The occurrence of such exceptions has been unfortunately much too frequent; but however numerous the instances in which we may be driven from an adherence to our rule, nothing in our opinion would warrant a systematic departure from it."¹

The last Chapter was an account of political preparation for the realisation of Hastings' aim; this might be considered as registering a substantial advance towards that aim. The Treaties of Nagpur in 1816, and Poona in 1817 marked, in their many provisions a distinct and definite progress towards the establishments of the political relationship which was desired by the Marquis of Hastings.

1) Secret Committee's letter to Governor-General in Council, 5th Jan. 1818, No. 132, *Board's Drafts*, Vol. V.

CHAPTER V

WAR AND AFTER

JEALOUSY OF BRITISH POWER - SINDHIA - RANJIT SINGH - NEPAL - MARATHA CONFEDERACY, ATTEMPTS IN 1815/16 - PESHWA, THE MOVING SPIRIT - SINDHIA - HOLKAR - BHONSLA - PINDARIS, THEIR INROADS IN THE DECCAN AND SOUTH INDIA - SINDHIA UNABLE TO CONTROL THEM - HIS ATTITUDE - BRITISH DECISION FOR THEIR SUPPRESSION - GRAND PREPARATIONS - MILITARY SCHEMES CAREFULLY LAID OUT - SINDHIA FACED WITH A TREATY WHICH HE ACCEPTS - RELATIONS REVISED - AMIR KHAN DETACHED, SIGNS AN AGREEMENT - PROGRESS OF THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PINDARIS - THE PESHWA BECOMES RESTIVE - PREPARATIONS - HOSTILITIES - BATTLE OF KIRKI - DEFEAT - FLIGHT - BATTLE OF ASHTA - SATARA RAJA RESCUED AND RESTORED TO HIS STATE - PESHWA'S COUNTRY APPROPRIATED BY THE BRITISH - NAGPUR RAJA FOLLOWS PESHWA'S EXAMPLE - WAR - HIS DEFEAT - RESTORATION UNDER RESTRICTED AUTHORITY - SECOND ATTEMPT - ARRESTED - SENT TO ALLAHABAD - ESCAPES - BECOMES A FUGITIVE - AN INFANT, RAGHUJI'S GRANDSON, SEATED ON THE THRONE - HOLKAR'S GOVERNMENT - TULSI BAI'S LEANINGS TOWARDS BRITISH ALLIANCE - BRITISH ATTITUDE - NEGOTIATIONS - FAILURE - BAI MURDERED - MILITARY CHIEFS FOR WAR - BATTLE OF MAHIDPUR - HOLKAR BECOMES DEPENDENT ALLY - NEW TREATY - PINDARIS DESTROYED AND THEIR CHIEFS SURRENDER - BAJI RAO MEETS MALCOLM - TERMS OFFERED - ACCEPTED - SENT TO BITHUR ON A PENSION - THE FALL OF ASIRGARH - TREATY WITH BHOPAL - SAUGOR - ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED BY THE BRITISH - BRITISH POLITICAL SUCCESS AND ACQUISITION OF EXTENSIVE TERRITORY - HASTINGS' AIM REALISED.

CHAPTER V

WAR AND AFTER

It has already been noticed that the rising power of the Company excited general distrust among the leading States of India. They realised that the predominance which the British Government was requiring meant the loss of their independence and political importance. The events of the first three years of Hastings' period of office increased that feeling of jealousy. The movements of the British forces in October 1814, in the beginning of 1815, and again in the summer of 1816 (already alluded to) must have worked up their fears to a high degree. The negotiations by which it was attempted to take Bhopal and Jaipur under subsidiary alliance, fed the same feeling. And not the least of these contributory factors were the discussions at Poona in the autumn of 1815, leading to the confinement of Trimbakji under British custody, and again those in 1817, resulting in the conclusion of the humiliating Treaty in June of that year. All these incidents could not fail to arouse still further the feelings of discontent in the various Princes of the country.

Persons, and even parties, were to be found at the Courts of these Princes who earnestly pressed on their masters' attention, plans and proposals for concerting measures for the overthrow of the British power. The influence which those persons exercised on the rulers differed in different States according to the character of the Prince.¹

Daulat Rao Sindhia and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, often exchanged letters and presents, and it was at times believed that the correspondence subsisting between them was not a mere act of courtesy, but was prompted by political motives, for the formation of an alliance.² Although such an engagement did not come about,³ the desire for its attainment was an index to the minds of the ruling Princes of the time.

1) Hindu Rao Ghatke, at Sindhia's Court, Sita Ram Rao, at Baroda, Nairoba Chitnavis, later Ram Chandra Wagh and Paras Rao Bhao at Nagpur, Trimbakji, also Sadashoo Mankeshwar and Gokhale at Poona, the Pathan party at Holkar's Court, Manji Das at Jaipur, are examples. Similar influences existed at Mysore, Lucknow and Hyderabad also.

2) Resident at Delhi to Adam, 23rd Oct. 1815, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Nov. 1815, and Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 26th May 1816, No. 29, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June, 1816.

3) Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 3rd Mar. 1816, No. 23, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd March 1816.

Similarly, reports were received relating to the exchange of letters between the Maharaja of Nepal and Sindhia. The former sent a Vakil also, but the envoy received no very warm reception from the Maratha Prince,¹ and in spite of the earnest complaints from Nepal, Sindhia remained cold and unresponsive.²

But it would appear that the secret negotiations which went on among the Maratha Princes themselves were more sustained and earnest than those carried on with the remoter States of Lahore and Katmandu. What the British Government watched with an anxious and vigilant eye was the possible attempt at the revival of the Maratha Confederacy.

The prime mover in the affair was, of course, the Peshwa, whose attitude towards the British grew steadily worse under Trimbakji's influence. It was later discovered that as early as 1814, Baji Rao had sounded Sindhia and Holkar, to combine with him against the British, but nothing came of the attempt.³ About the same time, in the autumn of 1815, when the British Government were pressing for the arrest and surrender of Trimbakji as the person responsible for the murder of, Gangadhar Shastri, the Peshwa was engaged in a studious but secret propaganda to interest the Bhonsla, Sindhia and Holkar in his affairs and to persuade them to make common cause with him against the British.⁴ Whilst the position of the Peshwa still commanded a real respect from the independent members of the one-time Maratha Empire,⁵ yet they did not trust the man who now filled that position. Baji Rao's messages were received with seeming readiness and loyalty which was only skin-deep. Raghuji Bhonsla, and Daulat Rao Sindhia both returned very polite answers, expressing their willingness to follow the Peshwa if he should give them the lead, and requisition their aid in his own writing ⁶—a condition, which they knew perfectly

1) Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 23rd April, No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th May, 1816.

2) Raja Bikram Shah Shamsheer Jang's letter to Sindhia, 4th February 1816, and Sindhia's reply, 13th Apr. 1816, No. 30, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June, 1816.

3) The evidence of this is to be found (for what it is worth) in the replies furnished by the Pindari leader Karim Khan, after his surrender, to Capt. Stoneham who was asked by Hastings to examine Karim on that point. (Hastings to the Secret Committee, 31st May, 1820, *Bengal Secret Letters*, Vol. 19, and Capt. Stoneham to Hastings, 6th May, 1820, *Enclosures to Secret Letters from Bengal*, Vol. 21.)

4) Jenkins to Elphinstone, 22nd Sept., No. 35, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Oct. 1815, 8th Oct., No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Oct. 1815. Elphinstone to Adam, 14th Oct. 1815, No. 10, enclosing copy of letter from Hindu Rao Ghatke to Dajiba Deshmukh, 11th Sept., No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th November 1815.

5) In a Treaty concluded secretly between Sindhia and Holkar in 1815-16, the first article described the common allegiance due from them to the Peshwa. (No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th Aug. 1818.)

6) Elphinstone to Adam, 14th Oct. 1815, No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th Nov. 1815, and Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 10th Sept., No. 31, Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th October 1815.

well, the Peshwa's position would never permit him to perform. Balaji Kunjar, an aged man of repute who had formerly been a minister of the Peshwa, went round on a visit to the Maratha Princes; in the autumn of 1815 he proceeded from Sindhia's Court to that of the Raja of Berar. Although he professed a complete indifference to politics, and gave out that he was going to a place of pilgrimage, to spend the rest of his life in retirement, it was believed that his mission had the object of awakening those rulers to a sense of unity, and rallying them all under the standard of the Peshwa.¹ But Raghuji was not converted by Balaji's persuasion, and soon wished that his expensive guest would leave his capital.² Thus the secret efforts towards unity made in 1815, chiefly on the initiative of Baji Rao, had produced no result, and through the firmness of Elphinstone, the Peshwa had been obliged to surrender his low favourite.

The important events of 1816 found Sindhia disinclined to avail himself of the opportunities which arose. Raja Raghuji Bhonsla and Wazir Muhammad, the respective rulers of Berar and Bhopal, died in March of that year. Those States were both strategically and politically very important, and Daulat Rao Sindhia was aware that the British would surely take advantage of the distractions that were bound to arise in those quarters. However, as though the British attitude in 1814 on the Bhopal negotiation had so completely frightened him, he took no interest in the intrigues that followed Raghuji's death at Nagpur, nor did he show any inclination to take part in the affairs of Bhopal.³ He even expressed satisfaction when he received the intelligence that the disorders at Nagpur had terminated in Dharmaji's arrest, and the establishment of British influence at that Court.⁴ Another occasion which concerned Sindhia far more intimately arose in the shape of the difficulties of Jaipur, which was again being harassed by Amir Khan. The Jaipur Durbar appealed to Maharaja Sindhia earnestly for help against the Pathans.⁵ But in spite of the inveterate enmity which he cherished against Amir Khan, and the alarms produced by the diplomatic and military measures of the British with regard to

1) Jenkins to Adam, 31st October, No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th November 1815.

2) Jenkins to Adam, 4th December 1815, No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th January 1816.

3) Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 3rd April, No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th April 1816, and 23rd April. No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th May, 1816.

4) Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 31st May, No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th June 1816.

5) Resident with Sindhia to Resident at Delhi, 19th May, No. 27, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June, 1816. Resident with Sindhia to Resident at Delhi, 4th June, No. 25, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd June, 1816.

Jaipur, Sindhia made little attempt to profit by the comparatively advantageous situation. His only efforts consisted of the tardy support of a body of 1500 men, sent out from his own camp, and loose orders issued to his two reluctant and disobedient generals, Bapu Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Bhao, to proceed to the rescue of Jaipur.¹ Although he was strongly desirous of driving Amir Khan from Jaipur, and also of preventing it from falling under British control, he showed no energy or decision in attempting to achieve those ends.² Later, he became markedly indifferent to the requests of that Prince.³

The condition of Holkar's Government was growing steadily worse. Sindhia failed in his desire to obtain control and influence over its affairs. Amir Khan was the real obstacle. The Pathan was Sindhia's great rival in the Rajput country, and not only were Jaipur and Jodhpur under his control, but it was feared that Mewar would also be lost to Sindhia in the same way. In any case, any union between Sindhia and Holkar remained an impracticable proposition, in spite of Sindhia's wishes⁴ and Holkar's distress.⁵ The Regent Tulsi Bai was eager to free herself from the control of the military under Ghafur Khan.⁶ Matters grew steadily worse owing to the further dissensions between Mina Bai and Tulsi Bai, the former being keenly suspicious of the Regent Bai's attitude towards her. These internal jealousies left Amir Khan free to pursue his own designs abroad, and he showed no inclination to take any advantage of the disputes.⁷ The condition of Holkar's State, at the time, made it "neither useful in alliance nor formidable in hostility."⁸

1) Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 22nd May, No. 28, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June 1816. Bapu Sindhia was known to be friendly with Amir Khan.

2) Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 2nd June 1816, No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th June 1816. Jaipur Vakil complained to Sindhia about Bapu Sindhia's delay and evasion. Resident with Sindhia to Resident at Delhi, 4th June, No. 25, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd June, 1816. Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 22nd June, No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th July, 1816.

3) Resident with Sindhia to Resident at Delhi, 6th Aug., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th Aug. 1816. Resident with Sindhia reported to Moira "The Jeypore question is now very little thought of." (Aug. 13th, No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Sept., 1816.)

4) In fact, a Treaty was concluded between Sindhia and Holkar in 1815-16 for a defensive union. The Resident came to know about it three years later. (Stewart to Adam, 23rd July, No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th Aug. 1818. The text of the Treaty No. 22, *Loc. Cit.*)

5) Acting Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 8th Dec. 1815, No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th January 1816.

6) Same to same, 18th Dec. 1815, No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th January 1816.

7) Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 3rd April, No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th April 1816.

8) As Moira expressed it in his letter to the Secret Committee of 11th Aug. 1815 (*Bengal Secret Letters*, Vol. 16, p. 299 onwards).

The changes which took place in another Maratha State have been reviewed in the last chapter. After Raghujī's death, Nagpur became a subsidiary State, and Hastings naturally relied upon it as having passed out of the list of probable enemies. But this feeling of security was not of long duration. Appa Sahib was attached to his allies only from selfish interest, in order to draw support from British strength against his enemies at Nagpur. He supported that alliance with earnestness, so long as he required their help. But very soon he grew cold, and once his object was attained, his attitude began to undergo a perceptible change. During his Regency, his position was not wholly secure. His hopes as the presumptive heir to the throne were still awaiting fulfilment. However, he did not have to wait long. On the 1st February, 1817, Raja Parsoji Bhonsla was found murdered in his bed-room,¹ and, as the rightful claimant to the vacant throne, Appa Sahib succeeded him.² This event represented the final fulfilment of his personal ambitions, and then followed the change in his attitude. The old ministers, Nagu Pandit and Narain Pandit fell into disfavour because they were considered to be the supporters of the British alliance. Negotiations with the Vakils of the Peshwa and also of Sindhia and Holkar were secretly carried on by the Raja without the knowledge of the British Resident. The latter had to protest against the change in the ministry and the secret conversations with foreign envoys against the terms of the Treaty.³ At that very time, the Peshwa was screening Trimbakji, and secretly designing to unite the other Maratha States with himself against the British. The new Raja showed great eagerness in the affair and held anxious conferences with the Poona Vakils at the time. The Resident was given the usual assurances of faithful attachment, but Jenkins did not fail to use all the necessary precautions. It was at his instance that Lieutenant-Colonel Adams posted suitable detachments, properly equipped under European officers, at Nagpur, Betul and Hushangabad.⁴

This sketchy review of the situation at the different Courts shows how circumstances had conspired to produce a growing estrangement between the Maratha Princes and the Company's Government.

1) Jenkins found evidence later to show that Appa Sahib was responsible for Parsoji's secret assassination. (His Despatch dated 14th April 1818, No. 25, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th July 1818, and his private letter to Adam, 12th March, No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th July, 1818.)

2) Formally installed himself on 21st April 1817. (Jenkins' *Report Op. Cit.*, p. 132).

3) Jenkins to Adam, 3rd May, No. 28, Bengal Secret Consultations, 31st May 1817, Jenkins to Hastings, 9th May, No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th May 1817.

4) Jenkins to Hastings, 30th May, No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1817.

This coolness was a common feature of all the four principal States. That the attempt to revive the Maratha Confederacy in 1817 did not bring forth equal efforts and sacrifices from them all, is to be ascribed to the differing mentality and condition of the four Princes. The Peshwa was smarting under British dependence, particularly after the last treaty. He was the most active of all, and harboured the most hostile motives. The new Raja of Nagpur appeared to be ready to follow his lead. But both were placed under strict checks imposed by the treaties, and by the presence of British forces in their States. The condition of Holkar had been reduced to "extreme debility and insignificance."¹ There was no outstanding personality at that Court capable of striking a bold line of policy or of marshalling its resources with any vigour or definite purpose. Daulat Rao Sindhia was undoubtedly "looked up to as the great support of the native States against the aggrandisement of the British Power, and he no doubt feels his own importance by giving encouragement to that idea."² But he lacked enterprise and earnestness. Indecision and lethargy were his growing characteristics. Moreover, he was convinced of the utter futility of taking any bold step against the British. Captain Close, the British Resident at his Court, was of this opinion, and reported that "Sindhia, however desirous he has always shown himself to bring about a re-union of the Mahrattas, seems never to have thought of forming a general confederacy out of all the neighbouring States." It appeared to him that the Marathas had formerly been guided by a national feeling, but that after their division into separate States, they could not act together.³ Sindhia had, moreover, come to realise the relative strength of his State, and that of the Company's Government. "Anxiety and alarm were fast succeeding to the jealous rivalry and contentious spirit which the violent among his courtiers still vainly flattered him was the policy warranted and demanded by his relative position among the Powers of India."⁴ It was in this frame of mind that after the summer of 1817, the various Maratha Sovereigns carried on secret attempts to bring about a combination of their strength and resources. The Peshwa's agents were engaged in urging Holkar⁵ and Amir Khan, Sindhia and Bhonsla⁶ to make common cause against the foreign Power.

1) Adam to Metcalfe, 24th May, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th May, 1817.

2) Close to Adam, 26th May, No. 29, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June, 1816.

3) *Ibid.* 4) Prinsep. *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 388.

5) Elphinstone to Adam, 18th July, No. 35, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th Aug. 1817, and 27th July, No. 22, and also No. 23, (the intelligence received from the camps of Holkar, Amir Khan, Zalim Singh of Kota, of Sindhia's Hirkarras at Poona, etc.) Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Aug. 1817.

6) Jenkins to Hastings, 30th May, No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June 1817.

All the secret correspondence which went on among the Indian rulers, was fully known to the British Government, as were also, naturally, their plans and intentions. The Residents and Political Officers maintained a close and highly efficient staff of secret news-writers and local agents at the different camps and capitals of the Princes. They kept their Government fully and regularly informed of what was passing. Even the conversations held in strict privacy behind closed doors came to be reported, more or less in detail, to the Residents.¹ Nothing escaped the vigilant eye of the British Government. In all the schemes which they adopted for the establishment of their power and the tranquillity of the country, they made full allowance for the possibility of having to deal with potentially hostile States, seething with discontent, and smarting under their political control. Therefore, whilst this element was never absent from the grand military preparations which Hastings decided to make in 1816-17, the ostensible justification of these measures was furnished by another factor, which he could no longer ignore.

As before remarked, the Pindari Chiefs had entered into definite engagements with Sindhia in the summer of 1815, agreeing to abstain from plunder and to settle on the lands allotted to them.² But they lost no time in violating these conditions, and they very soon renewed their former occupation of plunder and rapine with increased cruelty and audacity.³ As soon as the season of 1815-16 opened, they carried their inroads into the Deccan. Although the Nizam's dominions⁴ suffered most, their depredations inflicted cruelties

1) For example, the paper of intelligence forwarded by Close to Adam, No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th Aug. 1816, and another, No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1817. Baji Rao complained to Malcolm at Maholi against Elphinstone, that the latter so completely watched him that he knew "the very dishes that were served at his meals." Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I, p. 303. Similarly, the Resident at Lucknow received "hourly" reports from his "newswriters and Hirkarras" (Baillie to Moira, 13th July, 1814, *Oude Papers, Home Misc.* Vol. 518, p. 615, and Cole at Mysore "employed secret spies" for procuring information (despatch to Madras Government, Feb. 10th, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar. 1814).

2) Close to Moira, 20th May, 1815, No. 89, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th June, 1815, and 13th June, No. 75, Bengal Secret Consultations, 4th July, 1815, and Wauchope to Adam, 19th Aug. No. 146, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Sept. 1815.

3) Jenkins to Adam, 20th Oct. No. 14 and No. 15, (Intelligence Paper) Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th Nov. 1815, Russell to Adam, 2nd Nov., No. 33, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th Nov. 1815. Col. Doveton to Russell, 28th Oct., No. 34, and 30th Oct., No. 41, Close to Adam, 6th Nov. 1815, No. 45, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th Nov. 1815.

4) Russell to Adam, 21st Nov. 1815, No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Jan. 1816.

and violations on the subjects of Bhopal,¹ Nagpur,² and the Peshwa,³ not excluding those of Sindhia himself.⁴ The Deccan expedition returned with rich booty.⁵ They were encouraged by their successes, and in the beginning of 1816 they fitted out a second expedition which set out for the Deccan in February.⁶ This incursion reached even further than the last inroad, and caused greater injuries to the life and property of the people of the Company's Madras Presidency. Going beyond Hyderabad, passing through Musalipatam, they appeared at Guntur. They attacked that civil station and "committed various depredations attended with acts of the most outrageous violence."⁷ This inroad of the Pindaris was the worst that had been experienced by the people in the South. It was attended by the grossest forms of cruelty, torture and violence to women. A number of villages were burned; poor people fled into the jungles to escape the horrors of Pindari oppression. A general panic ensued. The moral injury resulting in the loss of confidence was even greater than the material injury they suffered.⁸

It became abundantly clear that Sindhia was incapable of exercising any control over the Pindaris. Since he kept up "the farce of considering them subject to his authority, and they, in return, affect to acknowledge themselves his obedient and humble servants,"⁹ the British Government very naturally remonstrated with him about the Pindari outrages. Sindhia was conscious of the blame which would attach to him, and the odium that he would incur from the States

1) Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 4th Dec., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd Dec. 1815.

2) Jenkins to Adam, 17th Nov., No. 4, and 21st Nov., No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Dec. 1815.

3) Elphinstone to Moira, 10th Dec. 1815, No. 83, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Jan. 1816.

4) Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 4th Dec., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd Dec. 1815.

5) Acting Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 1st Feb., No. 55, (Big merchants of Ujjain were sent for in Chitu's camp to buy the valuable jewellery brought from the Deccan), No. 56, Bengal Secret Consultations, 2nd Mar. 1816.

6) Acting Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 3rd Mar. 1816, No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd Mar. 1816, and Wauchope to Adam, 7th Mar. No. 57, Bengal Secret Consultations, 16th Mar. 1816, also Jenkins to Adam, 13th Feb. No. 9, and 15th Feb. No. 10 and No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 9th Mar. 1816.

7) Magistrate Guntur to Secretary Judicial Department, Fort St. George Government, 11th Mar. No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Apr. 1816, and of 12th Mar., pp. 35-6 (*Papers Relating to Pindari and Maratha Wars*, printed, *Home Misc. Series*, Vol. 516a).

8) A Commission was appointed to enquire into the injury inflicted on the people of Madras Province by the Pindari inroad of Mar. 1816. Their Report pp. 50-63 Vol. 516a, *Op. Cit.*

9) Acting Resident with Sindhia to Adam, 8th Dec. 1815, No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Jan. 1816.

which the Pindaris devastated.¹ He was anxious to restrain their activities and curb their mischievous power. The British Resident renewed his protests several times, complaining against Sindhia's indifference towards the suppression of those freebooters.² This state of affairs continued throughout 1816 and part of 1817.³ For the greater part of the year 1816 Sindhia's best force was fully occupied in an attempt to reduce the rebellious Raja of Raghugarh.⁴ Moreover, he could not make up his mind as to what could be done to put an effective check on the Pindari leaders. Besides "the pecuniary difficulties, the mutinies and the numerous embarrassments to which this Government (of Sindhia) continues to be subject,"⁵ his evasive and uncertain attitude towards the Pindaris must be ascribed to "his habitual and increasing love of ease and indolence."⁶ Captain Close ably summed up his situation in these words; "His Highness certainly has in this case to contend with numerous conflicting interests and feelings. If he were seriously to restrain the plundering incursions of the Pindaris; the effect must be to turn them loose on his own possessions, should he be sensible of his inability to act against them, he must yet be alarmed at the probable consequences of such a confession. Should he sincerely and honestly concur in measures for their destruction, he would lose the aid of a powerful body on whose existence he may perhaps count for the preservation of a fancied independence."⁷

With the perpetual fear and distrust of British power at the back of his mind, Sindhia had also the consciousness of his inability to deal a decisive blow at the powerful Pindaris. It was a difficult situation for him. And yet he knew, and admitted, that since he claimed them as his subjects, the British had a just right to call upon him to restrain them. He seems to have had a vague desire, which his pride forbade him to avow openly, that the British would offer to co-operate

1) *Ibid.* and a Despatch of 25th Apr. No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th May 1816.

2) Close to Moira, 13th Aug., No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Sept. 1816.

3) Adam to Resident with Sindhia, 14th Jan. Nos. 1 & 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Jan. 1817; and of 15th Feb., No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 16th Feb. 1817; Close to Hastings, 9th July, No. 34, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th July, 1817 and 26th Aug. No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 12th Sept. 1817.

4) Close to Moira, 23rd Apr. No. 11, 11th May 1816. Although Raghugarh fell on 3rd Sept. (Despatch of 4th Sept. No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Sept. 1816), Raja Jai Singh kept on harassing the possessions of Sindhia after that time. (Despatch to Moira, 7th Jan. No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Jan. 1817.)

5) Close to Moira, 9th May, No. 32, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th May 1816.

6) Tod to Adam, 9th June, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th June 1817.

7) To Moira, 3rd Apr. No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Apr. 1816.

with him in suppressing the Pindaris. Hints were even thrown out by his ministers with that object, but the British Resident had no authority to give any undertaking of the kind.¹

When the British Government, naturally impatient at Sindhia's hollow promises, learnt that as soon as the season of 1816-17 had opened the Pindaris again commenced their inroads,² they decided to take a stern course of action. The Resident with Sindhia was required to wait on the Maharaja to demand from him an explanation of the Pindari outrages, and to ask him to declare whether he was at war with the British Government.³ That attitude had a serious effect on Sindhia, if only for a time. He ordered a force of 5,000 horse and six battalions of infantry to move out under Bala Rao Inglia.⁴ Bapu Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Bhao were also instructed to join that contingent, which eventually went under Jacob, since Inglia did not wish to stir out of his Jagir.⁵ These measures, following the threatening letters which Daulat Rao Sindhia had issued to Chitu and Namdar Khan,⁶ showed that he meant to carry out his intentions against the Pindaris.⁷ But it seems that those preparations were directed more out of an anxiety to avoid a rupture with the British⁸ than with any real zeal to uproot the Pindari evil. His Government possessed neither the energy nor the proper means to effect that purpose.⁹ This was exemplified by the indifferent progress which the expeditionary forces

1) Resident Close expected that a proposal for a system of co-operation "would be made by Sindhia". (His letter 25th Apr., No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th May 1816.) The Maharaja's minister did discuss the question on those lines later, but the Resident gave him no decisive answer. (13th Aug., No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Sept. 1816); also his Despatch of 26th Nov., No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Dec. 1816. Elphinstone wrote to Lord Keith on 26th Nov. 1816 "The Resident with Sindhia is of opinion that if the demand were seriously made, Sindhia would at once agree to all the measures requisite to enable us to crush the Pindaris." Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I, p. 341.

2) Resident at Nagpur to Resident with Sindhia, 6th Sept., No. 49, Supt. Political Affairs, Bundelkhand, to Adam, 17th Sept., No. 52, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Sept. 1816; Adam to Jenkins 23rd Nov., No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd Nov. 1816; and Collector Ganjam to Board of Revenue, 6th Jan. 1817, and Secret Letter from Government Fort St. George, 27th Jan. 1817, pp. 47-8, *Home Misc.* Vol. 516 a.

3) Note of Instructions, No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Jan. 1817.

4) Close to Adam, 7th Feb., No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st Mar. 1817.

5) Tod to Adam, 29th May, No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June 1817.

6) No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Dec. 1816.

7) Resident with Sindhia was of this view. His Despatch No. 5. Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Dec. 1816.

8) A paper forwarded by Tod to Adam (23rd May 1817) No. 18. Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1817, and Close to Adam, 7th Aug. No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Aug. 1817.

9) Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 7th Jan. No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Jan. 1817.

made in the fulfilment of their mission, and the violent differences which occurred amongst the commanding officers themselves.¹

In the meantime, the subject was undergoing a thorough discussion in the councils of the British Government, both at Calcutta and in London. The Government of Bengal came to the unanimous conclusion that vigorous measures for the suppression of the Pindari marauders were indispensable.² This important decision was arrived at on the 21st December, 1816, but, owing to the lateness of the season its systematic execution was postponed until the opening of the next season, about the month of September.³

Just after the Board of Control in England had issued their strict instructions of 5th September, 1816, in favour of a pacific policy, they received the account of the Pindari excesses committed on the subjects of the Company's Government in the spring of 1816. "Warmest indignation," was excited in their minds, and forthwith fresh instructions were issued to the Governor-General-in-Council authorising the adoption of a bold policy for the suppression of the marauders. Whilst a distinction was still maintained between warlike policy for a remote political advantage and a military exertion in defence of their subjects, the Government in India was given full discretion to employ adequate defensive measures and to demand co-operation from the Indian Princes.⁴

These concurrent decisions, taken almost simultaneously, but independently, by the authorities in England, and by their Government at Calcutta, gave Hastings the opportunity of undertaking the plans which he had been vainly urging on his colleagues and employers for three years. Very naturally, therefore, he made the fullest preparations to put those plans into execution.

Military measures against the Pindaris were continued in the winter of 1816 and the spring of 1817.⁵ But the full scheme for

1) Tod to Adam, 9th June, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th June, 1817;

2) Secret Letter from Bengal, 21st Dec. 1816, *Home Misc.* Vol. 516 a, p. 45, also the Minutes of the Governor-General, 6th Dec., No. 13 of 16th Dec., No. 17, Edmonstone's Minutes, 7th Dec., No. 10, 13th Dec., No. 9, of 12th Dec., No. 14, and 21st Dec. No. 18; Seton's 8th Dec. No. 11, 14th Dec. No. 15, and Dowdeswell's 10th Dec. No. 12 and 14th Dec. No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Dec. 1816. In the general decision to destroy the Pindaris the whole Board agreed, although Edmonstone held to the view that Sindhia was genuinely desirous of joining in their suppression, and did not think there were any schemes involving the accession of strength of Sindhia or Holkar to the Pindaris.

3) Governor-General's Minute *Op. Cit.* No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Dec. 1816.

4) *Home Misc.* Vol. 516 a, pp. 40-42. Despatch was dated 26th Sept. 1816.

5) Particularly Colonel Walker's operations in pursuing them. Adam to Jenkins, 23rd Nov., No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 23rd Nov. 1816. Resident with Sindhia to Secretary Adam, 26th Nov., No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Dec. 1816. Secret letter from Fort St. George, 27th Jan. 1817, *Home Misc.* Vol. 516 a, pp. 47-48.

exterminating them root and branch, was timed to begin in September, 1817, when the grandest preparations were undertaken.¹ The resources of the British Government were brought into full play, and a mighty army was marshalled to round up the Pindari hordes, hunt them out of every corner of the land, and destroy them completely. It consisted of a force of about 115,000 strong, both regular (91,000) and irregular (24,000)² and its distribution and movements as regards time and rendezvous were carefully arranged. The plan embraced the whole of Central India and Rajputana.³ The Governor-General was to take the field in person, in command of the centre division. The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, Sir Thomas Hislop, had been asked to assume the charge of the Deccan Army, with Sir John Malcolm in his camp as the Political Agent of the Governor-General.⁴

The thorough and extensive plan of operations against the Pindaris, including the careful provisions for a possible war with the Maratha States, together with the events that followed, fall within the province of a military historian. In this limited study concerning the political relations of the States one has to be content with the bare mention of the military actions that took place.

In the summer months of 1817, Maharaja Sindhia was still wavering between an open and determined attack on the Pindari Chiefs and a weak policy of bringing them under his control through negotiation.⁵ During this time, Hastings was maturing his schemes for drastic action, and in the month of September Sindhia's Government was confronted with the unalterable determination of the British to have their way.⁶

1) Hastings did not wish to let Sindhia know of these plans in advance. (His Minute No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Dec. 1816). The Resident with Sindhia was later even instructed to tell Sindhia that "The British Government is aware of the embarrassments which have prevented him from taking immediate steps against the Pindaris, and that his failure would not be misconstrued by the Governor-General-in-Council." (Adam to Resident with Sindhia, dated 21st June, No. 15, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1817.)

2) Grant-Duff, *Op. Cit.*, (1912) Vol. III, p. 399.

3) The military plans are described by Prinsep, *Transactions*, Vol. II, pp. 11-17.

4) Governor-General's Minute, 10th May, No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th May, 1817.

5) Tod to Adam, 29th May, No. 17, and No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June 1817. Resident to Hastings, 9th July, No. 24, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th July, 1817, 30th July, No. 34, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Aug., 7th Aug., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Aug. and 15th Sept., No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th Oct. 1817.

6) Resident told Sindhia's minister "Our plans are laid and nothing could now change them." (Resident to Hastings, 27th Sept. No. 35.) and three days later Sindhia had given permission for the passage of Hislop's forces through his territory (to Adam, 30th Sept., No. 37, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th Oct. 1817).

The assent of the Board of Control for the suppression of the Pindaris had by this time been received in India. But the Governor-General thought that something more was needed to meet the situation. He declared again his "settled conviction that no system of measures which did not comprehend the reform of the greater States of Central India and the revision of our relations with them all would effect the extirpation of the predatory system (in which sense alone the extirpation of the Pindaris is an object of any consequence)." He therefore took upon himself the "unparticipated responsibility" for the comprehensive measures which he adopted.¹

Lord Hastings left Calcutta in July, and arrived at Cawnpore in September. From Cawnpore, he sent down definite conditions to be put to Daulat Rao Sindhia for acceptance. If he rejected them, he was to be treated as an enemy. He was required to furnish his troops to act with the British force against the Pindaris, distributing his infantry, cavalry and artillery as desired by the British Government. No Pindaris were to be sheltered or employed by him. He was not to raise any further troops without the concurrence of the British Government. The Maharaja himself was to engage to remain at Gwalior or at any other place which might be designated for him, during the operations. And finally, since Sindhia had failed after long expectations to suppress the Pindaris whose re-union must be prevented, and since the British Government had resolved to take that step, the subsisting Treaty between Sindhia and the British Government was to be considered virtually dissolved. Therefore, Hastings felt that the British were free to enter into treaties with the substantive States on the left bank of the Chambal. Securities for the observance of these conditions were considered desirable, and consequently Sindhia was asked to surrender some of his best forts during the operations. If the Maharaja declined to accede to the terms, the Resident was to take leave, quit Sindhia's Camp, and withdraw to the Governor-General's headquarters. In any case, operations were to be commenced, either against the Pindaris or against Sindhia.² This action was followed by a draft treaty, embodying the terms demanded from Sindhia, and defining the changed relationship.³ The British Government's firm attitude naturally alarmed the Maharaja,⁴ but no further wavering or procrastination on his part was admissible. Hastings

1) His Minute for the Council, addressed to Edmonstone, 10th Oct., No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Oct. 1817.

2) Adam to Resident with Sindhia, 28th Sept., No. 4, and draft of a note to be presented to Sindhia, No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Oct. 1817.

3) Despatch, 30th Sept., No. 6, and draft of treaty of thirteen articles, No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Oct. 1817.

4) Close to Adam, 6th Oct., No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Nov. 1817.

demanding clearly "I must learn at once whether he be a friend on whom I am to place reliance, or whether I must resort to the procedure which his standing in the light of an enemy would impose on me."¹ The discussion on the Treaty opened on the 6th October.² The Maharaja's Government showed surprising indifference on the question of allowing the British the freedom to enter into an alliance with the Rajput States,³ on which point some resistance was expected.⁴ Obstinate reluctance was shown in giving up the fortress of Asirgarh.⁵ The time to be allowed to Sindhia to decide was to be so regulated by the Resident as "to bring him to a determination by the 26th October, when the centre and right divisions will have effected the passage of the Jumna."⁶ The Maharaja assented to the terms, and on the 5th November he signed the Treaty, which was ratified by the Governor-General on the very next day.⁷

This engagement was prefaced with the expression of the mutual desire to destroy the predatory system, and to prevent its renewal.⁸ Its main provisions dealt with the measures to be adopted towards these ends. The lands in the possession of the Pindaris were to be restored to their rightful owners. The Maharaja agreed to provide 5,000 efficient horse to act against the Pindaris. He was not to augment his army, which during the war would occupy certain positions allotted to it by the British Government. British garrisons were to be admitted into his two forts of Asirgarh and Hindia, which were to be restored to him after the close of the war. The Government of Sindhia released the Company from the restriction imposed upon them by Article Eight of the Treaty of 1805, by which the British were precluded from entering into an alliance with the States of Hindustan. At the same time, the British Government disclaimed any interference with those States which were clearly and indisputably the tributaries of the Maharaja Sindhia.

This Treaty settled in a peaceful manner an issue which had always been doubtful, namely, Sindhia's attitude in the war against

1) Hastings to Close, 26th Oct., No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th November 1817.

2) Resident's Despatch, 11th October, No. 56, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th November 1817.

3) *Ibid.*

4) Resident's Despatch of 3rd October, No. 42, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th October 1817.

5) Resident's Despatches of 15th Oct., No. 67 and 16th Oct., No. 69, and 20th Oct., No. 72, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th November 1817.

6) Instructions to the Resident, 28th September *Op. Cit.*

7) Adam to Close, 6th Nov., No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Nov. 1817.

8) The preamble of the Treaty, No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st November 1817.

the Pindaris. He was practically disarmed by the British, the Treaty itself conferring many advantages on the British in their immediate object against the Pindaris. The British were released from the galling restriction of the former treaty—a point to which they rightly attached great importance. The Treaty was a great achievement, and the Government felt justly elated over it.¹ It brought out clearly the relative strength and position of the contracting parties in their reality. The weaker of the two had to submit to conditions imposed on it by the stronger. But theoretically and constitutionally, Sindhia continued to remain an independent ruler, whose relation with the Company's Government was merely that of "amity and friendship".

Hastings had never ceased to smart under the restrictive provision (Article 8) of the Treaty of 1805,² and now that it was removed, he meant to reap to the full the advantages of the change. The policy he applied towards the Rajput States as a result of that liberation merits separate treatment (next chapter). In the meantime, it is interesting to follow the events in Central India which developed into a Maratha War.

Amir Khan, another powerful Chief, second in strength perhaps only to Sindhia, was a force to be reckoned with.³ It was desired "to waken a little the hopes of Amir Khan with a view to detach him from the rest of the predatory bands."⁴ The negotiation, which had been discouraged earlier, was re-opened through the Resident at Delhi. At first Amir asked for rather extravagant terms in exchange for his security and maintenance.⁵ But the shrewd Pathan understood his interests, and agreed to Metcalfe's proposals.⁶ He signed a Treaty on the 9th November.⁷ The British Government guaranteed him the independent possession of his lands and territory. Amir Khan undertook to disband his army, to dispose of his artillery to the British, and to refrain from all aggressions on other States. His force was to serve

1) *His Private Journal*, Vol. II, pp. 231-33.

2) *Loc. Cit.* Vol. I, p. 301, also his Minute of 1st December 1815, paras 79, 84, 89 and 115. *Op. Cit.*

3) Governor-General's Minute of 1st December 1815, paras 25 and 26, of 13th April 1816, *Home Misc.* Vol. 604, 5th June 1816, No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th June, 1816.

4) Hastings to Metcalfe, 5th May, 1817, *Kaye's Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, pp. 457-8.

5) Metcalfe to Adam, 13th August, No. 39, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th September 1817, and Adam to Metcalfe 1st October, No. 13. Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th October 1817.

6) He found himself placed between the forces of General Donkin and Sir D. Ochterlony. (*Amir Khan's Memoirs*, pp. 463-5.)

7) Metcalfe to Adam, 9th November, No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th November 1817.

on the requisition of the British Government.¹ His son was to proceed to Delhi as a hostage for the due fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty.² Thus a fairly powerful Chief, who might have been a possible enemy of the British, was successfully converted into a peaceful ally. Once a plundering Pathan, who preyed upon the Princes and their subjects he was now settled as the head and founder of a State, and became His Highness the Nawab of Tonk. The arrangement, though viewed with doubts and dissatisfaction by some sagacious persons,³ was justified by its results.

Having secured the neutrality of Sindhia and Amir Khan by means of negotiation and diplomatic effort, Hastings' military operations commenced under fortunate auspices indeed. On the 16th October he crossed the Jumna to take command in person. The different divisions of the Deccan army were already on their way converging on Malwa. Three British officers were sent to take up their positions in the three divisions of Sindhia's army, under Generals Baptiste, Bapu Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Bhao.⁴ General military action against the Pindaris had been commenced before the close of the rainy season, and their leaders soon began to realise that they had to meet a formidable attack. They experienced great difficulty in finding an asylum for their families, for no Prince would admit them into his territory.⁵

It is now time to refer to the events which made the Pindari campaign develop into a war against the Maratha Rulers (except Sindhia and the Gaekwar). The first among them to strike that line of action was, as one would naturally imagine, the Peshwa.

His last humiliation still rankled and, although by his deep dissimulation he was able to persuade Malcolm⁶ that he had no warlike designs, he had been hatching such a plan. On the pretext of raising men to co-operate with the British against the Pindaris, as recommended by Sir John Malcolm, Baji Rao began vigorous preparations. He even took other steps with the same object, such as requiring the Jagirdars to

1) The Treaty of Six Articles, forwarded by Metcalfe, on 10th November, No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th December 1817.

2) Metcalfe to Adam, 11th November No. 32, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th December 1817.

3) Such as Captain Sutherland and Sir David Ochterlony. (Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, footnote in Vol. I, p. 464.)

4) Adam to Ochterlony, 21st November, No. 7, and to Malcolm, No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th December 1817.

5) Resident with Sindhia to Hastings, 26th August, No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 12th September 1817.

6) Malcolm went round on a political mission to visit the different Courts of Mysore, Hyderabad, Nagpur and Poona, before taking up his duties in Sir Thomas Hislop's camp. He met the Peshwa at Maholi, on 9th August 1817. Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, pp. 169-70; also Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I, p. 386.

recruit men for his army, and conciliating the Raja of Satara and his own brother.¹ On the occasion of the Dashera, on the 19th October, a great military display took place, which the Resident witnessed. The latter at once wrote to Bombay for a European Regiment, and requested General Smith to send back reinforcements. The Peshwa, with his habitual indecision, could not decide on definite action, and was still deliberating with his council on the attack.² The Resident had a most anxious time on the night of the 28th October; but Baji Rao, with his usual hesitation, lost his opportunity. The British battalion arrived on the 30th,³ but the Peshwa had gone too far to retrace his steps. The action took place on the 5th November at Kirki.⁴ The British Residency was burnt, but the British forces met and repulsed the Peshwa's heavy numbers. The day went against the Peshwa, who lost heavily in the number of killed and wounded, as compared with the Company's troops.⁵ Moro Dikshit, the Peshwa's prominent officer, lost his life in the battle, defending his master's standard.⁶ Brigadier-General Smith returned to Poona on the 13th November, attacking the town on the 16th, and on the following day the Peshwa and his army abandoned his camp.⁷ Thenceforward, Baji Rao became a wandering fugitive, his pursuit being taken up by Brigadier-Generals Smith and Pritzler with energetic action.⁸

On receipt of the news of the outbreak of hostilities at Poona, Hastings sent down prompt instructions for the Resident's guidance. Baji Rao was not to be restored to the Government of Poona on any terms. It was decided to annex the Peshwa's country, and to exclude Baji Rao and his House from sovereign authority for all time. He was to be expelled from the Deccan or his person seized. Jagirdars were to be continued in their possession, excepting Baji Rao's adherents, such as Gokhale, whose lands were to be confiscated. The Raja of Satara was to be set up as a separate Jagirdar, or established in a small and compact sovereignty to conciliate Maratha sentiment. Elphinstone was allowed full discretion in applying these principles. The Governor-General appointed him as the Sole Commissioner of the conquered territories, fully empowering him to administer the country and settle its civil Government.⁹

1) Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I, p. 371.

2) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 372.

3) Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. I, pp. 372-5 and 379.

4) Elphinstone to Hastings, 6th Nov. 1817, *Home Misc.* Vol. 516 a, pp. 119-121.

5) Forrest's *Official Writings of M. Elphinstone*, pp. 180-7.

6) *Ibid.*, 187, and Prinsep, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 61.

7) Prinsep, Vol. II, pp. 64-5.

8) *Home Misc.* Vol. 516a, pp. 137-41.

9) Adam to Elphinstone, 15th Dec. 1817, *Home Misc.* Vol. 516a, pp. 266-8

The Peshwa was chased from place to place,¹ his forts² were attacked one after another and reduced. His troops came into action with the Company's forces more than once. A battle took place at Koregaon on the 1st January, 1818,³ and another at Ashta on the 20th February following. Baji Rao was defeated at the latter spot and had to flee, leaving his brave general Gokhale dead on the field. The British gain in the action included the rescue of the young Raja of Satara and his family.⁴ Considering the decision arrived at relative to the future of the Peshwa's Government, the recovery of the person of Shivaji's descendant was a notable political advantage, of which Elphinstone at once made full use. He treated the young Prince with becoming courtesy. He was taken to Satara, where Elphinstone waited on him on the 4th March.⁵ He had already issued a proclamation in the name of the British Government, declaring the annexation of Baji Rao's dominions to the British possessions. He also announced the intention of placing the Raja of Satara "at the head of an independent sovereignty of such an extent as may maintain the Rajah and his family in comfort and dignity."⁶

Hastings' determination to abolish the Peshwaship for ever rested in the belief that this institution was bound to claim the allegiance of the other Maratha Sovereigns, whose implicit obedience would always be rendered to the Peshwa, no matter what pledges they might give to the British Government, or what individual filled that office. Hastings came deliberately to the conclusion "there must then be no Peshwa."⁷

Thus whilst Baji Rao and the Peshwaship were disposed of simultaneously, events in Nagpur had taken a similar turn. It has been previously noticed that at heart the Raja agreed with Baji Rao and sympathised with him in the discussions preceding the Treaty of June, 1817. The Resident (Jenkins) was taking full precautions against him. After the Peshwa had opened hostilities against the British, the Raja received the Khilat (robes of investiture) sent from Poona, with great devotion and ceremony, in spite of the Resident's warnings.⁸ This was, of course, a forecast of future events. After making preparations, and

1) *Loc. Cit.* pp. 197-201.

2) Strong fort of Simlegarh fell on 2nd March 1818, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 245.

3) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 180-1.

4) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 219-21.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 238.

6) Issued on 11th February, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 245-7.

7) His letter to the Court of Directors, 20th June, 1818, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 362-3.

8) Jenkins to Hislop, 24th Nov. 1817, No. 136, Bengal Secret Consultations, 26th December 1817.

learning, that Baji Rao had already led the way, the Raja opened war on the British. In the fierce fighting that ensued at the Battle of Sitabaldi, on the 26th and the 27th November, in which both sides lost heavily, the Raja's side was defeated.¹

As soon as Hastings learnt of the happenings at Nagpur, he instructed the Resident to remove Appa Sahib from the throne, and to place Raghuji's grandson on it.² These instructions did not reach Jenkins until he and Brigadier-General Doveton, who arrived there on the 12th December, had decided to offer terms to the Raja.³ They were presented to him on the 14th, and he was forced to submit to them on the morning of the 16th December, on which day the Raja repaired to the Residency at 9 A.M. The British proceeded to occupy the city of Nagpur.⁴ The Raja's Arab soldiers resisted the British attack, and repulsed the British on the 24th, but were eventually forced to retire and leave the town on the 30th December, when Doveton occupied Nagpur.⁵ When Jenkins received the Governor-General's instructions of the 19th December, he already stood committed to Appa Sahib's restoration.⁶ But as he explained in his despatch of the 16th January, in his action he had anticipated the salient features of the instructions, with the one exception of Appa Sahib's removal. The plans adopted included the securing of the complete command of the country. Whoever might become the ruler, no substantial authority was to remain in his hands. Jenkins advocated "the principle of governing the State ourselves through responsible ministers, making such a provision for the Prince and his family and dependents as may make him respectable." The settlement was to follow the Mysore arrangement, with this difference, that "I should introduce more direct and constant interference in every branch than was there found expedient."⁷ So that, in essence, and apart from the person of the ruler to be recognised, the Resident's action was not in any way less drastic than that which the

1) Lieut-Col. Scott to the Adjutant-General of the Deccan Army, 30th Nov. 1817, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 133-5.

2) Adam to Jenkins, 19th Dec. 1817, No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 9th January 1818.

3) Jenkins to Adams, 16th Dec. 1817, No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 9th January 1818.

4) The Battle of Nagpur, after which the Raja's ammunition and 75 guns were captured by the British. General Doveton to the Adjutant-General, 19th December, *Home Misc.* Vol. 516a, pp. 148-50.

5) The whole series of incidents summed up in Hastings' letter to the Secret Committee, 21st August 1820, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 426-30.

6) Jenkins gave his motives in keeping Appa Sahib on the throne. His Despatch of 6th January 1818, No. 39, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Feb. 1818.

7) Jenkins' Despatch to Adam, 16th Jan., No. 30, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th February 1818.

Governor-General had directed him to take. A fresh treaty was prepared for the Raja, which was signed and executed on the 6th January. It laid down that he retained his *Masnad* until the pleasure of the Governor-General was known, on the conditions that he ceded certain territories (parts of the country on either side of the river Narbada, Berar, Gawilgarh, Sirguja, Mandala, Sohagpur);¹ the government of the country was to be conducted by ministers in the confidence of the British Government, according to the Resident's advice. All those forts which the British Government might demand were to be delivered immediately.² These terms were accepted by the Raja, and approved by the Governor-General,³ and the Raja returned to his palace on the 9th January. The Resident took measures to arrange for the government of ceded and reserved territories.⁴

The conditions of the Raja's restoration must, of course, have made him more unfriendly to the British Power. Very soon, his sympathies with the cause of Baji Rao reasserted themselves, and revealed his real feelings. He planned to join the ex-Peshwa near Chanda. But the Resident was vigilant, as usual, and seized Appa Sahib before he could achieve his object.⁵ Since the Resident reported that proofs⁶ had been obtained that Appa Sahib was connected with the murder of Raja Parsoji Bhonsla in the preceding year, and in view of Appa Sahib's correspondence with Baji Rao, it was decided to send him, with his two ministers, Nagu Pandit and Ram Chandra, to Allahabad, under a proper guard.⁷ Jenkins was directed to raise the grandson of Raghuji, who was the rival claimant to the throne when the British supported Appa Sahib in 1816, and to invite the Dowager Rani, Buka Bai, to assume the regency. The infant ruler ascended the *Masnad* on the 26th June, 1818, and the Bai became his guardian. Hastings was in favour of selecting a minister or two to carry on the administration. But before his sentiments could be made known to the Resident, the latter had

1) These were very fertile parts, yielding a net revenue of Rs. 22,47,200; Prinsep Vol. II, p. 101.

2) These were the main provisions of the Treaty. (Full text in Aitchison's *Treaties, Op. Cit.*, (1909), Vol. I, pp. 424-5.)

3) Adam to Jenkins, 22nd January, No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th March 1818.

4) Resident to Adam, 15th February, No. 27, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th April 1818.

5) Jenkins' *Report, Op. Cit.*, p. 135.

6) Jenkins to Adam (private letter), 12th March 1818, No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th July, 1818.

7) Jenkins' Despatch, 6th May, No. 38, Bengal Secret Consultations, 26th May, 1818.

chosen European Superintendents for several divisions to function under his control.¹

On the morning of the 13th May, Appa Sahib himself escaped from the escort of Captain Brown, who was conducting him to the Fort of Allahabad, and fled in disguise.² He joined the Cond Chiefs, and organised their forces in opposition to the British, but they were easily dispersed, and he was obliged to fly for his own life as a desperate fugitive, reaching Asirgarh to seek shelter there with Jaswant Rao Lar.³

Baji Rao and Appa Sahib, both very impatient and disgusted at the strict and increasing control of the British imposed by the presence of British forces in their dominions, attempted to shake off their dependence. Both lost their Kingdoms and were reduced to a miserable condition. Appa Sahib, on the fall of Asirgarh, made his escape to Hindustan. He next retired to Jodhpur, where he died in 1840.⁴ Before taking a final glimpse at the declining fortunes of Baji Rao, it is only fit that a short account should be given of the transformation through which Holkar's State passed in this time of crisis. For this, we must revert to the autumn of 1817.

Holkar's position was, similar to that of Sindhia, independent (by treaties) of British control. Although not so powerful as his rival, the State of Malhar Rao Holkar still commanded great resources, which his weak Government was incapable of organising or controlling. Hastings applied to this State the same principles with which he had reduced the proud position of Sindhia. He directed Metcalfe to tell Holkar's administration, that the British Government considered it an indispensable branch of its duty to settle the disorders of that Government, which was in a state of decay and dissolution, since the Regent Bai had lost all authority over its affairs. She was unable to restrain the soldiery or to oppose the Pindaris. "If Holkar's Government," said the despatch, "possess neither the power nor the inclination to bear its part in a duty incumbent on every substantive State in India, it must incur the consequences of its inability to discharge that duty, and must either submit to be considered as an accomplice of the freebooters, or must place its resources at the disposal of a Power which will direct them to their proper object." The despatch went on to affirm

1) Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 21st August 1820, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 435-46. His instructions to the Resident, 28th June, Nos. 3 and 4, Resident's Despatch, 26th June, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th July 1818.

2) Jenkins' Despatch, 17th May, No. 59, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th June, and also p. 338, Vol. 516a.

3) Jenkins' *Report*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 135.

4) Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, (1909), Vol. I, p. 385.

that "No power in India is capable of assuming that direction of affairs of the Holkar family, excepting the British Government, which, in the failure of those States whose more immediate duty it was, has been compelled to take the lead in the important work of destroying the Pindari powers." On these grounds it was urged that "in fact the dissolution of Holkar's Government and its absolute incapacity to maintain the relations of peace and amity have nullified the engagements concluded with Jaswant Rao Holkar in January, 1806, and have absolved the British Government from any necessity for respecting the provisions of that Treaty, which is not imposed by general equity without reference to specific convention." Hastings made it quite plain that if Holkar did not submit to his conditions, he was determined to treat the State as an enemy to be destroyed with the predatory bodies. The Regent Bai and the boy Maharaja were required to place themselves under British protection, and to reside at some place in Khandesh or on the Narbada until their country was settled by the British power. The latter were to be released from the restriction of the Treaty of 1806, thus becoming free to conclude separate treaties with the Rajput Princes; and, finally, the State must aid the British in their operations against the Pindaris, and recognise whatever arrangements they might come to with Amir Khan. These instructions were issued on the 1st October, from the Governor-General's Camp at Cawnpore,¹ and Metcalfe attempted, though in vain, to carry them out.²

Since the increasing desire of Tulsi Bai to obtain freedom from the oppression of the Pathan party was well-known, the negotiations were expected to yield results satisfactory to the British interests. At this time, the Assistant Resident at Sindhia's Court, Captain James Tod, was sent to Kota to concert measures with Raj Rana Zalim Singh and the Maharao of Bundi for their aid in the Pindari War, and he was desired, by reason of his vicinity to Holkar's capital, to open negotiations with that Government, and to avail himself of the dissensions of that Court.³

While such were the expectations with which Metcalfe had charged Tod's mission towards Malwa, circumstances precipitated the crisis, and turned the course of events at Holkar's Court. The Deccan army, under Hislop, was advancing. In the early days of December,

1) Adam to Resident at Delhi, 1st Oct. 1817, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Oct. 1817.

2) Metcalfe to Adam, 17th Oct., No. 48, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th November 1817.

3) Metcalfe to Adam, Nov. 15th, No. 37, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th Dec. 1817; 21st Nov., No. 108, and Metcalfe to Tod, 21st Nov., No. 109, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th Dec. 1817.

its Third Division under Malcolm was chasing energetically but unsuccessfully the Pindari leader Chitu.¹ The divisions of the Deccan army approached Holkar's Dominions, and matters had to be settled with that Government, either by its submission or by open rupture. Therefore, Malcolm opened negotiations.²

As has been already seen, on the 6th November, the Peshwa, and on the 26th of the same month, Appa Sahib, the Bhonsla Raja of Nagpur, had opened hostilities against the British. The War against the foreigner had begun. Holkar's army was requisitioned by the head of the Maratha Confederacy. This factor rapidly changed the situation. The military party was in favour of supporting the Peshwa, and fighting the British as the common enemy. This was the dominant voice in the councils of Holkar's Government. The *Sardars* resolved on war. Preparations were commenced. Vakils sent to the British camp for conducting negotiations were recalled. The Regent, Tulsi Bai, who had formerly evinced a desire to enter into alliance with the British, was seized and the young Maharaja was put under strict guard.³ The Pathan Chiefs, Ghafur Khan, Raushan Beg and Raushan Khan, decided in council to punish Tulsi Bai with the penalty of death. Accordingly, she was taken down to the bed of the River Sapri early in the morning of the 19th December, and was publicly beheaded.⁴ No further doubt remained as to the attitude of Holkar's Government.

Hislop and Malcolm had fully anticipated that attitude before the murder took place. They combined their forces at Ujjain on the 12th December, and marched towards Mahidpur, where Holkar's army was assembled. When the negotiations failed to bring about an agreement, the British army advanced, and an attack was made on the carefully drawn up forces of Maharaja Malhar Rao at Mahidpur on the 21st December. The charge was led by Malcolm himself, and a deadly battle ensued, lasting from mid-day till 8 o'clock. Malcolm was loyally served by his European and Indian soldiers, and both displayed great bravery and resolution under the hottest fire from the guns on Holkar's side.⁵ The Company's army lost heavily, but Holkar's was destroyed.⁶

1) Malcolm to Hislop, 13th Dec. 1817, "I never was within fifty miles of the freebooters, and their flight was too rapid to afford me the least chance of reaching them." Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, p. 197. (Footnote.)

2) The letters exchanged between Malcolm and Holkar, *Home Misc.*, Vol., 516a, p. 186.

3) Malcolm to Adam, 24th Dec. 1817, *Loc. Cit.* pp. 184-6.

4) William's letter, 29th Dec., *Loc. Cit.* p. 162.

5) Malcolm to the Adjutant-General of the Deccan Army, Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, pp. 212-15.

6) Hislop to Hastings *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 166-9. The description of the battle by an English eyewitness, Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, pp. 232-4.

This decisive action put Maharaja Malhar Rao in the hands of the British. The Prince was hardly eleven years old, but he and his State had to suffer in full measure the consequences of the action of the military Chiefs. Malcolm opened negotiations with Tantia Jog, Holkar's able minister, whom he received in his camp on the 3rd January. The terms he offered were the confirmation of Amir Khan's independence and his engagement with the British, the cession of Holkar's claims on the Rajput States, the gift to Raj Rana of the four districts which he had rented from Holkar, and lastly, the cession in perpetuity of the whole of Holkar's possessions to the south of the Satpura Range, including Khandesh; Tantia Jog earnestly protested against the harshness of these terms. He pleaded piteously that Holkar's loss in territory to the British, to Amir Khan and to Zalim Singh was far too great, and that the terms involved an undue humiliation for his master, and that he would be deprived of some of the most cherished and ancient possessions of the Holkar House.¹ All these entreaties proved to be in vain. The vanquished party was to be deprived of all possible means of ever rising in arms against the British power.² Tantia Jog could only appeal for a kinder consideration at British hands. The minister realised as fully as Malcolm, that in the position to which his master had been reduced, nothing more could be done. But in dealings between States, feelings of kindness seldom affect public interests. Malcolm remained firm and did not relax his demands. On the 6th January, the Treaty was signed, and Holkar was obliged to accept the British terms in their entirety.³

This Treaty of Mandasor revised the relations between the British and Holkar. The former position of equality between the two became one of subsidiary and subordinate alliance. Besides the renunciation of all claims over the territory of Amir Khan, the Parganas in the possession of Zalim Singh of Kota, and the tributes from the Rajput States, Holkar was bound down to receive a British force in his territory to keep internal order. He had to reduce his own superfluous troops, to maintain a contingent of 3,000 horse to serve with the British force, to submit all foreign disputes to British arbitration and to abstain from any communications with other Powers. Lastly, it was

1) Malcolm to Adam, 6th Jan. 1818, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 188-90.

2) *Kaye's Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, p. 226.

3) With one minor exception, 9 unimportant villages of Walgaun (the birthplace of Holkar) were to be restored to Holkar if the Governor-General were satisfied with his conduct. *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 190.

provided that the British Government would not permit the Peshwa¹ to exercise any sovereignty over Holkar.²

This was another achievement of Hastings for his Government. Holkar was debased from the position of a free Power to that of a protected State in subordinate alliance with the Company. The settlement with Holkar squared even more completely with Hastings' aims and ambitions than that arrived at with Sindhia. British ascendancy was established, and the military power of the State was broken. The height of Hastings' triumph was reached by this Treaty. The aim of his early days was realised. Within a few months from October 1817 to January 1818, that high political purpose had been accomplished, chiefly through military successes. Although military operations continued for some time longer against the Peshwa, the Pindaris and the Raja of Nagpur, it became quite evident that what remained was only the necessary but less important part of what had already been achieved. Hastings was able to report to the Court of Directors on the 8th February that all essential operations (except those in the State of Poona) had terminated and that the Company's arrangements had assumed their destined shape.³

The military operations which were continued to round-up the Pindaris, and to pursue the Peshwa, need not occupy much more space. Jaswant Rao Bhao, Sindhia's rebellious general, was attacked by Major-General Brown. He fled into the deepest fastnesses of Mewar to Kumbhalmer, but was pursued by the forces under Major-Generals Donkin,⁴ and Malcolm, and surrendered to the latter on the 14th February.⁵ A day later, Karim Khan, the Chief of the Pindaris, surrendered at Jawad after wandering as a fugitive in the hills and jungles and remaining hidden in disguise for some time. He gave himself up to Malcolm on a promise of pardon and future subsistence.⁶ Karim and other Pindari Chiefs accepted the arrangements, which Malcolm offered them for the allotment of lands in the Gorakhpur District in the Upper Provinces, and were sent off to settle there.⁷ Chitu, another Pindari leader, was found killed by a tiger in the

1) This clause was welcomed by the minister, and was inserted at his request. Malcolm to Adam, 7th January, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 192.

2) Text of the Treaty of 16 Articles, p. LXXXVI, and Malcolm's Despatch of 7th January *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 190-2.

3) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 203.

4) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 236-7.

5) Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, p. 230 and also *Home Misc.* Vol. 516a p. 237.

6) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 237, and 253-4.

7) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 260. Captain Stoneham was appointed to that duty to act as superintendent of Pindari Chiefs. Despatch to him, 10th June, No. 34, Bengal Secret Consultations, 26th June 1818.

jungle, whither he had gone to seek safety from the incessant pursuit of Malcolm's men. His sword, his horse and his bones were found. His son Muhammad Panah surrendered to Malcolm.¹

During the task of pursuing and destroying the freebooters in Malwa, Malcolm received unstinted support from Holkar's Government under its prudent minister, Tantia Jog.² He learnt that Baji Rao was moving towards him, and this news roused the soldier-diplomat's natural keenness, and his spirit of energy and ambition. He made preparations to meet the contingency.³

The first indirect offers from Baji Rao reached Malcolm on the 14th May,⁴ direct overtures being received on the 17th of that month, when an emissary from the fugitive Prince arrived in the British General's camp.⁵ In the meantime, military arrangements were pushed forward. Baji Rao had no hope even if he thought of resistance. With Doveton in his rear at Burhanpur, and the forces of Malcolm and Colonel Russell close by, he was completely surrounded.⁶

Thus Baji Rao and Malcolm, who had previously made each other's acquaintance in the field of diplomacy, met again, but in very different circumstances, Malcolm, favoured by destiny at every turn of his eventful career, the Maratha depressed and defeated, alarmed and sorrowful. At the long and painful interview which took place, Baji Rao was told clearly that the British had made up their minds, and that nothing on his part could alter their decision. He must give up all hopes of regaining even a shadow of his sovereignty.⁷ If he delayed submission, he would merely bring ruin upon himself. The terms proposed for his acceptance, were, his resignation for himself and his heirs of all claim to the Poona Government in exchange for a liberal pension from the British Government, which Malcolm engaged would not be less than eight lakhs a year. He was to retire to some place in Hindustan. Further, his adherents would be treated liberally. These terms were to be accepted within twenty-four hours.⁸ The inevitable happened, and Baji Rao moved to Malcolm's Camp on the 3rd June,

1) Watson to Wellesley (Resident at Indore), Feb. 27th, No. 61, Bengal Political Consultations, April 3rd, 1819.

2) And also from Raj Rana Zalim Singh (Malcolm to Hastings 10th May, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 296-9.)

3) Malcolm to Low, 17th May 1818. *Kaye's Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, p. 237.

4) *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 300.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 337.

6) As Baji Rao himself told Malcolm, *Kaye's Life of Malcolm* Vol. II, p. 246 also *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 337.

7) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 353, 354-6.

8) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 353.

pitching his tent within half a mile of the General's.¹ Thus ended the career of the last of the Peshwas. He was moved to Bithur, where he lived for many years on the handsome pension to which Malcolm had committed his unwilling Government.²

With the disposal of Baji Rao and the final disappearance of the Peshwa from the public scene, Hastings' political measures achieved their end. The military activity, which began to slow down by the formal dissolution of "the Deccan Army" at the end of March 1818,³ did not complete its operations until the fall of the famous Fort of Asirgarh. Its commander, Jaswant Rao Lar, held out, in apparent defiance of his master, Maharaja Sindhia, and in opposition to the British demand for surrender. Malcolm suspected that Appa Sahib had taken refuge in the fortress and Chitu was certainly hovering about in the neighbourhood. When Jaswant Rao Lar showed a hostile attitude towards the British, the latter obtained Sindhia's consent to take possession of the place. On Lar's resistance, Sir John Doveton invested the fort which fell on the 19th April 1819, after a three weeks' close siege. In the subsequent search for Baji Rao's jewellery, which the British officers conducted, they accidentally came across a letter in Sindhia's own handwriting directing his commander, Lar, to obey Baji Rao's orders and to resist the British. This detection might have had a very damaging effect on Sindhia's relations with the British Government. The document discovered was conveyed to Sindhia by Hastings' orders, and as a penalty, the British decided to retain Asirgarh in their own possession. Beyond this, no further discussion took place between the two States.⁴

Whilst the military part of the Maratha War ended with the fall of Asirgarh and its loss by Sindhia, as the political side might be considered to close with the submission of the Peshwa to Malcolm, the arrangements made with the two minor States of Bhopal and Saugor, although not forming any part of the Maratha War, might be noticed at this stage. Their inclusion in this chapter is justified partly by the favourite position they occupied in Hastings' political discussions of that period, and partly by the important connection which they had, in his opinion, with the general political problem he set out to tackle.

1) *Loc. Cit.*, Malcolm to Adam, pp. 356-9 and to Hastings p. 356.

2) The amount of eight lakhs a year was considered too extravagant by Lord Hastings. It later formed the subject of a bitter controversy in which Malcolm defended himself. (Extract from his Despatches and private letters in Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, pp. 254-263). cf. Hastings to Secret Committee, 17th Oct. 1822, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 455-8.

3) Commander-in-Chief's general order of 31st March 1818, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 262.

4) Hastings to the Secret Committee, 17th October 1822. *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 462-66. Account of the siege *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, pp. 286-98.

The young Nawab of Bhopal who succeeded Wazir Muhammad in March 1816, repeatedly begged the British to take him under their protection.¹ But since the instructions of the Board of Control against that arrangement had been clearly laid down, the offer was politely declined,² although Hastings (then Earl of Moira) strongly favoured the alliance.³ But he abandoned this attitude when he set out from Calcutta for Cawnpore to lead the general operations against the Pindaris and the Marathas. He clearly avowed that he would boldly advance the political interests of the Company, and would fully avail himself of the situation in order to settle the country in a permanent state of tranquillity. So that, when military operations commenced, Hastings authorised Hislop and Malcolm to conclude a treaty with Bhopal.⁴ Malcolm opened negotiations by encouraging the Nawab to accept the terms offered him by Jenkins,⁵ who had addressed a letter to the Nawab through Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, asking him to accept conditions of defensive and subordinate alliance. Bhopal was to come forward to aid the British against the Pindaris in every way, surrendering its external independence.⁶ The Nawab accepted these conditions, and faithfully helped the British against the Pindaris.⁷ This agreement was later embodied in a formal Treaty which was submitted to the Governor-General on the 27th February 1818, and ratified by him on the 8th March.⁸ Thus Bhopal passed from a precarious condition to one of pledged protection under British power, and has remained in that position ever since. On account of its central situation, its alliance was then a coveted object. The conclusion of this Treaty was a part of the settlement of Central India as originally planned by Hastings.

1) Wauchope to Adam, 1st May, No. 21 and Nawab's letter to Supt. No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th May 1816, and another in July 1816, No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 9th Nov. 1816. No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th Jan. 1817, in Feb., No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Mar. 1817, two visits by the Nawab's Agent to the Resident at Nagpur; Jenkins to Adam, 25th Jan. 1817, No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Feb. 1817.

2) Adam to Wauchope, 9th Nov. 1816, No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 9th Nov. 1816.

3) His Minute of 1st Oct., No. 12, contained his sentiments, with which Seton agreed. Minute of 6th Oct. The whole Council agreed to refer the matter again to the Secret Committee, No. 13 and No. 15, Bengal Secret Consultations, 9th Nov. 1816.

4) Hastings to Hislop, 28th Oct., No. 29; Adam to Malcolm, 28th Oct., No. 30, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Nov. 1817.

5) Malcolm to Adam, 24th Oct., No. 44, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th Nov. 1817.

6) Jenkins to Adam, 15th Oct., No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Nov. 1817.

7) Hastings to the Court of Directors, 8th Feb. 1818, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 206.

8) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 333-5, and Aitchison (1909), Vol. IV, pp. 296-8.

The sister State of Saugor, owing to internal causes, offered a slightly stiffer problem for British diplomacy to deal with. The Nana, the nominal ruler, was kept away from actual administration by the manager, Binayak Rao, who really ruled to the exclusion and consequent discontent of Nana Govind Rao. Apart from this dissension, the British Government found another method of handling the Saugor case. The Peshwa had always claimed nominal sovereignty over the Chiefs of Saugor, Jalaun and Jhansi, and these he had transferred to the British Government by the Treaty of Poona (Article XIII). Hastings stepped forward to take full advantage of that transfer. He directed his agent in Bundelkhand to require the Manager to render to the British, who stood in the Peshwa's place, the allegiance which they owed to him. British protection was offered to him and to the State. In return, a fortress and a tribute of 50,000 Rupees a year were demanded. Binayak Rao was to be told how much he would profit by entering into the agreement. If Binayak Rao did not fall in with that proposal "he will be dispossessed of that territory should it suit the views of the British Government to support the pretensions of Govind Rao, which it must be considered at full liberty to do." The Manager was asked to make a prompt decision on the point.¹ But when these negotiations failed to make an impression on the Manager, a treaty was concluded with the Nana himself, by which he recognised British supremacy, and placed himself under their protection. He agreed to submit all disputes with other States to the British Government who, in return, engaged not to contract any agreement with the Dowager Bai or Binayak Rao, detrimental to the Nana's claims. The Nana ceded to the Company the territory of Mahoba pargana and certain other villages.²

Binayak Rao remained indifferent and would not recognise the Treaty. When diplomacy failed to win him over, force was resorted to, and Major-General Marshall was directed to march his army against the Manager. The Political Superintendent was also ordered to join the Major-General.³ The Manager could, of course, offer no further resistance. The Bai and Binayak Rao were removed and pensioned, and the administration was taken over by the British. The Nana retained the title, and the net revenues of the State were made over to him, after payment of the cost of administration, the pensions of the Bai

1) Adam to Wauchope, 29th July 1817, No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Aug. 1817. These instructions were carried out; Despatch from Adam to Wauchope, 9th Sept., No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 26th Sept. 1817.

2) Wauchope to Adam, 30th Oct., No. 163, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th Dec. 1817, forwarding the Treaty itself.

3) Adam to Wauchope, 15th Feb. 1818, No. 41, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Mar. 1818.

and Binayak Rao, and deduction of the tribute due to the British Government.¹ Thus Saugor, though its settlement was a little more difficult than Bhopal, received far more drastic treatment. It ceased to exist, not only as a political problem, but also as a political entity.

Before closing this chapter on the Maratha War and the changes which it brought about, mention might be made of another agreement which took place between the Company's Government and that of Sindhia, in June of 1818.² It did not possess any political importance, but involved the exchange of certain territories. It is worth mentioning because of the cession to the Company by Maharaja Sindhia of the important town and district of Ajmer, which is to-day a flourishing little spot of political value under British occupation, surrounded on all sides by the ancient States of Rajasthan. Ajmer was made over by Bapu Sindhia to Wilder on the 28th July, the latter being appointed its first Commissioner. Sindhia was also asked to make over to Bhopal the Fort of Islamnagar, to which the Nawab and his family had a particular attachment.³

Thus the war between the Maratha States and the English ended with the realisation in full measure of the Governor-General's early aim and ambition. Not only had the Pindaris been completely destroyed but the power of the major States of Hindustan had been broken, their political independence shattered, and the paramountcy of his own Government fully established. Sindhia, though nominally an independent ally, was greatly reduced in strength, and stood "insulated and precluded from any extraneous assistance.....girdled round by States which we have raised to the power of resisting him, even without our aid."⁴ Holkar was a smaller Power after the war, dependent on the British. Berar, which was also greatly reduced in size, was under British control owing to the Raja's infancy. The Peshwa, the chief source of embarrassment to the British and the rallying centre of Maratha nationalism, was finally uprooted.

1) Tribute to British Government	Rs. 1,00,000
Military Service	„ 1,59,840
Expenses of Administration	„ 69,800
Provision for the Bai and Manager	„ 2,50,000
	Rs. 5,79,640
Surplus payable to the Nana	Rs. 1,18,360
	Total Rs. 6,98,000

Hastings to the Secret Committee, 1st Mar. 1820, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 412-414.

2) Treaty dated 25th June 1818, Aitchison, Vol. IV, pp. 69 and 73.

3) Adam to Resident with Sindhia, 8th Feb., No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Mar. 1818, also Hastings to the Secret Committee, 1st Mar. 1820, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 403.

4) Hastings' speech in July 1818 to the European citizens of Calcutta, (reproduced in an Appendix) to White's *Considerations on the State of India*, p. 434.

The war resulted in the acquisition by the British of vast territories, although Hastings had not set out with that end in view, and disclaimed it as his principal motive for extending the political power of the Company. The dominions of the Peshwa, with the exception of a small area separated for the Raja of Satara, were annexed to British territories, and Elphinstone was organising its civil government, while Brigadier-General Thomas Munro was employed in settling the country south of the Krishna.¹ Large and rich territories were acquired from the Raja of Nagpur. Molony was appointed Commissioner of that part acting under the supervision of Jenkins.² The provinces of Khandesh and parts of Malwa acquired from Holkar were assigned to Malcolm, who restored order and peaceful life to that part of the country in the years 1818-1820.³ Major Marjoribanks was governing Saugor.⁴ Great and extensive as were the material gains of the Company in territory, still greater were the political advantages which resulted and which had been primarily the object nearest Hastings' heart. The new treaties gave the Company a clear ascendancy over the States of India. Their sovereignty in external affairs was taken away, and even in internal matters it was greatly circumscribed, more so in actual practice than in the words of the treaties themselves. The British Political Agents at the different Courts were not so much the ambassadors of a friendly Power, as the influential guides of the Indian rulers. A Resident was stationed at Holkar's Court. Major Agnew held that position temporarily, succeeded by Wellesley as the permanent incumbent of the post. They acted under Malcolm's supervision. The influence exercised by the Resident over the internal government became increasingly felt as something real.⁵ Captains Briggs⁶ and Dyson⁷ were employed to settle respectively Khandesh and the States of Banswara and Dungarpur. Captain Henley was deputed to Bhopal as the British Resident at that Court.⁸ The States of Rajputana were placed under the charge of Sir David Ochterlony, as the Resident-General of that province. Jenkins at Nagpur was

1) Hastings to the Secret Committee, 17th Oct. 1822, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 461.

2) *Loc. Cit.*, 21st Aug. 1820, p. 438.

3) Malcolm to Hastings, 10th May 1818, pp. 296-9, *Loc. Cit.* other letters. Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, Vol. II, pp. 307-11. Instructions issued to him 24th Apr., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th May 1818.

4) Hastings to the Secret Committee, 1st Mar. 1820, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 414.

5) Hastings' letter, 1st Mar. 1820, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, pp. 399-400.

6) Despatch of 4th Mar., No. 359, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th July, 1818.

7) Despatch of 2nd July, No. 59, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Nov. 1818.

8) Hastings' Despatch, 1st Mar. 1820, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 404.

practically the ruler himself, and was administering the country through European Superintendents, the Raja being a minor.

Such were the arrangements following the extensive operations undertaken by Hastings in the season of 1817-18. The consequences flowing from them completely satisfied his sanguine expectations.¹ In the previous chapters, an attempt was made to sketch his plan and programme with their early preparation, followed by the first steps of advance towards that aim. This chapter has briefly described its fulfilment, and may be considered as marking the time of his achievement.

1) His speech of July 1818 at Calcutta, White, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 441-457.

CHAPTER VI

RAJPUT STATES

THEIR IMPORTANCE-TREATIES WITH THEM EMBODY HASTINGS' POLICY-HIS DETERMINATION TO REDUCE THEM UNDER BRITISH INFLUENCE-INSTRUCTIONS TO METCALFE-THE LATTER'S ACTIVITY-KARAULI TREATY SIGNED IN NOVEMBER 1817-TERMS-AMONG THE INDEPENDENT RAJPUT STATES KOTA THE FIRST TO ALLY WITH THE BRITISH-ZALIM SINGH-TREATY-SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE-REMARKS-TOD CONCLUDES TREATY WITH BUNDI-JODHPUR ENGAGEMENT SIGNED AT DELHI-MARWAR GOVERNMENT'S FEARS-POINTS RAISED-TREATY WITH MEWAR SIGNED-TERMS THE SAME AS OTHERS-MEWAR ENVOY'S MEMORANDUM-KISANGARH AND BIKANER-JAIPUR NEGOTIATIONS PROTRACTED-TREATY SIGNED-TRIBUTE QUESTION-BANSWARA-PRATAPGARH-DUNGARPUR-FINALLY JAISALMER-THE NATURE OF THE TREATIES-THEIR INTENTION COMPARED TO THEIR APPLICATION-MEWAR-RUINED STATE OF THE COUNTRY-USURPATION OF THE FEUDATORIES AND FOREIGN POWERS-TOD'S SETTLEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT-IMPROVEMENT-RETURNING PEACE AND PROSPERITY-MARWAR-MAHARAJA RESUMES POWER-RESISTS BRITISH INTERFERENCE-OPPRESSES HIS FEUDATORIES-JAIPUR-MOHAN RAM'S RULE-MAHARAJA'S DEATH-RANI MOTHER REGENT-DISORDERS AND INTRIGUES-BRITISH VIEW-AN AGENT DEPUTED-INTERFERENCE DECIDED ON-KOTA-MAHARAO'S DEATH-THE NEW MAHARAO AND THE RAJ RANA'S SON-DIFFERENCES-DISORDER-BRITISH SUPPORT OF THE RAJ RANA-MAHARAO'S FLIGHT-RETURN-BATTLE OF MANGROL-MAHARAO RETREATS-SUBMITS-RESTORATION-REVIEW-INTERFERENCE-GENERAL TREATMENT OF THE RAJPUT STATES-TRIBUTE QUESTION-CONCLUSION.

CHAPTER VI

RAJPUT STATES

While it is beyond question that in the history of the relations of the British Government with the Indian States, Lord Hastings' term of office should be considered of great importance, the name of that Governor-General is still more particularly associated with the settlement of the Rajput States, which he finally drew within the sphere of British Influence. A treaty had been concluded with Jaipur in Wellesley's time,¹ but, as has already been observed, with the change in the policy of the Company's Government, it was cancelled by Cornwallis and Barlow. The Agreement formed with Jodhpur by Lord Lake in 1803 never came into force at all² since it was not ratified by the Maharaja. So that with the minor exceptions of Alwar³ and the two Jat principalities of Bharatpur⁴ and Dholpur,⁵ the whole block of Rajput country on the western bank of the Jumna and extending its frontiers to the Punjab, Sindh, Gujarat and Malwa remained for political purposes a stretch of uncontrolled territory. This position continued until 1817, when Hastings embarked on his grand operations to tranquilise Central India and establish paramountcy in the country.

There are many good grounds for giving separate treatment to his dealings with the Rajput Princes. In the first place they formed then, as in many respects they do now, a group by themselves very similar to each other and yet very different from the other States in historical traditions, social conditions and political institutions. Moreover at that time their special interests were certainly not identified with those of the Maratha Princes whom Hastings set out to reduce. In fact the Rajput States found in British alliance a much needed relief and deliverance from the miserable conditions to which they had been reduced by Maratha oppression for half a century, owing to the destruction of their resources in wealth, population and political prestige. Since they furnished a source of strength and a field of prey for the Maratha Rulers and Amir Khan, the real rivals of

1) In 1803 and ratified by the Governor-General on January, 15th 1804. Aitchison, *Op. Cit.* Vol. III, pp. 102-103.

2) The Treaty, *Loc. Cit.* pp. 157-158.

3) Treaty of 1803 and another engagement of 1811. *Loc. Cit.* pp. 322-323 and 324-325.

4) *Loc. Cit.* pp. 275-277.

5) *Loc. Cit.* pp. 292-296.

British Power, the Rajput States were embraced by Hastings as the natural friends of his Government. He saw in their alliance not only a check to the extension of the power of Sindhia, Holkar and Amir Khan, an object of considerable value in his estimation, but the acquisition of immense strategic advantages for the Company's military and political position in Central India. "The establishment of our influence over those States would interpose strong barriers between the Sikhs and those Powers which might be expected to aid them."¹

He also expected to utilise the resources of the Rajput country for defensive and offensive purposes, against internal and external enemies of the Company.² It was not merely in the British attitude towards them that the Rajput States offered a problem for special treatment. Even after the conclusion of the treaties, their execution presented peculiar difficulties in those States on account of local conditions, which will be observed as this account progresses further.

Another interesting feature about the treaties binding the Rajput States in political relation with the Company is worth mentioning. They contain essentially those principles which Hastings, at the very commencement of his term of office, laid down as the ideal political arrangement. In this case he found almost untrodden ground on which to enter and chalk out his own plans for the foundation of the future edifice of political relationship. And so the treaties with these States were fashioned after Hastings' policy.

When he left Calcutta for the Upper Provinces of Hindustan personally to direct operations in the field he had set out with a determination to bring the Rajput States within the pale of British protection. It was principally on this point that he decided, on his own personal responsibility, to overstep the limits laid down for him by the Board of Control.³ He was not prepared to postpone action any longer. This again was the principal and most important motive in his mind for presenting to Sindhia a new treaty to modify the old one, concluded by Barlow in 1805, the restrictive clause of which Hastings had always resented. While Maharaja Sindhia was still considering the articles of the proposed agreement in October 1817, instructions had at the same time been issued to Metcalfe, the Resident at Delhi, to open negotiations with the Rajput Rulers. It was indeed unnecessary to wait for the final result of the conversations at Gwalior. The Governor-General had made up his mind.⁴ If peaceful negotiations

1) His minute of December 1st 1815, *Op. Cit.* para. 84.

2) *Loc. Cit.* paras. 89, 152, 302, 303.

3) His letter to the Vice President of the Council from Cawnpore, October 10th, No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th October 1817.

4) Hastings to Metcalfe October, 5th, 1817, Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, pp. 459-60.

failed, he was determined to achieve his purpose even by a war with Sindhia, should that extreme step be deemed necessary to obtain for the British Government the required freedom to treat with the Western Powers of Hindustan. While the definite measures for defining the relations with them could be suspended until Sindhia's attitude had been ascertained, no delay was to be allowed in arriving at a general understanding with them. The twofold object of that policy was "to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits assigned to it by the measures now in progress."

It could be achieved by one of two alternative plans, "either by combining them (the three principal Rajput States at least) in a common league under the paramount authority of the British Government or by concluding separate engagements with each State on the conditions best adapted to its peculiar circumstances and situation." But owing to the distractions prevailing in them, and their mutual pride and jealousy, a system of confederation was difficult, and the latter mode was, therefore, considered preferable. It was desired to contract relations of alliance with Udaipur (Mewar), Jaipur (or Dhundar), Jodhpur (Marwar), the smaller States of Kota and Bundi (Harsuti) and Karauli, and also with the three principalities of Banswara, Dungarpur and Pratapgarh (the off-shoots of the Udaipur House) situated on the Gujarat border and with the distant States of Bikaner and Jaisalmer. The instructions issued in 1816 to the Resident at Delhi for conducting negotiations with Jaipur were to form the basis of the terms he was asked to offer to the various Rajput States. However, Metcalfe was not to insist on the cession of a fort by the contracting State. The question of tribute was also to be re-examined in view of the possibility that Sindhia and Holkar might accept British terms without resort to warfare. In that case, the British Government would guarantee them the tributes from the different States, which had been regularly paid to the two Maratha Princes. But, "the question of Sindhia's and Holkar's tribute is to be treated as one between the British Government and the two latter Powers exclusively. So that all direct intercourse between the Rajput States and Maharattas shall cease." Hastings was keen that the negotiations should not be delayed or hampered by these minor details. If the engagements could not be concluded with all, they were to be formed with as many as possible. "Every step we take is so much gained, and offers a fairer probability of combining the rest in the same arrangement." Metcalfe was asked to invite the co-operation of the Chiefs in suppressing the Pindari freebooters, and in preventing their revival. The general object of securing their co-operation to the

extent of their means was deemed much more important than the conclusion of definite agreements, since it was believed that such co-operation would lead to their dependence on the British Government. These instructions formed the contents of an important despatch, issued from the camp of the Governor-General on the 8th October.¹ Metcalfe soon became busy. The States were duly informed of the wishes of the Governor-General, and negotiations were set on foot with the agents of many of them at Delhi, in accordance with the directions sent out from the headquarters at Cawnpore.²

On the 9th November, the same day on which Amir Khan's agreement was signed, Metcalfe reported that the Maharaja of Karauli had accepted a Treaty through his Agent at Delhi.³ Karauli had been a tributary of the Peshwa, and by virtue of the Treaty of Poona,⁴ the British Government had acquired all rights over his tributaries in Hindustan and Malwa. The Maharaja acknowledged the supremacy of the East India Company, and in return was taken under its protection. No tribute was imposed upon the State, but it was stipulated that the Maharaja would furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government, according to his means. The Treaty bound the principality of Karauli in subordinate alliance to the Company's Government, without whose consent, no negotiations with other Powers were to be carried on.⁵ The Treaty was approved and ratified by the Governor-General on the 15th November.⁶

Excluding the case of Karauli, which was an acknowledged dependency of the Peshwa's, the first of all the independent Rajput States to respond to Metcalfe's communication was the small but well-to-do State of Kota, then under the clever management of Raj Rana Zalim Singh who, by his tact and sagacity, had acquired a great name. He had completely eclipsed the hereditary ruler of the State. Whilst the latter was acknowledged as the nominal sovereign, the Raj Rana himself wielded the real power. By his clever manipulation of the various contending interests and warring powers, not only had he

1) Adam to Metcalfe, 8th October, No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th October, 1817.

2) Metcalfe to Adam, 18th October, No. 50, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th November, 1817.

3) Metcalfe to Adam, 9th November, No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th November 1817, and 10th November, No. 23, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th December 1817.

4) Article 14 of the Treaty of June 1817, *Op. Cit.*

5) The text of the Treaty, Aitchison (1909), Vol. III, p. 284-5.

6) Adam to Metcalfe, 15th November, No. 30, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th December 1817.

saved the little State of Kota from Maratha and Pathan devastations, but he himself had become a factor of considerable importance in almost all the inter-state matters of Malwa. He remained friendly with all the Powers, paying tributes to Amir Khan and Sindhia, and farming districts belonging to Sindhia and Holkar, keeping on good terms with everyone—especially the most powerful.¹ He arbitrated in their disputes² and, above all, guarded the interest of his own State with remarkable foresight, maintaining a highly efficient force. The country was extremely well-governed. Such a shrewd statesman as Zalim Singh would not be slow to discern the path of safety and self-interest, since he had watched the rising power of the Company. Not only did he offer a contingent of fifteen hundred finely equipped men, and co-operate in every way with the British in the Pindari campaign, but he readily came forward to form an alliance with them.³

The Raj Rana, therefore, led the way in this matter, and the Treaty which Metcalfe concluded with his Agent at Delhi on the 26th December, 1817, became the model for similar agreements with the other States of Rajasthan. By it, the Maharao of Kota entered into a relation of "perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interest" with the East India Company. He accepted its protection, agreeing to have no dealings with other States, to refer all disputes to British arbitration, to act always in "subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and acknowledge its supremacy." He also agreed to pay that Government the tribute payable to the Maratha Chiefs, and lastly, to furnish the troops of Kota according to the means of his State, at the requisition of the British Government. In return for the surrender of his political independence, the Maharao of Kota and his successors were recognised as "absolute rulers of their country," into which the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the British Government would not be introduced. This

1) Close to Hastings (then Moira) 23rd April, No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th May, 1816. Metcalfe to Adam, 13th August, No. 39, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th September, 1817.

2) For example, between Sindhia and the Raja of Raghugarh (Resident with Sindhia to Moira, 18th August, No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Sept. 1816) and between Tulsi Bai and Amir Khan (Malcolm's *Central India* (1824) Vol. I, p. 306).

3) Close's Despatch of 23rd April 1816, *Op. Cit.* Tod's Despatches to Adam, 26th November 1817, No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 2nd January 1818, and 10th December 1817, No. 53, and 5th December 1817, to Malcolm, No. 50, Bengal Secret Consultations, 9th January 1818. Metcalfe to Adam, 18th Oct., No. 50, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th November 1817. As regards Zalim's administrative success. Tod wrote:—"I need say nothing of Zalim Singh. He might instruct me. I could little benefit him by advice." Tod to Ochterlony, 11th August, No. 104, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th November 1818. But it must be said that the Raj Rana's rule was high-handed and oppressive to the people, p. 1568. Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* (1920), Vol. III.

Treaty¹ was ratified by the Governor-General on the 6th January.² A tribute schedule was drawn up, and it was agreed to pay the amounts due to Sindhia, Holkar and the Pawars for Kota proper, the seven Kotris and Shahabad, into the British treasury at Delhi.³ In the following year, the British Government relinquished the Shahabad tribute, and ceded to Kota the districts of Dig, Pachpahar, Ahora and Gangrar.⁴

Two years later another question arising from this Treaty became a source of serious embarrassment. It related to the rights and authority of the titular as against the real ruler of Kota. Raj Rana Zalim Singh was the actual ruler, managing the affairs of the State in the name of its hereditary Prince Maharao Umed Singh, with whom, at the request of the Raj Rana himself, the Treaty had been concluded. Zalim Singh's agents at Delhi required an assurance from Metcalfe in the name of the British Government, that his position as the Premier of Kota would pass on to his heirs and successors, and he was anxious to have that guarantee embodied in the Treaty itself. Considering the loyal services rendered to the British Government by Kota under Zalim Singh's administration, the Resident at Delhi was willing to meet his wishes.⁵ Hastings supported his Agent in the matter, and the Treaty was modified by means of a supplementary article to "more effectually secure to Raj Rana Zalim Singh and his heirs, the authority and the privileges in the State of Kota which he now exercises."⁶ It is not to be wondered at that this apparently innocent assurance to the Raj Rana, for whose friendly exertions the gratitude and consequent loyal support of the British Government was a just recompense, later became the cause of trouble and civil strife in Kota. The British Government entered into a solemn agreement, the provisions of which were capable of incompatible interpretations.⁷ They guaranteed to

1) Text of the Treaty, No. 61, and Metcalfe's Despatch, Dec. 30th 1817, No. 60, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Jan. 1818.

2) Adam to Tod, 6th Jan., No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Feb. 1818.

3) Despatches on the disputed claims on Kota tribute, Adam to Metcalfe, 19th Jan., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Feb. 1818, and Metcalfe to Adam, 20th Jan., Nos. 109 and 110, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Feb. 1818, also the Schedule of the Treaty.

4) Aitchison, (1909), Vol. III, p. 372-3.

5) Metcalfe to Adam, 8th Jan., No. 69, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Jan. 1818.

6) Adam to Metcalfe, 19th Jan., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Feb. 1818. The supplementary article was concluded at Delhi, on 20th Feb., and ratified by the Governor-General on 7th Mar. 1818. Aitchison, (1909), Vol. III, p. 372.

7) Edmonstone later referred to this unfortunate provision as capable of producing, unless abrogated, "interference on our part of the most vexatious, injurious and embarrassing nature" (written evidence for the House of Commons Select Committee), *Parliamentary Paper*, 735-VI 1831-1832 Vol. XIV, p. 113.

Zalim Singh and his heirs the authority of the chief manager of the State, (thereby creating a hereditary Premier) and at the same time (by Article 10 of the Treaty), engaged always to recognise the Maharao (the rightful sovereign of Kota) and his heirs as "absolute" rulers of the country. What ruler could be really absolute whose Premier was chosen for him by an outside authority, and in perpetuity? The germ of instability was inadvertently laid in the agreement itself, and in course of time it developed to mischievous dimensions. In the meantime, most amicable relations had been established between the two Governments. The services of the Kota Durbar were warmly appreciated by Hastings in personal letters¹ to the Maharao and to the Raj Rana, and Tod delivered to the State the possession of the territories north of the Narbada, which had been taken from Holkar by the Treaty of Mandasor and were given to Kota² in appreciation of its sacrifices in the British cause.³

Metcalf had concluded the Treaty with Kota at Delhi, with Thakur Sheodan Singh, the Agent of Zalim Singh, who arrived there before Tod could begin his political duties in Harauti. But the conclusion of a similar engagement with the sister State of Bundi was left to be completed by Tod. That small State had always maintained a friendly attitude towards the British, and had suffered terribly from the exactions of the neighbouring Powers. Considering those facts, it was Hastings' wish to require no tribute at all from the Maharao of Bundi.⁴ When issuing those instructions, the Governor-General was under the impression that the tribute which it owed to Sindhia amounted only to the trifling sum of Rs. 10,000. But Metcalfe very shrewdly kept the question open, and desired Tod to include in the Treaty the stipulation that Bundi would pay to the British Government the amount which it regularly paid to Maharaja Sindhia.⁵ As it turned out, the latter claimed that his share of tribute from Bundi was Rs. 1,05,000 per annum. Although this figure was reckoned to be far in excess of the amount normally received, yet it appeared that Sindhia's claim was too substantial to be relinquished. Beyond the instructions regarding the settlement of tribute, there was no difficulty

1) Governor-General to the Maharao and to the Raj Rana, 3rd Feb., No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Feb. 1818.

2) *Ibid.*, and Tod to Adam, 26th Dec. 1817, No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Feb. 1818.

3) Article 3, p. LXXXVI, *Home Misc.*, (*Pindari and Maratha War Papers*). Vol. 516a.

4) Adam to Metcalfe, 8th Oct., No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Oct. 1817.

5) Metcalfe to Tod, 21st Nov. 1817, No. 103, Adam to Metcalfe, 28th Nov. No. 105, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th Dec. 1817.

to amount. The conditions were to be "but few and simple, providing for protection and guarantee on the one hand, and political dependence and subordinate co-operation on the other."¹

Tod left Kota on the 6th February, arriving at Bundi on the 8th. Discussions on the terms of the treaty began on the 10th. But, as he reported, the ruined condition of the country and the benefits of British connection, made any discussion unnecessary. The Maharao was all along cordial, grateful and appreciative. The Treaty was soon concluded, the tribute chargeable being Rs. 80,000. The Maharao gave in a memorandum of the places belonging to his State, which were then in the wrongful possession of other Powers. His particular grievance was against his astute neighbour, Zalim Singh, who had contrived to keep for himself the fort of Indragarh, a place specially dear to the Bundi Raj.² The Treaty was approved and ratified by Hastings on the 1st March.³ Before Tod had completed his political mission in Harauti, and set out for Mewar, whither he was deputed to proceed,⁴ Metcalfe had cast his net over two of the leading States of Rajputana, and converted them into subordinate allies of the Company.⁴

He had opened negotiations with the Agent of the Maharaja of Jodhpur (Marwar) at Delhi in October. That State was very cautious in yielding to the terms demanded by the British Resident;⁵ but their fears and prejudices were overcome by giving the necessary assurances. The Government of Marwar were afraid that the British would extend their interference from external affairs to internal administration, and wished to be quite sure that the Company's Government would not enter into separate engagements with the feudatories of the State. The Maharaja wished to resume the Jagir given under coercion to Amir Khan, and to recover, by armed force if need be, their fort of Amarkot, lost to the Chiefs of Sindh through the treason of their own

1) Adam to Tod, 20th Jan. No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Feb. 1818. Tod made full enquiries into the subject of Sindhia's share of tribute, and his information was that for (a) Crila (b) The Mahals of Kurwar and Barundini (c) The Chouth of Khalsa lands, Sindhia received for 5 years net amounts varying between 39 and 49 thousand Rs. a year, to which would be added Sindhia's share of (d) Patan, amounting to Rs. 40,000 p. a. (Tod to Adam, 24th Jan., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Mar. 1818.) The British Government had induced Holkar's Govt. to give up its claim on Bundi by Treaty of Mandasor, Art. A *Op. Cit.*

2) Tod to Adam, 15th Feb., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th May, 1818.

3) Adam to Tod, 1st Mar., No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Mar., and 20th Mar., No. 20, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th May, 1818.

4) Tod made Political Agent in Mewar. Adam to Tod 3rd Feb., No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Mar. 1818.

5) Metcalfe to Adam, 18th Oct., No. 50, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th Nov. 1817.

officer. He was also desirous of retaining the province of Godwar, which had been given to Jodhpur by the Mewar Government several generations ago, in the time of Maharaja Bijai Singh. The custom of giving shelter and protection to those who sought it was a time-honoured tradition with the Rajput States, and the Government of Jodhpur were anxious to preserve it. They also desired that the services of their contingent should not take their men beyond the Narbada. These were the chief points raised by the plenipotentiaries of Jodhpur, on which Metcalfe gave suitable and satisfying assurances. He removed their fears by referring to Article Nine of the Treaty by which the British Government were precluded from entertaining the applications of the Maharaja's Thakurs, or nobles, and further reassured them that his Government had no wish to introduce its laws or jurisdiction into Marwar. The Treaty was concluded on the 6th January at Delhi, with the usual provisions of defensive alliance, perpetual friendship, protection and subordinate co-operation. Article Eight laid down that the Jodhpur State would furnish a contingent of 1500 horse for the service of the British Government, and that whenever necessary, the whole of the disposable forces of the State would join the British Army.¹ The conclusion of this Treaty further increased the political prestige of the Company. An important State, with extensive dominions in Western Rajputana, was reduced to dependence.

Only a week later, Metcalfe concluded an agreement with the ambassador of Udaipur, Thakur Ajit Singh. On account of the fame of its past history, Mewar holds the premier rank amongst the several States of Rajputana. Its illustrious rulers had always fought chivalrously to protect their honour. For generations, Mewar had given to the country a succession of wise rulers, brave generals, heroic leaders, and even some fine poets.² But in the eighteenth century the fortunes of the country steadily declined. And just before Hastings' period of office, Mewar was perhaps the worst sufferer from Maratha and Pathan exaction. The depopulation and decay, the ruin and desolation, which the repeated inroads of Bapu Sindhia and Amir Khan caused in Mewar, had reduced the position of its ruler and the condition of its people to a

1) Metcalfe to Adam, 8th Jan. No. 66, Text of the Treaty, No. 67, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Jan. 1818. Same to Same, 20th Jan., No. 102, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Feb. 1818. The tribute was fixed at Rs. 1,08,000 (after all deductions) in Jodhpur Rupees, to be paid half in specie, and half in goods. (22nd May, No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 12th June 1818.)

2) Bapa Rawal, Samarsi Ranas Hamir, Lakha, Sanga, Kumbha, Pratap, Raj Singh, are illustrious names not only in the history of Mewar, but also in the annals of Hindustan. Tod's *Rajasthan* (1920), Vol. I, Chapters, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, etc.

low and miserable level indeed.¹ Therefore, when the British turned their attention to the Rajput States in 1817, they found the proud name of the ancient house of the Maharana humiliated, the fertile country, with its rich natural resources lying desolate, and many parts of it usurped by refractory nobles or Maratha generals.² From his high title of the "King of the Hindus," Metcalfe had anticipated some objections on the part of the Rana of Udaipur to accept the terms of "supremacy" and "subordinate co-operation" with the British Government. As he reported to the Governor-General:—"On account of these high pretensions, I expected some opposition to the third article, and was prepared to modify it as might have been requisite or expedient."³ Instead, the Rana's envoy raised another objection of a similar nature, but since he did not insist on it, the objection was eventually dropped.⁴ So that the Treaty, as it was finally signed on the 18th January, embodied provisions almost identical with those contained in the engagement with Kota and Jodhpur.⁵ The Mewar envoy presented to Metcalfe a memorandum of the claims for the restitution of territories in the wrongful possession of other Powers—Sindhia, Amir Khan, Holkar, Jodhpur, and Kota, and for the restoration of the Rana's sovereignty over the Chiefs of Banswara, Dungarpur and Pratapgarh, the former feudatories of Mewar.⁶

Although the Company's Government, under Hastings, was at this time at the height of its power and political prosperity, there can

1) Tod's *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* (1920, Ed. by Crooke), pp. 545-548, Vol. I. References to Babu Sindhia's depredations in Mewar, in 1814, in the Despatch of the Resident with Sindhia to Moira, No. 15, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th July, 1814.

2) Adam to Metcalfe, 8th Oct., No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Oct. 1817.

3) Metcalfe to Adam, 18th Jan., No. 107, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Feb., 1818.

4) It seems strange that the Udaipur envoy should have failed to secure better terms for his State, which Metcalfe was prepared to concede. It is possible that Thakur Ajit Singh was not disinterested enough in the execution of his duty. This explanation is confirmed by later correspondence between Tod and the Political Secretary. (Tod to Adam, 1st Feb., No. 31, Bengal Secret Consultations, Feb. 20th, 1818; Tod to Metcalfe, Nov. 29th, 1820, No. 9, and Swinton to Tod No. 10, Bengal Political Consultations, Jan. 6th, 1821.) In this last Despatch Tod was asked explicitly to warn the Thakur that since he "appeared to be the chief cause of this lamentable state of affairs in Mewar" and since he was "opposing the establishment of tranquillity and good order" it might "ultimately become necessary for this government to require his exemplary punishment on that account."

5) The Treaty was ratified by the Governor-General on 22nd Jan. Adam to Metcalfe, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Feb. 1818. There was no specific number of horsemen mentioned for service, as in the Jodhpur Treaty. The tribute was fixed at one-fourth of the revenue for five years and afterwards at three-eighths of the revenue.

6) Memorandum of claims containing 21 items, No. 29, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Feb. 1818.

be no doubt that the indirect moral result of such a treaty as that concluded with Udaipur greatly enhanced its prestige in the country. The Ranas of Udaipur had never before so definitely, formally and effectually surrendered their independence to any other Power, not even to the Mughal Empire, as they did to the Company in 1818.

In the month of March, Metcalfe induced two more States to form an alliance with the British Government on practically the same conditions as the others. The Rathor States of Kishangarh,¹ a tiny principality in the neighbourhood of Ajmer, and Bikaner,² became allies of the Company, and agreed to recognise its supremacy. In neither of the two cases, was it deemed necessary to charge any tribute. By Article Seven of the Treaty with Bikaner, the British Government engaged to help the ruler in restoring his authority over his nobles and other subjects who had thrown it off. The State undertook to meet the cost of the military assistance which it might require for that purpose. With the conclusion of the Treaty with Bikaner, the sphere of British control was pushed further towards the frontiers of the Punjab and Sindh.

Of all the important States which formed these alliances with the British Government, the State of Jaipur was the last to capitulate. Negotiations with that Government had given no small amount of embarrassment and disappointment to Metcalfe in 1816. And the State was maintaining its former tradition in 1817 and 1818 also, by the way in which its embassy conducted itself at Delhi.³ Metcalfe expected that the advance of Ochterlony's force towards Jaipur territory would "bring the procrastinating counsels of the Rajah to a decision in favour of the immediate conclusion of the alliance."⁴ It was perfectly obvious that with the submission of one State after another, both big and small, Jaipur could not hold out for any length of time. But with a view to accelerating the settlement which was, of course, inevitable, Metcalfe tried two effective plans for the wavering Government of Jaipur. Not only did he not raise any objections to, but he even connived at, Amir Khan's occupation of some parts of Jaipur territory. And secondly, he encouraged the feudatory Chiefs and nobles of Jaipur

1) Metcalfe to Adam, 28th Mar., No. 77, and Treaty itself, No. 78, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th Apr. 1818. Ratified on 7th Apr., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th Apr. 1818.

2) Adam to Metcalfe, 4th Apr., No. 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st May 1818.

3) Metcalfe to Adam, 29th Jan., No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Feb. 1818, and 18th Oct., No. 50, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th Nov. 1817.

4) Metcalfe's instructions to Ochterlony, 21st Nov. 1817, No. 112, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th Dec. 1817, which were approved by the Governor-General. Adam to Metcalfe, 3rd Dec., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 26th Dec. 1817.

to enter into separate agreements with the British Power. With this object, the Raja of Khetri, one of the leading nobles of Jaipur, sent his son, Kunwar Bakhtawar Singh, to Delhi, and a conditional engagement was concluded with him. Others would have been similarly treated if the Jaipur Durbar had not felt alarmed at this clever move of the British Resident, whose aim was twofold, either to frighten the Court of Jaipur into concluding a treaty, or to undermine its authority by forming separate alliances with the nobles of that State.¹ Metcalfe's diplomacy succeeded, and Jaipur negotiations became more earnest. The tribute question further prolonged the discussion.² But eventually an agreement was reached, and the Treaty was signed on the 2nd April, 1818. The main conditions of the engagement were the same in essentials as those agreed to by the Maharana of Mewar. The amount of tribute was adjusted on a sliding scale by which the State was excused from it altogether for the first year, and agreed to pay four, five, six, seven and eight lakhs of rupees respectively for the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth years. After that, the amount was to be eight lakhs a year until the revenues exceeded forty lakhs per annum, when the State was to pay five-sixteenths of the additional revenue above eight lakhs.³

This Treaty was ratified by the Governor-General on the 15th April, 1818. With the submission of Jaipur, the whole of Rajputana lay prostrate, and British paramountcy came to be acknowledged over that historic country. Formal engagements still remained to be concluded with the smaller States of Banswara, Dungarpur, Deolia, Pratapggarh and the Bhati State of Jaisalmer. The three former, of Sisodia stock, had, in the dark days of its decay, shaken off their allegiance to Mewar, and desired independent recognition. The British Government naturally favoured the latter plan.⁴ In the unsettled times when the Mewar Government was so completely disintegrated, they were overpowered by Holkar and by the Pawar States of Malwa, who levied tributes from them whenever possible. As has been mentioned at the end of the last chapter, Sir John Malcolm with a few able assistants

1) Metcalfe to Ochterlony, 21st Nov. *Op. Cit.*, and Metcalfe to Adam 29th Jan. No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Feb. 1818.

2) Metcalfe to Adam, 27th Feb., No. 21, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Mar. 1818, and 24th Mar., No. 74, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th Apr. 1818. Metcalfe demanded 15 lakhs and the Jaipur Delegation offered Rupees 2,40,000 to begin with.

3) Text of the Treaty, No. 26, Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th Apr. 1818. (Art. 6 of the Treaty about tribute.)

4) Instructions to Metcalfe, 8th Oct. 1817, Metcalfe's reply of 18th Oct., already referred to, and Adam to Tod, 3rd Feb., No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th Mar. 1818.

was engaged in tranquillising Malwa. The settlement of Banswara, Dungarpur and Pratapgarh, was left to him. He deputed Lieutenant Dyson to enquire into the conditions prevailing in those States,¹ and that officer addressed himself to the task with singular zeal and care. His enquiries revealed how these petty States were reduced to desolation and poverty owing to the depredations of the times.²

On the 16th September, Metcalfe concluded a Treaty with the Agent of Banswara, which Hastings ratified on the 10th October, 1818.³ But the Maharawal denied that he had sent any agent to Delhi with authority to conclude an agreement with the British.⁴ And so, on the 25th December, 1818, another engagement was concluded between the Maharawal and the British Government at Banswara, by Captain Caulfield, another of Malcolm's assistants, being ratified at Calcutta on the 18th February following. The second treaty resembled the first in all essential matters, with the addition, at Malcolm's instance, in the second of a security for the regular payment of the stipulated tribute. Authority was given to the British Government to collect the town duties of Banswara, should punctual payment be not made. This Treaty, unlike the engagements with other States, gave to the British the power of interposing their advice in settling the affairs of the State, a provision which was deliberately inserted.⁵ And finally, the Treaty provided for the payment to the British Government of arrears of tribute due to the Pawar Chief of Dhar (or any other State).⁶

The connection of Pratapgarh with the East India Company began in 1804, but the engagement concluded in that year was dissolved under the policy of Cornwallis.⁷ Between that time and the period of Malcolm's regime in Malwa, this principality suffered heavily from Holkar's Government. The people of Pratapgarh felt bitter against that Government from the memory of the afflictions and oppressions to which they had subjected them. The Jagirdars usurped the

1) Malcolm to Adam, 2nd July, No. 59, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Nov. 1818.

2) His full Reports on Banswara and Dungarpur, No. 96, Bengal Secret Consultations, 31st Oct. 1818, and Memorandum on Pratapgarh, 20th June, 1818, No. 60, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Nov. 1818.

3) Metcalfe to Adam, 22nd Sept., No. 4, and the Treaty itself, No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th Oct. 1818.

4) Dyson to Malcolm, 17th Sept., No. 97, Bengal Secret Consultations, 31st Oct., 1818.

5) Metcalfe wrote thus referring to this provision in his own treaty with Banswara. "The Fifth Article was introduced in order to secure us the right of interposing our advice and authority for the settlement of the disturbances which at present prevail in the State of Banswara." His Despatch of 22nd Sept., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 10th October 1818.

6) The Treaty. Aitchison (1909) Vol. III, pp. 67-69.

7) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 81-82.

lands of the State, and committed acts of plunder in times of general disorder. Having endured all these wrongs and losses, the Maharaja of Pratapgarh sought relief in the alliance and protection of the British Power.¹ In concluding an engagement with this State, Malcolm had to consider and settle Holkar's claims to tribute from it.² Another hitch in the signature of the Treaty was the security for the payment of tribute, on which point again Malcolm showed great firmness.³ The Treaty was concluded by Caulfield at Nimach on the 5th October, with the usual stipulations for protection, tribute and subordinate isolation. Although it was declared that the British would not interfere in the internal government of the State, the Ruler agreed "to be guided by the advice of the British Government." The security for the regular payment of the tribute was duly provided for, as in the case of Banswara, by the authority given to the British Government to receive the town duties in case of failure.⁴

A Treaty was concluded with the third State of this group on the 11th December, 1818, on exactly the same terms as those concluded with Banswara, mentioned above.⁵ The Treaty with Pratapgarh formed the model for both of them, with this one difference, that Dungarpur and Banswara owed tributes to Dhar,⁶ and Pratapgarh to Maharaja Holkar.

Before the close of 1818, the great year of the Rajput treaties, Metcalfe had concluded another treaty at Delhi on the 12th December. This last engagement was with the State of Jaisalmer. The terms of this Treaty were simple and general, and it was in itself expressive of the position of security and superiority which the British had attained. The relations were defined in a few short sentences comprising only four articles. The complete establishment of the British Power in the country made it unnecessary to define the relations with Jaisalmer with any great precision. No tribute was imposed. This State was remote from the scene of the Maratha and Pathan depredations and consequently did not owe them any tribute.⁷

1) Dyson's note, 20th June, No. 60, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th November 1818.

2) Malcolm to Adam, 26th September, No. 61, to Agnew 26th September, No. 62, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th November, 1818.

3) Caulfield to Malcolm, 6th October, No. 65, and Malcolm to Adam, 13th October, No. 64, and Malcolm to Caulfield, 10th October, No. 66, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th November, 1818.

4) The Treaty was ratified by the Governor-General on 7th November 1818, Aitchison (1909) Vol. III, pp. 83-85.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 55-57. Both these treaties were ratified on the same day, 13th February 1819.

6) Dyson to Malcolm, 17th September, No. 97, Bengal Secret Consultations, 31st October 1818.

7) Metcalfe to Adam, 15th December 1818, No. 41, Bengal Political Consultations, 2nd January 1819. The Treaty was ratified on the 2nd January 1819. Aitchison (1909) Vol. III, pp. 204-205.

Thus the group of States which now comprise Rajputana had all been taken under the Company's protection before the end of 1818, with the solitary exception of the small Chiefship of Sirohi, with which no treaty was concluded until a few years later,¹ owing to the undecided claims of the Maharaja of Jodhpur to its tribute and allegiance.²

An examination of the treaties concluded at this time reveals, as was remarked at the beginning of this chapter, that they essentially embody the principles advocated by Hastings on his arrival in India. His object was to form a Confederacy of all the internal States of India, with the British Government as the senior controlling member. The two main duties of the vassal States were to be *firstly* the settlement of their disputes through the arbitration of the paramount Power, instead of by war, and *secondly*, the furnishing of their forces at the call of that Power at any time.³ Both these principles were included in all the engagements which have been noticed in this chapter. The policy of interposing British arbitration in inter-state disputes, for the suppression of mutual warfare and the extension of the political control of the Company was an old one, and Hastings also adopted it. But the second part of his scheme was his own. None of his predecessors had so uniformly demanded that the entire resources of the allied States should be available at the requisition of the British Government. It was a bold step in advance on existing political conditions, which meant the accession of new and substantial strength to the Company's prestige in its dealings with the Indian States. And the latter fully realised the significance of the change. Not only was the feudal stipulation to furnish the State forces whenever required included in every treaty, but the Governor-General preferred that the obligations of the contracting States to afford the services of their troops, should be kept general, rather than specified to a precise number.⁴ On this important ground, these treaties represented the attainment of his cherished goal and the complete success of his efforts to plant the British domain permanently in India.

1) In 1823, *Loc. Cit.* pp. 210-212.

2) Metcalfe to Adam, 20th January, No. 102, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th February 1818, and Wilder to Ochterlony, 11th February, No. 19, Bengal Political Consultations, 14th April, 1821. Tod repudiated the claims of Jodhpur over Sirohi as untenable, *His Travels in Western India*, (1839), pp. 61-64.

3) This was Hastings' aim as recorded by him in his *Private Journal* in Feb. 1814 (pp. 54-5), and publicly in his Minute of 3rd April 1814 (reference to these has already been made in Chapter II).

4) Adam to Metcalfe, 19th January, No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th February 1818. (Instructions relating to Kota.)

His idea of the British Confederacy in India was a group of internally independent States "possessed of perfect internal sovereignty,"¹ having no external relations whatsoever with other States, excepting through and with the paramount Power, namely, the British Government. He had deplored in strong language past interference with the internal affairs of the States, leading to great discontent, disharmony and even bitterness amongst the Princes.² It has been seen how the new relations that Hastings formed embodied the two basic principles he had early laid down. It remains to be seen whether in the execution of these treaties he was equally successful in carrying out his principles of confederal relationship and avoiding the errors he had condemned in the policy of his predecessors. With this object, it is worth while to review briefly the developments that took place after the treaties had been signed and ratified. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the course of the relations of the British Government with the leading States of Rajputana, namely, Udaipur, Jodhpur, and Jaipur.

It has been seen how the historic State of Mewar had been the worst sufferer from the Pathans and the Marathas. After concluding the Treaty with Bundi, Tod was required to proceed to Mewar, to settle the affairs of that unfortunate land.³

It was apparent that the conclusion of the Treaty with the Maharana, affording him and his Government the protection of the superior power of the Company, would be insufficient to meet the situation. The Maratha and Pathan inroads had so completely unsettled the authority of the Rana, that a deep wound had been caused in the body politic of Mewar, which had grown into a disease, and it was not, therefore, enough, merely to remove the original cause of the evil. It was felt desirable to apply a more positive and prompt treatment to restore the State and save it from further decay.

When Tod entered into Mewar in February, 1818, he found that some of the richest and most valued forts and districts belonging to the Maharana were in foreign possession. Kota held the distant Pargana of Jahazpur, the famous Fort of Kumbhalmer was garrisoned by Jaswant Rao Bhao's men, Bapu Sindhia had become the master of Rajnagar, Raipur, Kuakhera, and Sangramgarh. Several other very fertile parts, such as Nimach, Jawad, Jiran, Gangapur, Godwar and Nimbahera had been lost to Mewar through the weakness of its rulers

1) *Private Journal*, Vol. I, p. 54.

2) His Minute of 3rd April, No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1814.

3) Adam to Tod, 3rd February, No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th March 1818.

and the aggression of its neighbours.¹ Hastings realised that it was "an object of importance with reference both to the restoration of the prosperity of that State and to the direct interests of the British Government to recover as large a portion of them as possible."² This was not the only relief that Mewar cried for. Under the new Treaty the restitution of her territories, forcibly seized or usurped by unscrupulous adventurers, would fairly come within the province of British interference, as the paramount arbitrary Power. But Mewar was then suffering from more ills than one. Taking advantage of the disorders of the time, the powerful Chiefs and feudatories of the Maharana had also usurped large parts of the State (Khalsa) Lands, and had disregarded the claims of service and tribute due from them to their suzerain, the head of the State. This aristocracy of the nobles of Mewar, most of whom are descended from the reigning house itself, is, in its traditions, dignity and privileges unique in the whole of India. The usurpations of the State territory and the adjustment of the Rana's claims on their service was a much more perplexing problem than it at first appeared.³ Moreover, it was clearly a matter of internal concern. Before the Government of Mewar could be placed in a stable working condition, it was desirable to settle these two outstanding matters, namely, the restitution of the usurped territories and the restoration of the Rana's authority over his recalcitrant Chiefs.

Only a partial solution of the first was practicable.⁴ Those territories which had long remained in the possession of other States—Sindhia, Holkar and Marwar—could not be retaken. But the more recent usurpations were restored to the Maharana. General Donkin's force advanced into Mewar and easily recovered Raipur from Babu Sindhia's agents.⁵ Tod arrived just in time to recover Kumbhalmer without any fighting, by paying off the arrears of Bhao's garrison which made over the fort without further resistance.⁶

1) Memorandum furnished by the Udaipur envoy to Metcalfe at Delhi, No. 29, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th February, 1818.

2) Adam to Tod, 3rd February, No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th March 1818.

3) Tod to Adam, 22nd April, No. 67, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th June, 1818.

4) *Ibid.*

5) Donkin to Adam, 11th February, No. 108, and to Tod, 12th February, No. III, Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th March 1818.

6) Donkin's Despatch, 26th February, No. 43, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st March 1818, and Tod to Adam, 27th February, No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th May, 1818. Other parts, such as Hurda, Chhoti Sadri, Kanera, and Rajnagar, were also duly restored. Jahazpur came much later. (Tod's Despatch of 22nd April, No. 67, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th June, 1818.)

From Kumbhalmer Tod proceeded to Udaipur, arriving there on the 8th March. There he saw with his own eyes the excessive poverty of the Rana, the utter destitution of the country around and the deplorable weakness of the governmental authority, which was at once the cause and the consequence of the ruined condition of the State. In such a situation as Tod found himself "it will be difficult" he wrote "to avoid immediate interference, but it would have the worst effect to allow them to know I wished to abstain from it."¹ Hastings himself perceived that "in this actual state of the Court of Udaipur, some more active interference on your part than would be justifiable in a more wholesome condition may not only be excusable, but actually indispensable for the success of the measures in view." Tod was told, however, to exercise that intervention "with utmost moderation, caution, and discretion and in the form of private advice, not of authority."²

He addressed himself to that task very soon after his arrival, a task at once urgent, yet bristling with enormous difficulties. The Maharana himself was a person of shrewd understanding, fully conversant with the history of his House, and the privileges attaching to his position. Although not devoid of talents, and certainly possessed of the best intentions, Maharana Bhim Singh was weak, fickle and generally incapable of managing men or affairs. His ministers were selfish and corrupt. The nobles flouted his authority and quarrelled amongst themselves. The two factions of the Chundawats and the Saktawats had been irreconcilable for many generations. At this time, Rawat Gokul Das of Deogarh was the leader of the former (although the senior Chief of the clan is the Rawat of Salumbar), while Maharaj Zorawar Singh of Bhindar was the head of the Saktawats. Not only the Chiefs of the first rank (called the "sixteen" from the original number in that premier class), but also the lesser nobles, such as the Rao of Bhadesar, had displayed a rebellious attitude towards the Maharana during the time of his declining fortunes.³ The Maharana accused them of wrongfully extending their possessions in Khalsa land, of levying customs duties which were due only to the central Government of the Rana, and of delinquency in service at his Court by personal attendance, and in furnishing foot and mounted forces at the capital according to usage.

1) Tod to Adam, 11th March, No. 23, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th May, 1818.

2) Adam to Tod, 20th March, No. 25, Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th May, 1818.

3) Tod's *Rajasthan* (1920), Vol. I, pp. 569-70.

Tod held conferences with the Maharana and the different nobles. On the 27th April, 1818, an assembly of the Chiefs was convened, at which the terms of the proposed arrangement, as previously settled between the Maharana and Tod, were explained to them. Another session of the assembly originally arranged for the 1st May, was, at the wish of the nobles, convened on the 4th of that month. A prolonged discussion ensued. Objections, excuses, postponement and opposition were urged one after the other. The Rana displayed remarkable firmness and judgment during that fifteen hours' sitting, after which, at last, the agreement was signed by all the Chiefs present—the Rawat of Begun setting the example, followed by his kinsmen of Amet and Deogarh. The Maharaj of Bhindar was the last to append his signature. The terms of settlement comprised the surrender of all Khalsa land seized by the nobles and jagirdars since the Sambat, 1822 (1766 A.D.). The nobles were to abstain in future from levying *Dhani Biswa*—a rateable impost on agricultural produce. *Rahbari Bhum* (a new toll charged from travellers in chaotic times for immunity from plunder) was disallowed. The terms and times of the service of the nobles by personal attendance, and the presence of their quota of irregular forces at the Capital were defined for future observance. The authority of the Rana's executive for enforcing these terms and for commanding the unfailing obedience of the nobles, was recognised. This was the substance of the *Kaulnama* (i. e. agreement), which was adopted under Tod's signed guarantee.¹

Difficult as was the settlement of these internal feuds, and, therefore, great as was his achievement in obtaining the signatures of all these proud Chiefs, the enforcement of the conditions was still more difficult indeed. For several months, Tod had to employ all his tact and firmness in persuading the nobles, (particularly the Maharaj of Bhindar) to restore the usurped lands, and to discontinue the collection of customs dues, (for instance, by the Rawat of Deogarh at the passes leading into Marwar). By patient endeavour and an uncommon spirit of loyalty, Tod achieved a large measure of success in re-establishing the Rana's government over his State. Very soon the results of those sincere efforts began to appear in the rising populations, returning trade, and reviving financial prosperity of the country.²

Although complete restoration to normal conditions and the reconstruction of a strong Central Government, from the wretched state

1) Tod to Adam, 22nd April, No. 67, and to Ochterlony, 7th May, No. 69, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th June, 1818.

2) Tod to Ochterlony, 11th August, No. 104, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th November, 1818.

to which the jealousies of the selfish nobles¹ and the corruption of the ministers had reduced Mewar, could only be gradual, it is certainly true that the recovery had set in and further, that its steady start was due chiefly to Tod's exertions and advice.² His influence was exercised in almost every branch of public administration; the system of land revenue naturally received his particular attention, for on it depended the regeneration of the State.³ It is even still more remarkable that his advice was welcomed by the Rana, who reposed a high measure of confidence in Tod personally, and expected useful support from the powerful Government which he represented. This state of affairs continued throughout Hastings' period of office,⁴

The Rathor State of Marwar, before entering into alliance with the Company in 1818, had suffered nearly as badly from Amir Khan's oppression as the sister State of Mewar.⁵ For some years earlier Maharaja Man Singh had been forced to withdraw from public affairs under a supposition of insanity, and the engagement had been concluded in his name with his son, Chhattar Singh, who was made Regent. The young Prince died within a few weeks of the conclusion of the Treaty, and the Government was carried on by his ministers, Thakur Salim Singh and Akhai Chand. But after the death of the heir-apparent, the Maharaja gradually removed his mask, and grasped the power of the State. As soon as his position became secure, he wreaked full vengeance on his former enemies, the ministers and nobles who had reduced him to a mere figure-head and driven him into seclusion. Twelve persons of rank, some of them nobles, were mercilessly put to death, and many more

1) Tod wrote:—"I have paid the deepest attention to the past history of this State, and can safely pronounce that all (its) past misfortunes may be dated from the period that the counsel of the Omrahs was admitted into the Government." To Metcalfe, 26th April, No. 30, Bengal Political Consultations, 12th June, 1819.

2) "I had long foreseen they would be compelled to apply to me, and was prepared." Tod to Metcalfe, a long Despatch, *Ibid*.

3) Tod's statements of the income for Mewar, Nos. 31 and 32, and his Memorandum to the Rana, No. 33, Bengal Political Consultations, 12th June, 1819. The British Government approved of the plan of giving the farmers their guarantee to lease the crown lands. Metcalfe to Tod, 12th June, 1819, No. 34, Bengal Political Consultations of date.

4) Tod to Metcalfe, 25th February, No. 41, Bengal Political Consultations, 15th April 1820, 29th November 1820, No. 9, Bengal Political Consultations, 6th January 1821, to Secretary Swinton, 16th July, 1821, No. 19, Bengal Political Consultations, 6th October 1821, and Tod's final report on Mewar, before his departure for Europe in June 1822, addressed to Ochterlony, 26th May, No. 6, Bengal Political Consultations, 2nd August 1822.

5) His aid was first sought by the State in the dispute with Jaipur over the hand of the fair Princess Krishna Kumari of Udaipur. Once having gone in, the Pathan Parasite stayed on and treated the whole State as the spoils of his adventure. (Tod's *Rajasthan, Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1086-1092.)

were thrown into prison.¹ He then began to rule with a strong hand. Intending to chastise his disobedient Chiefs, he applied to the British Government for the loan of two battalions to act strictly under his orders.² He particularly hoped to deal a blow at the Thakur of Nimaj who had openly revolted against the Jodhpur sovereign.³

In view of this increasing difference between the Maharaja and his feudatories, and the general instability of the administration at Jodhpur,⁴ the British Government had to decide on their line of action. Both the Maharaja⁵ and the ministers⁶ whom he had treated cruelly were opposed to British intervention in their State administration. The attitude which Hastings desired his local representative to adopt in the matter was "on the one hand the maintenance of the lawful authority of the Rajah, and the acknowledged rights and privileges of the Thakurs of the State of Jodhpore, the exclusion of foreign and the suppression of domestic plunderers, and the establishment of order and tranquillity throughout the Province of Marwar, and on the other, the accession of the military strength and local political influence of the Government of Jodhpore to the views and measures of the British Government for the general tranquillity of India, and specially of Rajpootana, and the security of the tributary and feudal rights confirmed or acquired by the Treaty." It was further laid down that "the performance of our pledge to the State of Jodhpore requires that when we are called on to take part in support of its interests, we should exercise the power of effectual interference, to the full extent demanded by the nature of the case." But by the policy and the duty as imposed by the spirit of the Treaty, that interference was to be limited to general political arrangements, and its extension to internal affairs was to be avoided. "Desirable as this forbearance may be, however, the circumstances of the country may be such as to compel us as in the case of Jaipur and Oodeypore to take a more direct and ostensible part. If this be so, the Governor-General-in-Council would not, out of a scrupulous refinement which would defeat the expediency of the case,

1) Wilder to Ochterlony, 22nd February, No. 14, Bengal Political Consultations, 31st March 1821.

2) Maharaja's letter to Ochterlony, No. 6, Bengal Political Consultations, 23rd September 1820.

3) A letter from Jodhpur received by Ochterlony, No. 7, Bengal Political Consultations, 23rd September, 1820, and Wilder to Ochterlony, 22nd February, No. 14, Bengal Political Consultations, 31st March, 1821.

4) Ochterlony to Secretary to Governor-General, 25th August, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th September 1818.

5) Tod's *Rajasthan*, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1093-4.

6) Ochterlony to Adam, 11th August, No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th September 1818.

refuse to meet the exigency, but he would at once assume the necessary tone."¹

When the trouble between Maharaja Man Singh and his Chiefs became more acute, and the former sought British military assistance, he was required to disclose fully his motives, and the purpose for which he required a British force, before it could be sent to his aid, so that "the Governor-General-in-Council may judge of the justness of the measures which we are called upon to support."² But as has been before remarked, the Maharaja was very averse to admitting British counsel in his own affairs.³ He was a deep, dissimulating character, and did not in the least relax in his determination to crush his nobles. He achieved his purpose by using the name of his British allies, and the impression of their power, without actually calling in their arms. The dreaded threat of employing British troops against them was sufficient to throw the nobles into despair. Their lands were sequestered, their forts besieged, some of them seized and imprisoned, others killed in defending their homes and property. The Maharaja completely estranged his Chiefs, who left Marwar, and from their temporary asylum in the neighbouring States, made a spirited appeal for British mediation.⁴ They waited for over a year in patience, but in vain.⁵ Man Singh succeeded in his plans, ruining his feudatories through the potential aid of the British, without actually making use of it.

The policy which was defined for Jodhpur could not be applied there. But a greater scope for its use was found in the affairs of Jaipur, which continued to give great trouble. After the conclusion of the treaty with that State, Ochterlony then the Resident in Rajputana, proceeded to Jaipur in May 1818. That State had a most dissolute Prince as its ruler.⁶ Maharaja Jagat Singh impressed Ochterlony with an eagerness to purify his administration by reorganising the ministry.⁷ He selected Nazir Mohan Ram as his chief minister (Mukhtiar) and begged the British Resident to support his

1) Adam to Ochterlony, 5th September, No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th September 1818.

2) Metcalfe to Ochterlony, 23rd September, No. 8, Bengal Political Consultations, 23rd September, 1820.

3) He rejected the offer of British troops to settle his State, made by Wilder, who was deputed to his Court in 1818, and later again showed the same attitude when Tod advised him to rely on British support. (Tod's *Rajasthan*, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1093 and 1095-6.)

4) The translation of their letter to the Political Agent, Western Rajputana States, reproduced in Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I, pp. 228-30.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1097-1101.

6) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 1364-5.

7) Ochterlony to Adam, 21st May, No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 19th June, 1818.

nominee.¹ Mohan Ram served the State with understanding and industry. General improvement began to appear in various branches of the administration, including the revenue system.² Matters had hardly settled down, when suddenly Maharaja Jagat Singh died on the 21st December, 1818, thereby ending a reign incompletely redeemed by his late attempts at reform from the disgrace of earlier debauchery and dissipation.³ This event was followed by intrigues, disorders and party jealousies, which for many years threw the Government into great confusion. It was also a period during which the British attitude in the matter of interference in its affairs underwent a clear and deliberate development.

The adoption, to the *Gadi*, of a minor from the Narwar house, a remote branch of the family, carried out by the Nazir, threatened to produce a serious dispute in the State.⁴ But the country was saved from that misfortune by the birth to the junior Rani on the 25th April, 1819 of a posthumous son of the Maharaja. That event threw the Nazir's action regarding the adoption into oblivion, and brought to the fore the more important one of the formation of the Government. Ochterlony had again arrived at Jaipur to take a personal part in the discussions at that Court.⁵ He favoured a policy of interference, and tried indirectly to maintain his favourite, Mohan Ram, in power.⁶ But he failed in that object, and could not prevent the power from

1) Ochterlony to Adam, 22nd August, No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 12th September, 1818. Rawat Beri Sal, who had concluded the Treaty at Delhi as the Jaipur envoy, was not only excluded from the ministry, but was coerced by the Maharaja to surrender the large parts of State (khalsa) lands, which he had usurped. He had expected that the British would support him in his resistance, but Ochterlony did not favour his disloyalty to his master.

2) Ochterlony thought very highly of the integrity and achievements of Mohan Ram. In his opinion, the Nazir was the ablest Prime Minister that Jaipur had known. (Despatches to Metcalfe, 29th April, No. 28, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd May, 1819, and to Hastings, 31st May, No. 18, Bengal Political Consultations, 23rd June, 1821.) But "the system of chicanery and force by which he attempted to carry his object, savoured more of self-interest than of loyalty." Tod's *Rajasthan*, (1920 Ed.), Vol. III, p. 1373.

3) Tod's *Rajasthan*, Op. Cit., Vol. III, pp. 1364-5 and 1369.

4) Mohan Ram to Ochterlony, received 4th February, No. 43, Jaipur Vakil at Delhi to Metcalfe, No. 44, Bengal Political Consultations, 20th February, 1819. Protests were received from the Maharaja of Kishengarh, Nos. 87, 89 and 111, from the Thakur of Jhalai, No. 88, Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd April, 1819. Tod also criticised the adoption adversely, as violating the succession law of the Rajputs. Tod's *Rajasthan* Vol. III, pp. 1370-71, (1920).

5) Ochterlony to Metcalfe, 10th April, No. 40, Bengal Political Consultations, 1st May, 25th April, No. 29, Bengal Political Consultations, 14th May, 1819. No. 27, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd May, 1819.

6) His conference with Beri Sal, who resisted the British desire to interfere. (Ochterlony to Metcalfe, 7th May, No. 19, Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd June, 1819.) He addressed letters to Bhatianiji (the junior Maharani) to dissuade her from joining the senior Maharani, also advising her to support Mohan Ram. No. 20, Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd June, 1819.

passing into the hands of Rawat Beri Sal, who became the head of the administration with the Dowager Maharani as Regent.¹ The Governor-General had no objection to this, and wished to avoid direct interference as long as possible. It was, however, recognised that "the ministers of a petty Court so supported by a paramount Power almost inevitably become tyrants over their prince, and usurpers of his sovereignty." Therefore, the Resident was required to watch the regency with strict attention and to give his advice when necessary.²

This view, adopted in 1819, was re-affirmed in the following year. Although this time (in 1820) a slight change in the attitude was visible in the declaration that "it is our right and duty to prevent the diminution or defalcation of the revenues, more especially during a minority," Hastings was still inclined to put off interference.³

Rawat Beri Sal, however, was not secure in his position. Palace intrigues and jealousies widened the difference between the two dowager Ranis. The junior Maharani, as the mother of the infant Maharaja, asserted her right to supreme authority in the State. At the end of 1820, serious disorders took place at Jaipur. Thirty-five persons lost their lives, including Fauji Ram, a favourite official of the Rani Rathorni. Rawat Beri Sal's position became extremely precarious. It transpired that the Rawat was in the good books of the Maharani, and distrusted by the Rani Mother who began to exercise power through her own favourite, Jota Ram, still allowing Beri Sal to retain the rank of the Mukhtiar. Ochterlony, in reporting these occurrences, represented the advisability of appointing a European officer at Jaipur.⁴

The proposal was forthwith sanctioned, and Captain Stewart, Resident at Gwalior, was chosen for the duty.⁵ The stationing of a permanent British political functionary met with unanimous opposition from all parties at the Court.⁶ This triangular tussle went on for some

1) A written agreement from Beri Sal and other Thakurs and officials, to serve the State faithfully. The former also engaged to leave the person, property and dignity of Mohan Ram undisturbed. Ochterlony to Metcalfe, 25th May, No. 19, and No. 21, Bengal Political Consultations, 11th September 1819.

2) Metcalfe to Ochterlony, 3rd June, No. 24, Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd June 1819.

3) Metcalfe to Ochterlony, 28th October, No. 20, Bengal Political Consultations, 28th October 1820.

4) Ochterlony to Swinton, 17th December 1820, No. 4, Bengal Political Consultations, 13th January 1821, 10th January, No. 7, No. 8, (Intelligence) 20th January, No. 9, No. 10, (Intelligence), Bengal Political Consultations, 10th February 1821.

5) Swinton to Stewart, No. 11, Bengal Political Consultations, 10th February, 1821.

6) Stewart arrived at Jaipur on 17th April. His Despatch to Ochterlony, 26th April, No. 7, Bengal Political Consultations, 26th May, 1821, and to Swinton, 18th May, No. 15, Bengal Political Consultations, 23rd June 1821.

time, but Stewart did not wish to remain there merely as a passive spectator or an honoured guest. He soon showed his impatience at not being consulted.¹ The administration was suffering from corruption and inefficiency. The revenues were falling. Jota Ram, the Rani Mother's favourite, was associated with the Rawat in all his public functions.² The British knew that although the Rawat was neither able nor honest, their best course under the circumstances lay in supporting the Mukhtiar. At a private interview, Stewart explicitly promised him that support.³ Ochterlony was again urging on his Government the need and desirability of effectual control over Jaipur affairs.⁴

The Resident's proposal was adopted. Thus came the final phase of British policy when Hastings formed "his deliberate opinion that the condition of affairs at Jaipur ... has at length imposed on the British Government the absolute necessity of exercising that direct and decided interference," which was conceived to be in the best interests of the State. The policy was justified and grounded on the provision of "protection" embodied in the Treaty. He was therefore "determined to authorize the requisite degree of interference in the internal administration of that Government." And that interference was to embrace not merely the revenue branch, but others too, particularly the spending of the revenues. The British Government, it was declared, as "the guardians of the interests of the minor Rajah" were bound to secure his State against embezzlement.⁵ This decided course was also made known to the Jaipur Government.⁶ It was in keeping with this changed attitude that Stewart's action in pledging his Government's support to Beri Sal should be fully approved.⁷ The British Agent at Jaipur carried out the above orders with spirited

1) Stewart to Swinton, 7th June, No. 7, Bengal Political Consultations, 30th June, 1821.

2) Stewart to Swinton, 18th May, No. 15, 11th June, No. 20, Bengal Political Consultations, 23rd June, 1821, and 18th July, No. 14 Bengal Political Consultations, 11th August 1821.

3) Stewart to Swinton, 25th August, No. 7, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd September 1821.

4) Ochterlony to Hastings, 31st May, No. 18, Bengal Political Consultations, 23rd June, 1821.

5) Swinton to Ochterlony, 30th June 1821, No. 8, Bengal Political Consultations, 30th June, 1821.

6) Governor-General's letters to the infant Maharaja and Rawat Beri Sal, No. 9, Bengal Political Consultations, 30th June, 1821.

7) Swinton to Stewart, 22nd Sept., No. 10, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd Sept. 1821.

vigilance.¹ Rawat Beri Sal assumed a decided tone in his affairs, being assured of the support of the British Government. In consultation with Stewart, he even considered the advisability of expelling the evil counsellors of the Rani, and removing the minor Prince from her care. He also desired the presence of a British detachment at Jaipur.² British support of the Rawat was continued, but no drastic measures were considered desirable during the Raja's minority.³

These unstable conditions at the Jaipur Court continued for many years until the Rani's death in 1833.⁴ The misgovernment and disorders at the end of 1822 compelled Ochterlony to revisit the State in January, 1823, to attempt for the third time a solution of its complications. By that time Lord Hastings had left India.

This sketch of British relations with the three leading States of Rajputana gives to the student an idea of their development. Although further enquiry into the affairs of more minor principalities would involve unnecessary repetition, this review of Rajput relations with the British Government would be incomplete without a brief reference to what occurred at Kota as a result of the anomalous provisions of the Treaty with that State. That event merits a short notice on account of the important issues which it involved.

The titular sovereign of Kota, Maharao Umed Singh, died on the 21st November, 1819. His eldest son, Kishore Singh, aged forty, succeeded to his father's *Gadi*. The new Maharao was "a man of some talents, and considerable energy of character." Although mild in temper and demeanour, he had sufficient pride of position to feel the indignity of being reduced to a mere cypher in his own State.⁵ And that is precisely what was required of him by the supplementary article to the Treaty of December, 1817, concluded by the British Government in the February following, in favour of Zalim Singh, and his eldest son, Madho Singh and their heirs.⁶

1) He demanded the land revenue settlement for three years, required the State to produce for his inspection these statements (a) *Jamabandi*, Land Revenue Account, (b) *Tankha* land, that is territory held by officials in lieu of pay, and (c) *Jagir* land, held as fiefs. He even deputed two of his own officials to watch the proceedings at the Diwan Khana. But he later withdrew them on the protest of the Rani and on her promising to furnish all the required information (Stewart to Swinton, 26th Aug., No. 7, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd Sept. 1821).

2) Stewart to Swinton, 17th Dec. 1821, No. 18, Bengal Political Consultations, 11th Jan. 1822.

3) Swinton to Ochterlony, 11th Jan., No. 19, Bengal Political Consultations, 11th Jan. 1822.

4) Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, (1909); Vol. III, p. 91.

5) Tod to Metcalfe, 2nd Dec., 1819, No. 45, Bengal Political Consultations, 1st Jan. 1820.

6) Aitchison (1909). *Op. Cit.* Vol. III, p. 372.

Kishore Singh was willing to allow to the old Raj Rana (at that time in his eightieth year) the full and unfettered powers that he had been exercising in the State. But the new Maharao was not prepared to surrender to Madho Singh his rights and privileges of ruling his own country. Zalim, on the other hand, was only too anxious that his powers and position should descend to his eldest son in their entirety. He was clever enough to obtain British support, in the shape of the supplementary article, for the furtherance of this ambition. Occasion for the inevitable dispute soon presented itself, when the old Regent had an attack of paralysis, and, according to the practice which Zalim had been careful to maintain for several years, Madho Singh discharged his father's functions during his illness. The Maharao appeared determined to assert his authority, and the affair threatened to develop into a serious breach. Tod arrived at Kota on the 22nd February, 1820, and examined the state of the parties on the spot. He found that the Maharao of Bundi supported Kishore Singh. Moreover, his younger brother, Maharaj Prithi Singh, and the younger son of the Raj Rana himself, Goverdhan Das, were loyally attached to the Maharao. As later events showed, and as could very well be expected, the nobles and people of Kota naturally sympathised with his position. Madho Singh had his own party, and in spite of his inferior character and reputation, he had the advantage of Zalim Singh's name and influence, and the support of the British Government.¹

The latter declared unambiguously in favour of Zalim Singh. They recognised him as the *de facto* ruler of Kota. "The titular Rajah was no more thought of as the ruler of Kota" averred the British Government in justification of their attitude "than the Rajah of Satara was as the leader of the Marathas or the Great Moghul as the Emperor of Hindustan." Hastings' Government clearly laid it down that their obligation, from which they could not depart, was due only to the Regent and that Zalim Singh had alone the power to release them from it. "No pretensions of the titular Rajah can be entertained by us in opposition to this positive engagement."²

In the meantime, matters grew daily worse at Kota. Maharao Kishore Singh, aided by the impetuous counsels of Prithi Singh and Goverdhan Das, made up his mind to recover his position. In the spirit of the Tenth Article of the Treaty he demanded that he should be the sovereign of Kota, and maintained that the subsequent guarantee to

1) Tod to Metcalfe, 12th Mar., No. 15, of 28th Mar., No. 16, Memorandum about the persons and parties of Kota, No. 17, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd Apr., 1820.

2) Metcalfe to Tod, Apr. 22nd, No. 20, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd Apr. 1820.

Madho Singh "reduced the Gadi of Kota to a simple heap of cotton."¹ The estrangement between the Maharao and Madho Singh increased. The situation seemed serious when arms were collected on both sides and the general tranquillity was threatened. Instead of attacking the Maharao, the Political Agent and the Regent decided to blockade the fort and the palace in order to bring about his surrender. Kishore Singh, rather than submit to the humiliating terms, marched out of the palace, followed by a party of his adherents. In this seemingly hopeless situation, Tod acted with great tact and succeeded in bringing the Maharao back to Kota. He also impressed on him the futility of his resistance, and insisted on the surrender of his friend, Goverdhan Das, who was exiled from the State. Affairs reverted to their normal course. Public reconciliation was brought about between the Maharao and the Raj Rana, and also Madho Singh. At Tod's request in August 1820, the Maharao bestowed the customary Khilat on Madho Singh.²

This reconciliation was only short-lived. Maharao Kishore Singh and Madho Singh had disliked and distrusted each other from boyhood. Moreover, Kishore Singh could never remain content with nominal sovereignty. Trouble again broke out in December, with the appearance of Goverdhan Das in Malwa. At Kota, the Maharao won over a large portion of the regular battalion of the Regent under Saif Ali, a trusted old officer. They mutinied. The old Regent attacked the Maharao's party with artillery. The Maharao with his brother, Prithi Singh, escaped from Kota into Bundi, and the Raj Rana quelled the disorders within a week. Order was restored in the town, but the Maharao became a fugitive. The British Government at once took serious notice of the affair. A cavalry detachment from their cantonment at Nimach was ordered to pursue Goverdhan Das and arrest him, dead or alive, whilst the commanding officer was also required to be ready to offer any aid asked for by Zalim Singh.³

After a short stay at Bundi, the Maharao proceeded to Brindaban (a place of pilgrimage) and thence to Delhi, passing Bharatpur on his way. He represented to the British Government, through their resident at Delhi, that the rebellious conduct of the Raj Rana

1) Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. III, p. 1589 (1920).

2) Tod to Metcalfe, 14th Apr., No. 24, Bengal Political Consultations, 6th May, 1820. 22nd May, No. 16, Bengal Political Consultations, 15th July, 1820. 17th June, No. 10, Maharao's letter to Tod, No. 11, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd July 1820, Tod to Metcalfe, 10th Sept., No. 29, Bengal Political Consultations, 14th Oct. 1820, & Tod's *Rajasthan* (1920), Vol. III, pp. 1590-4.

3) Tod to Swinton, 31st Dec., 1820, No. 8, to the Raj Rana. 31st Dec. 1820, No. 10, to Lieut.-Col. Ludlow, 31st Dec., No. 11, to Swinton, 3rd Jan. 1821, No. 12, to Lieut.-Col. Ludlow, 3rd Jan., No. 18, Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd Feb. 1821.

had deprived him of his just rights.¹ His appeal produced no effect at Calcutta. His action was treated as a violation of the authority of the Regent and his flight from Kota was considered as an abdication of his *Gadi*.² However, Kishore Singh's spirit was implacable and uncompromising towards Madho Singh.³ Not only was the sympathy of the people and Chiefs of Kota on his side, but public opinion among the Rajput Princes was strongly in favour of his cause.⁴ In his indignation Kishore Singh turned back towards Kota, in the vain hope of achieving by force that which he had failed to obtain through negotiation. As he approached, his followers increased in numbers, many of his nobles rallying to his standard with characteristic Rajput loyalty. The Raj Rana and the British Agent concerted measures to check his progress.⁵ Negotiations having failed, the two opposing parties met in a pitched battle at Mangrol on the 1st October, where, although the Maharao's men fought with great bravery, he lost the contest, and had to retire, losing his brother, Prithi Singh, who died of wounds received in fighting.⁶ The Maharao learnt the bitter lesson that he had no chance of success against his rival so long as the superior might of the Company was behind Zalim Singh. Although Hastings realised, though very late, the anomalous situation created by the Treaty, and the impolicy of deposing a Prince whose cause was so popular in the *Rajwara*, yet he was not ready to relax the terms on which alone Kishore Singh could be restored. British support of Zalim and his son Madho Singh was consistent and unalterable,⁷ and it was finally decided to raise his younger

1) Maharao to Ochterlony, No. 16, Bengal Political Consultations, 24th Feb. 1821, of 7th May, No. 9, Bengal Political Consultations, 9th June, 1821, and another, No. 16, Bengal Political Consultations, 16th June, 1821.

2) Swinton to Tod, 10th Mar. 1821, No. 34, Bengal Political Consultations of date.

3) Tod to Swinton, 24th Apr., No. 12, and Maharao to Tod, No. 13, Bengal Political Consultations, 12th May, 1821.

4) Tod to Swinton, 2nd Apr., No. 23, Bengal Political Consultations, 5th May 1821, Ochterlony to Swinton, 31st Jan., No. 15, Bengal Political Consultations, 24th Feb. 1821. Tod to Metcalfe, 17th June, No. 10, Bengal Political Consultations, 22nd July, 1820, also Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. III, p. 1597.

5) Tod to Swinton, 15th Sept., No. 21. Bengal Political Consultations, 6th Oct. 1821. Tod ordered the battalions from the British cantonments at Nimach and Nasirabad.

6) Tod gives a graphic description of this battle (his *Rajasthan*, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 1602-6), in which the chivalry of the *Haras* was exhibited. The Raj Rana was always uncertain about the loyalty of his men, so unpopular was his cause (*Rajasthan*, Vol. III, pp. 1599-1600.) also Tod to Swinton, 2nd Oct., No. 4, Bengal Political Consultations, 20th Oct., 1821.

7) Swinton to Tod, 9th June, No. 14, Bengal Political Consultations, 9th June, 1821.

brother, Bishen Singh, to the *Gadi* of Kota, if the Maharao should refuse to submit unconditionally to the terms offered him.¹

Realising the hopelessness of any further efforts, and having to choose between utter ruin and merely nominal rank as ruler, the Maharao abandoned further resistance.² After securing the consent of the Raj Rana to the conditions laid down for the Maharao by the authorities at Calcutta, Tod obtained Kishore's submission to them. The conditions were presented to him on the 13th November, and the agreement signed and exchanged on the 25th at Nathdwara (in Mewar). He returned to Kota on the 29th December, and was formally re-installed on the *Gadi* of his ancestors.³ Maharao Kishore Singh agreed to admit the supremacy of Zalim Singh, Madho Singh, and their heirs in the Government of Kota, and further undertook to recruit no troops beyond personal guards.⁴ Tod also drew up some articles which Madho Singh signed, agreeing to respect the dignity of the Maharao and render him all customary honours and homage. The Maharao's allowance was fixed at Rs. 1,64,000 annually, which amount was to be paid regularly.⁵

The protracted dispute which led to bitterness and bloodshed was at last settled. The Maharao resigned himself to his fate. No one could look upon this as a satisfactory solution. It could not be expected that Kishore Singh would forget his indignity, nor that he should feel anything but the deepest distrust of Madho Singh.⁶ Hastings himself would have liked to separate the two by making a separate provision for the Raj Rana and his heirs. But he declined to quit the line he had once chalked out for his course. Since, however, the root of the trouble remained, the remedy, which he contemplated, had to be applied later (in 1838) when a separate principality was created for Zalim's descendants, and the real cause of the strife, the fateful supplementary article of 1818 was removed.⁷

1) Swinton to Tod, 20th Oct., 1821, No. 5, Bengal Political Consultations of the same date.

2) Tod to Swinton, 26th. Oct., No. 14, Bengal Political Consultations, 14th Nov. and 31st Oct., No. 36, Bengal Political Consultations, 24th Nov., 1821.

3) Tod to Swinton, 29th Nov., 1821, No. 13, Political Consultations, 3rd Jan., 1822, and 5th Feb., No. 6, Bengal Political Consultations, 16th Apr., 1822.

4) Aitchison (1909), Vol. III, p. 373.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 375-6.

6) Caulfield to Ochterlony, Sept. (no date given) 1822, No. 11, Bengal Political Consultations, 11th Oct., 1822. Zalim Singh's distrust of the Maharao was equally persistent, (Ochterlony to Swinton, 3rd Oct., No. 1, and Caulfield to Ochterlony, 1st Nov., No. 2, with correspondence that passed between Zalim and the Maharao. Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Dec., 1822.)

7) Treaty of 1838, by which Jhalawar was set up by dismembering Kota. Aitchison, Vol. III, pp. 393-5(1909).

The Kota incident, although it made the Company unpopular with the Rajput States, established its paramountcy over them all by fear of their irresistible power. All those States,¹ big and small, realised either by example or by experience the change in their situation. The Princes no longer possessed the unrestricted authority to which they aspired. Not only was their independence and with it their international status finally and formally taken away, but in internal affairs also, although technically autonomous, their Governments were not in reality free to do as they liked. Their relations with the feudatory nobles, the way in which they managed their finances, the regulation of succession to the thrones, and sometimes even the choice of their ministers, were all subjects on which the British Government did not always adopt an attitude of neutrality. Hastings' early determination to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of the allied States could not be maintained. It was inevitable in the nature of such wholly unequal alliances that he would be unable to adhere to his original ideal. The temptation was too strong, and the conditions were too trying, for any Government. It has been seen how slowly, haltingly, yet inevitably he authorised the policy of interference in the States of Rajputana, and how it was unsuccessfully tried in Jodhpur, partially applied in Jaipur, and effectively carried out in Kota and Udaipur. The consequence was that the Princes and their Governments became still more dependent on the British Power, and less self-reliant than would have been the case had Hastings remained firm in his original intentions.

It must be observed that the Rajput States did not range themselves in opposition to the British Government. In fact, they were, as characterised by Hastings, the "natural allies" of the British.² But their independence was reduced to the same extent, and subjected to the same conditions as those Governments were which had been hostile to the Company. Indeed Hastings' treaties with the Rajput States indicate their subordination in a more explicit

1) The Treaty with the State of Alwar, since it had been formed in an earlier period, conceded, by its formal wording rather than in its actual working, a comparatively better status to the Alwar Government. (Alwar Treaty of 1803, Aitchison (1909), Vol. III, pp. 322-3). But Alwar possessed no greater independence than other States, as is evident from another engagement that the Maharao Raja had to sign in 1811, not to enter into any negotiation or agreement with other States, without the consent of the British Government. Aitchison (1909), Vol. III, pp. 324-5. No tribute was levied from Alwar. Similarly the treaties concluded in 1805 and 1806 subsisted between the Company and the Jat States of Bharatpur and Dholpur. (Aitchison, (1909.) Vol. II, pp. 275-7, and 299-301). Alwar, Dholpur and Bharatpur sent contingents to aid the British in the Pindari operations, (Metcalf to Adam, Nov. 1st, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Nov. 1817.)

2) His Minute of Dec. 1st, 1815, *Op. Cit.*, Para. 84.

manner than those concluded with other Powers in an earlier period (or with Sindhia in Hastings' own time). This invidious distinction is indeed noticeable. Tod's devotion to the chivalrous traditions of the Rajputs is well-known. He lamented deeply the miserable conditions to which they had been reduced, and earnestly wished "for the restoration of their former independence."¹ But he was not the only person to feel the wrong inflicted on the Rajputs. The matter received the attention of the Court of Directors and orders were drafted in 1829 for the improvement of the relations with the States of Rajputana.² It was thought advisable to revise the treaties in order to remove some of the humiliating clauses precluding those Princes from communicating with their peers, binding them to submit their disputes to British arbitration and engaging them to furnish their contingents when required. The articles relating to the payments of tributes were to be modified, and the Political Agents were to be withdrawn from their capitals. This change was to be more-or-less formal, out of deference to their former rank and dignity, and from a regard for their sentiments. The proposed change was not to have any material effect on the British right to interpose their influence in the concerns of the States and to call for their co-operation in time of need. It was expected as a result that the Rajputs would feel considerably more attached to the alliance. But these proposals never took shape and the instructions which had been drawn up were never issued.³

A few words might be added on the particular question of the tributes levied from the Rajput States, on which account Hastings has been criticised.⁴ Their underlying principle meant the continuation of the oppressive practice of the Pathans and Marathas. "The quota to the British Government was fixed precisely on the same scale. A change had occurred, but principally in name. The humiliating consciousness of subjection still remained."⁵

But the imposition of tribute on the Rajput States had a certain justification which must not be overlooked before coming to any definite conclusion on this interesting question. The British Government, who undertook to protect them against external enemies, claimed that the contracting States should share, according to their

1) His dedication of "*The Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*" to Kings George IV and to William IV.

2) Edmonstone's written evidence for the Parliamentary Select Committee. *Paper* (735-VI) 1831-32, Vol. XIV, p. 101.

3) Edmonstone's Note, Oct. 27th, 1829, *Loc. Cit.* pp. 112-3.

4) Their amount was considered excessive by Sutherland and Tod. Sutherland *Op. Cit.*, p. 180. Tod's written evidence for the Select Committee. *Parliamentary Paper* (735-VI) 1831-32, Vol. XIV, pp. 123-4.

5) *Considerations on the State of British India*, by A. White, p. 230.

means, the cost of defence. Their tributes represented this contribution. Moreover, the Company's Government, in order to mark their supremacy over their subordinate allies, fixed the payment of tribute as the indication of that relationship. Another argument urged in favour of the tributes is that, by the operation of the treaties, the States greatly increased their revenues "of which it would have been an act of wanton profusion to make a distribution purely gratuitous."¹

These apparently convincing points put forward in favour of the levy of tributes do not fully explain the policy which authorised them. Several States were exempted² from that payment altogether, although protection was extended to them in the same measure as to the tribute-paying Princes. Then, again, it was not necessary to receive permanent annual payments to charge the States with their share of the cost of defence against external enemies.³ Agreements could have been made that on such occasions the actual expenditure incurred in military operations would be chargeable to them, (the method actually adopted, for example, in the cases of Bikaner and Alwar).⁴ If tribute were to be the outstanding feature of the feudatories' fealty to the supreme Government, and the proper share of the common expenditure on military defence, the levy ought to have been proportionately uniform and certainly universal. But that was not the case. A different policy was pursued in the case of the larger States. From them "No subsidy, no concession humiliating to their national dignity was demanded. Why not preserve the same exalted conduct to the smaller States?"⁵ The arguments urged in defence of the tribute, therefore, only partially explain the underlying motives of that policy.

Whilst the historian judges the deeds of the statesmen in cool moments, and applies to them the tests of strict logic or high morality, the latter has to "act in the living present." Hastings set out on his grand military enterprise determined to crush the Pindaris and extend British supremacy over all the States—Maratha and Rajput. This he wished to achieve, by peaceful means if possible, but by war if necessary. His Government was solemnly bound by an agreement with the Marathas (Sindhia and Holkar), not even to negotiate with the Rajput States of Mewar and Marwar. In these difficult and anxious circum-

1) Prinsep uses these arguments in favour of the tributes levied by Hastings, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 349-351.

2) Such as Holkar, Bikaner, Kishengarh, Jaisalmer.

3) White would not admit this contention as sound. "Where was the enemy?" He asks. The Pindaris and Pathans had been swept away. "There remained no predatory force to disturb Central India." *Op. Cit.*, p. 231.

4) Alwar (Art. 5 of the Treaty of 1803) and Bikaner (Art. 6 of the Treaty of 1818); Aitchison (1909), Vol. III, pp. 322 and 343-4 respectively.

5) White; *Op. Cit.*, p. 231.

stances, the only bait which he could offer to obtain Sindhia's assent to the otherwise drastic terms was that his revenues from the Rajput States (originally imposed by coercion) would be secured to him, even after he gave the British freedom to treat with them. This is what Hastings did. This is the chief (not the only) cause and motive for levying tributes. It was an act of expediency which yielded a great political advantage.

It is true that the Rajput States were subjected to tribute which was humiliating, and that, as has been seen, British intervention was authorised and even exercised in their domestic matters, thus reducing their independence, an object highly prized throughout Rajput annals. Yet it is only fair to remember that through British alliance they received a timely rescue from a cruel, crushing and degrading system. British influence over those States restored the elements of peace, prosperity and settled Government. It is undeniable that the permanent effects of helpless dependence are demoralising and deeply injurious to any community; but when it is borne in mind that these ancient Governments were, in Hastings' time, gasping for the last breath of their existence, the price paid will not appear as heavy as would otherwise be the case.

CHAPTER VII

SUBSIDIARY STATES

NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION IN HASTINGS' TIME - *ODDH*-TREATY OF 1801 - THE RESIDENT'S INTERPRETATION AND ACTION - NAWAB'S RESENTMENT - MINTO GOVERNMENT URGE REFORMS IN ADMINISTRATION - MOIRA'S ARRIVAL - CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY - SAME TREATY DIFFERENTLY INTERPRETED BY DIFFERENT PARTIES - NAWAB SADAT ALI'S DEATH - HIS SUCCESSOR MEETS THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL - COMPLAINS AGAINST THE RESIDENT - WITHDRAWS THE STATEMENT - BAILLIE INSTRUCTED NOT TO INTERFERE MINUTELY IN NAWAB'S AFFAIRS - COMPANY TAKES LOANS FROM THE NAWAB - NAWAB ASSUMES THE KINGLY TITLE - *MYSORE* - WELLESLEY'S ARRANGEMENT OF 1799 - MAHARAJA ASSUMES POWERS IN 1811 - RESIDENT'S DISTRUST OF RAJA'S CAPACITY - HASTINGS' POLICY - *TRAVANCORE* AND *COCHIN* - THE *GAEKWAR* - 1802 TREATY - BRITISH LOANS - ASSIGNMENTS IN TERRITORY - INTERNAL GOVERNMENT REGULATED BY THE RESIDENT, COLONEL WALKER - KATHIAWAR SETTLEMENT - INTRIGUES IN 1815 - SITA RAM'S SURRENDER DEMANDED - TREATY OF 1817 - DEATH OF FATEH SINGH AND ANAND RAO - SIYAJI RAO GAEKWAR SUCCEEDS TO THE GADI - ELPHINSTONE GOES TO BARODA - RELATIONS DEFINED - INTERFERENCE DEFINITELY WITHDRAWN - KATHIAWAR TRIBUTE QUESTION SETTLED - *THE NIZAM OF HYDERABAD* - RELATIONS - SIKANDER JAH - HIS MINISTERS - THEIR APPOINTMENT - CHANDU LAL - HIS CHARACTER - NIZAM'S SONS - THEIR MISCONDUCT - FORCE SENT AGAINST THEM - THEIR CONFINEMENT AT GOLKUNDA - NIZAM'S CONTINGENT - REFORM AND REORGANISATION - HYDERABAD GOVERNMENT - DISORDER, OPPRESSION AND DECAY - RUSSELL'S ATTEMPTS AT REFORM - METCALFE BECOMES THE RESIDENT - WILLIAM PALMER & CO. - DEALINGS WITH THE STATE - SIXTY LAKH LOAN - COURT OF DIRECTORS DISAPPROVE - METCALFE'S DISTRUST OF CHANDU LAL AND DISLIKE OF PALMER & CO.'S DEALINGS - HIS REFORMS - CHANDU LAL'S JEALOUSY - ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN METCALFE AND HASTINGS - QUESTION OF INTERFERENCE - METCALFE PROPOSES TO CLEAR THE NIZAM'S DEBTS TO PALMER & CO. - PLANS ENFORCED - TREATY OF 1822 - *CONCLUSION*

CHAPTER VII

SUBSIDIARY STATES

Mention has been made in an earlier chapter of a number of important States which had been reduced by Wellesley's subsidiary treaties to an alliance with the East India Company, thus surrendering their independent rights of making war and peace with other States, and agreeing to accept and pay for a British force stationed in their territories. The Peshwa had belonged to this class of States. Hastings added Nagpur to the list in 1816 and Holkar in 1818. These three cases have already been reviewed.¹ Other subsidiary States of India did not undergo any fundamental change in their relations with the British Government during Hastings' period of office. This is true in the sense that their constitutional position as fixed by Wellesley remained unaltered in all essential matters, as distinguished, for example, from the case of Holkar and that of the Rajput States. But the changed position of the Company after its victorious emergence from the war of 1817-18 necessarily reacted on its relations with these States. Therefore, the working of these relations also forms an interesting part of this narrative of Hastings' dealings with the States of India.

ODDH

The relations of the Bengal Government with the Ruler of Oudh formed a subject of pressing importance till the very last days of Minto's stay in India, and consequently early became one of the first objects of Hastings' attention. Those relations had been settled by the Treaty of 1801, which forced Nawab Sadat Ali to cede to the Company nearly half his dominions, yielding an annual revenue of a crore and thirty-five lakhs of Rupees. That Treaty,² and another document³ defining the final arrangements as arrived at after a conference between Wellesley and Sadat Ali in February 1802, were expected to smooth away all difficulties in future, and to usher in a period of harmony. Whatever might have been the intentions of the authors of those instruments of amity, it is not surprising that, worded as they were, their working produced results very opposite indeed from those

1) Chapters IV and V.

2) Signed 10th November, 1801, Aitchison (1909). Vol. I, pp. 123-7.

3) In the form of propositions of the Nawab and answers of the Governor-General. *Loc. Cit.*, (1909), pp. 127-35.

desired of them. The Sixth Article of the Treaty, while guaranteeing the remaining territories to the authority of the Nawab and his heirs, also laid down that "he will establish in the reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect with his own officers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants; and his Excellency will always advise with and act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the said Honourable Company." By the same Treaty the Company agreed to defend the Nawab Wazir¹ against all foreign and domestic enemies, at the same time engaging that after the cession of the territory no further demands would be made on his treasury for the services of British troops, whether employed to repel a foreign enemy or suppress rebellions in Oudh itself.² The able Nawab, Sadat Ali, took a personal interest in his affairs. He dealt vigorously with the big landlords and in many cases resumed their grants, when they resisted his demands. He was extremely parsimonious, though not mean. His aims were the acquisition of wealth for his treasury and the consolidation of the central power of his Government.³

The Resident at his Court, Major Baillie, constantly demanded that the Government of the country should be carried on under his advice. He claimed, indeed by a literal interpretation of the Treaty, that the Nawab Wazir's obligation to consult the wishes of the British Government extended "to all affairs connected with the *ordinary* government of your dominions and with the *usual* exercise of your authority."⁴ Even the domestic concerns of patronage and the granting of pensions and Jagirs to the officials and courtiers of the Nawab became subjects of a most bitter and prolonged controversy between the two Governments.⁵ Nor was the manner in which these

1) This double title meant the Nawab (Ruler) of Oudh and Wazir (Minister) of the Mughal Empire. The latter title became hereditary from the great Nawab Safdar Jung, who was the powerful Minister of the Emperor of Delhi.

2) Articles 3 & 5 of the Treaty of 1801. *Op. Cit.*

3) Bishop Heber's *Narrative*, (1829), Vol. II, pp. 77-8. Irwin's "*Garden of India*," chapters on *Oudh History and affairs* (1880), pp. 108-10. Prinsep, *Transactions*, etc., Vol. 1, pp. 217-8.

4) Baillie to Nawab Wazir, 2nd July, 1183, p. 533, *Oude Papers, Home Misc.*, Vol. 518. In this letter he emphatically told the Nawab that "the grant of a district in farm, the establishment of a court of Adaulat, the reform or alteration of any branch of the police of your Excellency's dominions, however frequently these measures have occurred, without my previous knowledge or concurrence, are measures that unquestionably require your previous consultations with our government, and your conformity to our advice in the execution of them."

5) For instance, both the Resident and the Governor-General repeatedly urged the Nawab to grant pensions and restore their property to Ali Naki Khan and Hussain Ali Khan. (Minto to Nawab Wazir, 8th May, 1812, pp. 283-5, Baillie to Nawab Wazir, 29th Apr., 1813, p. 403, Baillie to Minto reporting his conferences

representations were made always tactful, or considerate to the Nawab's dignity or authority in his own State.¹ The discussion centred chiefly round the question of the reform of the revenue administration in the reserved territories. The revenues were collected by Amils, to whom the lands were farmed out on a loose system of contracts. This frequently led to extortion and oppression, with the result that the Zamindars put up armed resistance against the State. To quell the revolt of the landlords the Nawab Wazir had to call in the aid of British troops, as was permitted by the Treaty.² This meant that the British arms were employed apparently in the interest of law and order, but also at times to support oppression, possibly injustice. The British Resident claimed that just as British troops were required to help the Nawab Wazir's administration, so the latter must agree to rule the country in accordance with British counsel. He further required that the system of revenue collection should be altered, and a better one introduced in its place. The Governor-General, Lord Minto, gave full support to that proposal. After a protracted discussion on the subject, he made definite suggestions to Sadat Ali for his immediate acceptance. The principles of reform urged by Minto consisted of "an essential change in the system of assessment, management and collection" of the Nawab's revenues.³

Either because he was convinced of the impracticability of the suggested reforms, or because he saw in them the further loss of his authority and importance, the Nawab did not feel any great enthusiasm for them. But they were pressed upon him with such insistence and unabated vigour by the Resident and the Governor-

with the Nawab about the two cases, 29th Sept., 1813, pp. 534-9, etc., *Oude Papers Op. Cit.*) The disposal of Tehsin Ali Khan's personal property, also became a subject of similar interference, (Baillie to Adam, 24th Aug. 1813, pp. 520-1, and Adam to Baillie, 3rd Sept. 1813, pp. 524-5, *Loc. Cit.*) Again the settlement of the younger Begum's claims was brought about through the Resident's intervention (Baillie to Adam, 16th July, 1813, Baillie to the Begum, 10th July, 1813 and Adam to Baillie, 30th July, 1813, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 516-20).

1) In his discussions with the Wazir, Baillie assumed an intimidating tone which forced the former into an outward acquiescence, (Baillie to Minto, 30th Aug., 1813, pp. 527-30 and 29th Sept., 1813, pp. 534-40) but which was regarded by the Wazir as coercion. (Baillie to Adam, 13th Dec. 1813, p. 551). The Nawab complained of the disrespectful tone of the Resident's addresses (Nawab Wazir to Baillie, 7th Jan. 1813, pp. 340-2.) His distress at Baillie's interference, and the consequent loss of his own dignity became painful to him. (Capt. McLeod's statement, pp. 902-4.) Baillie himself speaks of "my immediate control through the operation of fear on his (i. e., the Nawab Wazir's) mind." (Baillie to Minto, 30th Aug. 1813, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 527.)

2) This was very frequent. For example, the case of the Zamindars of Dariabad. Baillie to Edmonstone, 27th Feb., 1812, pp. 263-4, and Baillie to the Nawab Wazir, 15th Jan. 1812, pp. 264-7, *Loc. Cit.*

3) Minto's letter to Nawab Wazir, 28th Dec. 1810, contained these final proposals, *Oude Papers*, pp. 131-3, *Op. Cit.*

General¹ that Sadat Ali had neither the courage nor the means to withstand the decisive tone adopted by the British Government. When open resistance appeared vain, he adopted the method of evasion, and, whilst apparently submitting to the will of the Resident, he postponed action in spite of repeated remonstrances.²

Minto had left the matter in this unsettled state when Hastings (then Earl of Moira) took over charge. The new Governor-General, was definitely opposed to the exercise of interference in the affairs of the Indian Princes, and also to the lowering of their status and dignity. He had already heard that the Nawab of Oudh was held in a "painful and degrading thralldom,"³ and he took a different view of the situation from his predecessor. An occasion soon presented itself for the demonstration of the change in policy. A courtier of the Nawab Wazir, Tehsin Ali Khan, died on the 27th August, 1818,⁴ appointing the British Government executor of his property amounting to nearly a lakh and a half of Rupees.⁵ Considering Tehsin Ali's services to the British Government, Minto had authorised the Resident to accept the execution of his will.⁶ The Nawab Wazir claimed that, as his master and sovereign, he had the reversionary right to Tehsin Ali's personal property.⁷ Hastings decided to withdraw from the position taken up by Minto, and made over the property to the Nawab.⁸ He considered that public faith and equity required that the Nawab should be left free to exercise his independent rights over his subjects and servants. The Resident was instructed to avoid any future agitation in minor matters, which might cause irritation, and to reserve the influence of the British Government for more important affairs.⁹ The authorities in England approved of this attitude.¹⁰

1) Both Minto and Baillie united in maintaining that demand right up to the closing days of the former's term of office. (For example, Minto's strong note to Sadat Ali, 8th May, 1812, pp. 283, Baillie's conferences with Sadat Ali. pp. 497-99, 501, 527-8, Minto to Sadat Ali, 2nd July, 1813, p. 507, etc., etc., *Oude Papers*.)

2) The Nawab would hear subserviently what the Resident said, and would agree with it (e.g. p. 536). He would promise to act (pp. 540, 544) but in the end, evasions and excuses would follow, (pp. 551-2, etc.) *Loc. Cit.*

3) Summary of operations, etc., *Parliamentary Papers* 1831-32, Vol. VIII, *Political Appendix* p. 95.

4) Baillie to Adam, 28th Aug., p. 525, *Oude Papers Op. Cit.*

5) Baillie to Adam, 24th Aug., pp. 520-1, *Loc. Cit.*

6) Adam to Baillie, 3rd Sept. 1813, pp. 523-5, *Loc. Cit.*

7) Baillie to Adam, 23rd Nov., 1813, pp. 551-54, *Loc. Cit.*

8) Hastings to Nawab Wazir, 31st Dec. 1813, p. 564, *Loc. Cit.*

9) Adam to Baillie, 31st Dec., 1813, pp. 564-7, *Loc. Cit.*

10) Political letter to Bengal, 8th May, 1815, p. 844, *Loc. Cit.*

The question of reforming the revenue system was still in suspense. The conciliatory policy was extended to that sphere also.¹ The Nawab had undertaken some partial measures in the direction suggested by the British Government, but their limited scope and extent did not satisfy the Resident.² It was felt that the Nawab had an inward repugnance to carrying out the reforms. It was of little use to force him to adopt them, for since they had to be worked by his own officers, it was in his power to defeat the spirit of these changes.³ Moreover, the principles of compulsion could not be adopted without violating the spirit of the alliance. Therefore, "the conclusion appears to the Governor-General-in-Council to be inevitable, namely, that the specific plan of reform proposed to the Vizier by Lord Minto must be relinquished, or insisted on as the alternative of a resolution on our part, which would amount to a dissolution of the existing relations between the two States. The principles of justice and good faith, as well as of political expediency, appear to the Governor-General-in-Council to forbid the adoption of the latter course, and thus to impose on the British Government the necessity of desisting from the further prosecution of the object."⁴ This extract contains Hastings' view, which again met with the entire approval of his employers at home.⁵

It is interesting to pause here for a moment to consider how the same instrument (Wellesley's Treaty of 1801) was differently interpreted by the different parties concerned.

Baillie, the British envoy at Lucknow, concentrating his attention on the letter⁶ of the engagement, was clearly convinced that the British were unquestionably entitled to require the Nawab to act in accordance with their wishes in all his concerns.⁷ In this construction of the Treaty, Minto fully agreed with his Agent.⁸ On the other hand, the Nawab Wazir imagined that, after depriving him of a large part of

1) Hastings to Nawab Wazir, 7th Jan. 1814, pp. 579-81, *Loc. Cit.*, stating the position in a frank and friendly spirit.

2) Baillie to Adam, 8th Mar., 1814, pp. 604-5, *Loc. Cit.*

3) According to the provision of the Treaty of 1801, Art. 6, *Op. Cit.*

4) Adam to Baillie, 25th Mar. 1814, pp. 608-10, *Oude Papers.*

5) Political letter to Bengal, 22nd Mar. 1816, p. 857, *Loc. Cit.*

6) Viz.: "always advise with, and act in conformity to, the counsel of the officers of the said Honourable Company." Art. 6.

7) Baillie to Wazir, 2nd July, 113, p. 5833, and also the conditions laid down for the Nawab's acceptance before he could be allowed to proceed on his long-contemplated journey. (Baillie to Minto, 5th June, 1813, p. 503) *Oude Papers.*

8) "In urging the adoption of that most necessary reform, I exercised a right derived from the specific provisions of the existing engagements, nay, I fulfilled a positive obligation imposed upon this Government, by an express article of the treaty of 1801." Minto to Nawab Wazir, 8th May, 1812, p. 283, and another of 2nd July, 1813, remonstrating with the Wazir for not complying with his demands about reforms, p. 507, *Loc. Cit.*

his territory, the Treaty was intended to leave him reasonably free to rule the reserved dominions without the Resident's minute intervention in his domestic affairs. In fact, he thought that the dismemberment of his State was the price with which he had purchased that autonomy,¹ and that in future he would consult the British envoy only on extraordinary matters.² While the two parties viewed the position from different angles, it was not easy to attain any satisfactory solution of the outstanding problem. And although, under the inspiration of fear or intimidation, he might agree to abide by the advice imposed on him, his own conviction was that he was being unfairly treated. By a strict interpretation of Article Six of the Treaty, Minto and Baillie were justified in exercising the minute control which they attempted over the Oudh Government. But that construction of the terms of the Treaty would have logically led to the conclusion that the Company's Government was to be the sole judge of the occasion and the extent of British interference in the Nawab's ordinary administration. It is unlikely that such a complete subordination of the Nawab in matters relating to his reserved territories was intended.³

By restricting the right reserved to the British, to interfere with advice and remonstrance, to those affairs which might injuriously affect British interests, Hastings attempted to reconcile the Nawab's view to the words of the Treaty. He considered "that in all other respects the administration of the Nawab is to be free; but, indeed, it is evident from the whole tenor of the treaty, that an uninterrupted exercise of his own authority within the reserved dominions was assured to him in order to qualify the very strong step which we took in appropriating to ourselves (as an exchange for the subsidy) so large a portion of his territories. The Nawab is consequently to be treated in all public observance as an independent prince. Essentially he must be subservient to the British Government."⁴

Before Hastings could formulate these definite views on the Oudh question, a number of incidents and events had occurred to give him an intimate acquaintance with the real situation at Lucknow, not

1) Edmonstone to Baillie, 6th July, 1811, contains the best vindication of that interpretation on the part of the Nawab Wazir, p. 235, *Loc. Cit.*

2) Baillie repudiated this emphatically in his letter to the Wazir, 2nd July 1813, p. 533, *Loc. Cit.*

3) The Bengal Government (in Minto's absence) interpreted it in a liberal manner and instructed the Resident not to use compulsion on the Nawab in the matter of reforms. It was held that the British Government would not be right in withholding the aid of troops from the Nawab. Edmonstone to Baillie, 6th July, 1811, *Oude Papers*, pp. 234-7.

4) Adam to Baillie, 12th Nov. 1814. (This decision was given by Hastings after he had seen the working of the relations for a year, and when matters approached a crisis in the time of the successor of Sadat Ali.) p. 919. *Loc. Cit.*

the least of which was his visit to that city in the autumn of 1814 (25th October to 11th November).¹

While the negotiations for the introduction of reforms were still pending, Nawab Sadat Ali suddenly died on the 11th July 1814,² leaving an accumulation of several millions sterling in his treasury.³ His eldest son was quickly declared Nawab, the claims of Sadat Ali's second and favourite son Shamsudaula, being ignored. The deceased Nawab had trusted and trained Shamsudaula in the governmental duties.⁴ The new Nawab, Ghazi-ud-din Haider-Rafaut-Daula, perceived the value of the British Resident's help in the removal of his rival, and was, therefore, obviously anxious to keep Baillie pleased,⁵ at any rate until he felt secure against his ambitious brother. The latter Prince was eventually removed to Benares, on an annual pension of two lakhs of rupees.⁶ The new Nawab, though learned in philosophy, philology and literature, did not possess his father's ability as a ruler.⁷ For the time being, he readily accepted the Resident's advice, and accordingly, measures were undertaken to refrom the revenue and judicial administration.⁸ But the new arrangement was hardly better in its working, and certainly not more popular. As in the past, British troops were still required to uphold the authority of local officers.⁹ And lastly, the Nawab Wazir himself did not like the change.¹⁰ Very soon the relations between the new Nawab and the old Resident reverted to the state of tension that had existed in the time of Sadat Ali.

The young Nawab and the Governor-General met at Cawnpore on the 13th October, 1814, whence they both proceeded to Lucknow.

1) His *Private Journal*, Vol. I, pp. 200-31.

2) Baillie to Nugent, 11th July, *Oude Papers*, p. 614, *Op. Cit.*

3) Calculated by Baillie to be about 13 millions sterling (his evidence before the Parliamentary Committee, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. XIV, p. 60, 1831-32). Although Bishop Heber in his *Narrative* put it over 2 millions sterling (*Op. Cit.* 4th Edition, Vol. II, p. 78). But obviously Baillie's estimate should be regarded as more reliable.

4) Nawab Shamsudaula to Hastings, 11th Oct. 1814, *Oude Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 869-70.

5) Baillie was very satisfied at the cordial way in which the new Wazir behaved to him (Baillie to Moira, 15th July 1814, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 618.)

6) Adam to Brooke (Agent to the Governor-General at Benares) 11th Nov. 1814, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 868.

7) Heber, *Op. Cit.*, p. 78, and Baillie to Adam, 5th Aug. 1815, *Oude Papers*, p. 695.

8) Baillie to Adam, 2nd Sept. 1814, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 621.

9) *Ibid.*, and Baillie to Lieut.-Col. Burrell, 27th Aug. 1814, pp. 622-23, Col. Frith to Baillie, 5th Sept. 1814, p. 627, and 8th Sept., p. 628. Baillie to Adam, 20th Sept., pp. 629-30, and 25th Oct. 636, Lieut.-Col. Burrell to Baillie, 4th Nov., pp. 639-40, and again pp. 649-52, etc., etc. *Loc. Cit.*

10) He saw in the new arrangements the loss of his authority and the reduction in his revenue because of the payment of 10% commission to the revenue collectors introduced on the lines adopted in the ceded provinces. (Nawab Wazir to Hastings, received on the 23rd June, 1815, p. 686, and McLeod's statement, p. 901, *Loc. Cit.*)

Hastings again received accounts of Baillie's overbearing conduct towards the Wazir, and the latter's wish for the Resident's removal.¹ These complaints, which were expressed by the Nawab Wazir in a paper to the Governor-General, and also orally expressed to him and his Aide-de-Camp, Captain Gilbert, were later withdrawn, first through his servant Agha Mir, and later personally to the secretaries of the Governor-General. The unconvincing explanation offered was that the Nawab had been incited to that action against the Resident by the evil counsels of his European officers, McLeod, Law, Clarke and de L'Etang.² The latter, of course, denied the imputation, and McLeod offered to prove to Hastings' satisfaction that the Nawab's charges were basely untrue, and further that it was owing to Agha Mir's intimidation, presumably on the Resident's support, that the Nawab had withdrawn his complaints.³ The whole incident revealed an ugly and deplorable situation, made even disgusting by the timid and base behaviour of the Nawab Wazir. His clear denial made any further enquiry a very delicate business.⁴ Hastings felt convinced that this denial was the result of intimidation.⁵ The Nawab did not, however, escape punishment for his cowardly act, for as a result of the intrigue he had to accept Agha Mir, a low servant, as his minister.⁶ He would have preferred Hyder Mehdi, the clever and tried administrator whom Baillie disliked.⁷ Agha Mir (who assumed the title of Muhamud-daula) and Raja Daya Krishna became, respectively, the Peshkar and Diwan of Oudh, and began to rule

1) Clarke and McLeod interviewed Thompson, the Governor-General's secretary, and later both saw Hastings himself, *Private Journal*, pp. 178-81, Governor-General's Minute of 30th Nov. 1814, particularly Gilbert's interview with the Nawab Wazir, *Oude Papers*, pp. 920-3. He complained specifically how the Resident forced on him a physician (Wilson) whom he did not want, in preference to his father's (Law) whom he liked, also that the Resident had disallowed the time-honoured practice of beating the *Nobat* (Big Drum) at the Gateway. *Private Journal* Vol. I, pp. 904-6.

2) Ricketts' conference with the Nawab Wazir, on 1st Nov., pp. 875-6, Agha Mir's message, pp. 880-1, conference between the Wazir and Adam and Swinton on 2nd Nov., pp. 891-2, and another conference between him and Adam, Swinton and Ricketts on 4th Nov., pp. 885-9, *Oude Papers*.

3) McLeod's to Adam, 9th Nov. 1814, p. 891. They were all declared innocent, Adam to McLeod and others, 12th Nov. 1814, pp. 905-6, *Loc. Cit. Private Journal*, Vol. I, pp. 210-13.

4) Hastings wrote:- "The issue of the intrigue was none of my business. I had only to accept the Nawab Wazir's own statements and to concur in what he chose to say was his wish." His Minute, 30th Nov. 1814, *Oude Papers*, p. 926.

5) His Minute of 30th Nov. *Op. Cit.*, p. 924, *Oude Papers*.

6) Hastings' Minute, 30th Nov. 1814, p. 926, Baillie thought him to be a man of noble birth, talent and education (Baillie to Adam, 29th Apr. 1815, p. 950). In an anonymous letter received by Hastings, Agha Mir's parentage was described as low and even doubtful. (p. 1,000), *Loc. Cit.*

7) The Nawab made that request to Hastings (Minute of 30th Nov. 1814, p. 923). Irwin, *Op. Cit.*, p. III.

the country with the Resident's support.¹ As might have been expected, the Nawab considered them as unwelcome checks on his own authority, and very soon his distrust of them became openly manifest.² He had only himself to thank for what followed. Hastings did all he could to uphold his dignity and restore his authority in his realm.

Clear instructions were laid down for the British Resident, that "in all intercourse, the Resident should consider himself as the ambassador of the British Government to an acknowledged sovereign. A respectful urbanity and a strict fulfilment of established ceremonials should thence be preserved by the Resident towards his Excellency."³ On other points, too, all the wishes expressed by the timid Wazir were met by the Governor-General in an open-hearted manner. It was recognised that "the treaty unquestionably, in every fair construction, purported to leave the Nawab Vizier an independent sovereign within the reserved dominions. The clause by which the interference of the British Government with advice or remonstrance, through the Resident, is acknowledged as a right, can never in any decent acceptance be understood to mean a meddling with the Vizier's family and domestic concerns."⁴ By enforcing the principles of his early policy,⁵ Hastings had restored amicable relations with the Ruler of Oudh who must have experienced a sense of relief for which he had been pining for many years. This benevolent effect did not remain unappreciated.⁶

Nor was the gratitude wholly one-sided. Another transaction between Hastings and Oudh which took place at the same time as the incidents already described, and which must have influenced the policy adopted, deserves mention. Just when the Nepal War was progressing, and the Company's Government was in financial difficulties, when the market was indeed very unfavourable for procuring loans, and when Hastings badly needed money to fight the Gurkhas in the Hills, his

1) The Resident defended them in his reports. (Baillie to Adam, 29th May, 1815, p. 681-3. It was arranged to have the investiture of the ministers performed by the Governor-General in open Durbar. *Private Journal*, Vol. I, pp. 297-8.)

2) Baillie to Adam, 18th July, pp. 688-93, 5th Aug. 1815, pp. 694-5; and 4th Sept., p. 697, *Oude Papers*. Irwin writes:- "Agha Mir plundered his master in almost every possible way," and that he had appropriated half a million sterling out of public works fund. *Op Cit.*, p. 111. His violence and selfish aggrandisement described by Heber, *Narrative, Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 80-1.

3) Adam to Baillie, 12th Nov. 1814, p. 919, *Oude Papers. Op. Cit.*

4) Nawab's papers of requests, 9th Nov., and Governor-General's reply, 12th Nov. 1814, *Oude Papers*, pp. 909-15.

5) His Minute emphatically upholding the character of an ally for the Nawab of Oudh, and the preservation of his independence within his territory. (15th May, No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1814.)

6) He was gratified to hear later how his action was remembered by the Wazir in a tone of affectionate energy. *Private Journal*, 18th Sept. 1817, Vol. II, p. 213.

eyes turned to the hoards left by Sadat Ali. A crore of Rupees was offered by the Nawab as a gift, but accepted as a loan at six per cent.¹ It was a very timely, useful and substantial help to the Company, and was acknowledged as such. The financial need of the Company, and the protracted operations against Nepal, necessitated a second application to the Nawab Wazir, who advanced another crore a few months later, on the same conditions.² On the conclusion of the Nepal war, as the spoils of victory, the British received the district of Khairagarh and some part of the *Tarai*. These tracts were comparatively unproductive, and certainly a great trouble to the Company to hold.³ Hastings made them over to the Wazir in full satisfaction of the second loan, which was cancelled by a formal Treaty.⁴ This arrangement was naturally very gratifying to Hastings, who knew that it could not have been brought about, excepting through the Wazir's wish to adopt his recommendations.⁵

Whilst the public relations between the two Governments were thus improved, the personal relations between the Nawab and the Resident grew worse. Baillie ascribed that estrangement to the encouragement of private intrigue by the Governor-General himself.⁶ Hastings was obliged to reply and point out Baillie's domineering disposition which both Nawab Sadat Ali and Ghaziudin Haidar had rightly resented.⁷ Baillie's presence at Lucknow was regarded as incompatible with the harmonious relations which should subsist between the head of the Government and his Agent in Oudh and so his removal was ordered.⁸ Baillie fell a sacrifice to that anomalous system which had been set up by the Treaty of 1801, although it is true that his zeal, more mistaken than discreet, and his manners, contributed to that consequence.

Although this policy of non-intervention inaugurated by Hastings, considerably smoothed the relations between the Governments

1) Governor-General's letter to the Secret Committee, (31st Aug. 1815, p. 515 onwards, paras 12-15, *Bengal Secret Letters*). Hastings to Nugent, 29th Oct. 1814, p. 711, *Oude Papers*, Baillie wrote "I was instructed by his Lordship's secretary, Mr. Ricketts, to open a negotiation with the Wazier, for the loan of a crore of rupees to the Honourable Company, to appear as a voluntary offer," to Adam, 29th Apr., but forwarded on 20th Sept. 1815, *Oude Papers*, p. 952.

2) Baillie to Adam, 16th Mar. 1815, *Oude Papers*, pp. 722-3.

3) *Private Journal*, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 54-5.

4) Treaty signed 1st May 1816. Aitchison Vol. I, pp. 155-6, (1909).

5) As he himself wrote in his *Journal*. "This agreement enables me to assert that the Gurkha war has not cost the Company one single shilling." *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 121.

6) In his long letter to Adam, 29th Apr., though despatched on 20th Sept. 1815, *Oude Papers*, pp. 936-62.

7) Hastings' Minute, 3rd Feb. 1816, pp. 966-94.

8) The Council unanimously concurred in that decision. The Minutes of the Governor-General and Councillors, 31st Oct. 1815, *Oude Papers*, p. 963.

of the Company and of Oudh, it could not wholly cure the evil system which had its root in the Treaty of 1801, namely, the calling in of British troops to suppress the Zamindars who took up arms against the Wazir's administration. This continued as before. "In the beginning of 1822, about seventy of their forts in the vicinity of Sultanpur, were occupied and dismantled by a British detachment."¹ (Wilson.)

During Lord Hastings' time, and with his deliberate encouragement, the Nawab Wazir assumed the title of the King of Oudh.² Hastings' fear of the revival of the Mughal House, and its possible danger to the British, led him to hint to the Nawab that it rested entirely with him whether he was to continue the old servile forms of respect to the Delhi family.³ He was informed that the British had dropped that unbecoming mark of submission. That diplomatic observation was expected to produce its effect. The Resident was further advised to work upon the Nawab's reflection. If consulted by him about his desire to assume the kingly title, "he should seize it and bring it immediately to a distinct understanding intimating his persuasion that the British Government would readily recognise such a title if assumed by the sovereign of Oude, provided it made no change in the relations and formularies between the two States or altered the manner in which British subjects had hitherto been received."⁴ The higher title was accordingly readily assumed. As had been expected, this was received with undisguised indignation at the Court of Delhi, which in its turn produced a keen resentment at Lucknow. The net result of it was "an irreparable breach between the two Mahomedan States" which afforded Hastings "extraordinary satisfaction."⁵

He has been criticised for taking this step, but much of the strength of this condemnation is washed away by the fact that his critics attack him from two almost opposite positions. In the first place, it has been said that "This was perhaps the most sterile stroke of the sterile science of diplomacy that was ever conceived or executed. The title never took much root out of Lucknow."⁶ On the other hand,

1) Correspondence between the Resident and the British military Officers in 1815, pp. 691-52, and 710, etc. *Oude Papers*. Wilson (1845), Bk. II, p. 503, Heber's *Narrative*, Vol. II, (1829), pp. 83-4.

2) His new designation was:—"Abu Muzaffar, Moizuddin, Shah-i-Zaman Ghazi-ud-din Hyder, Shah, Padsha-i-Avadh" (Wilson, Bk. II, p. 504).

3) Hastings observed at Lucknow, that the royal Princes, although residing there, as the Nawab's pensioners, received, from the latter, marks of ceremonial courtesy due to their regal blood.

4) Hastings' *Summary of Operations*, etc. *Op. Cit.*, p. 110.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 111.

6) Irwin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 112.

Wilson, writing long after Hastings' term of office, declared that "names are sometimes as real as things and the King of Oude is not for any purpose the same Potentate as the Nawab Vizier," and doubted "whether identity of religion and community of interest will not outweigh all other considerations, and whether the King of Oude will not be as willing as the Nawab Vizier to place his resources at the foot of the imperial throne."¹ The above criticisms represent two extremes. This act of Hastings' diplomacy could, however, be considered consistent with his general policy towards the States of India, namely, that of dignified, though subordinate isolation. But his avowed motives for taking that step must lead the student to the conclusion that it was certainly an unnecessary, though not wholly a sterile, course of action, the product rather of fantastic fears than of bold statesmanship.

MYSORE

In this class of subsidiary States, Mysore bore a certain resemblance with the Kingdom of Oudh since in both cases the British had, by treaty, reserved to themselves the right to offer advice and to be consulted in matters of internal administration.² In the last Mysore War, the British and the Nizam, the victorious allies, indemnified themselves with a large portion of the territories of Mysore. The remaining portion was restored to a minor belonging to the family of the old Hindu Rajas whom Haidar Ali had dispossessed.³ The Maharaja, thus restored by Wellesley, was only three years old. The Treaty defining his relations with the British Government, bound him tightly to the performance of his subsidiary obligations. In the case of his failure to fulfil them, it empowered the Company to take over the management of the State into their own hands, in that case allowing a lakh of pagodas and a fifth of the net revenue of his State for the Maharaja's subsistence.⁴ The Government of Mysore, was placed in the hands of an able Brahmin minister Purniya who worked under the supervision and general counsel of the British Resident. Purniya was a clever administrator, and by his tact

1) Book II, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 505-6.

2) Art. 14 of the Treaty of Mysore, 1799, is fairly comprehensive on this point (Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 224, (1909 Ed.) and resembles the similar provisions of Art. 6 of the Oudh Treaty of 1801 (already referred to).

3) Partition Treaty of 22nd June, 1799, by which the Company's net share was territory yielding 5,37,170 pagodas, and the Nizam's 5,37,332 pagodas (pp. 57-8). The Peshwa's share, worth 2,63,957 pagodas was further divided between the allies, since the former declined to accept it, (p. 60). The territory retained for the Maharaja of Mysore was estimated to yield 13,74,076 pagodas (pp. 63-5). In addition to this, the English kept the town of Seringapatam (p. 59), Aitchison, Vol. IX, *Op. Cit.*, (1909).

4) Treaty of 8th July, 1799, particularly Arts. 4 & 5, (pp. 221-2), Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IX, (1909).

and prudence conducted the affairs with great regularity and discretion. There was little interference on the part of the Resident during the later years of Purniya's ministry.¹ "The knowledge of the right of interposing had proved sufficient of itself to prevent any frequent or urgent necessity for its exercise."² Purniya's rule was absolute, and in his anxiety to fill the treasury, he frequently injured the true interests of the State and the resources of its people. The latter suffered from extortion.³

While the Government was carried on by this powerful minister, the education of the minor Prince was sadly neglected. He "was left to the enlightened tuition of his mother, grandmother, and other ladies of the Harem."⁴ As he grew in years, he became jealous of Purniya's sole authority and aspired to assume the reins of Government which he was little fitted to hold.⁵ In 1811, he took the direction of affairs into his own hands. Purniya, unwilling to share his authority with anybody else, resigned, and died shortly afterwards. The Maharaja was sixteen years of age when he thus began to rule. He found a full treasury (Purniya left two crores of Rupees in the State coffers) and a settled Government.⁶ Though possessed of an amiable disposition, an excellent temper, and a liberal heart, the Maharaja Krishna Raja Odiyar was superstitious, credulous, unreliable and in many ways an indifferent ruler. He was very jealous of British interference and extremely tenacious of power, wishing to do everything himself. His ambitions in this direction were always fed by the counsels of the personal favourites, who surrounded him.

In the relations between the Mysore State and the Company's Government, during the time of Lord Hastings, nothing of sufficient importance took place, to alter fundamentally the position as defined by the Treaty of 1799. But, as in the case of Oudh, Mysore is an illustration both of the way in which the working of treaty provisions led to friction, irritation and constant difficulty, and of Hastings' views. The Mysore story has such a close parallel to that of Oudh, as to appear almost identical with it. At Mysore, we find the

1) When Purniya was first made prime minister, the Resident, Colonel Close, exercised a close check over him, but later he released that control. (Cole's Despatch to Madras Government, 10 Feb., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar., 1814.)

2) *Mysore and Coorg Gazetteer*, by L. Rice, (1877), Vol. I, p. 297.

3) *Ibid*, also Major E. Bell, "*The Mysore Reversion*" (1865), p. 12.

4) *Ibid*. (Bell).

5) Cole, the Resident, to the Chief Secretary, Fort St. George, 18th Dec. 1813, Bengal Secret Consultations, No. 1, 21st Jan. 1814. Also from Cole to Madras Government, 10th Feb., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar. 1814.

6) Rice, *Op. Cit.*, p. 298. Bell, *Op. Cit.*, p. 14.

Resident, Cole, who, like Baillie, displays a keen sense of duty and an extraordinary zeal in purifying the Maharaja's Government. He offers his advice, and insists on its acceptance, in almost the same tone and manner as Baillie at Lucknow. The Raja receives the Resident's counsel in the same way as the Wazir, with outward deference but inward indignation. Cole employs the same modes of secret spies for procuring information as Baillie at Lucknow. In desiring the Raja to introduce all the new Amildars to him before they were sent out to their districts, Cole took the same action as Baillie took in Oudh in revenue matters. These methods produced the same annoyance to the rulers at both places. We find the Raja sending his secret agent, Shri Niwas Rao to Madras, with the same object as Sadat Ali had in McLeod's visit to Calcutta, to obtain emancipation from the Resident's control. Cole put up his own nominee, Bakir Sahib, for the minister's post, just as Baillie supported Agha Mir, and both these persons, who were at first in the good books of their respective sovereigns, later lost their confidence, presumably because they looked to the Resident for support in their power.¹ In short, in their exuberant zeal for a better administration the British representatives at the two Courts, assumed a decided tone in demanding from the Princes concerned a ready compliance with the measures of reform suggested by themselves.² The resemblance continues still further in the policy adopted by Hastings in the two cases.

Whilst giving credit to Cole, as in the case of Baillie, for his integrity and honourable zeal, Hastings directed the Government of Madras to instruct the Resident to abstain from that minute and irritating interference in the details of the Raja's Government. "While the external defence of the Kingdom of Mysore was entrusted to the British Government, and the internal tranquillity of the country maintained by the presence of the British force, the charge of the civil administration, both in its general outline, and subordinate details, devolved on the Rajah, a general superintendence and control

1) "Not a day has passed of late in which the Rajah has not secretly pressed upon Bakir Sahib the situation of Prime Minister, but he always declined it, replying 'I shall obey the wishes of the Resident and whatever situation he gives me I will act in it.'" Cole to Madras Government, 10th Feb. 1814, No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar. 1814. And later, he reported to the same authority that the Raja's mind was poisoned to the greatest possible extent against Bakir. (Letter 8th Dec., No. 49, Bengal Secret Consultations, 29th Dec. 1814.)

2) Cole's Despatches to the Fort St. George Government, 10th Feb., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar. 1814, 22nd June, No. 45, 4th Aug. No. 47, and 8th Dec., No. 49, Bengal Secret Consultations, 29th Dec. 1814, and 17th Jan., No. 68, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th May, 1815.

being vested in the British Government, and certain provisions made for the preservation of our paramount influence in the State and for the surety and security of resources from which the subsidy is derived." A distinction was to be drawn between the time of the Raja's minority, when the British Government was the guarantee of the conduct of the minister, and the time when he himself assumed the Government. The interference exercised in the former case, could not be justified in the latter. It was noticed with regret that the Resident did not appreciate this distinction. The public disapproval of the Raja's proceedings and "the tacit though perhaps unintentional encouragement given to the subjects to appeal to the protection and the redress of the Resident, accompanied by public reproof and advice relative to the affairs of his government, could produce no other effect on the mind of a prince, of any independence of spirit, than aversion to the advice so conveyed, and dissatisfaction to the person from whom it proceeded." Following the spirit of this policy the Resident was also told not to force on the Raja a minister of the Resident's choice, but to leave him free to select one for himself. Even if Bakir was to be appointed, "the proposition must come from the Rajah." And lastly, the suggestion of the Resident, to let Ram Rao, the minister in office, continue in name, and to vest the real power in Bakir's hands, was disapproved.¹

The Resident, who did not relish these instructions, followed them in a halting spirit.² Affairs continued in this manner, without any particular improvement either in general administration or in the personal relations between the Raja and the Resident. The Government of Madras were disposed to reduce the Raja's condition to that of the Nawab of the Karnatic.³ This Government considered that the rendering of deference and attention to a ruler like the Maharaja of Mysore, was accompanied by the danger of exciting overweening notions of self-importance, quite inconsistent with his dependent position, which he must be made to feel as much as possible. Hastings did not subscribe to that view, but adopted a different attitude. He particularly considered the very zealous and efficient assistance rendered by the Raja to the British during the Pindari operations, and desired to apply a liberal policy to Mysore. He also

1) Despatch from the Bengal Govt. to Madras Govt., 25th Mar., No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th Mar. 1814.

2) Cole to Chief Secretary Madras, 22nd June, No. 45, 4th Aug., No. 47, and 8th Dec., No. 49, Bengal Secret Consultations, 29th Dec., 1814.

3) Cole to Adam, 1st May, 1818, *enclosures to secret letters from Bengal* (accompanying Governor-General's letter to Secret Committee, 11th July, 1818, Vol. 18, *Secret letters from Bengal*).

recommended to the Secret Committee that the Mysore Resident should be placed directly under the Supreme Government.¹

TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN

Two other States in the far south, Travancore and Cochin, were also in subsidiary alliance with the Company. A subsidiary force had been introduced into Travancore in 1795.² The Treaty of 1805, concluded in Wellesley's time, further increased the strength of the force³ and in general imposed on this State almost the same conditions as were embodied in the Mysore Treaty of 1799, particularly in reserving to the Company the powers of assuming the Government of the country if the subsidy should not be regularly paid.⁴

British control was resented by the State, and in 1809, the Diwans of Travancore and Cochin combined to offer armed resistance to the British. A military force was despatched by the Madras Government and the rising was quelled with excessive severity.⁵ The Raja of Travancore died in 1810, being succeeded by Lakshmi Bai, who became the ruler of the State. During her time, the British Resident, Colonel Munro, discharged the duties of the Diwan.⁶ The Rani died in 1814, and was succeeded by her infant son. Her sister became Regent during the Raja's minority. The advice of the British Resident continued to guide the administration. Travancore became thereafter pacified and subjected to British supremacy.

After the military action of 1809, a fresh treaty was concluded with Cochin. The annual subsidy payable by that State to the Company was raised from one lakh to Rs. 2,76,087. The protection of the State and the distribution of the subsidiary force rested entirely with the Company.⁵ Both these States were so completely reduced in 1809 that no spirit of freedom remained in them to give any further political embarrassment to the British Power.

THE GAEKWAR

Another important State, a former member of the Maratha Empire, which was brought under subsidiary relations by Wellesley,

1) Hastings to the Secret Committee, 11th July, 1818, Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. 18.

2) Treaty of that year, Art. 3, Aitchison, Vol. X, p. 130, (1909).

3) Art. 3, of the Treaty, *Loc. Cit.* p. 136.

4) Art. 5 of the Treaty, *Ibid.*

5) The Diwan fled when beaten, and killed himself. His body was gibbeted at Trivandrum. His brother was seized and executed for his cruel conduct. Wilson, *Op. Cit.* pp. 256-7.

6) Col. Munro's evidence before the Select Committee on 27th March, 1832. (*Parliamentary Papers*. 1831-32, Vol. XIV, pp. 20 and 22.

7) Aitchison, (1909), *Op. Cit.*, Vol. X, pp. 161-4.

was that of the Gaekwar of Baroda. The reigning Prince, Anand Rao, succeeded to his father's throne in 1800, but his half-brother Kanoji disputed the succession with him. Raoji Appaji, Anand Rao's minister, sought British help, and a Convention was signed on the 15th March, 1802.¹ The Bombay Government sent a force which drove out Kanoji and his supporter, Malhar Rao. The Convention was confirmed by a formal Treaty. A secret Article of the former was incorporated in the Treaty to provide for the permanent stationing of a British subsidiary force consisting of two thousand sepoys and one company of European artillery to be paid for by the Gaekwar.² By this instrument, the British offered a loan of money to reduce the Arab soldiery of the Gaekwar. The method of repayment was also provided for. As a security the British were authorised to collect the revenues of certain districts yielding Rs. 11,75,000 a year. The Company undertook to protect the Gaekwar against his enemies.³ Along with this engagement, which was ratified by Anand Rao personally in a separate document,⁴ Governor Duncan of Bombay made a private engagement with Raoji Appaji, the Gaekwar's shrewd minister, guaranteeing to him the permanent Diwanship of Baroda State, and promising similar support and protection to his son and relatives against the possible encroachment on their rights and privileges by the Gaekwar or anybody else.⁵ This was a step similar to the one later taken by Hastings in the case of Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kota. As was natural, it also became a cause of serious embarrassment to the Resident at Baroda, when Sita Ram, the adopted son of Raoji,⁶ claimed the benefit of the guarantee given by the Governor of Bombay. Unfortunately, its fulfilment became very inconvenient by the change of circumstances.⁷

The engagements contracted in 1802 between the Governments of Bombay and Baroda were all consolidated in 1805 by another Treaty, which further increased the strength of the subsidiary force to three thousand Sepoys, one company of European artillery and their proportionate equipment: the functions of the force were to be the protection of the Gaekwar's person and country, the chastisement

1) Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 32-33.

2) Signed 6th June, 1802. Aitchison, Vol. VIII, pp. 33-5.

3) *Ibid.* Articles 4 and 5.

4) Dated 29th July, 1802, Aitchison (1909), Vol. VIII, pp. 36-39.

5) This was dated 8th June, 1802. Aitchison, Vol. VIII, p. 46. The Governor also gave to this minister the valuable village of Bhatta near Surat in Jagir, for his services to the British Government. (Grant dated 6th June, 1802, *Ibid.*)

6) Adopted on the 23rd May, 1803. R. Wallace, *The Guicowar and His Relation with the British Government.* (1863) p. 90.

7) Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, p. 79, pp. 90-91 and pp. 141-4.

of rebels and inciters of disturbances, and the correction of his defaulting subjects and dependents. Cessions of territory made by the former Treaty were confirmed and the Provinces of Chourasi, Chikli and Khera were added, along with the Chouth of Surat. The Gaekwar was to submit to British arbitration all his disputes with other Powers, including his unsettled accounts with the Peshwa.¹

The internal difficulties of the Gaekwar's Government afforded to the British Power a great opportunity of extending their influence over his country. The ground gained in 1802 and later, by the establishment of a military ascendancy, and by financial transactions, was maintained, and the British position became increasingly strong during the years preceding Lord Hastings' arrival.

Anand Rao was a weak ruler, himself incapable of carrying on his government. He had as his able minister, Raoji Appaji.² The British defeated, pursued and put to flight his energetic rival Kanoji,³ whilst Malhar Rao was defeated by Withal Rao (Raoji's relative, and a brave general).⁴ After Raoji's death, his adopted son became the minister, and later, Fateh Singh, Anand Rao's brother, was selected as the Regent of the State.⁵

The first British Resident, Major Alexander Walker, was a person of uncommon tact and great ability. During his seven years' stay at Baroda (1802-1809), he rendered invaluable service to the country. Not only did he gain great advantages for the Company, but by his industry and prudence he was successful in settling the Gaekwar's country as well. Although he was the real power behind the administration, he did not assume a tone of open authority in the country, a temptation which very few Residents could resist in that situation. He preserved the prestige of the Gaekwar over his subjects. Although as he himself wrote, "Certain causes of a delicate nature called for and demanded an active interference in, and vigilant control over, every part of internal management, without which the

1) Treaty of 21st April, 1805 (Aitchison (1909), Vol. VIII, pp. 61-66). As the revenues of the territory formerly assigned to the Company fell short of the expected amount, a further cession was made by a memorandum of 12th July, 1808, to the value of Rs. 1,76,168 a year. (*Loc. Cit.*, pp. 69-71.)

2) Raoji died on 18th July, 1803. His services to the British Government are thus described by Wallace, "that he placed in its hands the virtual sovereignty of a magnificent province" and those to his own master, "that he released him from perils far too great to have been surmounted by his feeble energies." Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, p. 90.

3) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 85. Kanoji was of an independent and enterprising nature. His great ambition was to free his own country from British subjection, to reconquer Kathiawar and expel the traitor Raoji Appaji. Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 92-3.

4) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 87.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 104.

objects of the Honourable Company's Government could scarcely have been obtained, and the Government of the Gaekwar saved from the state of anarchy and confusion with which it was threatened."¹

His great service to the two Governments and a remarkable personal achievement consisted in the discontinuance of the practice of *Mulk giri* expeditions; which were annually undertaken by the Gaekwar's army into Kathiawar for the purpose of collecting his tribute from the numerous feudatory Chiefs of that region. The exactions and oppressions of these predatory incursions were indeed ruinous to peaceful life and industry. Walker invited the Chiefs to fix the amount of their tribute to the Gaekwar and agree to remit it voluntarily and regularly without the movement of the *Mulk giri* force. His appeal met with a favourable response, and accordingly, bonds were executed between the Gaekwar and over a hundred and twenty Chiefs of Kathiawar. These were countersigned by Walker in the name of the British Government.² It was the accomplishment of a great object for both the Governments, and for the peace and tranquillity of the land.³

Walker was succeeded in the Resident's office by his assistant, Captain J. Carnac.⁴ The latter could not maintain the standard set by his able predecessor, and always found reasons to continue the supervision of the affairs of the Gaekwar.⁵ When the pecuniary claims of the Company over that State had been liquidated,⁶ the chief justification for that minute interference ceased to exist. But, like many other Residents, he also could not resist the temptation of reforming the administration by means of the power and influence possessed by the British Government. Not only was the external policy of the Gaekwar controlled by him, but, as Wallace, a later Resident at Baroda, declared, "the constant well-meaning dictation in domestic affairs under the guise of advice of the Resident, and still worse, the ever-prying intermeddling action of his native agent, must have been galling in the extreme to any Chief of spirit, and the candid compiler must admit that gradually, almost imperceptibly, the habitude of advice had induced a tone more lordly, an impatience more impatient, and an assumption more aggressive than in the days of Governor Duncan and Colonel Walker."⁷

1) His last letter to the Bombay Government, Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, p. 155.

2) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 105-7, and pp. 128-133.

3) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 123-4.

4) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 157-8.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 159.

6) As Carnac reported on 22nd Mar. 1812. Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, p. 187.

7) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 207.

The negotiations which were opened at Poona for the settlement of the mutual claims between the Peshwa and the Gaekwar, which ended in the murder, on the 14th July, 1815, of the Baroda envoy, Gangadhar Shastri, have been already recapitulated.¹ As previously noticed, the plot, which culminated in that crime, had accomplices at Baroda also.² When it was discovered that Sita Ram had been engaged in that conspiracy, and that he showed secret hostility to the British influence at Baroda,³ the Resident demanded the surrender of the ex-minister to the British Government, who proposed to send him to Surat. Although the Regent, Fateh Singh, had no hostile intentions against the British,⁴ he strongly resisted that demand, expressing his readiness to punish Sita Ram if he were found to be connected with the murder of the Shastri. The surrender of his subject to another Government was, he said, a great humiliation for his State. Whether it was this pride, or his fear of the faction which sympathised with Sita Ram, the Regent assumed a spirited attitude in the matter.⁵ However, he was obliged, though not without a great deal of pressure, to surrender Sita Ram to the Government of Bombay.⁶

By the Treaty of Poona (June 1817) the Peshwa was forced to give up all his claims on the Gaekwar in return for a fixed annual payment of four lakhs of Rupees, and to farm in perpetuity to the Gaekwar his (the Peshwa's) share of the City and District of Ahmadabad for a sum of four lakhs and a half a year.⁷ This led to the conclusion of another Treaty between the British and the Gaekwar, by which the strength of the subsidiary force was further augmented by one battalion of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. The farm of the Peshwa's territories, which the Gaekwar had obtained by virtue of the Poona Treaty, was

1) Chapter IV, ante.

2) Elphinstone to Adam, 23rd Aug., No. 85, with an enclosure (an intercepted letter) No. 86, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct. 1815.

3) It was further reported that through Sita Ram's intrigues the forces of Dhar, under Babu Raghunath were assembling on the frontier of Gujarat. The Resident had to take military measures against that possible danger. (Carnac to Warden, 29th Aug., No. 2) Bengal Secret Consultations, 13th Oct., 1815, again, 21st. Aug., No. 16 and 23rd Aug., No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Oct. 1815.

4) Carnac to Warden, 9th Sept., No. 23, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Oct. 1815.

5) Warden to Adam (enclosing a copy of Carnac's Despatch) 20th Sept., No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 3rd Nov. 1815; also Wilson, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 105 and Prinsep *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 323.

6) The Bombay Government also took a decided view in the matter, and insisted on Sita Ram's removal from Baroda. Warden to Carnac, 18th Oct., No. 3, (in which the Supreme Government concurred) Adam to Warden, 25th Nov., No. 4, (Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th Nov. 1815). Also Prinsep, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 323, Wilson, II, p. 105.

7) Articles 5 and 15 of the Treaty. Aitchison (1909), Vol. VI, pp. 64-70.

transferred by him to the Company to meet the increased expense of the subsidiary force. The Gaekwar agreed to an exchange of territory, ceding to the Company his own share of Ahmadabad (net value Rs. 12,61,969 a year) and certain other districts, obtaining in return some parganas belonging to the Company. The usual provision of the treaties of Hastings' time was also inserted, by which the Gaekwar engaged "in case of war, to bring forward the whole of his military resources for the prosecution of the war." He further agreed to maintain a body of 8000 horse to be placed under the command of the officer of the subsidiary force. The British were to have a controlling voice in matters of pay, efficiency and muster of this contingent. On the other hand the Company agreed "to take into consideration and determine the pretensions of the Gaekwar Government to benefit by any future partition of territory acquired in foreign wars." (Article 8.)¹

This Treaty, which was concluded on the eve of the war, secured, for the Company considerable political, military and territorial gains in Western India, and strengthened its influence over the Gaekwar's Government. The attempt to persuade the Gaekwar to cede his share of the Kathiawar tribute to the British, failed because the former attached a great importance to his suzerainty over that region. But this disappointment was considerably compensated for by the cession of the rich city of Ahmadabad which, by its central position, historical association and commercial importance, was a valued and coveted acquisition for the Company.²

Fateh Singh, the real head of the Gaekwar Government, died in 1818. His younger brother, Siyaji Rao, was recognised as Regent in Fateh Singh's place. In the following year, on the 2nd October, the nominal ruler, Anand Rao, also died, after an inefficient rule extending over a period of nineteen years. Siyaji Rao then became the full ruler, both in title and reality.³ The young Prince was of a different mettle from his feeble brother, whom he succeeded, and, although he was inexperienced, possessed ambition, talent and energy of character.⁴

During the war the Baroda subsidiary force was accompanied by the Gaekwar's contingent and both rendered very useful service in the operations in Malwa in 1817-1818. The Gaekwar's heavy debts

1) The Treaty was signed on 6th November 1817, and ratified by the Governor-General on 12th March 1818. Aitchison, (1909), Vol. VIII, p. 75.

2) Hastings to the Governor of Bombay, 26th September, No. 18, Warden to Adam, 10th September, No. 19, and Carnac to Warden, 26th August, No. 20, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th October 1817.

3) Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 226-7 and 235.

4) Elphinstone's minute of 18th April, 1820. Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, p. 278, and also pp. 233-4.

(amounting to over a crore of rupees in 1820¹) were in part due to the amounts that were borrowed for the upkeep of that expeditionary force.² Siyaji Rao, relying on the provision made in Article Eight of the Treaty of 1817, claimed a share of the conquered territory. Although his help was warmly recognised, his claim was not admitted.³

The relations between the Company and the Gaekwar were defined in 1820, when Elphinstone personally repaired to Baroda for that purpose.

The British Government decided to withdraw from the minute control exercised by the Resident and his agent in the details of civil administration during Anand Rao's time. The conditions for that withdrawal were that the Gaekwar would observe the agreements made by him with the bankers, the tributaries, and the ministers about their salaries, since all these three cases had been settled under British guarantees. The British would control exclusively all foreign intercourse, but in internal matters, the Resident would occasionally offer advice, and acquaint himself with the yearly budget and accounts of the State. Siyaji Rao was particularly anxious that all representations be made to him in private, and that all acts of Government should emanate directly from himself. He complained against the fraud and rapacity of Dhakji Dadaji, and he was determined not to have that person as his minister.⁴ Siyaji Rao desired to have Sita Ram back in that situation. Elphinstone would not permit Sita Ram's return under any circumstances, but left him free to choose his own minister, though he was to consult the British Government before appointing him. The principles of the agreement were, at the particular request of Siyaji Rao, given to him in writing by Elphinstone, and a proclamation was issued, announcing the restoration of the Gaekwar's authority in his internal administration.⁵

Before leaving Baroda, Elphinstone settled another matter of pressing importance. That part of Kathiawar, which had formerly been an integral part of the Gaekwar's dominions, had for many a year groaned under oppression and misery. The people had suffered, not

1) Appendix to Elphinstone's minute of 18th April. Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 288-9.

2) Resident Baroda (to Chief Secretary Bombay, 24th June, 1819) calculated that amount at Rs. 39,63,965. Wallace *Op. Cit.*, p. 232.

3) Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 229-30.

4) Dhakji was drawn from Bombay, and forced on Fateh Singh by Carnac, who compelled him to send away his own favourite, Manik Das. (Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 208 and 209-11.) Siyaji complained to Elphinstone that Dhakji misused his influence over Carnac to his own selfish ends. *Loc. Cit.*

5) Elphinstone, on his return to Bombay, recorded the whole transaction in a Minute, 18th Apr. 1820. Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 251-78, proclamation issued 7th Apr. 1820, Wallace *Op. Cit.*, pp. 308-9. The instructions embodying the principles of the agreement sent to Resident Williams per Warden, 3rd May, 1820. Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 309-15. And written paper given by Elphinstone to Siyaji Rao 3rd Apr. 1820, Aitchison, (1909) *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 80.)

only from famine and plague, but from the extortion of the Gaekwar's agents many of whom were introduced by his commander Withal Rao Diwanji as the managers of the various chiefships.¹ The force kept in that region by the Gaekwar disturbed the peace on the British frontier for a hundred miles. Moreover, Walker's arrangement in Kathiawar, and later on in Mahi Kantha, were made for ten years only.

Elphinstone proposed to Siyaji Rao that the British should collect his tribute in Kathiawar and Mahi Kantha, and that he should engage to have no concern whatever with the tributaries unless the British called for his aid. The Gaekwar naturally did not like the suggestion, fearing that the British would eventually absorb his authority over his own tributaries. However, the proposal was agreed to, and a memorandum was drawn up and executed by Siyaji Rao, engaging not to send any troops, nor to make any direct demands on the Zamindars of Kathiawar and Mahi Kantha. The British Government undertook to collect the tribute on his account.²

All these arrangements were approved in their entirety by Hastings,³ and Elphinstone was satisfied with their working. He found that Siyaji Rao's conduct was more satisfactory than he had expected it would be.⁴

THE NIZAM OF HYDERABAD

One of the oldest, and by the position and extent of its territories, the most important of the Company's allies, was the State of Hyderabad. It was also one of the earliest of the Indian Powers with which the British had contracted treaty relations. These relations were, in all essentials, similar to those of the other subsidiary States. The British Government furnished a subsidiary force⁵ and undertook to defend the State against all enemies. The Nizam had no dealings with any other Power, except with the consent of the British, and engaged to submit all his external disputes to their arbitration, and to accept their award. He was also pledged to furnish, in time of war, a contingent of 6,000 infantry and 9,000 horse to serve with the subsidiary force in the field.⁶ These were the general features of the

1) Wilson, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 471 and Elphinstone's Minute (Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 273-4).

2) Elphinstone's Minute (Wallace, pp. 275-6) the Memorandum, Wallace, pp. 306-7.

3) Metcalfe to Warden, 17th June, 1820 (Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, p. 317).

4) His Minute, 16th Apr. 1821 (Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 319-324).

5) Its strength was increased in 1800 by two battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, making the total 8 battalions of infantry of 1,000 Sepoys each, and two regiments of cavalry of 500 horse each. For the upkeep of the additional force, the Nizam ceded to the Company all the territory which had fallen to his share by the two partition treaties with Mysore, in 1792 and 1799. (Arts. 3 and 5 of the Treaty with the Nizam, 1800, Aitchison, (1909) Vol. IX, pp. 68-69.)

6) Treaty of 12th Oct. 1800, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 68-72.

subsidiary alliance which applied to all States of that class. However, speaking very roughly the position of Hyderabad resembled that of Baroda more than that of Oudh or Mysore. The case of Hyderabad differed from the two latter in-as-much as the Company was precluded, by the terms of the Treaty, from interfering in the domestic concerns of the Nizam.¹

The reigning sovereign, Sikandar Jah, had succeeded to the *Masnad* in 1803. He possessed neither the ability nor the character to make an efficient ruler.² The British maintained their influence on his Government by insisting on the appointment of a minister of their choice.³ On this principle, Mir Alam, who was always loyal to the British alliance, was made Premier in 1804, to the exclusion of Raja Mahipat Ram, whom the Nizam favoured.⁴ On the death of Mir Alam, in December 1808, the same controversy was renewed between the British Government and the Nizam. Minto wished to appoint Shamsul Umra, but the Nizam favoured Munir-ul-Mulk. After protracted negotiations, an arrangement was arrived at in June 1809, by which the latter became the ostensible minister, whilst it was understood that the administration would be carried on by Chandulal, the deputy (Peshkar) of Mir Alam, who was attached to, and trusted by, the British.⁵

On the appointment of Henry Russell to the Residency in 1810, Munir-ul-Mulk attempted in vain to obtain power for himself, little realising that the change in the personnel of the Residency did not mean any change in British policy. He had nothing to do with public administration, which was left entirely in the hands of Chandulal. The Nizam also retired from the administration in disgust, leading a life of gloomy retirement and sullen discontent, as later recorded by Metcalfe.⁶

1) Art. 15 of the Treaty, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 71-72.

2) Russell to Hastings 24th Nov., 1819, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Jan. 1820.

3) Barlow's Minute of 2nd Oct. 1806 (Wilson, Bk. I, p. 31).

4) Sydenham to Edmonstone, 8th Sept., 1806, (Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe* (1854), Vol. II, p. 5.).

5) Sydenham's private letters to Edmonstone (Kaye's *Metcalfe*, *Op. Cit.* Vol. II, p. 7), Metcalfe's Minute of 13th May, 1829 (Kaye's *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*, p. 223).

6) Kaye's *Metcalfe Papers*, pp. 222-3, Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 8-9. The British protected Chandulal "against the jealousy of the Nizam and the intrigues of Mooneer-ool-Moolk." Russell to Hastings, 24th Nov. 1819, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Jan. 1820. The Nizam's indifference to public affairs can be judged from the fact that when in 1815 the Resident conveyed to him the news of the Bhopal negotiations, he took no interest, one way or the other. He merely enquired whether Bhopal was on the North or on the South side of the Narbada. (Russell to Moira, 22nd Jan., No. 93, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th Feb. 1815.)

It is indeed curious to see that the character of the minister who, with British support, ruled the State of Hyderabad like a despot for nearly thirty-five years, should have made quite a different impression on two such able and distinguished Englishmen as Russell and Metcalfe.

In the former's opinion, Raja Chandulal was "mild, intelligent, thoughtful, unaffected, humble incredibly hard-working," experienced in every mode of business. "Naturally humane and benevolent," and "with our support he is qualified to make a better minister than any other that could be chosen." Lack of political courage and firmness was his "great and perhaps his only defect."¹ Metcalfe, on the other hand, thought the Raja to be insincere, intriguing, vicious, unreliable, having "the plausibility ascribed to Satan," addicted to the vices of bribery and corruption, faithless and unscrupulous to his master, oppressive and extortionate to the people, and subservient to the Residency staff.²

After allowing for the exaggeration resulting from strong opinions, the two estimates will be found more complementary than contradictory to each other. Russell's own remark, "his virtues belong to his private and his faults to his public character" goes some way to explain Metcalfe's later tirade against this man around whom the affairs of Hyderabad centred for so many years.³

In any case, there appears to be no doubt that the Raja was a very able and experienced administrator, who enjoyed the support of the British Power against all his enemies, even against the Nizam himself. It would only be natural that such a man should give his first attention to maintaining himself secure in power and counteracting the jealous intrigues of his opponents. Consequently public affairs could not be attended to with that disinterested thoroughness which the wretched state of the country badly required.⁴ The poor people suffered the evils of mal-administration in the form of insecurity, extortion and tyranny.⁵ Whenever the Resident exerted his influence to remedy these

1) Russell's estimate of Chandulal's character quoted by Syed Hoossain Bilgrami and Willmott; *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of H. H. the Nizam's Dominions*. (1883), Vol. I, pp. 136-8, and also Russell to Hastings 24th Nov. 1819, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Jan. 1820.

2) Kaye's *Metcalfe Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 98, 115, 225.

3) In Metcalfe's words, written in 1829, "the subsequent history of the Nizam's country and our further interference therein, turns entirely on the character of this minister, Chandoolall." Kaye's *Metcalfe Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 224.

4) Sutherland: *Sketches of the Relations Subsisting Between the British Government in India and the Different Native States*, pp. 54-5.

5) Russell to Hastings, 24th November, 1819, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd January 1820. Metcalfe to Swinton, 31st August 1822, paras. 9, 14 and 15, No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th December 1822.

evils, Chandulal, who was only too anxious to keep the British envoy pleased, showed his readiness to co-operate in the measures proposed by the Resident.¹

Before mentioning these attempts at the reform of the Nizam's administration, notice must be taken of an incident which, though an unconnected and internal event, was yet serious enough to induce the Resident to take a decided attitude. Incidentally, it serves to reveal the state of the country at the time.

The Nizam had three illegitimate sons, Nazir-ud-dowla, Shams-ud-dowla and Mubariz-ud-dowla. The two latter had for some time been behaving in a most violent manner. They were supported and encouraged in their high-handed deeds by their cousin Imtiaz-ud-dowla. These young Princes (aged between twenty and thirty) resorted to acts of open defiance of the constituted Government, as though compensating with a vengeance for the utter disregard of their father towards his administration. They set up a sort of tribunal, tried cases, inflicted sentences, and executed money demands. Life and property were not safe from the rapacity of the Princes. High and low alike suffered insults and injuries at their hands. Matters were steadily becoming intolerable. At one time, a servant of the Residency was arrested by the orders of the Princes. This brought matters to a head. Measures had been taken in 1814, a year before this incident, to restrain the violent activities of the young Princes, but they had proved unavailing. The Resident complained of the indignity which he had received, whereupon the Nizam authorised the Resident and Chandulal to adopt severe measures. Captain Hare was ordered to proceed with a force and mount guard over the Princes' Place. On the 20th August, 1815, Hare marched out with seven hundred men, and after reconnoitring the position, moved with three hundred of them to the house itself. While he was about half a mile from the Princes' palace, firing was opened on the force by men concealed in the upper stories of the houses on either side of the street. The captain advanced, blew open the gates of the house, and attempted to set fire to it, but he was repulsed by the Princes' men and forced to retire. The Resident dispatched Major Macdowell, at the head of all the available forces (which then consisted only of 316 Europeans and 412 Sepoys), with some cannon.²

There was a great commotion in the town. Insecurity and fear of insurrection prevailed. Both the nobles and the common people, even

1) Swinton to Metcalfe, 25th October, No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th December 1802, para. 8.

2) Russell to Hastings (then Moira), 23rd August, No. 124. To Adam, 21st August, No. 116, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th September 1815.

the Nizam himself, felt alarmed. There was a vague fear in the popular mind that the English would destroy the town. On the other hand, the Resident realised the weakness of his situation, since at that time he had at his disposal only an insignificant number of troops as compared with the armed population of the discontented Pathans (about 10,000, in the two villages very near the city walls, and within three miles of the Residency). Russell thought it too hazardous to let Macdowell's force remain in the city, and withdrew it.¹ At the same time, he requested the commanding officer at Bellary to send five companies of Europeans and one battalion of sepoy to his support, and asked Doveton to proceed from Akola to Hyderabad with the whole of the subsidiary force, or at least the horse artillery of the 25th. Dragoons, five companies of Europeans and three battalions of sepoy.² These two or three days were a time of suspense and acute anxiety. At this very time, news came from Poona of the Peshwa's uncertain attitude in the surrender of his favourite Trimbakji. This further strengthened the Resident's resolve to settle the trouble quickly, before it had any time to spread.

During this period of disturbance, Chandulal shut himself up in his own house, too nervous to move out. The Nizam, fearing that the British might avenge Captain Hare's defeat, effected the removal of his two sons Shams-ud-dowla and Mubariz-ud-dowla, and also their cousin, Imtiaz-ud-dowla, to his palace on the 23rd August.

The Resident called upon the Nizam and his ministers to confine the Princes in the fortress of Golkunda, and demanded that their violent adherents should be punished, adding that he had sent for reinforcements from Bellary and Akola. Although he showed a readiness to comply with these demands of the Resident, the Nizam argued that it was not necessary to intern the Princes. Besides his own feelings as a father, he was being pressed by the ladies of the family, his wife and mother, not to be too severe on the youthful Princes. By the 28th August, the talk of sending them away to Golkunda had died out. Therefore, Russell wrote a strong note to Chandulal, sending him the draft of a letter which he was required to address to the Nizam. This produced the desired effect on the latter. The Princes were removed to Golkunda and lodged there under a strong guard on the 30th August. The Begums raised a great cry over this treatment of the Princes, and went with them to the place of confinement. But the Nizam remained unmoved by their threats.

1) Russell to Hastings, 23rd August, *loc. cit.*

2) Russell to Officer in Command, at Bellary, 21st Aug., No. 118, to Doveton, No. 119, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th September, 1815.

The city was quiet, and good order prevailed.¹ The lawless adherents of the Princes were punished with varying terms of imprisonment.²

In a study of the relations of the British and Hyderabad Governments, the reorganisation and reform of the Nizam's contingents forms indeed an integral part. A brief reference to this subject here is proper for the additional reason of its connection with the financial affairs of the Nizam's Government, which later became the cause of an acute controversy.

In 1798, the British had succeeded in ousting the French battalions in the Nizam's service, trained by Raymond, and later commanded by Perron. In 1800, after the Mysore war, in which the Nizam sent a contingent to aid the English, Colonel Kirkpatrick, the able English Resident at Hyderabad, concluded the treaty by which the Nizam was bound to furnish a contingent of 6,000 foot and 9,000 horse. This force co-operated with the British against the Marathas in 1803. The Nizam's forces, cavalry (of two kinds, *Sarkari* and *Jagirdari*) and infantry, were in a very defective condition. Excepting the troops of Salabat Khan, the Nizam's army was "incomplete in numbers, loose in discipline, badly armed and irregularly paid."³

Although the employment of British officers in all arms of the State forces began quite early, the contingent was not properly organised until 1818, when the "Russell Brigade" (named after the Resident) consisting of two battalions was taken under his supervision in the matter of pay and discipline. In 1814, Lieutenant Hare was appointed to its command. All through the years 1814-1817 the Brigade received particular attention from Russell, and consequently rose to a high pitch of efficiency. In 1815 it was used against the Princes, and in 1817-18 it rendered valiant services on the British side against Holkar's army at Mahidpur, and in the operations against the Pindaris.⁴

In the same way the plan of reforming the Nizam's cavalry was undertaken. This was a task full of difficulties. The Nizam himself was silently obstructive, the interested nobles naturally hostile, and even the minister's opposition was feared. But the scheme was carried out and Captain Davis was appointed commander on the strong

1) Russell to Hastings, 5th Sept., No. 33, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Sept. 31st Aug., No. 55, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct., to Adam 30th Aug., No. 127, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Sept., 1815.

2) Chandulal to Russell, 1st Sept., No. 34, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Sept., Russell to Hastings, 30th Nov., 1815, No. 11, Bengal Secret Consultations, 6th January 1816.

3) *The Calcutta Review*, Vol. XI. 1849, an article on the Nizam's contingent, p. 156.

4) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 156, 159, 170-2.

recommendation of the Resident. This reformed cavalry under Davis was 4,000 strong, and was stationed in different parts of Berar. After its reorganisation in 1817, it became another very efficient section of the contingent.¹

The Russell Brigade, as already noticed, consisted of only two out of the six battalions of the infantry. The other four in Berar had not been so thoroughly organised as the two favoured ones at the capital. In January 1819, the whole force was reorganised. Two field officers from the Company's army, Majors Pitman and Doveton (the latter in supercession of Major Hare of the Russell Brigade) were in command of the two sections of the contingent on either side of the Godavari.² In order to ensure regular payment to the troops, the minister came to an arrangement with the firm of Messrs. William Palmer & Company, by which the latter furnished two lakhs of Rupees a month, required for the payment of the regular battalions and the reformed horse at Aurungabad. For that purpose, the firm was assigned the revenue of certain districts amounting to thirty lakhs of Rupees a year to meet the principal, interest, and contingent charges.³

The Ellichpur Brigade, which was Salabat Khan's contingent, was also brought under British control, with the appointment by the Governor-General of Major James Grant, of the Madras Army, as its commander. Both Grant, and still more, his successor in office, Captain Seyer, carried the reform of that force into complete effect.⁴

This reform of the Nizam's contingent was brought about at the Resident's initiative, and in course of time, the reformed forces came, for all practical purposes, under the control of the British Resident. As Hastings wrote in one of his Minutes:—"It is perfectly true that these troops are, in fact, more ours than those of the sovereign by whom they are maintained."⁵

The efficiency of the contingent was greatly raised, but this was brought about at an enormous expense. The annual expenditure on the contingent about the year 1820 amounted to thirty-six lakhs. This figure excluded Salabat Khan's Brigade, which was maintained by a separate Jagir valued at fourteen lakhs of Rupees.⁶ The emoluments and conditions were so attractive that "employment in the

1) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 162-4.

2) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 174-5.

3) *Hyderabad Papers*, printed by the order of the Court of Directors, *Home Misc.*, Vol. 517, p. 9.

4) *Calcutta Review*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 176.

5) 10th Nov. 1819. *Hyderabad Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 31.

6) The *Calcutta Review*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 183. Metcalfe's estimate was above forty lakhs. (Kaye's *Metcalfe Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 224).

Nizam's service was generally coveted by the officers both of the King's and the Company's army."¹ When one appointment followed another, it became a proverbial expression, according to the able writer in the *Calcutta Review*, to say: "Poor Nizzy! Nizzy pays for all."²

While these improvements were being effected in the regular forces of the Nizam, his Government was steadily becoming oppressive and demoralised. The cost of the contingent alone was a heavy demand on the public treasury. "Extraordinary expenses, therefore, must be met by extraordinary exactions," wrote Russell.³ In order to meet the demands of the Government the revenue collectors extracted from the cultivators more than they could afford to pay. Whilst the country was becoming reduced to a wretched state, the Nizam, himself, was every day growing more indifferent to its affairs. He took no interest, either in the disturbances that went on in the Peshwa's country in the spring of 1817, or in the wars and treaties that followed them. This indifference was due more to the weakness and helplessness of his position than to fidelity towards his allies. Chandulal was kept fully informed by the Resident, of all the events, and he returned that confidence with an unflinching devotion to the British cause. He fully realised that if the Maratha influence prevailed on the Nizam, the first consequence would be his own dismissal as a traitor. But the Nizam, he said, was too fickle and timid for any decisive action. As the head of the executive Government, the minister provided a force of 13,425 men (7,425 infantry and 6,000 cavalry) to fight for the British Government.⁴ This act of loyalty further strengthened British support of Chandulal.

After the close of the war, Russell drew the Governor-General's attention to the oppressive administration of Hyderabad, and recommended speedy action. The disorders and weakness of that Government were, in a great measure, due to the political alliance of a subsidiary nature. They had now reached such a stage, that Russell considered, that the remedy could be applied only by the British Government. The plan of reform must be "general and comprehensive." In the existing circumstances, he favoured increased interference in

1) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, pp. 15-16.

2) Vol. XI, p. 175. He writes "Major Doveton's appointment was thought superfluous; as it cost the Nizam's Government some sixty thousand rupees a year, it might have been dispensed with." *Ibid.* He gives the amount of the table allowances drawn by officers, p. 183, *Loc. Cit.*

3) Russell to Hastings, 24th Nov. 1819, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Jan. 1820. The ruinous condition of the country described by Hastings (in his letter to Russell of 26th Oct., 1819, *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 88).

4) Russell to Hastings, 11th June, No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th July, 1817, and 8th Dec. 1817, No. 71, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th Jan. 1818.

order to support the executive authority of the minister, Chandulal. Although "nothing short of a close, vigilant and decided control over the internal administration" would be desirable, yet it was to "be exercised through the medium of advice and influence, and not by direct exertion of authority." He thus summed up the desired policy: "I would rather enlarge the sphere than increase the degree of interference."

The reforms would consist in the retrenchment of public expenditure, chiefly by the reduction of useless and unnecessary troops, in the selection (through the Resident's recommendation) as Talukdars, of men of reputation and integrity, and in the appointment to the districts of collectors instead of farmers (system of *Inami* rather than *Ijara*). The Nizam's opposition was to be avoided by the pleasing offer to release his sons, whose confinement he regarded as a great disgrace.¹

These suggestions were entirely approved. Russell was authorised to "interpose your advice and influence for those purposes." The instructions said:—"A salutary control over the internal administration of the country, accurate accounts of all establishments, receipts and expenditure, the correction of abuses, a proper distribution of justice, the reduction of expense, the amelioration of the revenue system, including the customs and duties levied on commerce, the improvement of resources, the extinction of debt, the efficiency of troops retained, and the discharge of such as are useless, are objects to which your attention will naturally be directed." Chandulal, as the fittest instrument for carrying out these reforms, was to be assured of the protection and support of the British Government. And the release of the Princes from Golkunda was sanctioned.²

The reforms met with much opposition from interested nobles. But the Nizam was appeased by British consent to release his sons.³ On the 1st September, Russell reported his great satisfaction at the improvement effected in the administration, and commended the co-operation of the minister in establishing a purer system of rule. The districts had, in almost all cases, been given in *Inami* instead of *Ijara*, hereditary police officials were restored, the *Nazarana* charged

1) These proposals were embodied in Russell's Despatch to Hastings, 24th Nov. 1819, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Jan. 1820.

2) Metcalfe to Russell, 22nd Jan. 1820, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, of date.

3) Russell to Hastings, 30th April, No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th September 1820.

from the Talukdars on their appointment abolished, and the administration of justice attended to by the appointment of a tribunal of a Hindu Pandit and a Musalman Kasi. Russell himself exercised a personal supervision on the administration by receiving petitions. In the course of eight months, he had sent 1042 such petitions to the minister.¹

These glowing accounts, which brought forth the "highest approbation" of Hastings² must have aroused in the mind of Metcalfe, then Political Secretary at Calcutta, the hopes of having a time of ease and leisure at Hyderabad, whither he proceeded at the end of 1820, to succeed Russell.³ His stay at the Nizam's Court, however, proved to be a time of considerable grief, bitterness, and strenuous anxiety, including a temporary estrangement from his chief, the Governor-General. The unhappy discussions which generated those feelings centred round the firm of Messrs. William Palmer and Company, to which a short reference is now necessary.

William Palmer, son of General Palmer by his Muslim wife, was in the military service of the Nizam. About 1810 or 1811, he retired from that office, and opened a banking and commercial firm at Hyderabad. In 1814, the partnership was reconstituted, with the following members: Hastings, Palmer, Bankati Das, a Hindu millionaire, Samuel Russell and William Currie. The last named was the Residency surgeon at Hyderabad. The firm carried on business with the countenance of the British Resident, in fact, its offices were in one of the Residency bungalows. A number of European servants of the Company invested money with the firm, which paid them 12 per cent interest, while the firm itself transacted business with the Nizam's Government and his nobles, charging 24 and 25 per cent. per annum.⁴

As the firm's dealings with the Hyderabad State were growing, it began to be feared that their activity might be declared illegal, since the partnership included British subjects.⁵ Therefore, on appli-

1) Russell to Hastings, 1st Sept., No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th September 1820.

2) Metcalfe to Russell, 23rd Sept., No. 10, Bengal Secret Consultations, 30th September 1820.

3) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, pp. 30-31. He was pressed by Russell to accept the Hyderabad Residency on those very hopes. (His letters to Metcalfe in April and May 1820, *Loc. Cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 492-96.)

4) William Palmer's Memorial to Lord Amherst, 12th May, 1824, *Home misc.*, Vol. 758, pp. 1-2. Adam to Russell, 23rd Apr. 1814, instructing the Resident to afford all facilities to the firm. *Loc. Cit.*, MS. pp. 35-6, and Briggs *The Nizam* (1861), Vol. II, pp. 165-9.

5) According to Act 37, George III, Cap. 142, Section 28, of 1797 by which British subjects were prohibited under pain of penalty from having any kind of dealings with the Indian Princes or States. (Section reproduced in *Hyderabad Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 8.)

cation to the Bengal Government, William Palmer and Company obtained, in 1816, under the dispensing powers of the law, a licence to carry on their banking transactions with the Nizam's Government.¹

The position of the Palmer Company, which was locally regarded as being more or less identified with the British Government, was thus completely strengthened. This impression was further confirmed by the addition to the partnership, in 1815, of Sir William Rumbold. He had gone out to India in the Governor-General's suite to make his fortune, and had married Hastings' ward, whom the latter treated as his own daughter.²

The powerful influence which the firm began to exercise in Hyderabad was further increased by an agreement (already referred to in passing) by which, at the suggestion of the Resident, and with the concurrence of the ministers, they established their branch at Aurungabad in 1819, to disburse the pay of the regular forces.³ For this service, they received interest at the rate of 25 per cent from the Government, by the assignment of the revenues of certain districts in Berar. This arrangement was sanctioned by the Governor-General in Council.⁴

In 1820, the Minister and the firm negotiated another loan of sixty lakhs of Rupees. Chandulal represented that with that sum he would be able to pay off certain old debts, and also make *taccavi* advances to cultivators for improving their agricultural holdings. The Raja also announced that he would make reduction of unnecessary establishment, to the extent of twenty-five lakhs of Rupees annually.⁵ The Palmer Company wished to have the transaction guaranteed by the British Government. Russell regarded Chandulal's proposal as sound and genuine, and recommended it for sanction.⁶ The details of the transaction were withheld from the British Government. It was arranged to pay the firm a bonus of eight lakhs of Rupees,⁷ and the rate of interest was

1) The Instrument of Licence issued on 23rd July. *Hyderabad Papers. Op. Cit.*, Vol. 517, pp. 5-6.

2) The Instrument of Licence issued on 23rd July. *Hyderabad Papers, Op. Cit.* Vol. 517, pp. 5-6. Russell's letter to the Court of Directors, 21st Sept. 1824. *Home Misc.* Vol. 758, MS., pp. 85 and 113, Hastings' Minute, 17th June 1820, *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 44 and Metcalfe's Minute, of 11th Dec. 1828, (*Kaye's Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II. pp. 45-6).

3) Palmer's Memorial, Vol. 758, *Op. Cit.*, p. 3.

4) Political letter from Bengal (*Hyderabad Papers*, Vol. 517, pp. 9-10). One member, Stuart, dissented, and recommended further enquiry before sanctioning the arrangement (*His Minute Loc. Cit.*, pp. 23-4). The Governor-General thought any further enquiry unnecessary, being satisfied by the oral statement of Sir William Rumbold before the Council. (*His Minute Loc. Cit.*, pp. 31-4.)

5) Chandulal to Russell (*Hyderabad Papers*, p. 39).

6) Russell to Metcalfe, 19th May, 1820, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 38.

7) Palmer's Memorial, Vol. 758, *Op. Cit.*, p. 4.

not revealed to the Calcutta Government.¹ The consideration of the question involved a spirited discussion at Calcutta, in which the Council was equally divided, and finally the loan was sanctioned with the casting vote of the Governor-General.² The sum of sixty lakhs was to be repaid in six years by annual instalments of sixteen lakhs of Rupees.³

In the meantime, information regarding Messrs. William Palmer and Company and the sanction given to their dealings, reached England. The Directors strongly censured the action of their Indian Government in granting the licence to the Company. It was a misuse of an extraordinary power, amounting to the protection of an otherwise illegal traffic. They issued positive and peremptory orders to the Government at Calcutta, to revoke the licence. After the experience of the abuses in the Karnatic and Oudh, of similar dealings, the Directors in England could not approve of the indulgence shown to Messrs. William Palmer and Company.⁴ These orders arrived in India in November 1820. Since prompt compliance with them was emphatically demanded, the Resident was at once directed to refuse all further pecuniary arrangements between the Nizam and the firm.⁵ When the news of the sixty-lakh loan was received by the Directors they refused to ratify it, and further instructed Hastings' Government to discontinue the plan of paying the troops through the firm.⁶

Metcalf took over charge from Russell on the 1st December 1820. With his characteristic energy, he soon began to acquaint himself with the real state of affairs in the country. His investigations showed that his predecessor's mild measures had been hardly effective. The new Resident found the Nizam's subjects groaning under oppression. The Government was thoroughly disorganised, and in many parts the frequent cases of dacoity and robbery made life and property insecure.⁷ He found that public interests were neglected by the self-seeking

1) Stuart's Minute, 10th June, 1820. *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 43. The nominal rate was 18%, but with the bonus it amounted to about 25% p. a.

2) Hastings had the support of Fendall. But Adam and Stuart strongly opposed the sanctioning of the loan. Hastings, since he was personally interested in one of the partners, did not at first wish to take a share in the decision. (His Minute, 17th June, pp. 44-6.) But when the Council was found to be opposed to the measure, he had to change his mind and voted in its favour. (Minute of 14th July, p. 55.) Other Minutes of the Councillors, Fendall, Adam, Stuart, pp. 43-54, *Hyderabad Papers*, *Op. Cit.*

3) Metcalfe to Russell, July 11th 1820, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 55.

4) Letter to Bengal, 24th May, 1820, *Hyderabad Papers*, pp. 7-8.

5) Swinton to Russell, 16th Dec. 1820, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 70.

6) Letter to Bengal 28th Nov. 1821, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 70-84.

7) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, pp. 26-7. Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 55. Metcalfe to Swinton, paras. 11, 12, & 15, 31st Aug., No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822.

minister, who spent lavish sums to strengthen his own position.¹ He had bought the support of William Palmer and Company, with enormous sacrifices of public money.² Besides the pecuniary transaction which, with their high rate of interest and obscure accounts, were extremely profitable to the firm, William Palmer, his brother and two sons (at school in England) drew separate personal allowances from the State treasury.³ The Nizam's Government had become involved in serious financial difficulties. The last loan of sixty lakhs which Metcalfe characterised as "a fiction,"⁴ had been grossly misapplied, with the result that, instead of its being a relief to the State, the public indebtedness to the firm had increased by Rs. 18,22,000 between August 1820 and January 1822.⁵ Metcalfe saw how the accounts of the debts, new and old, with interest, bonuses and allowances, were every day leading the State into deeper distress.⁶

This alliance of an unscrupulous and all powerful minister with adventurous money-lenders, was not merely a financial evil. The Palmer Company wielded a considerable political influence in the country. The character of the house and "the British name became involved in detestable acts of oppression, extortion, and atrocity."⁷ Their badged peons went about the country making exactions from the ryots. The common people closely associated the bankers with the British Power.⁸ As Metcalfe put it, armed with the double authority of the British and the Hyderabad Governments, they were making rapid strides towards the entire possession of the revenues of the country.⁹

These political and financial entanglements of the Nizam grieved Metcalfe intensely. He witnessed "the plunder of the Nizam

1) Munir-ul-Mulk told Metcalfe how Chandulal bribed the servants and members of his (Munir's) and the Nizam's household. (*Hyderabad Papers, Op. Cit.*, p. 185.) Also Kaye's *Metcalfe Papers*, pp. 100 and 225.

2) Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 66.

3) Amounting to Rs. 64,800 per annum. (Wm. Palmer Rs. 2,000, his sons Rs. 12,00 each, Hasting Palmer Rs. 1,000 per mensem.) Metcalfe to Swinton, 1st Aug. 1822, *Hyderabad Papers*, pp. 181-2.

4) Because of the renewal of the old debts and the payment in cash of far less than the amount stipulated. Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 42, also Metcalfe to Swinton, 1st Aug. 1822. *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 181.

5) *Loc Cit.*, pp. 181 and 184.

6) Even Chandulal complained to the Resident of "the interest upon interest, interest upon interest" ("Sood dur sood dur Sood") charged by the Palmer Company. (Metcalfe to Swinton, 3rd Sept., No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822.)

7) Metcalfe to Hastings, Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 59.

8) Metcalfe to Swinton, 30th Sept. 1822, *Hyderabad Papers*, pp. 244-5.

9) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 45.

by William Palmer & Co., in league with an unprincipled minister,"¹ and was indeed anxious to stop it.²

The measures which appeared to him to be most essential in the circumstances were, the reduction of public expenditure, land revenue settlements with the village communities for a term of five years, and, thirdly, the prevention of oppression through the agency of European superintendents of districts.³

Metcalf lost no time in putting into operation his scheme of village settlements. He anticipated that the cultivators would obtain from them security of tenure and freedom from exaction. These hopes were fulfilled, and he felt gratified by the excellent results produced by the revenue settlements made in various divisions by his assistant, Wells, and other European officers, Captain Sutherland, Seyer, Hollis, Clark, Hislop and Lieutenant Sutherland.⁴

These measures were distasteful to Chandulal. At first, he pretended to like them, and promised the Resident his hearty co-operation in their execution. He undertook to settle some parts himself. But in a short time it became clear to Metcalfe that the minister was counteracting the reforms by indirect yet effective means. He either did not carry out the settlements of the parts which he had taken upon himself, or nullified the true benefit of it by turning the district collector into a farmer.⁵ Notwithstanding all this obstruction, Metcalfe was able to report his profound satisfaction at the happy results which his plan had produced.⁶

He received encouragement and tacit support from Hastings, in the reforms of the land revenue system.⁷ This attitude of the Governor-General soon changed. In August 1822, Chandulal addressed a private letter to Hastings which was transmitted through the irregular channel of William Palmer. In it he complained of the

1) As he wrote to John Palmer, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 49.

2) He made detailed enquiries into the Revenue management of the State. He desired the ministers to discontinue the clandestine allowances to the Residency servants, and the presentation of fruits, dinners, etc. (Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 28.)

3) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 30 & 32.

4) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 35. Sutherland *Op. Cit.*, pp. 57-9. Metcalfe to Swinton, 7th Nov. 1821. *Hyderabad Papers*, pp. 155-7.

5) Metcalfe to Swinton, 31st Aug., No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822, paras. 18-22.

6) *Loc. Cit.*, para 28.

7) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 37. (Hastings' most encouraging letter to him in April 1821), also Swinton to Metcalfe, 7th Apr. 1821, in which Metcalfe's plans of settlement are called "highly judicious." Although it must be said in fairness to Hastings that he had written a Minute on the 27th May 1821, which was not officially recorded until Sept. 1822, in which he disapproved of the minute interference which Metcalfe exercised. (*Hyderabad Papers*, p. 207.)

Resident's unfriendly attitude towards him.¹ And since Metcalfe's measures undoubtedly involved direct interference in the internal affairs of the Nizam—a matter on which Hastings had always held strong opinions the Governor-General addressed him an emphatic official communication sharply condemning his action in asserting and enforcing such a degree of encroachment on the Nizam's authority, as was wholly unjustifiable.² There was a general agreement in principle (in which Metcalfe himself always joined) that direct interference in the internal concerns of rulers such as the Nizam was objectionable, and to be deprecated. However, the other members of the Council (and the Resident) argued that in the special circumstances of Hyderabad, the general principle of non-interference could not be applied. Since the British Government supported the minister in power, they would be responsible for his oppression, if they did not step in, to protect the people's interests.³ Hastings' advocacy of non-interference (in the despatch of the 25th October and also in his Minute of the 19th December, 1822),⁴ lacked consistency. He, himself, had authorised Russell to exercise "a salutary control over the internal administration of the country," by interposing his "advice and influence."⁵ Secondly, it was but a meaningless and mischievous policy which prohibited the British Agent from meddling with the Nizam's affairs, and at the same time urged him to support Chandulal (even if the Nizam wished to remove him).⁶ Thirdly, as pointed out by the Court of Directors, where was the consistency in objecting to interference in the Nizam's civil Government, whilst at the same time authorising and sanctioning measures for the payment, organisation

1) Chandulal to Hastings, (no date received 16th Aug. 1822) *Hyderabad Papers*, pp. 173-4. He feared that the Nizam might dismiss him, and that Metcalfe would not support him. These imaginary fears led him into that intrigue. (Metcalfe to Swinton, 3rd Sept., No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822, paras. 4, 5, 9, 10 & 11).

2) Swinton to Metcalfe, 25th Oct., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822, paras. 2, 3 & 4. From this view, although officially expressed in the name of the Governor-General-in-Council, all his colleagues Adam, Fendall and Bayley, expressed their dissent. (Minutes respectively, 1st Nov., No. 5, 19th Nov. No. 6, 25th Nov., No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822.)

3) *Ibid.*

4) No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822.

5) Metcalfe to Russell, 22nd Jan. 1820, No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations of date.

6) These self-contradictory instructions were issued by Hastings in the same despatch of 25th Oct. 1822. He directed Metcalfe to let the Nizam understand by intelligent hints that the removal of Chandulal would cause a material change in the connection between the two Governments, and that the British Government would "claim for itself as standing in the Paishwah's position all those rights over the Hyderabad Dominions which that Prince had possessed." etc., para. 9. p. 227. *Hyderabad Papers, Op. Cit.*

and discipline of his army—measures which were extensively adopted in Hyderabad State?¹

Metcalfe met with similar displeasure from Hastings in another attempt to serve the true interests of the Nizam. When he saw that in its monetary transactions with the Palmer Company, the State was becoming involved in increasing distress, he desired to rescue it from the firm's clutches. In the spring of 1821, he proposed that the debts of the house should be paid off by the Nizam's Government by raising a loan on British guarantee at six per cent in the Calcutta money market.² The firm naturally could not relish a proposal of this kind.³ On Rumbold's representation, Hastings reproached Metcalfe for officially proposing that embarrassing plan, without taking his consent, and for injuring the interests of the firm by his unfriendly attitude towards it.⁴ The subject engaged the attention of the Calcutta Government for more than a year, during which time correspondence both public and private, involving much acrimony and acute differences, passed between Calcutta and Hyderabad. For a time Metcalfe's detractors triumphed over him and his scheme was rejected.⁵ But eventually Metcalfe emerged successful. Under the instruction of the Directors, the Calcutta Government informed the Resident that the British Government was prepared to advance to the Nizam from their own treasury, up to a crore of rupees, to pay off his debts to the Palmer House. The annual tribute of seven lakhs (*Pesh Kush* for Northern Circars) was to be considered a security for the proposed loan.⁶ Eventually a sum of nearly eighty lakhs was accordingly advanced to relieve the Nizam's Government from its debtors,⁷ and an acute and troublesome problem was thus solved. Yet, so far as the Palmer firm was concerned, this did not end matters. Even after its liquidation, it continued its agitation for redress.⁸ In 1824 (February and March) the matters relating to this concern and Hyderabad in general,

1) Court of Directors to the Governor-General in Council, 21st June, 1824, *Hyderabad Papers, Op. Cit.*, p. 388.

2) Metcalfe to Swinton, 5th Apr. 1821 (*Hyderabad Papers*, p. 194).

3) Although, perhaps, to mark time, they showed outward willingness to co-operate with the Resident in the matter. (Their letter to Metcalfe, *Home Misc. Vol. 758*, MS. p. 45.)

4) Hastings to Metcalfe, 27th Aug. 1821. Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, pp. 54-5.

5) Hastings had the support of Fendall in voting against the loan, either from the Company's treasury, or as a guaranteed loan in the open market. (Hastings' minute, 3rd May, 1821, pp. 198-200.) Fendall's minute, (21st May, 1821, pp. 203-4). Adam supported Metcalfe's plan (Minute, 4th June, pp. 207-8). *Hyderabad Papers, Op. Cit.*

6) Swinton to Metcalfe, 23rd Nov., 1822, *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 288.

7) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 87.

8) Its memorial to Lord Amherst. *Home Misc. Vol. 758*.

furnished the occasion for most heated and bitter debates at the India House. The public acts of Hastings (also Metcalfe and others) were reviewed in a critical and animated atmosphere where the spirit of partisanship prevailed.¹

In any case, it was extremely unfortunate that at that time, serious and pronounced differences should have divided those two outstanding characters in India, who had always before been intimate friends. In ranging his influential support behind Rumbold, Palmer and Chandulal, against his tried and trusted agent, Hastings no doubt displayed a deplorable partiality. He was unduly credulous in thinking that William Palmer and Company, although reaping enormous profits, were yet rendering beneficial service to the Nizam's Government. He failed to realise that his private feelings for friends might possibly injure public interests.² So that while there is no reason to question Hastings' motives, his acts certainly proceeded from an erroneous judgment, which caused Metcalfe avoidable grief, and hindered his public work. It must, however, be said to the credit of both Hastings and Metcalfe, that they were reconciled before the former left India.³

On the eve of Hastings' departure, almost his last public act of a political nature was to ratify a Treaty concluded with the Nizam on the 12th December 1822, by which the latter was formally released from all claims of *chouth*, past and future, which the Peshwa had asserted over him, and which, with the Peshwa's disappearance, descended to the Company as his successors. This was the chief object of the Treaty, which also provided for the exchange of territory.⁴ Although it certainly destroyed a vexatious demand against the Nizam for all

1) Extracts from speeches, Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, pp. 88-92. Russell's speech is reproduced in Briggs' *The Nizam*, Vol. II, pp. 178-215.

2) However, when the real state of the accounts was revealed to him, the Governor-General joined with his Council in expressing extreme displeasure at the "highly reprehensible" conduct of the firm and the "unworthy deception" practised by the minister in grossly misapplying the funds. Even Russell's "blameable neglect of duty" was noticed. But it is curious that even in this despatch the Resident was instructed not only not to withdraw any assurances of support of Chandulal, but to renew them. (Swinton to Metcalfe, 13th Sept., 1822, *Hyderabad Papers*, pp. 186-9.)

3) Hastings to Metcalfe, 27th Sept., 1822, Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II pp. 82-4. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they were only "outwardly reconciled". *Loc. Cit.*, p. 87.

4) As a share of the conquests of the war, the Nizam was given territory out of the parts acquired by the Company from the Peshwa (Estimated value Rs. 5,69,275) the Raja of Nagpur (worth Rs. 3,13,743) and Holkar (worth Rs. 1,89,373). The Nizam ceded to the Company territory worth Rs. 4,31,785, and engaged to pay Rs. 1,20,000 annually as due on the assignment of *chouth* on the Nizam's territory to Appa Desai and the Patwardhans. Treaty ratified on 31st Dec. 1822. Aitchison (1909) *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IX, pp. 86-9.

time,¹ it must be admitted that the Company had previously agreed to arbitrate for its abolition. For by a separate and secret Article to the Treaty of 1800, the British Government had given a sort of undertaking to the Nizam that they would use their influence to obtain for him total exemption from the Peshwa's claim of *chouth*.²

Whilst negotiations for this treaty had been proceeding, Hastings desired that the Nizam should be asked to make a gift to the Company of sixteen lakhs of rupees for building a cathedral and an episcopal palace at Calcutta. The Resident had been instructed to make it appear a voluntary offer for public purposes on the part of the Nizam.³ Chandulal was not at all difficult to persuade in a matter of this description, and he readily assured Metcalfe that the Nizam's consent could be taken for granted. And he was right; the Nizam gave his assent to it.⁴ But the Board of Control rejected the suggestion, strongly disapproving a demand for such a big sum from a Prince whose public finances were then in a ruinous state of indebtedness.⁵ Consequently, the offer was declined.⁶ Hastings keenly resented this reprimand, and this incident caused a lasting breach between him and George Canning, who was then at the head of the Board of Control. Hastings wrote Canning an indignant letter, accusing the latter of an anxiety to get rid of him. The letter concluded with these words:—"Adieu, my dear Sir, our public relations will soon terminate."⁷

CONCLUSION

This survey of the situation of the Subsidiary States reveals a number of features common to them. They all suffered from more or less the same ills, and experienced similar advantages by the suppression of the disorderly elements in society by the agency of an outside Power. Their rulers were losing alike their self-reliance and their self-respect. There appears to be a resemblance between the sullen retirement of Nizam Sikander Jah and the imbecility of Anand Rao Gaekwar, between the demoralisation of the Wazir of Oudh and the incompetence

1) Art. 2, *Ibid*.

2) Separate and Secret Article, Aitchison, Vol. IX, p. 74.

3) Hastings to Russell, 26th Oct. 1819, *Hyderabad Papers, Op. Cit.*, p. 88. Metcalfe had gone out with instructions on this point (Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 24.) The offer was to take the form of an additional article to the treaty. (Metcalfe to Swinton, 21st Dec., 1820, Nos. 15 & 16, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Jan., 1821.

4) Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 25.

5) Secret Despatch, 22nd June, 1820, *Board's Drafts*, Vol. IV, pp. 116 and 118.

6) Chastenev to Metcalfe, 27th Jan. No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 27th Jan. 1821.

7) "Private" letter to Canning, 2nd Feb. 1821, additional MSS. (*Liverpool Papers*) 38,411 fo. 29, (British Museum), to this Canning wrote an equally spirited reply, 20th Aug. 1821, *Loc. Cit.*, fo. 54.

of the Maharaja of Mysore. Since the time when their predecessors had wielded great authority was not very remote, they were naturally all discontented with their severely controlled positions. In all the four major States mentioned in this chapter, there were ministers ruling at one time or another, whom the reigning Princes distrusted as agents of the foreign Power.¹ But these Princes were conscious of their utter weakness. So that while their fidelity to the British was not (and could not be) sincere, at the same time, they had no hostile designs against them whatsoever.²

In this connection one must further observe that whatever the condition of the Subsidiary States was in the time of Hastings, it was certainly not the result of his policy, but the natural sequel of the measures adopted earlier than his own day. In fairness to Hastings, it must be readily granted that against this class of States, he had no ambitions of an aggressive nature. On the contrary, from the beginning to the end of his term of office,³ he raised his voice in favour of these allies of the Company, and advocated the restoration to them of complete independence in their internal concerns. He claimed with pardonable pride that he had rescued the Wazir of Oudh from the thralldom in which he had been held.⁴ He refrained from applying drastic measures to the Maharaja of Mysore, thus deferring by many years that ruler's evil day.⁵ In his time, Siyaji Rao Gaekwar was restored to the sovereignty of his domestic affairs after seventeen years of British control of his State. And lastly, he severely condemned⁶ Metcalfe's action in reducing the authority of the Nizam's Government by his minute interference and the employment of European Superintendents in the dominions of Hyderabad.⁷ It appears that his earlier ideal of a confederation

1) Agha Mir at Lucknow, Mir Alam and Chandulal at Hyderabad, Gangadhar Shastri and Dhakji Dadaji at Baroda and Purniya and Ram Rao in Mysore.

2) For example, in one of his otherwise very unfavourable reports about the Maharaja of Mysore, Cole says: "It is but fair to the Rajah to observe, that in every instance connected with the British Government, he is liberal and accommodating, and as far as he can show favour, he does on this particular." (10th Feb., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar. 1814.) Carnac wrote similarly about Fateh Singh Gaekwar, 9th Sept., No. 23, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Oct. 1815.

3) From 1814 (when within a few months of his arrival in India, he recorded his Minute of 3rd Apr., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1814) to 1822, less than a fortnight before his departure, (His Minute of 19th Dec., No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822).

4) Hastings to Russell, 26th Oct. 1814, *Hyderabad Papers*, p. 89.

5) Lord William Bentinck assumed the Government of Mysore in 1831.

6) In this he had the support of the authorities in England (their letter 21st Jan. 1824, *Hyderabad Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 388).

7) Although the effect of this attitude was greatly nullified by his insisting on supporting Chandulal, even against the Nizam.

of States, internally autonomous and free, had not altogether disappeared from his vision although it was undoubtedly dimmer than before.

But, with regard to these States, as with others, the other and more important part of his ideal had been fully realised; "We should have thus a complete control over the politics of the whole confederacy,"¹ in order to establish a more "operative ascendancy."²

1) Minute of 1st Dec. 1815, *Op. Cit.*, para. 149.

2) *Loc. Cit.*, para. 72.

CHAPTER VIII

OPERATIVE ASCENDANCY

BRITISH SUPREMACY OVER THE STATES NOT HITHERTO MENTIONED - *KUTCH*, RELATIONS WITH THE RAO - RIVAL FACTIONS - BRITISH ATTITUDE IN THE SUCCESSION DISPUTE - WAGAR DEPREDATORS - BRITISH FORCE SENT - TREATY OF 1816 - THE RAO'S HOSTILE ATTITUDE - BOMBAY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW - MILITARY ACTION AGAINST KUTCH - THE RAO DEPOSED - ANOTHER TREATY - PROVISIONS - *SINDH* - MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE AMIRS - HASTINGS AVERTS WAR - TREATY CONCLUDED IN 1830 - *SAWANTWARI* - STRAINED RELATIONS WITH DURGA BAI - BRITISH MARCH AN ARMY INTO WARI - TREATY CONCLUDED - *SATARA* - TREATY IN 1819 - *KOLHAPUR* - MAHARAJA'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMPANY - *SIKH STATES* - CHIEFLY PATIALA, NABHA AND JHIND - *BUNDELKHAND* - REWA - TREATIES WITH THE RAJA - ORCHHA - DATIA - SAMTHAR - PANNA - JHANSI - *MALWA CHIEFS* - DHAR - TREATY CONCLUDED IN 1819 - RAJAS OF DEWAS - GHAFUR KHAN MADE NAWAB OF JAORA - MEDIATISED CHIEFS OF MALWA - MALCOLM'S SETTLEMENT - *KATHIAWAR CHIEFS* - THEIR ALLEGIANCE SEVERED FROM THE GAEKWAR - *BHOPAL* - THE ATTACHMENT OF THE STATE TO THE BRITISH - *SUBSTANTIVE STATES* - *BERAR* - ADMINISTERED BY BRITISH OFFICERS - *HOLKAR* - TANTIA JOG'S MINISTRY - *SINDHIA* ALSO ACCEPTS BRITISH ASCENDANCY AS AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT - *THE MUGHAL KING* - HIS POSITION OF NOMINAL SUPREMACY IN PUBLIC SENTIMENT - HASTING'S VIEWS AND MEASURES - BRITISH ASCENDANCY

CHAPTER VIII

OPERATIVE ASCENDANCY

Lord Hastings negotiated more treaties in his time than any other ruler of India.¹ The more important of those engagements by which he suppressed Maratha independence and reduced Rajputana under British influence, have already been reviewed, but they do not complete the story of the establishment of British ascendancy in Hastings' time. It is useful, therefore, to take even a hasty view of the relations of his Government with many other States of India, which have not so far been treated. There were indeed numerous petty principalities and chiefships in all parts of India, varying enormously in size and status, which had been taken under British suzerainty before Hastings' departure. Although a detailed narrative of them all is impracticable here, yet a brief reference to the States which still possessed some measure of sovereignty can be profitably attempted, to illustrate further the rise of British supremacy in India. Among such States would be included the rulers of Western India, of whom it is now time to say a few words.

KUTCH

The Peninsula of Kutch occupied a difficult position owing to its vicinity to the external power of Sindh. When Hastings arrived, affairs in Kutch were in an unsettled condition. The Jareja Rajputs of that region, immigrants from Sindh, had brought with them their own system of *Bhayad* (or "*Brotherhood*") analogous to the *Frerage* tenure in France.² The titular ruler, Rao Raidhan, had been kept in confinement by the usurping minister, Jamadar Fateh Muhammad. The British had concluded an agreement in 1809 with the Jamadar, who acted for the Kutch Government. By it, the parties agreed not to send troops across the Gulf of Kutch, and to abstain from interference in each other's territories. The main object of the engagement was to eradicate piracy.³ While the imbecile Rao was under Fateh Muhammad's control, another rival minister, Hans Raj Shah, established himself in independent possession of Mandavi, another part of the State.⁴ The British contracted similar relations with

1) According to Lee Warner "*The Native States of India*" (1910), p. 99.

2) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 119-20.

3) Aitchison, (1909), *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 12.

4) Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 132.

Hans Raj¹ (as with the Jamadar), guaranteeing his hold on Mandavi until the Maha Rao should assume his own Government. To give effect to that guarantee, Hans Raj was assured of military assistance, for which the Shah would be liable to pay Rs. 32,500 per month. A British Agent was also to be stationed at Mandavi, for whose expense Hans Raj was to be charged Rs. 18,000 per year.² This guarantee nearly involved the British Government in the contests that ensued between Sheo Raj, the son of Hans Raj, and Jamadar Fateh Muhammad. The latter's faction with the Rao under his custody, and with many Chiefs for his support, was the more powerful of the two. Sheo Raj claimed British support. "The Bombay Government was prepared to put forth a military force to support the phantom power which it had set up at Mundavee."³ This interference⁴ was resented by the Rao, the Jamadar and the Chiefs of the Bhayad. The result was, that they buried their internal differences, and both parties required the withdrawal of the British battalions. The Jamadar even resisted the overture which was made to him to ally himself more closely with the Company.⁵

The Jamadar died on the 5th October, 1813, and a month later the Maharao of Kutch, Raidhan, died also.⁶ These events occurred just at the time of Hastings' arrival in India. A scramble for power arising from the dispute for succession, offered a favourable opening for the introduction of British influence into Kutch. Carnac, the British Resident at Baroda, who received overtures from a faction for British intervention, was strongly in favour of using this opportunity to British advantage. Sir Evan Nepean, the Governor of Bombay, also recommended interference. He applied for instructions to the Supreme Government at Calcutta, in the meantime deputing an officer, Captain MacMurdo, to proceed to Kutch and report on the state of affairs.⁷ This officer submitted the result of his enquiry, representing therein that the late Jamadar's son, Hussain Miyan, who was favourably inclined towards the British, had succeeded to his father's powers. The

1) Aitchison, (1909), Vol. VII, p. 13.

2) Hans Raj's Paper, 12th Nov. 1809. Ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council, 6th January 1810. (*Loc. Cit.*, pp. 13-14.)

3) Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 133.

4) Which was disapproved and disallowed by the Supreme Government, who ordered that the British Agent should be withdrawn and no troops sent into Kutch. But the Agent of the Bombay Government had already sent for two battalions from Kathiawar to support one party against the other. *Ibid.*

5) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 133-4.

6) Aitchison, (1909), Vol. VII, p. 4.

7) Carnac to Warden, 1st Jan. No. 2, (with enclosures) Nepean's (Governor of Bombay) Minute 22nd Jan., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Feb. 1814.

depredations committed by the predatory leaders from Wagar, the eastern part of Kutch, were a serious disturbance to the peace of the country, and Hussain Miyan, although desirous of suppressing them, could not succeed in that attempt unaided. The Government of Bombay reiterated their opinion that the British should put down the banditti and recover the cost of the operations from the guilty Chiefs.¹ Hastings' Government took a different view, however. The advance of a British force into Kutch was considered inexpedient. Interference on the part of the Company in the contests for succession was unwise and unjustifiable. The Bombay Government was accordingly directed that it would, "in reply to the overtures from Jugjeevan Mehta and his confederates, state the determination of the British Government to avoid taking a part in their internal dissensions as being repugnant to the principles on which this Government is accustomed to act with relation to independent States," but the instructions added further that "the British Government is nevertheless desirous to remain on terms of peace and amity with that State by whatever hands administered."² This resolution was again confirmed on the receipt of MacMurdo's reports. The temporary mission of an English Agent to Kutch, or even his permanent residence at Bhuj, was, however, not considered objectionable. In this communication, the projected operations for the suppression of the banditti from Wagar were approved.³

These tribes of Wagar carried their inroads into the States of Kathiawar, which were tributaries of the Gaekwar, and therefore, under the Company's protection. They carried away cattle, killed people, and even burned villages. The confusion in Kutch naturally made those depredators more audacious. At the end of 1815 the British Government fitted out an expedition under Lieutenant Colonel East, to obtain satisfaction for the injuries suffered by the Chiefs of Kathiawar and to settle the Government of Kutch. The force was directed first against the fort of Anjar, then held by Hussain Miyan. On the opening of the batteries against it, the place surrendered. Colonel East next proceeded against Bhuj, the Capital of Kutch. The

1) Carnac to Warden, 20th Mar., No. 2, forwarding MacMurdo's Report, 6th Mar., together with a translation of several letters received by the latter from local agents and Chiefs. Governor in Council to the Governor-General, 25th Mar., No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Apr. 1814.

2) Bengal Government to Nepean, Governor of Bombay, 18th Feb., No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Feb. 1814.

3) Governor-General-in-Council, to Bombay Governor, 22nd Apr., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Apr. 1814.

Rao abandoned the idea of resistance, and an agreement was arrived at between the two Governments.¹

This was the Treaty of 1816, which was signed on the 14th January of that year. By it, the British recognised Bharmalji, the illegitimate son of Maha Rao Raidhan, as the ruler of Kutch, to the exclusion of Ladhupa, Raidhan's young nephew. Bharmalji had established himself with the consent of the Bhayad,² and the British Government concluded their engagement with him. A "firm and lasting peace" was declared between the Governments of Kutch and the Company. The Treaty laid down that the subjects of the Peshwa, the Company, or the Gaekwar, would not cross the gulf for hostile purposes, nor would those of the Rao of Kutch. The suppression of piracy was provided for in the most effectual manner. No foreigners or Europeans would be allowed to settle in or pass through Kutch. The Rao undertook to disband his Arab mercenaries (excepting four hundred, whom he could retain to protect Lakhpat, on the Sindh border). The Company offered to help the Rao in recovering his tracts which had been lost through the treachery of his servants, and to mediate with him on behalf of those Chiefs who would return to their allegiance to their suzerain. Wagar province needed a thorough reform, and the Treaty declared that the Company would aid the Rao in settling that tract in a suitable manner. The slaughter of cows and bullocks would not be permitted in Kutch territory. A British representative would reside at Bhuj, but "this Vakil shall not listen to any complaints either from the Rao's Bhayad or his ministers, at the Rao's request the Sirkar will afford him its best advice."³

Although the Treaty secured great political advantages to the Company in Kutch, it apparently still left the Rao in independent

1) Wilson, *Op. Cit.*, Book II, pp. 100-2. Sutherland *Op. Cit.* p. 134. Governor in Council to Hastings 17th Feb., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Apr. 1819, paras. 11 & 12.

2) Bombay Government to Hastings (then Moira) 28th Feb., informed the latter that Hussain Miyan had placed the illegitimate son of the Rao on the *Gadi* and again urged the need for British intervention. But the Supreme Government had refused to be drawn into any warlike measures. (Nos. 11 & 15, Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st Apr. 1814.)

3) The Treaty of Thirteen Articles, signed 14th Jan, and ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council, 9th Mar. 1816 (Aitchison, Vol. VII, pp. 15-17). Moira's Government considered some of the terms too harsh for Kutch, especially the amounts of the compensation fixed (at the sum of Rs. 8,13,876) for the Company's military expenses, and of annual tribute (two lakhs of cowries). They thought that the other advantages secured by the Treaty were a sufficient remuneration. (Governor-General to Secret Committee, 29th Mar., 1816, *Bengal Secret Letters*, Vol. 17, pp. 62-4), and consequently both these demands were relinquished by a supplementary engagement signed on the 18th June, and ratified on the 21st Sept. 1816. (Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, p. 19.)

The Treaty ceded to the Company the Fort of Anjar (Art. 10). But it was retransferred to the Kutch Government in 1822 for an annual payment of Rs. 88,000 (Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, p. 27.)

charge of his country, imposing on him no subsidiary alliance; nor did it effect any open breach between him and his tributary Chiefs. The Rao, however, was of a jealous and overbearing disposition. He had Ladhupa, his cousin and rival, murdered. He disliked the British and was dissatisfied at their irritating interference in his family affairs.¹ He manifested his hostility towards them by assembling a force with a view to marching against Anjar, then under British protection.² Finding that fortress well-garrisoned, the Rao directed his troops against Arisir, the town belonging to Thakur Kalyan Singh, with the object of making a severe example to those who were attached to the Company.³

The Bombay Government represented to Hastings the state of affairs in Kutch, and the Rao's unfriendly attitude. Nepean's Government urged that the policy of forbearance had failed, and that it was desirable to adopt strong measures. "Nothing short of the most decisive interference, not only in the settlement of the Government, but in calling forth and in aiding and protecting by our guarantee the most respectable agents in the administration of it," would prove conducive to the arrangement desired by the British Government. And to enforce those plans, the constant presence of a British force at Bhuj was deemed essential. The Bombay Government, though not in favour of the Company's assumption of the Government of Kutch, pleaded for the limitation and reformation of its military, and for the correction of the abuses of its administration. Their proposals included the stationing of a subsidiary force in Kutch at the estimated cost of Rs. 4,02,783 a year, for which the tribute from Wagar and the customs of Mandavi should be assigned.⁴ The Bombay Government formulated these views and asked for instructions from Calcutta.⁵

Hastings and his Government concurred with their colleagues in Bombay in the desirability of taking decisive measures against the Rao of Kutch; although agreeable to the temporary stationing of a force in Kutch, his Government was not satisfied of the necessity for a permanent subsidiary arrangement, which he was anxious to avoid. At the

1) Wilson, Book II, p. 441.

2) Governor in Council to Hastings, 17th Feb., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Apr. 1819, paras. 15-19.

3) MacMurdo to Warden, 24th Oct. 1818, No. 10, Bengal Political Consultations, 13th Feb. 1819. The Resident wrote encouraging letters to the Chiefs who sided with Kalyan Singh, to continue their help and protection.

4) Bombay Government to Hastings, 17th Feb., No. 6, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Apr. 1819, paras. 24-32.

5) In the meantime, they sent down to their agent the proposed articles of alliance with Kutch. Newnham to MacMurdo, 6th Feb., No. 7, Articles themselves, No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Apr. 1819.

same time, it was stated that the subsidiary arrangements would be ratified, should they have been concluded before the receipt of those orders.¹

Before the orders from Calcutta were received, in fact, even before they were dispatched, the military and political activity of the British in Kutch had decided the fate of Rao Bharmalji. Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay's force entered Kutch on the 19th February.² Two days later, the Resident addressed a letter ordering the Chiefs of the Jareja Bhayad to assemble.³ Military preparations under Colonel Miles were also progressing.⁴ The Jareja Chiefs assembled at Anjar. On finding that the Resident would not hear of a compromise and would not even receive them if they spoke on behalf of the Rao, they declared against the Rao. The minister, Lakshmi Das, was secretly inviting the British to advance to Bhuj.⁵ Major-General Keir's Division marched against the Capital on the 24th March, surprised the town on the morning of the 26th, and carried it by an assault. The same afternoon, the Rao arrived in the British Camp to remain a prisoner.⁶

The English were determined to depose Rao Bharmalji.⁷ His infant son, Desalji, who was elected by the Bhayad in his place was proclaimed as the Maharao of Kutch.⁸ A fresh Treaty was concluded between Kutch and the Company. The administration was vested in a Regency Council of six members, (one of whom was the Resident),⁹ to work under the Company's guarantee until the Rao attained his twentieth year.

In other provisions, the Treaty was designed to bring the State of Kutch in line with the States of Rajputana and Central India, which had been obliged to accept the supremacy of the East India Company by surrendering those rights of sovereignty which related to the negotiation of peace or war with their neighbours. The Company guaranteed

1) Governor-General-in-Council to the Governor of Bombay, 8th Apr., No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Apr. 1819.

2) MacMurdo to Newnham, 24th Feb., No. 3, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Apr. 1819.

3) *Ibid.*

4) MacMurdo to Newnham, 14th Mar., No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st May, 1819.

5) MacMurdo's private letter from Anjar, 21st Mar., No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st May 1819.

6) Newnham to Metcalfe, 5th Apr., No. 10; Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st May, 1819.

7) Proposed Articles No. 8, Bengal Secret Consultations, 8th Apr. 1819.

8) MacMurdo to Newnham, 9th Apr., No. 10, Bengal Political Consultations, 29th May, 1819. Bharmalji lived as a prisoner at Bhuj on an annual pension of 36,000 cowries (Articles 2 & 3 of the Treaty), Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 20.

9) Others were two Jareja Chiefs, the *Rajguru*, one Mehta and one Khatri. (Art. 4 of the Treaty. *Loc. Cit.*, p. 21.)

to protect Kutch against foreign aggression and domestic disorders. A British force was to be left in Kutch to be withdrawn when the Company considered that its presence was no longer necessary. The expenses of this force were to be met by the Kutch Government.¹

The British engaged "to exercise no authority over the domestic concerns of the Rao, or those of any of the Jareja Chieftains of the country, that the Rao, his heirs and successors shall be absolute masters of their territory."² The Company's Government was to limit its views to the reform and reorganisation of the military establishment, to the correction of any abuses in the administration, and to the restriction of the general expenses of the State within the limits of its resources.³ The usual provisions of Hastings' treaties were inserted, by which the Maha Rao's Government was precluded from entering into any correspondence with other States without the consent of the British Government. Any claims on, or disputes with, them were to be submitted to British arbitration. The State agreed to afford military aid to the Company on the latter's requisition. The ports of Kutch were to be opened to all British vessels, but no foreign ships were to be allowed to import arms or ammunition into Kutch.⁴

The Company guaranteed separate protection to the Jareja Chiefs of the Bhayad, and all Rajput Chiefs of Kutch and Wagar, and similar protection was extended to Lakshmi Das Vallabji.⁵

The Rao engaged to abolish infanticide in his own family, and in the Bhayad generally. A British Resident was to be posted at Bhuj. And finally, the killing of cows, bullocks and peacocks was prohibited.⁶ On the 15th April, 1819, the Chiefs of the Bhayad signed and submitted to the Rao a separate deed by which they agreed to render him due obedience, and undertook to prevent plunder, robberies and any breach of the peace.⁷

By this Treaty, Kutch finally passed under the powerful sway of the Company. The infancy of the Rao, the presence of the British Resident with a subsidiary force, and the separate guarantee given to the tributary Chiefs and the minister, removed all chances of a possible opposition to British ascendancy in that quarter.

1) Arts. 5, 6 & 7, *Loc. Cit.*

2) Art. 10, p. 22, *Loc. Cit.*

3) Art. 11, *Loc. Cit.*

4) Arts. 9, 12, 13, 14 & 15, *Loc. Cit.*

5) Art. 16, *Loc. Cit.*

6) Arts. 17, 18, 19 & 21 of the Treaty, signed on 13th Oct., and ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council, 4th Dec. 1819, p. 23, *Loc. Cit.*

7) pp. 24-25, *Loc. Cit.*

SINDH

This establishment of British control in Kutch, naturally aroused feelings of alarm and jealousy in the Amirs of Sindh, its aggressive neighbour and old enemy. Not being one of the internal States of India, Sindh does not properly form a part of this study. But a word, in passing, may serve to show how Hastings averted a war with that State, into which the Bombay Government had nearly drawn him. The subsisting Treaty of "eternal friendship" with the Amirs had been concluded by Minto in 1809, chiefly with the object that "the Government of Sindh will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in Sindh."¹ There were frequent incursions of the people on the border, chiefly the Khosas, who plundered Kutch territory and that of the Company. The relations between Sindh and Kutch had always been those of mutual suspicion and aggrandisement. The Government of Bombay protested against the inroads of the Khosas from Parkar into the Company's area, and at last decided to send a detachment under Colonel Barclay to suppress them. The Sindh Government was invited to co-operate in that measure, and therefore the Amirs sent a force. On a dark night, a section of Barclay's force accidentally directed their attack against the Baluchis of the Sindh Army, presumably mistaking them for the banditti. The Sindh force retired in sullen indignation. Revenge being a point of honour with the Baluchi clans, an expedition was fitted out from Hyderabad which marched into Kutch, burned the village of Luna, about fifty miles from Bhuj, and carried off many inhabitants, laying waste that district. The Government of Bombay began military preparations to demand ample compensation for the damage done in Kutch, proposing to invade Sindh if the Amirs should refuse or resist the demand. The Resident at Hyderabad (Deccan) and the Madras Government were informed of the probability of a war with Sindh, and advised to be ready to send their military forces for the purpose. For a time the air on both sides grew thick indeed.²

But Hastings deprecated those hostile gestures against Sindh.³ He directed the Resident at Hyderabad not to detain the Madras Army.⁴ He disagreed with the Bombay Government that preparation

1) Aitchison, (1909), Vol. VII, pp. 351-2.

2) Miles to Williams, 6th May, No. 2, Warden to Williams, 27th May, No. 3, Wilson to Warden, 20th May, No. 5, Wilson to Warden, 20th May, No. 6, and 25th May, No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations. 15th July, 1820. Warden to Metcalfe, 15th June, No. 2, and 10th June, No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd July, 1820.

3) Metcalfe to Warden, 22nd July, No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd July, 1820.

4) Metcalfe to Russell, No. 8, *Loc. Cit.*

for war was the best way to avert it, and condemned the unnecessarily severe terms demanded of the Sindh Government. "The unfortunate mistake on our part led to the outrage committed by the Sindh Army. His Lordship is of opinion that we might accept an apology from the Sindh Government, or even a disavowal, whether true or false, of the outrage committed by their army." Hastings was determined to avoid entanglements with the Amirs. "Few things," as his secretary wrote to Bombay, "in his Lordship's judgment can be conceived more impolitic than a war with Sindh, and its successful prosecution would not only be unprofitable, but an evil." The country was not worth possessing, and its occupation would involve the Company in disputes, jealousies, intrigues and embarrassments. The dispatch closed with the prophetic words:—"At a future time perhaps we may be forced in self-defence to pass that boundary and establish ourselves in regions with which at present we have no connection."¹ The Bombay Government persisted in their view, and again submitted it to Calcutta, in the meantime continuing their military preparations.² But Hastings remained firm, and overruled the Bombay Government. He considered the latter's attitude unfair and untenable.³

The Amirs themselves, after taking their revenge, were not particularly anxious to go to war with the English.⁴ Their agent, Ismael Shah, repaired to Bombay, and had cordial meetings with Elphinstone,⁵ who concluded a Treaty on the 9th November, 1820, by which friendly relations were restored between the Amirs, Karim Ali and Murad Ali on the one side, and the Company on the other.⁶

SAWANTWARI

Sawantwari, ruled by a branch of Shivaji's family, was another maritime State on the West Coast which also came finally under British supremacy in Hastings' time. "The first Chief with whom the British Government formed relations" was Phond Sawant, by the Treaty of 1780. It was a union, defensive and offensive, against Kanoji Ingria, whose piratical aggressions inflicted serious losses on the Company's

1) Metcalfe to Warden, No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 29th July, 1820.

2) Warden to Metcalfe, 11th Sept., No. 1, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct. 1820.

3) Metcalfe to Warden, No. 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct. 1820.

4) Williams to Warden, 31st Aug., Nos. 1 & 2, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st Oct. 1820.

5) Elphinstone's Minute, 25th Sept., No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 14th Nov. 1820.

6) Aitchison (1909), Vol. VII, pp. 352-3.

commerce in its early days.¹ In 1812, a Treaty was concluded between the Wari and British Governments, with the view of suppressing piracy on the Konkan Coast. The fort of Vingorla was ceded to the Company, and it was agreed that if the piratical acts of the Sawant's subjects continued, the Wari Government would make over the forts of Reri and Neoti also.² By this Treaty, no closer political relations between the British and the Wari Government could be established, particularly because the Company would thereby have excited the jealousy of the Peshwa, who claimed sovereignty over all the scattered branches of the Maratha Empire.

The Ruler of Wari had died in 1812; Khem Sawant, his successor, being a minor, the Government was conducted by Durga Bai, the Dowager Rani. When Hastings took over the Government of the Company from Minto, some very menacing discussions were in progress between Durga Bai and the British. At the time of the British Treaty with Sawantwari, an agreement had been concluded with the Maharaja of Kolhapur,³ under which the latter became the friend and ally of the Company. Between Wari and Kolhapur, there existed old disputes about certain districts and lands. About the middle of 1813, Rani Durga Bai seized the two forts of Bharatgarh and Narsingarh, in Kolhapur's possession, claiming that they belonged to Wari. The British protested against that aggression on their ally. The Rani, pleading ignorance of any connection between the Company and Kolhapur, gave up possession of the forts, but maintained her claim on them, desiring the British to arbitrate in the dispute.⁴ This surrender made to the British troops, which were moved into the Rani's territory, was followed by the demand on the part of the British envoy at Goa, for full security from the Rani's Government for future good behaviour. They demanded that the districts of Malundi and Vardha should be made over to the Company in exchange for the less valuable ones of Pant and Haveli, and further that the Wari Government should enter into terms of friendly alliance with the Company. The British force advanced and occupied the districts of Malundi and Vardha which were retained.⁵

1) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 291. "The articles of peace and friendship" were concluded between the Governor of Bombay and the Chief Commander at Sea of the Sawant, pp. 296-7, *Loc. Cit.*

2) This Treaty was concluded on 3rd Oct. 1812, and ratified 15th Jan. 1813. (*Loc. Cit.*, pp. 304-6.)

3) Signed on 1st Oct., 1812, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 236. The Wari Treaty was signed on 3rd Oct.

4) Rani's letter to the envoy at Goa, 13th Feb., No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar. 1814.

5) Schuyler to Dunlop, 27th Jan. No. 33, Bengal Secret Consultations, 25th Feb. 1814, and Secretary Fort William to Schuyler, No. 20, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Mar. 1814.

The Rani would not agree to the forced cessions and repudiated the charges of aggression and violence made against her. She professed her adherence to the Treaty of Mardur, of 1812, by which friendship had been established between the two Governments.¹

These animated discussions did not develop into an open conflict, since the Rani did not put forth military resistance. But the relations which subsisted during the succeeding years were far from friendly.² During the negotiations between the British and the Peshwa after the Shastri's murder, and the war of 1817-1818, the Rani's sympathies and loyalty were on the side of the Peshwa.³

After the close of operations in central India, when it was found that there was no change in the attitude of the Wari Government and that the depredations of its subjects into the neighbouring areas still continued, the British decided to march a force into Sawantwari under Sir William Keir. He landed at Malavan, and marched against Neoti, which surrendered on the 18th February, 1819. The General next stormed Reri, a strong fortress which offered some resistance.⁴ By this time Rani Durga Bai had died, and the Ranis Savitri Bai and Narmada Bai, who had assumed the Regency for the minor Raja, accepted the terms proposed by the British General. The Treaty thus concluded by them was signed on the 17th February, 1819. By it, Sawantwari came under the protection of the British Government, acknowledging its supremacy. Its Raja agreed to abstain from all political intercourse with other States, to deliver to the British Government all persons guilty of offences in British territory, to cede to the Company the two forts of Neoti and Reri, and the whole coastline from the River Karli to the boundary of the Portuguese possessions, and finally, to admit British troops into Wari and assist them in seizing plunderers. The Treaty also provided that "The Rajah and his heirs and successors shall remain absolute rulers of the country, and the jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into that principality."⁵

1) Rani to Schuyler, 13th Feb. No. 19, *Loc. Cit.*

2) The Rani sent her revenue collectors in the districts seized by the British who imprisoned them. (Dunlop to Schuyler, 26th Jan. and the latter's reply, 1st Mar. Nos. 15 & 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st Apr. 1814.) The Rani threw into prison two persons who were in the service of the British Government. (Elphinstone to Chief Secretary at Bombay, 25th June, with correspondence No. 64, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th July, 1815.)

3) Dunlop to Warden, 21st Aug. No. 90, No. 91 (Secret News) Bengal Secret Consultations, 7th Oct. 1815; also Aitchison, Vol. VII, p. 292.

4) Newnham to Metcalfe, 28th Feb., No. 3, Bengal Political Consultations, 24th Apr. 1819.

5) Treaty of 10 Articles ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council, 24th Apr. 1819. (Aitchison (1909) Vol. VII, pp. 306-8.) The inland districts of Ajgaon and Pant, taken by the Company, were restored to Sawantwari a year later, but the two forts and the coastal possessions were retained. (Treaty of 17th Feb. 1820, p. 309, *Loc. Cit.*)

The political supremacy of the British Government, thus established, was further strengthened by the increasing control over the administration of the State exercised by the British, owing to the internal disorder and factions at its Court.¹ Sawantwari, which had held so severely aloof for many years, was the last Maratha State of any importance to be brought under the authority of the English. Satara and Kolhapur, both descended from the respected founder of the Maratha Empire, gave no trouble to Hastings' Government.

SATARA

It has already been mentioned (in Chapter VI) that Hastings had decided to carve a small sovereignty for the House of Shivaji, out of the territories of the Peshwa. A Treaty was concluded with the young Raja of Satara on the 25th September, 1819. The usual terms of "subordinate co-operation" with the British were inserted in the instrument,² which also laid down that "the administration will for the present remain in the hands of the British Political Agent. That officer will, however, conduct the Government in the Rajah's name." But even after the Raja was vested with full powers, it was laid down that "he will, however, at all times attend, as above agreed, to the advice which the Political Agent shall offer for the good of the state and for the maintenance of general tranquillity."³ The British Government guaranteed the possessions of the Raja's Jagirdars.⁴

Captain James Grant became the first Political Agent. He found his work greatly facilitated by the "naturally good disposition of the young prince."⁵ He was entrusted with the management of his State on the 5th April, 1821, when he was in his twenty-fourth year.⁶ The Southern Jagirdars of the Maratha Empire were taken under the direct control of the Company, and had no connection with the Raja. "In fact, therefore, the Satara Court differs little from the Pageant courts of Delhee, Moorshedabad, and Arcot."⁷

KOLHAPUR

The junior branch of Shivaji's family was represented by the Maharaja of Kolhapur. This Prince entered into direct Treaty relations

1) Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 145.

2) Including the British control over the numbers of the Raja's forces, and prohibition of foreign intercourse of all kinds by the Raja. He also engaged to afford all assistance to the Company in war.

3) Art. 6 of the Treaty, Aitchison, (1909), Vol. VII, p. 441.

4) Art. 7, *Loc. Cit.*

5) Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 164.

6) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 166.

7) Prinsep, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 385.

with the Company in 1812 by "the articles of agreement" which had been concluded by Elphinstone, to effect the suppression of piracy on the western coast, and the settlement of his disputes with the Peshwa, and also to break his political connection with the latter.¹ By that agreement, the Company obtained the Port of Malavan and the surrounding districts,² and the provinces of Chikori and Manoli were ceded to the Peshwa.³

In the war with the Peshwa in 1817, Aba Sahib, the Ruler of Kolhapur, cordially sided with the Company. As an appreciation of that friendly attitude, Chikori and Manoli, formerly wrested from him at the Peshwa's demand, were restored.⁴

In 1820, the Company mediated between the States of Sawantwari and Kolhapur, and settled their territorial dispute over the village of Shivapur, on the basis of exchange with Ambegaon.⁵

SIKH STATES

On the Punjab frontier of the Company's dominions, British supremacy over the Cis-Sutlej States was maintained. After the Treaty of 1809, which Metcalfe had concluded with Maharaja Ranjit Singh, a proclamation was issued extending British protection to the Chiefs of Sirhind and Malwa.⁶ In 1811, another proclamation was issued effecting the restoration to the weaker Sirdars of the lands usurped by the stronger Chiefs and further prohibiting future encroachments.⁷

A large number of these Chiefs⁸ had been taken under British protection in 1809. The principal of these were the Phulkian Princes of Patiala, Nabha, and Jhind, Patiala being by far the largest State of them all. The ambitious power of Maharaja Ranjit Singh had struck terror into their hearts, and consequently they rendered a ready allegiance to the Company. The Raja of Patiala aided the British with his troops in the Nepal War, in return for which he was given lands yielding a revenue of Rs. 35,000, for which he paid into the British treasury Rs. 2,80,000 as Nazarana.⁹ In the Pindari operations also, the Chiefs of Patiala and Jhind sent their small contingents to co-operate with the British forces.¹⁰

1) Articles of agreement, Aitchison, Vol. VII, pp. 236-8.

2) Art. 5, pp. 236-7, *Loc. Cit.*

3) Art. 2, p. 236, *Loc. Cit.*

4) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 217-18.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 314-15.

6) Dated 3rd May, 1809, Aitchison, (1909), Vol. VIII, pp. 196-7.

7) Dated 22nd Aug. 1811, *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 197-8.

8) About 150 in all of whom 135 were Sikhs and the rest Muhamedans. (Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 147-8.)

9) Two *sanads*, dated 20th Oct. 1815, (Aitchison, Vol. VIII pp. 199-200).

10) Metcalfe to Adam, 1st Nov. No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Nov. 1817.

Although no treaties or formal engagements had been concluded with the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, British control over them was fully recognised and admitted.

BUNDELKHAND

Just as the ascendancy of the Company on the Western and North-Western parts of the country was being consolidated, the centre of India was also steadily moving in the same direction. "Settlement of Central India" was the primary aim of Hastings' programme and the chief justification for his military operations. The realisation of this ambition has been noticed at the end of an earlier chapter. A few words might be added here to show how, after the fall of the Peshwa and the close of the war, all the leading States of Central India had come to accept British paramountcy as a hard fact.

Rewa is the largest State in Bundelkhand (*cum* Baghelkhand) the ruler of which is the head of the Baghela Rajputs. He had rejected the British alliance in 1803, when, after the Treaty of Bassein, overtures were made to him for that purpose. In 1812, when Karim Khan, the Pindari Chief, carried his first inroad into the British district of Mirzapur, it was inferred that, in letting the Pindaris pass through the territory, the Raja was either afraid of opposing them or was supporting their activity.¹ The British could not tolerate either attitude, and consequently, the Raja was required to accede to a Treaty by which the British recognised him as the ruler of his possessions; he accepted British protection, and engaged to refer his claims and disputes with other Chiefs to their arbitration, agreeing to allow British troops to march through, or be stationed in, his territory.² The terms of the Treaty proved irksome to the sturdy Baghelas, who tried to evade carrying out the provisions relating to British military control over Rewa. A British detachment entered the State, and the Raja was obliged to sign another Treaty by which the former engagement was confirmed, and the Raja agreed to punish those of his Chiefs (Lal Zabardast Singh in particular)³ and soldiers who assumed hostility towards the English force. Those of his subjects and Sirdars who remained attached to the British were guaranteed the protection of the Company. The Raja was further required to indemnify the Company for the expenses incurred in the military expedition. And lastly, he agreed to receive an agent or newswriter of the British Government.⁴ Thus, the State of

1) Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 140.

2) Treaty was signed on 5th Oct., 1812; Aitchison (1909), Vol. V, pp. 238-41.

3) By Art. 5 of the Treaty, the British Government acquired the right of inflicting on him "exemplary punishment," p. 243, *Loc. Cit.*

4) The Treaty signed on 2nd June and ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council on 25th June, 1813, *Loc. Cit.* pp. 242-5.

Rewa was reduced to submission by Minto. A third Treaty was, however, concluded in 1814 by Moira, re-establishing the principles of former engagements.¹

The Raja of Orchha (formerly also known as Tehri) was the highest in rank among the Chiefs of Bundelkhand, never having submitted to the sway of the Peshwa, although his State lost large portions of its territories to the Marathas. In 1812 it accepted a British Alliance, the terms of which were in almost every way similar to those of the Treaty with Rewa. The Raja was guaranteed in his possessions against all foreign attack. He accepted British protection, engaged to have no dealings with other States, and agreed to permit British forces to pass through or post themselves in his dominion.² The minor Chiefships of Datia and Samthar, came under the political authority of the British, when the latter entered Bundelkhand to take possession of the territory ceded by the Peshwa under the Treaty of Bassein.³ British protection was extended to Datia in 1804,⁴ and Samthar in 1805,⁵ although no definite engagement was concluded with the latter until 1817.⁶ After the war was over, by a separate engagement, Hastings granted the Raja of Datia the district of Chowrasi, formerly held by the Vinchorkar Jagirdar of the Peshwa. This was in recognition of the assistance rendered by the Raja to the British troops under the command of Hastings himself.⁷ In the treaties with Samthar and Datia of 1817 and 1818, Hastings inserted the provision common to most of his treaties, by which the Rajas engaged to employ their forces in co-operation with the British whenever required to do so.⁸ There were numerous other small Chiefs in Bundelkhand, many of whom were the descendants of the famous King, Chatra Sal, who once ruled over an extensive empire. The chief of them was the Ruler of Panna, which, like Datia and Samthar, is an offshoot of the house of Orchha. The Ruler of Panna received sanads of protection from the British Government, first in 1807 and again in 1811.⁹

1) Signed on 11th Mar. pp. 246-9, *Loc. Cit.*

2) Treaty concluded at Banda on 23rd Dec. 1812, and ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council, 8th Jan. 1813, pp. 84-6, *Loc. Cit.*

3) Aitchison (1909), Vol. VI, p. 53.

4) Treaty with Datia, 15th Mar. 1804. By it, this small State was placed in a much greater dependence on the British than Rewa and Orchha, and also occupied an inferior political status. (Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 87-9.)

5) Preamble of the Treaty of 1817, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 101.

6) Concluded 12th Nov. 1817, and ratified by Hastings on the following day. Provisions similar to the Treaty with Datia, pp. 101-104, *Loc. Cit.*

7) Treaty of 31st July, 1818, pp. 90-2, *Loc. Cit.*

8) Art. 6, p. 91 and Art. 4, p. 103, *Loc. Cit.*

9) pp. 108-111 and 112-114, *Ikrarnama* of the Raja, pp. 114-7, and another sanad, pp. 117-8, *Loc. Cit.*

The Subedar of Jhansi was taken under the protection of the Company by a treaty in 1817, which confirmed the transfer of the Peshwa's sovereignty over him to the British. The terms of the agreement resembled those of the treaties with Datia and Orchha.¹

The British claimed a right of suzerainty over the several Chiefs of Bundelkhand, first by the Treaty of Bassein, then by that of Poona (1817), and finally as the successors of the Peshwa after his defeat and deposition in 1818, when the whole of that province was brought under their political control.²

MALWA

After the close of the military operations of 1817-18, the States of Malwa also acknowledged British supremacy. The settlement of that province was entrusted to Malcolm, who remained in Malwa for four years and did valuable work in that part of the country.

The Pawar Chiefs of Dhar belong to one of the most ancient and distinguished families of early Maratha history.³ They had preserved their freedom through a period of general disturbance. But those rulers (of Dhar and Dewas) could not resist the power which had exterminated the Pindaris and reduced Sindhia and Holkar. Hastings regarded "their remaining in the state of rude independence which they have of late enjoyed," as "incompatible with the tranquillity of the country and the completion of the system which it is the object of the British Government to institute."⁴

Accordingly, Malcolm concluded treaties with them. The engagement with the Raja of Dhar was signed on the 10th January, 1819, and contained the usual stipulations of "perpetual peace, friendship and unity of interests" between the two Governments. The Raja agreed "to act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and to have no intercourse or alliance, private or public, with any other State, but secretly and openly to be the friend and ally of the British Government; and at all times when that Government shall require, the Rajah of Dhar shall furnish troops (infantry and horse) in proportion to his ability." His tributary rights over the Rajput States of Banswara and Dungarpur were ceded to the Company. The latter engaged always to protect Dhar against its enemies.⁵ This document

1) pp. 67-70, *Loc. Cit.*

2) British settlement with Saugor has already been sketched in Chapter V., *ante*.

3) Malcolm's *Central India* (1824), Vol. I, p. 97.

4) Adam to Malcolm, 12th May, No. 9, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th June, 1818.

5) This Treaty was ratified by the Governor-General-in-Council on 13th Mar. 1819. Aitchison (1909), Vol. IV, pp. 468-70.

does not contain the article included in almost all the treaties with sovereign and semi-sovereign States, by which the British Government was bound to abstain from interfering in the State administration or listening to the complaints of discontented nobles or subjects.

Another agreement was concluded with Tukaji and Anand Rao, the joint Rajas of Dewas (the ancestors of the modern senior and Junior Dewas—both equal in rank and authority). The same relation of subordination on the one side and protection on the other was contracted in this engagement, as in the treaty with the larger State of Dhar, with the notable exception that the British Government engaged to the Rajas of Dewas “to give no protection to any of their discontented relations or dependents, and not to interfere in the internal administration of the country.” The Treaty was concluded with the two Rulers jointly, and they agreed “to act in union of authority and to administer the affairs of their provinces through one public minister or chief officer.”¹

The British created a new principality in Malwa in 1818, by guaranteeing to Ghafur Khan, Amir Khan’s brother-in-law, the independent possession of the territory which he held in Jagir from Holkar. Ghafur Khan was freed from his allegiance to the Indore Government, and thus became the first Nawab of Jaora.² The creation of the two Mussalman States of Tonk and Jaora by the dismemberment of Holkar’s territories was an “effort of political foresight,” as a counterpoise against the predominant Hindu influence in Malwa.³

Besides settling these principalities, Malcolm inquired into and defined the position, powers, and claims of a large number of minor chieftains and sirdars. During the fifty years preceding British ascendancy in Malwa and Bundelkhand, there was no strong Government in the country. The Maratha Princes, Sindhia and Holkar, and in some cases the Pawar Rajas of Dhar and Dewas, levied tributes from the smaller Chiefs. The latter, either daring or in despair, retaliated by leading blackmail campaigns in the territory of the larger States. Their example was followed by predatory leaders who exploited the instability of the times for their own gains. Through regular practice, these claims and counterclaims became recognised dues, but their definition and peaceable fulfilment involved a difficult task, and required a powerful arbitrator.

After the struggle of 1818, naturally, that duty fell on the British, “who the more readily undertook the task because of the

1) This Treaty was ratified on 12th Dec. 1818, pp. 252-4. *Loc. Cit.*

2) Art. 12 of the Treaty with Holkar (dated 6th Jan. 1818), p. 199, *Loc. Cit.*

3) Prinsep, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 399.

opportunity which it afforded them of breaking the continuity of the influence of the Maratha Powers, with whom they had recently been engaged in a contest for empire."¹ The principle adopted was "to declare the permanency of the rights existing at the time of British occupancy, on conditions of the maintenance of order; to adjust and guarantee the relations of such Chiefs as owed mere subordination or tribute, so as to deprive the stronger Powers of all pretext for interference in their affairs; and to induce the plundering leaders to betake themselves to peaceful pursuits, either by requiring their superiors to grant them lands under the British guarantee, or by guaranteeing to them payments, equivalent to the Tankhas which they levied."²

The British Government stepped in and separated those numerous Chiefships of different sizes from the several sovereigns to whom the former were bound by a variety of ties of tribute or allegiance or both. From this act of mediation came the modern official term *Mediatized Chiefs*. Malcolm settled the terms of guarantee and protection to over one hundred Chiefs.³ Among them were the small Rajput States of Rutlam, Sailana and Sitamau, whose tribute to Sindhia was fixed through British mediation, Sindhia engaging to have no further interference whatsoever with the principalities.⁴

The terms of guarantee and mediation varied according to the status and tenure of the Chiefs, but the one thing which they all established was the virtual supremacy of the British Government over the tributary Chiefs. This was the object of the principle of mediation, and it was successfully applied by Malcolm in Malwa.

KATHIAWAR

Although in Hastings' time, it was more extensively and effectively employed as a political weapon in the pacification of Central India and its reduction under British authority, use had also been made of this policy of mediation previously. Walker's settlement of the Gaekwar's tribute from Kathiawar, under British guarantee, has already been mentioned.⁵ No fewer than one-hundred-and-fifty-three Chiefs of Kathiawar entered into agreements.⁶ The engagements concluded were

1) Aitchison's note at the beginning of his Vol. IV (1909), on which this paragraph is based. p. 3.

2) *Ibid.*

3) Malcolm's *Central India* (1824), Vol. II, pp. 413-25. In this he was assisted by Major Henley and Captain Boothwick.

4) Tributes from Rutlam were fixed at 84,000 *Salim Shahi* Rupees, from Sailana Rs. 42,000 (Aitchison, Vol. IV, pp. 409-10), and from Sitamau Rs. 60,000 (*Loc. Cit.*, p. 414) also Malcolm's *Central India* (1824) Vol. II, p. 248.

5) Chap. VII, *ante*, also Mallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 128-33.

6) Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 76.

of two kinds, as explained by Aitchison, one was the bond of security (or a *Fa'el Zamin*) for the general peace of the country, and the other was an agreement for the payment of a fixed revenue in perpetuity.¹

In 1817 the British acquired from the Peshwa his rights in Kathiawar.² They had also tried to obtain the Gaekwar's share, but the latter declined to accede to their demand.³ However, as has been noticed in the last chapter his consent was in some way obtained to the arrangement by which his feudatories in Kathiawar paid their fixed tribute through the British Government, the Gaekwar being precluded from asserting his demands directly on the Chiefs.⁴ This arrangement of 1820 shifted the centre of political gravity of Kathiawar for ever.

Among the numerous Chiefs whose direct allegiance was thus severed from the Gaekwar and indirectly, but in an increasingly effective manner, transferred to the British Government, the more important were the Nawab of Junagarh,⁵ the Jam of Nawanagar,⁶ the Thakur of Bhaunagar,⁷ the Diwan of Palanpur,⁸ and the Nawab of Radhanpur.⁹

The immediate object of this principle of mediation was to effect an isolation of the Chiefs concerned, with the view of settling

1) Examples of the two types of agreements, pp. 112-13 and pp. 121-3, *Loc. Cit.*

2) By Art. 7 of the Treaty of 13th June, p. 67 and p. 71, *Loc. Cit.*

3) Hastings to Nepean, 26th Sept., No. 18, Bengal Secret Consultations, 17th Oct. 1817, and Elphinstone's Minute 18th Apr. 1820, Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 275-6.

4) With the exception, of course, of those parts (such as Amreli, Panch Mahals and Okhamandal) which remained under the direct rule of the Gaekwar.

5) Junagarh pays Rs. 28,394 as tribute to the British Government, and Rs. 37,210 to the Gaekwar. (Aitchison, 1909, Vol. VI, p. 92.) The Nawab charged his dependents a tax called *Zortalabi*. In 1821 the British Government mediated and collected it for the Nawab, charging 25 p. c. expenses of collection. (*Loc. Cit.*, p. 168.)

6) The Jam pays annually to the British Government, Rs. 50,312, to the Gaekwar, Rs. 64,924, and to the Nawab of Junagarh Rs. 4,857 (*Loc. Cit.*, p. 94). The pecuniary demands of the Rao of Kutch which the Jam resisted led to the military intervention of the British in 1812. The Jam was reduced, signed an agreement, produced *Fa'el Zamin* and received the Parwana of the Gaekwar. (pp. 179-83, *Loc. Cit.*)

7) The Bhaunagar tribute was transferred to the British by the Gaekwar in 1808. Its amount was Rs. 74,500 a year. (p. 195 *Loc. Cit.*) The State now pays to the British Government Rs. 1,28,060, to the Gaekwar, Rs. 3,581, and to the Nawab of Junagarh, Rs. 22,858.

8) The Diwan signed an agreement on 28th Nov. 1817, by which he agreed to receive an agent of the Gaekwar in the confidence of the British Government, whose advice he would follow, and to pay his tribute regularly to the Gaekwar. (pp. 246-8, *Loc. Cit.*) Palanpur pays no tribute now.

9) An engagement was signed by the Nawab on 16th Dec. 1813, by which he acknowledged through British mediation the suzerainty of the Gaekwar. The latter was not to exercise any interference in internal affairs. The Nawab was to have no dealings with any other States. (pp. 260-1, *Loc. Cit.*)

their mutual claims. Its ultimate result was the establishment of the paramountcy of the English Company in those remote regions in which it was applied.

BHOPAL

This paramountcy became effective over other States also. After the conclusion of the Treaty with Bhopal, its energetic ruler, Nazar Muhammad,¹ had entered into very cordial relations with the Company.² He was pleased to receive Islamnagar which the British recovered for him from Sindhia. Its possession was taken over by him with due pomp and ceremony on the 2nd March 1819.³ His contingent was reported to be in excellent efficiency, and maintained a submissive attitude towards the British.⁴ The latter's influence had been so completely recognised in that State that when Nazar Muhammad was accidentally killed by a pistol shot on the 11th November, 1819,⁵ the final decision of the question of succession was submitted to the British Government.⁶ Munir Muhammad, the deceased Chief's nephew was placed on the Masnad of Bhopal.⁷

BERAR

The reduction of the substantive independent States by military means has been described elsewhere. The Government of Berar had been assumed by the Resident, the Raja being an infant. Land revenue settlements were undertaken under British direction. The districts in the Kingdom were put under European superintendents. Captain Bayley filled the post of the office of Auditor and Paymaster, while Captain MacKenzie was made the Superintendent of Police in Nagpur, with judicial powers. Even in the Raja's household, the services of a European official (named Gordon) were made available, although that department had been placed under the charge of Gujaba Dada.⁸ This extensive control by the British Government of every department of the allied State including the Mint and the Treasury, was much deprecated

1) Malcolm, (*Central India* (1894), Vol. I, pp. 420-22) and Sutherland (*Op. Cit.*, p. 126) speak highly of the ability and character of the young Nawab.

2) Malcolm, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 254.

3) Henley to Metcalfe, 8th Mar., No. 79, Bengal Political Consultations, 8th Apr. 1819.

4) Henley to Metcalfe, 1st Sept., No. 37, Bengal Political Consultations, 2nd Oct. 1819.

5) Henley to Metcalfe, 15th Nov., No. 22, Bengal Political Consultations, 7th Dec. 1819.

6) Henley to Metcalfe, 17th Nov., No. 23, *Loc. Cit.*

7) Malcolm explains why the titular Nawab's family was excluded in favour of Wazir Muhammad's (*Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 423-4).

8) Jenkins to Adam, 6th Jan., No. 89, Bengal Political Consultations, 6th Feb. 1819 paras. 4, 5, 8, 10 & 11.

by Hastings.¹ Moreover, it was an altogether novel mode of interference adopted by the English in their dealings with the Indian States, differing from the other plans which had been previously adopted. The nearest resemblance to the system followed by Jenkins in Berar was that adopted in Mysore under Wellesley in 1799-1811, with this difference, that in Nagpur "more direct and constant interference" was introduced.² The Resident had completely reduced the Gond Chiefs, who had loyally followed Appa Sahib against the British.³ This was followed by the assumption of complete control of the military forces of Nagpur by the British, and in this matter also, the Bhonsla Raja received far more drastic treatment than even the Raja of Mysore.⁴

Although British authority was not established to the same extent in the other two States of Daulat Rao Sindhia and Malhar Rao Holkar, as had been the case with the Bhonsla, the two former Powers also felt the supremacy of the British.

HOLKAR

Tantia Jog became the chief minister of Holkar's Government. A banker⁵ and a shrewd business man, he ably managed State affairs, and was supported by the British representative whom he freely consulted in all matters of general administration. The intelligent and energetic Government of this minister⁶ considerably improved the resources of Holkar's dominions.⁷ It was at this time that Indore, the capital of this State, began to grow as a flourishing centre of commerce owing to its increasing wealth and population.⁸

SINDHIA

The situation of the independent Prince, Daulat Rao Sindhia, in relation to the British Power, was practically the same as that of

1) Prinsep, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 391.

2) Jenkins' *Report, Op. Cit.*, p. 294. Sutherland considered Jenkins' plan as "this best of all systems," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 48 & 186. Metcalfe favoured annexation of the territory to British dominions, and Malcolm desired to set up a Muslim State in Berar against Maratha interests. (Metcalfe to Jenkins, 5th July, 1820. Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, p. 477.)

3) Jenkins to Hastings, 10th Jan., No. 99, Bengal Political Consultations, 13th Feb. 1819.

4) Jenkins' *Report, Op. Cit.*, p. 333.

5) Sutherland, *Op. Cit.*, p. 70. He carried on banking activities even during his ministry, and lent money to the State. (Wellesley to Adam, 7th Dec. 1818, No. 59, Bengal Political Consultations, 9th Jan. 1819, para. 9.)

6) Malcolm's testimony to his ability in his *Central India* (1824), Vol. I, p. 306.

7) Malcolm's *Central India*, Vol. II, pp. 238-9. The army was considerably reduced (from about 10,000 infantry, 15,000 horse and 100 guns in 1817, to 200 guards, 3,000 horse and 13 guns in 1821. *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 229 & 237) the revenues of the State improved enormously. (*Loc. Cit.*, pp. 237 & 315.)

8) p. 239, *Loc. Cit.*

Maharaja Holkar. His army, although still numerically stronger than Holkar's, was yet greatly reduced after the conclusion of the Alliance.¹ Another step which still further reduced Sindhia to a state of future helplessness against the Company was the employment of British officers in his contingent.² The Maharaja used that force to suppress his rebellious Chiefs, particularly Dhonkal Singh, who had given no small amount of embarrassment to his Government.³ The dependence of Sindhia's Government on the British after 1818, is further illustrated by the fact that this former rival and much distrusted enemy of the British Government, was eager to receive a loan from that Government at a time of stringency.⁴

It was a great change indeed. It was not so much an act of choice as of necessity. "But his situation was painful and difficult, and he was only able to preserve his dominions by a departure from all that is deemed honour by the tribe to which he belongs."⁵ He had to choose between two alternatives. Either he could attempt to preserve his honour and independence by fighting an incomparably superior Power, or he could retain his territories and sovereignty by recognising the supremacy of that superior Power. Sindhia discreetly chose the latter alternative. He recognised the ascendancy of the English as an accomplished fact. Not only did he retire from Rajputana at their bidding, but he also assented to their mediation between himself and his tributaries, to settle his claims on them and permanently exclude his control over them. He became reconciled to the altered situation. He found the new contingent under British officers, which was originally formed only as a temporary measure to co-operate with the Company against the Pindaris, too useful to be disbanded. It was made permanent at the strength of 2,000 horse. Its payment was still provided for from the Resident's treasury out of the Pensions Fund, which the British Government owed the Maharaja, and which had been discontinued during the war by the

1) Sindhia's army in 1817 consisted of about 26,000 regular infantry, 13,000 cavalry and 396 guns, besides garrisons in his fortresses, and in 1821 it was 13,000 infantry and 9,000 horse. (Malcolm's *Central India* Vol. II, p. 228.)

2) The Commander was Colonel Blacker. Sindhia gave his consent to the appointment, for example, of Lieut. Johnson to the contingent. (Stewart to Metcalfe, 30th Apr., No. 55, Bengal Political Consultations, 14th May, 1819.)

3) Stewart to Metcalfe, 25th Mar., No. 48, and Blacker to Stewart, No. 47, Bengal Political Consultations, 17th Apr. 1819. The same instrument was used for breaking the power of his former commanders, such as Baptiste. *Prinsep, Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 401-2.

4) Stewart to Metcalfe, 14th May, No. 30, Bengal Political Consultations, 3rd June, 1819, para. 6, although Hastings' Government considered it inexpedient to give the requested assistance. (Metcalfe to Stewart, 12th June, No. 53, Bengal Political Consultations, 12th June, 1819.)

5) Malcolm's *Central India*, (1894), Vol. I, pp. 140-1.

Treaty of Gwalior.¹ This arrangement, concluded in February 1820,² gave the British an obvious political advantage. By the introduction of British officers into Sindhia's military establishment, though still technically independent, his Government became as much subject to British influence as were the States of Oudh or Indore.

KING OF DELHI

While the political ascendancy of the Company over all the internal States of India was thus effectively established, Hastings was very jealous of the honour and general allegiance which the Mughal Emperor at Delhi still enjoyed in the country, from Princes and people alike. Although the old King was a pensioner, if not a prisoner of the English, a mere phantom of a glory and power which had long disappeared, still the royal house drew respect from the Courts of the Indian States. The seal of Maharaja Sindhia contained the words "*Fidwi-a-Shah*" (Servant of the Emperor). The seal of the Governor-General bore a similar inscription.³ The Princes and nobles in the land felt proud of the titles bestowed on them by the King, who maintained the old forms and ceremonials of the Court, as though nothing had happened since Aurangzeb's death.⁴ When Sadat Ali, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh died his successor was, as usual, desirous of formally obtaining his hereditary title from Delhi.⁵ Similarly, in 1820, the Government of Jaipur applied for a *Tika* (mark of investiture) from His Majesty the King, for their young Prince, Maharaja Jai Singh.⁶ All these formal marks of imperial sovereignty enjoyed by the Mughal Shah were distasteful to Hastings, and from the very commencement of his term of office, he urged emphatically the need for declaring that "the pretension of British sovereignty stands unveiled."⁷

The occasion for the expression of strong views on the subject arose a few months after his arrival in India, when he decided to un-

1) Art. 5 of the Treaty concluded in November 1817. (Aitchison, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 66.)

2) Stewart to Metcalfe, Feb. 12th, No. 37, and Metcalfe to Stewart 18th Mar., No. 38, Bengal Political Consultations, 18th Mar. 1820.

3) Nugent's (Vice-President in Governor-General's Council) Minute, No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Nov. 1814.

4) *Ibid.*

5) Baillie to Moira, 13th July, 1814, *Oude Papers, Home Misc.* Vol. 518, p. 616.

6) The minister's application, No. 20, Bengal Political Consultations, 6th May, 1820.

7) His Minute, 21st June, No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1814, in which Hastings strongly advocated the discarding of all forms of inferiority on the part of the British Government in the latter's dealings with the Mughal King. The form of address usual at the time for the Governor-General was to write an *Arzdasht* (petition) to the King, who addressed the Governor-General as "our specially regarded servant, our honoured son, and the deserving object of our royal regard," etc. (No. 72, Bengal Political Consultations, 17th Mar. 1821.)

dertake a tour of Hindustan. The question was hotly debated whether the Governor-General should wait on the King. Hastings, as the head of the Company's Government, was determined not to visit the Mughal (unless the latter was prepared to meet him on terms of absolute equality).¹ The King made certain concessions in the details of the ceremonial, but would not assent to receive the Governor-General on a status of equality,² and, therefore, after protracted negotiations, the interview did not take place.³

This incident, although typical of Hastings' views on the matter, was by no means his only expression of them. His attention was constantly directed towards the destruction of the vestige of paramountcy, whether it remained at Delhi, at Poona or at Satara. This was, indeed, the principal motive for his decision to abolish the Peshwa. The severely restricted terms on which the Raja of Satara had been restored, further illustrate the same anxiety.⁴ But his greatest jealousy was of the lowliest in real power, and yet the loftiest in hollow glory—the descendant of Babar and Akbar, the King without a kingdom.

The Nawab Wazir's application for the confirmation of his title by the King, came too soon after Hastings' arrival in India to allow him definitely to decline compliance. But his consent was very reluctant and circumscribed.⁵ And when the similar request was made later on the part of the Maharaja of Jaipur, the Governor-General sternly refused to put the matter before the King.⁶ Again, when the Mughal Emperor wrote a letter to the King of England expressing condolence at the death of King George III, and offering congratulations to his successor, Hastings declined to forward the letter declaring "that the attempt thus made to establish an epistolary intercourse with the King of England is rather incongruous and should be discouraged to the utmost." It was considered inadmissible with reference to the constitutional character of the British Government in

1) Hastings' Minute of 21st June 1814, *Op. Cit.* (last foot note) and the same views were reiterated in another Minute addressed to Edmonstone 27th Feb. No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th Apr. 1815.

2) Metcalfe's private letter to Adam, 11th Jan., No. 6, and King's letter to Metcalfe, No. 7, Bengal Secret Consultations, 11th Apr. 1815.

3) Deputations of officers were exchanged as 'form of courtesy, Nos. 5 & 8, *Loc. Cit.*

4) Cf. Elphinstone's instruction to the Resident at Baroda, to encourage the Gaekwar to assume the Kingly title (of Raja) to mark his equality with, and independence of, the Raja of Satara, and to allow no intercourse between the two. (Warden to Williams, 3rd May, 1820, Wallace, *Op. Cit.*, p. 313.)

5) Adam to Baillie, 1st Aug. 1814, *Oude Papers, Op. Cit.*, pp. 620-1.

6) Metcalfe to Ochterlony, 6th May, No. 21, Bengal Political Consultations, 6th May 1820.

India.¹ It has already been seen that it was directly at Hastings' instance that the ruler of Oudh assumed the royal title.² Similarly, it was Hastings who authorised his representative with the Nizam to offer that Prince an identical inducement to adopt the kingly style in his address.³ Although this object could not be achieved,⁴ the incident itself shows how eager Hastings was to extinguish completely and quickly the dying glimmer of the Mughal name, in order that the light of the East India Company might shine in its unreflected, original brightness all over the country. He claimed that by its act of 1818, at the time of the renewal of the Company's Charter, the British Parliament had asserted the sovereignty of the English Crown over the British possessions in India, entrusting their rule to the Company. The toleration of the Mughal supremacy, even in name, was inconsistent, and injurious to the interests and the real position of the British Government.⁵

While it could not be wise or expedient to assume the formal sovereignty of the Indian Empire by an open proclamation at that time,⁶ and although the loyalty of the people and the nobility still clung to the Mughal Throne, and could not be transferred by a single stroke of the pen,⁷ yet the effective ascendancy of the English had been fully established throughout the country, from the Sutlej to the Brahmaputra, from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin. By a series of political and military transactions, Hastings had virtually completed the Empire which, in 1857, was taken under the direct control of Queen-in-Parliament.

1) Prinsep to Ochterlony, 10th Mar., No. 74, the King of Delhi to the King of England, No. 73, Bengal Political Consultations, 17th Mar. 1821.

2) Chapter VII.

3) Metcalfe to Russell, 22nd Jan., No. 14, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Jan., 1820.

4) The Nizam spoke most disparagingly of the disloyalty of the Nawab Wazir to the Mughal in assuming the title of the King. It is hard to say how far the Nizam was sincere in that censure, but the fact remains that the Resident did not prevail upon him to change his title from the Subedar, or Viceroy to the Shah, or King. Russell to Hastings 24th Nov., 1819, No. 13, Bengal Secret Consultations, 22nd Jan., 1820.

5) His minute No. 12, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1814.

6) As he himself wrote in his minute. *Ibid.*

7) As pointed out by Sir George Nugent, the Vice-President of the Council at Calcutta. He said that the people would continue to render allegiance to the Mughal King and to receive titles from him. If the British assumed that imperial role, it would not be readily acknowledged. On the contrary, feelings of alarm, aversion and jealousy would be excited amongst the people and the princes. The latter did not know or understand the Charter Act of 1813. (No. 19, Bengal Secret Consultations, 18th Nov., 1814.)

CHAPTER IX

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIAN STATES

BRITISH SUPREMACY AFFECTED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INDIAN STATES-TRANSITION TIME-EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIAN POWERS TAKEN AWAY-INTERNAL AUTONOMY DEPENDED ON THE MEASURE OF BRITISH INTERFERENCE-RESULTS OF INTERFERENCE-ITS RELATION TO ANNEXATION POLICY-ITS EFFECT ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATES-THREE SOURCES FOR INVESTIGATING THIS QUESTION-(a) TREATIES-(b) DECLARED POLICY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT-(c) ACTUAL EXPERIENCES AND OCCURRENCES-ADHERENCE TO NON-INTERFERENCE FOUND IMPRACTICABLE-VARYING CIRCUMSTANCES, PERSONAL FACTOR AND PUBLIC POLICY-ITS RELATION TO SUCCESSION MATTERS-DIFFERENT FORMS OF INTERFERENCE-INFERENCE REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY-VARIANCE BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE-STATES POSSESSED OF IMPORTANT POWERS-AND SOVEREIGNTY REGARDED DIVISIBLE-BUT IN PRACTICE THE INDIAN STATES NO LONGER FULLY SOVEREIGN BODIES-EVEN IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS THEY COULD BE REGARDED ONLY AS SEMI-SOVEREIGN-SUMMARY

CHAPTER IX

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIAN STATES

This establishment of the effective supremacy of Britain over India in advance of the final constitutional change of 1858, necessarily affected the sovereignty of the Indian Rulers. They entered what might roughly be described as the period of preparation for the position in which, by implied or forced acquiescence, they find themselves today. The former chapters have been devoted to the development of events, through which Hastings realised his object of making the Company's Government the head of the Indian Confederacy, the paramount power in India "in effect, if not declaredly so."¹ This achievement on the part of the British was brought about by the extension of their sway over the Indian States, and the corresponding diminution of the latter's sovereign powers. The two processes were indeed connected with and complementary to each other. It will be useful, therefore, to enquire briefly into the position of the States as Hastings left them in 1828, after the military and political measures carried out in his time.

It was a time of transition. The British were only just emerging into a state of ascendancy over those Governments which had been apparently their equals as independent sovereigns. Moreover, the points of contact were neither so numerous nor so complicated as are inevitable in the modern days of railways, and postal and telegraph organisation. Political authority had not been established long enough to modify constitutional rights, and although the text of the treaties was beginning to lose its original force and meaning, usage or practice had not yet developed to affect, much less displace, them. The description of such a situation as this would not square with any strict notions or principles of constitutional law. Any hope of a scientific accuracy in the treatment of the subject is likely to meet with failure.²

1) *Private Journal*, Vol. I, p. 54.

2) The constitutional position of the Indian States, even today, cannot be defined with any specific exactness. It is understood by the parties concerned, but left carefully undefined. (Cf. Lee Warner, *Op. Cit.* p. 11.) Again, "of their precise relations to the suzerain power it is not easy to give a satisfactory definition, nor are they regulated by any uniform code of rules." (*Wheaton's Elements of International Law*, 1916 Ed. p. 69.)

As is well known, Wellesley's treaties with the Indian States were concluded, at any rate in form, as between equals.¹ Their provisions had the appearance of reciprocity rather than of subordination. This was true even of those clauses which effectively curtailed the sovereign rights and independence of the Indian States, in their external relations with other Powers.² The provisions relating to subsidiary forces were not originally intended to encroach on their sovereignty. The relations of equality that subsisted between the States and the Company in the early years of the nineteenth century, were so well understood that the British Government did not always insist on the fulfilment of the clauses of the treaties by which they had agreed to have no dealings with other States, without the knowledge of the British.³ However this might have been, those provisions gathered strength with the increasing military superiority of the Company. And as the latter assumed the tone of an arbiter in all interstate relations, these restrictive clauses came to be acknowledged as effective and binding. Thus, without any deliberate or material revision of the existing treaties, the British Government succeeded, by adopting a forward policy, in effectively taking away the attributes of external sovereignty of the Indian rulers, which had already been formally conceded. The latter could not make war or peace, nor could they negotiate agreements with other Princes. In the new treaties which Hastings concluded, these principles were embodied in clear, unmistakable language. Thus, all the States were completely divested of the external forms of sovereignty. That point was settled beyond all doubt.

The problem of internal sovereignty cannot be so easily disposed of. In their internal affairs, the Indian Princes still remained full sovereigns, according to the treaties which the British made with them. But those engagements were not always observed in practice. Therefore, the subject becomes complicated, and defies any uniform treatment. How far the Indian States were sovereign in their internal concerns is a question, the answer to which depends on the extent and character of the interference exercised in their affairs by the British Government, through its political representative (called an Agent, Resident, or Envoy) at the Courts of the Indian Princes.

1) Jenkins' evidence before the House of Commons' Select Committee, Parl. Paper (735-VI) 1831-32, Vol. XIV, p. 25. This was also Elphinstone's view. (Colebrooke's *Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. II, pp. 391-2.) The Treaties with Oudh and Mysore, however, expressed the superiority of the Company. See Footnote 2 p. 522.

2) The contrast is noticeable between the treaties made in Wellesley's time and those concluded by Hastings.

3) For example, the Peshwa continued to receive Vakils publicly from, and depute them to, other Maratha Courts after the Treaty of Bassein.

The interference exercised in the domestic matters of the Indian States has been a vexed question, on which strong opinions, both for and against, have been expressed by eminent Anglo-Indian writers and administrators. It will serve no useful purpose for the present object, to examine that aspect of the subject. Whether the British political officers should have interfered in the affairs of the Governments to which they had been deputed as the Company's agents, is now a matter of mere academic interest, which has lost its practical importance. It will, therefore, be far more helpful to examine the question of interference with the view of finding out whether, and to what extent, its exercise affected, impaired, or destroyed, the sovereignty of the Indian rulers, than to approach it for its justification, or otherwise.

As far as this latter aspect goes, it will suffice here to say that the discussion of the subject has suffered from either side with one-sidedness, and consequent exaggerated advocacy.¹ The truth, as often occurs in such cases, lies somewhere in the middle. It is time that the critics of the interfering policy realised that under those peculiar circumstances, it was an inevitable course of action, whilst the defenders of that policy should also admit that in the long run it was injurious to the vitality of the States themselves. It has been widely admitted that the permanent effects of the policy of interference, were to kill initiative, to cripple the State Government, and to demoralise the Prince, and therefore produced consequences which were lamentably injurious and unfortunate.² These may be called the remote results of the policy. On the other hand, its immediate consequence was often (though not always) to restore tranquillity, and promote settled Government, with security of person and property against undue oppression. In these circumstances, the political officers, acting according to their own notions, found it impossible to avoid interference. And this is what the critics of the policy must bear in

1) A very strong condemnation of such political interference is to be found in Shore's "*Notes on Indian Affairs*", Vol. II, pp. 70-105. Sutherland censured it in the case of Oudh. (*Op Cit.*, p. 45.)

2) Munro writing on the result of the subsidiary system in a letter to Hastings on 19th Aug. 1817 (Gleig's *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, 1849), pp. (249-50) expresses this point most admirably. That the alliance of the Indian Princes with the British Government produced this result was expressed by Russell in his evidence before the Commons' Committee in these words:- "The habit of going upon crutches deprives him (the Prince) of the use of his limbs. By taking away the occasion, we take away, in the end, all power of exertion." *Parliamentary Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, (735-VI), p. II. Metcalfe wrote: "The effects of interference are permanent, and degrade the state for ever, if they do not destroy it." (*Kaye's Metcalfe Papers*, p. 242.)

mind. A great deal depended upon the temperament of the agents.¹ For those who were either impatient reformers or possessed of an overbearing disposition, the natural desire must have been to correct what appeared to them to be evils crying for remedy. Then again, they were conscious of the irresistible strength of their Government. As a result, they were tempted to assume a dictatorial attitude, where prudence and expediency, as also a strict regard for treaty provisions, required either neutrality or, at the most, friendly advice, on their part. In short, considering all the circumstances of the time, and the unequal nature of the alliances, the interference that was exercised, however paralysing its ultimate effect might have been, was unavoidable. As an abstract rule of action, almost everybody condemned it,² and none more so than Hastings himself. Yet in practice, it was applied time and again, even with his own sanction.³

It is interesting to notice in this connection, a view expressed by no less a writer than Lee Warner, whose work, "*The Native States of India*," holds a high place in the scanty literature on this subject. It is, that annexation was the logical result of the policy of non-interference. Isolation and unconcern were pushed to such absurd limits, that the only safety valve left for escape from their effect, was the absorption of the Indian State territories into British possessions.⁴ In stating this opinion, he presumably had in mind the annexations of Bentinck, and the still more extensive ones of Dalhousie. But the principle itself, as expressed by him, is only a half truth, and needs qualification before it can be accepted. The misrule and civil disorders, which later furnished grounds for the annexation of the Indian States, had their roots in the earlier period, when the military ascendancy of the Company was extended over the States through the subsidiary system. It was as a result of that system that the rulers became irresponsible, and their Governments enfeebled. Long before Dalhousie's days, competent and experienced persons had observed that the subsidiary system possessed "an inevitable tendency to bring every native state into which it is introduced sooner or later under the

1) "He is more of a minister than an ambassador. . . . He has to perform the delicate task of governing those who, from their station, should themselves be governors, etc." Report of the Select Committee, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1831-32, Vol. XIV, p. 6.

2) As Elphinstone said, "I must acknowledge that although the plan of abstaining from interference is the best for the time, yet it is the most hazardous for the native prince who has the power of running into errors which are not checked until they become irretrievable." His written evidence, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 156.

3) For example, in the affairs of Mewar in 1818-19, of the Nizam in 1820, and again in Jaipur in 1821, Chapter VI, and Chapter VII *ante*.

4) Lee Warner, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 129-30.

exclusive dominion of the British Government.²¹ The general effect of that system was to paralyse the vitality of Indian rule. It thus prepared the way for the situation which arose later when the British had to choose between effective interference and complete absorption. Therefore, the later annexations cannot be wholly attributed to a fitful policy of non-interference. With regard to that policy, the true note was struck by Metcalfe when he wrote: "I am of opinion that it never yet had a fair trial."²²

To return to the question of the sovereignty of the Indian States, it is necessary to enquire how far it was affected by internal interference on the part of the Company's Government. The answer to this must be sought in three main sources. First of all, there are the treaties which described authoritatively the nature of the subsisting relations; secondly, the declared views of the British Government on the same point must be examined. And thirdly, it is indispensable to notice the actual dealings which took place between the British Power and the different States, in so far as they modified or supported the principles laid down in the treaties and enunciated in the State dispatches.

In the engagements concluded between the Company and the States, the latter almost always sought a clear stipulation that the British would have no manner of concern with their internal affairs. As a general rule³ the British gave this undertaking, thus disclaiming

1) Munro to Hastings (Gleig's *Life of Munro*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 248). Cf. with this, other and similar views expressed by many able persons before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1832, e.g. M'Culloch (pp. 2-3), James Mill, who condemned the subsidiary system and advocated the absorption of the States and the pensioning of their Rulers (pp. 6-10), Russell (pp. 11, and 66-7), Jenkins (pp. 24-6), Bayley (pp. 41-2) and Baillie (Appendix, p. 88). Malcolm, on the other hand, was more favourable towards the system, and was also in favour of preserving the Indian States. But even he admitted that in some places the system had produced evil results (pp. 27-30). *Parliamentary Papers*, 1831-2, Vol. XIV.

2) Continued he in the same private letter written on 22nd July, 1828 in connection with Kishangarh affairs "and I shall be without chart or compass if it (i. e. non-interference) be abandoned." (Kaye's *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*, p. 158.) It must not, however, be supposed, that Metcalfe was always opposed to interference. One is entitled to infer from his writings (private and official) that he believed that, as a rule, interference in the internal matters of the States was arbitrary (*Loc. Cit.* p. 238), and decidedly harmful (*Loc. Cit.*, pp. 241-2) and therefore should have been carefully avoided (pp. 168-9 and 242). But on certain occasions it was unavoidable (p. 239). Metcalfe was also of opinion that interference when exercised, should be thorough and "with good effect" (p. 243) Council Minute of 14th Aug. 1835. *Loc. Cit.* and letter to Jenkins, 5th July 1820, in Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe* Vol. I, p. 478. His own interference in Hyderabad to check Chandulal's oppression has already been noted.

3) There were exceptions to this rule, already mentioned, in which the rulers were to receive the advice of the British Resident. Those States were Mysore and Oudh in Wellesley's time, and Satara, Berar and the minor principalities of Dungarpur, Pratapggarh and Banswara in Hastings' time. But these were all oc-

all interference in those concerns. The Princes were assured that they would be free and unfettered in their dealings with their own subjects, relations and dependents. The expressions used in Hastings' treaties with the Rajput rulers are as clear on this point as those in the earlier engagements.¹ It is true that they contained clauses demanding military co-operation from the allied States at the requisition of the British, in certain cases even specifying the strength of the contingents² to be maintained for that purpose. It must further be admitted that they reduced the States to an inferior status and tended to increase their helplessness and dependence. But those stipulations alone could not be construed as a surrender of sovereignty by the States. An arrangement of this kind is conceivable, though not probable, even among independent States. It is worth noticing that in the treaties with the Nizam and the Maharajas of Dholpur and Alwar, which continued in force in Hastings' time and after, the articles of military co-operation were drawn up on a footing more or less of equality.³ Therefore, it is incontestable that in the solemn and expressed agreements which governed the mutual relations between the States and the British Government, the rulers of the former were left "absolute" within their own territories, and declared immune from the jurisdiction of the Company's laws and administration.

The views of the British authorities, both in India and in England, are equally clear. They adhere to the spirit of the engagements concluded with the States, which gave them perfect internal sovereignty. Hastings' own declarations were indeed emphatically against interference, which he regarded as a breach of faith, and contrary to good policy. In formulating his proposals for a league of Indian States, with his own Government as its guiding member, and taking the case of the Nawab Wazir of Oudh as an example, he wrote of "our acknowledgment of that internal independence of his domi-

casions on which the British were really the dictators, and the bilateral nature of the contract was purely a formality. The special case of Oudh has already been noticed (Chapter VII).

1) Art. 9 of the Treaty with Udaipur in 1818, (Aitchison, Vol. III, p. 31), says:—"The Maharana of Oudeypore shall always be absolute ruler of his own country and the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that principality." The Nizam's Treaty of 1800 contains these words in Art. 15:—"The Honourable Company's Government on their part hereby declare that they have no manner of concern with any of His Highness' children, relations, subjects or servants with respect to whom His Highness is absolute." (Aitchison, Vol. IX, p. 72.)

2) As for example, Jodhpur, Hyderabad, Bhopal.

3) Art. 4 of the Treaty with Bharatpur of 1803 (Aitchison Vol. III, p. 274) might be contrasted with Art. 8 of the Treaty with the Maharaja of Jodhpur, a treaty of Hastings' time. (*Loc. Cit.*, p. 160) or again, Art. 4 of the Treaty with Alwar of 1803 (*Loc. Cit.*, p. 322) with Art. 7 of the Treaty with Jaipur of 1818 (*Loc. Cit.*, p. 105).

nions, which we are at present bound in honour to allow. To say that his territories or those of any other prince will be ill-governed when enfranchised from our control. What is that to us? One must lament to see any portion of the human race under oppressive sway. But we are not charged with the quixotic obligation of vindicating the rights of all mankind. The consequence of that misrule would be that the subjects of a State where such tyranny was exercised would desert it, and repair to augment the wealth and strength of our possessions.”¹ In an earlier part of the same document, Hastings described the effect of this plan on the position of the British Residents at the Indian Courts. “Our Resident would, in the new condition, have no duties to perform, but such as distinctly attach to the character of an ambassador, in Europe.”² These opinions were held and advocated at the beginning of his Indian career, when it might, with truth, be said that, fresh from Europe, he was, in his imagination, building political castles on the German model.

However, in 1818 on his return to Calcutta after his grand and successful military achievements against the Pindaris and the Marathas, he again expressed similar sentiments. Referring to his settlement of the Rajput States he said:—“With their internal government we profess to have no right of interference.”³ Once more, in 1822, only a few weeks before he laid down the reins of office, there arose an occasion for him to repeat his convictions on this subject. Strongly disapproving of Metcalfe’s minute interference in the affairs of the State of Hyderabad, the dispatch from Calcutta said:—“The assumption of our possessing an universal supremacy in India, involving such rights as you have described, is a mistake. Over states which have, by particular engagements, rendered themselves professedly feudatory, the British Government does exercise supremacy. But it never has been claimed, and certainly never has been acknowledged in the case of Native Powers standing within the denomination of allies. Although a virtual supremacy may, undoubtedly, be said to exist in the British Government, from the inability of other States to contend with its strength, the making of such a superiority a principle singly sufficient for any exertions of our will, would be to misapply that strength and to pervert it to tyrannic purposes The argument of supremacy having been set aside, nothing but the tenour of some special engagements could render us liable to the call, or allot to us the title for

1) His Minute, 3rd Apr., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June, 1814.

2) *Ibid.*

3) His speech to the European citizens of Calcutta in July 1818 (reproduced in the Appendix of White’s *Considerations on the state of British India*, p. 435).

such interposition. Our treaties characterising the Nizam as an independent sovereign, authorise no such latitude."¹

Metcalfe was further told "the fact of maladministration is unquestionable and must be deplored. Does that, however, decide the mode in which alteration is to be effected? Where is our right to determine that the amount of the evil is such as to demand our taking the remedy into our hands? His Lordship in Council observes that the necessity stated is altogether constructive. Were such a pretence allowable, a powerful State would never want a colour for subjugating a weak neighbour. The consequence is so obvious that no principle in the law of nations leaves room for acting on such a presumption."²

These views were further supported by Hastings in a minute for his Council, in which he explained the necessity for issuing those instructions to Metcalfe, because the latter's position was "irreconcilable to the received rules of procedure between nation and nation." This was written in reply to the dissenting minute of Adam,³ whose opinion was characterised by Hastings as "Diametrically repugnant to the recognised principles of international law."⁴

These views, expressed clearly, authoritatively and repeatedly, go to show that internal sovereignty resided in the rulers of the States. As has been observed, the Governor-General more than once invoked the principles of international law in referring to the Company's dealings with the allied States in their internal concerns.⁵

On this point, the attitude of the authorities in London had always been similar to that adopted by Hastings. Indeed, they favoured the extension of that rule of action even to military matters⁶ and politi-

1) Swinton to Metcalfe, 25th Oct., *Home Misc.*, Vol. 517, p. 224, paras. 2 & 3.

2) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 225, para. 5.

3) Adam's Minute of 1st Nov., No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th Dec. 1822. The other members also dissented from Hastings' view as expressed in the dispatch to Metcalfe on 25th Oct. The difference, however, was not on the principle of interference, but on the question of abstaining from its exercise, and leaving a free hand to the irresponsible minister, Chandulal. (Other minutes, Fendall's 19th Nov., No. 6, Bayley's, 25th Nov., No. 7, *Loc. Cit.*)

4) Hastings' Minute, 19th Dec., No. 8, *Loc. Cit.*

5) It is interesting to notice that this very argument employed by Hastings in connection with the Nizam's affairs, in 1822, was also used by the present Nizam in 1925, in his letter to the Viceroy (in connection with the Berar controversy). That plea was refuted and set aside by Lord Reading. The change in the constitutional position which has occurred in the course of a century is thus significantly explained. Nizam to Reading, Sept. 25th, 1925, *Parliamentary Paper—Cmd. 2621*, Vol. XXII—1926, MS. p. 445 and Reading's reply to the Nizam 27th Mar. 1926, MS. p. 461, *Loc. Cit.*

6) They were opposed to the policy of requiring the States to maintain contingents under British Officers, although their grounds for this view were tactical and strategic. They thought it unsafe and risky to let the States have disciplined troops equal in efficiency to the Company's, and to let them learn all the improved methods of scientific warfare. (Secret Committee to the Governor-General-in-Council, 3rd Apr. 1815, *Board's Drafts*, No. 99.)

cal domination. They opposed the coercion which was applied to the Raja of Nagpur in 1813-14, to oblige him to accept a subsidiary alliance. If their wishes had been faithfully carried out, Hastings could not have treated with the Rajput States, for nothing was permissible, which might give umbrage to Maharaja Sindhia.¹ The Treaty of Poona, concluded with the Peshwa in June 1817, which was placed before them as an accomplished fact, was only reluctantly approved.² They constantly urged the adoption of the policy of non-interference. It has already been seen how Hastings' action in freeing the Nawab Wazir of Oudh from the minute control of the Resident, through perpetual interference, was wholly approved by the authorities in England.³ And again, in the Nizam's affairs, when the Governor-General was opposed by the other members of his Council, the principle of non-interference was clearly upheld by the authorities in London.⁴ Indeed, it would be correct to say that the policy of the British Government (and also of the Court of Directors) in England at the time, was even more emphatically opposed to interference in the affairs of the Indian Powers or the encroachment on their sovereign rights, than that embraced by Hastings himself.⁵

Therefore, it would be fair to assume that, so far as the terms of the treaties, and the declared policy of the British Government go, the Governments of the Indian Princes retained full internal sovereignty. An unquestioned authority continued to reside in those rulers for administering their territories. This might be considered as the theoretical side of the case. The practical aspect of it comes to light when one examines the third source of information on the subject. How far were the actual relations regulated in the spirit of the treaties and in accordance with the principles of the policy just described? Contact with the hard facts and events of life tends to weaken, if not destroy, the

1) Principally on the same ground, the Board of Control had ordered their Indian Government (in 1815) to abstain from taking Bhopal under their protection. (Secret Committee to the Governor-General, 29th Sept. 1815, *Board's Drafts*, Vol. V, paras. 21 & 27.)

2) Secret Committee to the Governor-General-in-Council, 5th Jan. 1818, (*Board's Drafts*, No. 122, paras. 7, 13 & 14.) Also Chap. IV. *ante*.

3) Political letter to Bengal, 22nd Mar. 1816, *Oude Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 857.

4) Political letter to Bengal, 21st Jan. 1824, *Hyderabad Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 388. In the same dispatch, the Governor-General's interference to improve and discipline the Nizam's forces, and his support of Chandulal, were censured. pp. 388-9 and 392-3.

5) For instance, the Board of Control's dispatch to Bengal, relating to Nizam's affairs, in which they sharply criticised the interfering action taken by the Resident at Hyderabad with the authority of Hastings' Government. (Secret Committee's Dispatch, 22nd June, 1820, *Board's Records*, Vol. IV, p. 114. Hastings relaxed his principle of non-interference many times. As, for example, in Nagpur, his letter to the Secret Committee, 21st Aug. 1820, *Home. Misc.*, Vol. 516a, p. 444, para. 109.)

force of many theoretical propositions. The political occurrences of Hastings' time were not exceptional in this respect.

In the very nature of the circumstances, owing to the unequal state of the alliances, the application of that policy was indeed a difficult matter. It can easily be imagined that interference must ever have been a constant allurements for the superior Power. It was obvious that even simple suggestions or casual advice, when they emanated from the agent of the omnipotent Company, could not be lightly disregarded.¹ A close connection between two such unequal and dissimilar Powers as the English Company and the Indian rulers, particularly after the wars of Wellesley's time, could not but bring about the subjection of the weaker to the stronger. As Elphinstone put it:—"Differences must unavoidably arise; and however moderate the superior Power may be, the result of each must advance the inferior a step towards entire subjugation."² Metcalfe's pithy remark contains the same opinion. He wrote to a friend, "How contact with us seems to paralyse every State!"³

Then again, the nature and degree of interference, as has already been noted, depended also on the personality and temperament of the agent himself. Some were more interfering than others. Some would pay a greater regard to the stated policy and instructions from Calcutta, while others, perhaps less cautious, would boldly and eagerly seize the chances, as they arose, of extending the political influence of their own Government, or reforming that of the State to which they were deputed. It has been observed in earlier chapters, how Arthur Cole, and John Baillie, pressed for a forward policy respectively in Mysore and Oudh.⁴ Similarly, Ochterlony repeatedly begged to be allowed to interfere in Jaipur affairs.⁵ Jenkins, at Nagpur, went a step further, and introduced British officers into the administration of the State before receiving Hastings' instructions in the matter.⁶ At a time when communications were slow, and distances so great, it was inevitable that the Residents should sometimes feel themselves called upon to take decisions on their own responsibility. Then again, the prevailing conditions of the parties at the Indian Courts, also occasionally helped:

1) As Metcalfe wrote in his Council Minute of 24th Aug. 1835, "An interfering agent is an abominable nuisance wherever he may be, and our agents are apt to take that turn. They like to be masters, instead of mere negotiators." *Kaye's Metcalfe Papers, Op. Cit.*, p. 238.

2) Elphinstone's written evidence for the Select Committee, 1832 (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1831-2, Vol. XIV, p. 156). He viewed the results of interference, on the whole, in a favourable light. (*Loc. Cit.*, pp. 154-6).

3) *Kaye's Metcalfe Papers, Op. Cit.*, p. 159.

4) Chapter VII (*ante*).

5) Chapter VI (*ante*).

6) Chapters V & VIII (*ante*).

the Residents in their desire (at times even without their own wishes), to have a controlling voice in the internal affairs of the States.¹

Another practice which had frequently been adopted, led to encroachments on the sovereignty of the Indian rulers. The Company often mediated between them and their feudatories, guaranteeing protection to the latter, even against their overlord. Originally, agreements of this nature were designed only with a view to curbing the military ambitions and activities of the allying Princes, and establishing peace through British arbitration. British policy in the matter was not perhaps consciously directed at reducing the sovereign powers of those rulers. Yet, one can hardly wonder that such should have been its result. The first prominent use of this policy was made in 1812, when the Peshwa's disputes with his Southern Jagirdars were settled.² The supplementary Article to the Treaty with Kota more or less embodied this principle. Its consequences to the State of Kota have already been reviewed.³ The agreement reached in 1818 between the Maharana of Udaipur and his nobles was countersigned by Tod, as the representative of the Company.⁴ The British made separate personal agreements with Jamadar Fatch Muhammad, the adventurous minister of Kutch, and with Diwan Hans Raj.⁵ The latter's possession of Mandavi, which he had usurped, was thereby recognised. Again, by the Treaty of 1819, with the Maharao of Kutch, the Company gave separate guarantees to the Jareja and Rajput Chiefs of Wagar and Kutch.⁶ Elphinstone's arrangement of 1820 regarding Kathiawar was based on the same principle.⁷ By it, the Chiefs of that province were removed from the authority, and eventually from the sovereignty, of the Gaekwar of Baroda.⁸

The relations of the rulers with their own feudatories often produced friction, which reacted on the relations of the States with the Company's Government. Whenever internal commotion threatened the peace of the country, the British Government were not prepared to assume an attitude of unconcern.

The basic principles of the Company's engagements with the States were incompatible, if not illogical. Therefore, even where the British had not given separate guarantees to feudatory nobles, the

1) At almost every Court, there were to be found factions who sought the Resident's support for themselves, particularly against their rivals. Jaipur, Lucknow, Hyderabad and Nagpur furnish examples of this description.

2) Aitchison (1909), *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 72.

3) Chapter VI (*ante*).

4) Aitchison (1909), *Op. Cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 43-4.

5) In 1809, Aitchison (1909), Vol. VII, pp. 12-14.

6) Art. 16, of the Treaty, *Loo. Cit.*, p. 22.

7) Aitchison (1909), *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 80.

8) Chapter VIII, (*ante*).

treaties lent themselves to confused and arbitrary interpretation. While the authority of the ruler was fully guaranteed, and protection promised to him against all enemies, foreign and domestic, complete non-interference in his internal concerns was at the same time avowed. It was not always possible to reconcile these two positions. Their incompatibility was shown by the instructions issued to Ochterlony with regard to Jodhpur affairs in 1818. "Our obligation to maintain the just authority of the Rajah does not absolve us from the duty of securing the rights of his subjects, violation of which cannot in any form or under any pretext, be sanctioned by the British Government."¹ The obligation to maintain the lawful authority of the Raja was felt to be equally binding on that Government with the acknowledged rights and privileges of the Thakurs of Marwar.² Now, by the express provisions of the Treaty, the British Government was to have no concern with the Maharaja's subjects and dependents. Supposing that these should revolt against their sovereign and that the latter should ask for the military co-operation of his British allies in quelling the rebellious nobles, what were the British to do? It was indeed an awkward situation. If they refused their assistance, there was the danger of a breach of the peace, and consequent civil strife, which could not be tolerated. If the British gave the requested military aid, at the same time adhering to their policy of non-interference, they might possibly be aiding an unjust cause, or even upholding tyranny and oppression. The choice lay between abandoning their paramount position, or giving up the principle of non-interference. No Government which had so eagerly aspired to, and had so effectively acquired, a political and military supremacy, as the English had done in India, would easily and voluntarily relinquish it. The inevitable result was that it was impossible to observe the principle of non-interference in practice. The same dispatch regarding Jodhpur showed this clearly. It said:—"The performance of our pledge to the State of Jodhpur requires that when we are called on to take part in support of its interests, we should exercise the power of effectual interference to the full extent demanded by the nature of the case," although it was to be confined "as much as possible to general political arrangements and to avoid a direct interference in the internal administration of the country."³

Whatever might have been the aspirations on the one side, and the corresponding pledges on the other, the fact has to be recognised

1) Adam to Ochterlony, 5th Sept., No. 17, Bengal Secret Consultations, 5th Sept. 1818.

2) *Ibid.* A fuller extract from this dispatch has been reproduced in Chapter VI. (*ante.*)

3) Adam to Ochterlony, 5th Sept., *Op. Cit.*

that the relative positions of the parties had changed too decidedly to be governed merely by the written words of the treaties.

In the case of the States of Udaipur and Jaipur, the treaties themselves left the door open for internal interference. The tributes of those Princes were fixed in ratio to their general revenues.¹ Thus, the British Government became materially interested in the revenue administration of these States. This arrangement was capable of producing all the inconvenience and irritation of interference.²

Another example of this inconsistency was furnished by the treaty with Kutch. The Company engaged to the Maharao to have no authority over his domestic concerns; and the Rao and his successors were acknowledged to be "absolute masters of their territory." And yet the very same instrument stated that "the views of the British Government are limited to the reform and organisation of the military establishment of the Kutch Government, to the correction of any abuses which may operate oppressively on the inhabitants, and to the limitation of the general expenses of the State within its resources."³ These provisions are obviously contradictory. That which one upholds, namely, the internal sovereignty of the Maharao, the other tends to destroy.

Succession to the Indian sovereignties on the death of their rulers, was another important problem connected with interference on the part of the Company. When disputes arose between contending rivals, the British Government had to decide its own attitude as to whom it would support and recognise as the ruler of the country. This circumstance led them into the same sort of reasoning as above described, and the same result was reached in the long run, namely, the abandonment of the policy of indifference. The development of relations in the course of a century has resulted in the establishment of the clear rule to-day that "the succession to a native State is invalid, until it receives in some form the sanction of the British authorities."⁴

But this avowal of the British right to regulate succession had not been made in the time of Hastings. The British attitude in the matter had not been settled with any degree of clearness, much less

1) Art. 6 of the Treaties with Udaipur and with Jaipur, respectively, p. 30, and pp. 104-5, Aitchison (1909). Vol. III.

2) As pointed out by Tod in his written evidence in 1832. (*Parliamentary Paper*, 1831-2, Vol. XIV, p. 125.)

3) Arts. 10 & 11 of the Treaty of 1819. (Aitchison (1909), Vol. VII, p. 93.)

4) Government of India asserted this principle in the Manipur case (Notification of Aug. 21st 1891, published in the *Gazette of India*, 22 Aug. 1891. Part I, p. 492). It was approved by the Secretary of State for India. (*Ibid.*)

finality. Hastings' plan for the league of the united States of India, put forward in 1814, included the principle of making rules of succession according to the custom of the State in question. The league was to enforce those rules.¹ However, since that league never came about, naturally no rules could be framed.

On the death of Maharaja Jagat Singh in 1819, the British hesitated as to whether they should recognise the adoption effected by Nazir Mohan Ram.² In the case of the Nizam, long before the old ruler died, Hastings' Government started enquiries into the question, in order to decide beforehand which Prince's pretensions they would uphold.³ The settlement of the succession to the Masnad of Bhopal by British intervention in 1819 has already been alluded to.⁴ This changing attitude in favour of intervention to settle succession in the States can easily be understood from its position as the supreme military Power which the Company had come to occupy in India. Its wish and interests to be the guardian of the public peace throughout the land⁵ necessarily led it to abandon non-interference in succession matters, just as it did in others.

But from this, one is not entitled to conclude, as remarked above, that the British Government in Hastings' days had clearly put forward the claim that in order to be valid, succession to a sovereignty must receive the Company's recognition. The latter's policy in the matter was still in process of formation. So that Elphinstone, when asked many years later, whether the British Government was justified in interfering to regulate succession in the allied States, gave it as his opinion that the British did not possess that right over those States.⁶ In the Bharatpur case in 1826, the declaration of the Board of Control on this point, was still more emphatic and authoritative. They clearly disclaimed their right of interfering to decide as to who should succeed to the functions of Government in a State.⁷

As late as the year 1853, the principle of non-interference in succession matters was avowed by no less a person than the Marquis of

1) His Minute of 3rd Apr., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June 1814.

2) Metcalfe to Ochterlony, 20th Feb., No. 45, Bengal Political Consultations, 20th Feb. 1819.

3) Russell to Hastings, 25th July, No. 21, Metcalfe to Russell, 28th Aug., No. 22, Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th Aug. 1819.

4) When the family of Ghayas Muhammad was set aside and Nazir Muhammad's nephew was selected. (Chapter VIII, para. 50.)

5) That was the principal plea used by Metcalfe in the succession case of Bharatpur in 1825. (Kaye's *Metcalfe Papers*, p. 125.)

6) His letters to Colebrooke. (*Life of Elphinstone*, Vol. II, pp. 389-92.)

7) Secret Committee to the Governor-General-in-Council, 26th Mar., 1826. (Extract reproduced in Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. II, p. 141.)

Dalhousie. A dispute of this nature arose in Bahawalpur State, and John Lawrence advocated interference to prevent disorders. But Dalhousie refused to allow his chief commissioner to intervene. "It has long been the settled policy of the British Government not to interfere with other States in the selection of their supreme ruler."¹

The form and degree of interference in internal affairs also varied at different places. The common practice was for the Resident to offer advice and address remonstrances to the ruler and his Government for particular measures. Oudh, Baroda, Indore, Satara, Udaipur and Mysore, with varying shades of difference, would be examples of this system. It was carried to a much more extensive limit by Jenkins in Berar, where after 1818, the British Government was practically the *de facto* authority. Another mode adopted with the same object, though possessing a less interfering appearance, consisted in securing the appointment, as the minister of the State, of such a person as was in the confidence of the British Government. This method of interference was, on the whole, preferred by Hastings² and certainly supported by him at Hyderabad.³ It was employed at Jaipur, for some time at Baroda, and at Lucknow.⁴ Its effects were more injurious not only to the rulers, but also to the fabric of their administration. Metcalfe considered it "the worst plan of all."⁵ Elphinstone's condemnation of it is equally strong. The interference exercised through a minister under the Resident's influence was in his opinion "the most invidious and the least successful mode of all."⁶ Whatever may be the opinion on this form of interference, the fact remains that it was a practice which was often followed. And its result was the effectual curtailment of the powers of the ruling Princes in their own administration.

These are briefly the facts of the situation, drawn from the three sources, as mentioned above. They do not all lead to the same conclusion. This variance between theory and practice makes the question of the sovereignty of the Indian States a very difficult one to determine. It is clear, however, that the situation of the States in the Indian constitution in 1823 did not remain the same as it had been in 1813, although it had not, of course, reached the position in which it is

1) Extract from Dalhousie's Minute. Lee-Warner, *Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, Vol. II, p. 119.

2) As appears from the contents of his Dispatch to the Secret Committee, 21st Aug. 1820, regarding Nagpur. (*Home Misc.* Vol. 516a, p. 445, para. 110.)

3) To keep Chandulal in power. Chapter VII.

4) To support Beri Sal at Jaipur, Mohamudaula at Lucknow, and Dhakji Dadaji at Baroda.

5) His letter to Jenkins (Kaye's *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, p. 478).

6) His written evidence before the Select Committee (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1831-32, Vol. XIV, p. 155).

found to-day. The events of 1817-18 had materially altered the relative position of the States in relation to the Company's Government. This change is undoubted, but it is not easy to define its full implication with any exactness. The British asserted their right to preserve and enforce tranquillity in the whole country. This evidently involved a general, though undefined right, to carry their controlling influence into the internal matters of the States for the furtherance of that object. When it is remembered that this assertion was made by the supreme military Power in the land, possessing not only the will, but also the ability to enforce its authority, it becomes clear that the sovereignty of the Princes was necessarily rendered precarious.

It has been seen that, in theory, the Indian rulers possessed, and in practice even enjoyed, large and important powers within their own States. They ordinarily exercised unrestricted civil and criminal jurisdiction, raised their own revenue, made their own laws, levied their own customs duties, and sometimes maintained their own military forces. Many among them coined their own money—a distinct mark of sovereignty.¹ In short, these States were "separate political communities possessing an independent civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction."² A political body which is a supreme unit of this nature to the mass of its subjects, cannot be denied the name of a State.³ Theoretically speaking, the Indian States would be considered to possess internal sovereignty,⁴ which has been defined as "that which is inherent in the people of any state or vested in its ruler by its municipal constitution or fundamental laws."⁵ The indivisible, illimitable and all-supreme sovereign of the Austinian conception exists nowhere. Like Ricardo's "Economic man," he is a fiction, and "any attempt, as with Austin, to discover the sovereign is a difficult, if not an impossible adventure."⁶ Even independent sovereign States, both in their domestic concerns and their external relations, work under limitations which are real enough in actual experience.⁷ Maine emphatically contended that "there is not, nor has there ever been, anything in international law to prevent some of those

1) The Maharana of Udaipur, for example, issued a new coin in 1851-2. Its inscription is significant. It has the words, *Dosti London* "friendship with London" on it. (Webb's *The Currencies of Rajputana*, p. 9.)

2) *Wheaton's Elements of International Law* by Philipson, (1916), p. 69. This is the description of their present position. It would be *a priori* applicable to them in 1823.

3) As Westlake would say in describing the position of Austria and Hungary before the War, when in the world outside their separate existence was not recognised. (*International Law-Peace* (1910) p. 2.)

4) *Hall's International Law* (1917), p. 27, Footnote.

5) *Wheaton's Elements of International Law* (1916) p. 35.

6) Laski, *Grammar of Politics*, p. 55.

7) *Loc. Cit.*, pp. 52-4.

rights (i. e. of sovereignty) being lodged with one possessor and some with another. Sovereignty has always been regarded as divisible."¹

Assuming, therefore, that the functions of sovereignty are divisible,² and interpreting the Indian treaties in the light of authoritative declarations as discussed in the preceding pages, one would be led to infer that the Indian States were internally sovereign bodies.

This conclusion is based on certain theoretical assumptions and, therefore, needs very careful and, indeed, considerable, qualification before it can be accepted. It is true that the treaties laid down that position, and it is equally undeniable that the obligations following from those engagements were repeatedly acknowledged by the dominant party who was in a position to denounce them. But these considerations, powerful as they seem in theoretical reasoning, do not contain the whole truth. Did the States really possess unrestricted freedom in practice, and could they always act with their free will in such fundamental matters as the appointment of their ministers, the administration of their revenues, the regulation of their succession, the control of their military and their feudatories? Could they, in case of disagreement with the British Government on any of these points, afford to disregard its will and assert their own? The answers to these questions must be based, not on the words of the treaties or on declarations of policy, but on the actual occurrences in some States, and what would have happened in others, if similar occasions had arisen.

As regards the treaties, it will be conceded that they alone can neither obstruct development, nor prevent a change in the relative position of the contracting parties. The actual relations, therefore, have to be estimated in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time of the interpretation of the treaties, and not at the time when they were made.³ The equality of status of the earlier treaties, and even the "absolute" rule guaranteed by Hastings' engagements, would not accurately describe the actual relations, if they were not, in practice, regulated by those provisions.

A word must be said to explain the declarations of independence of the Indian States, and the practice of referring to international

1) *Life and Speeches of Sir Henry Maine*, by Grant Duff, (1892) p. 332.

2) Into *External and Internal* (*Wheaton's Elements of International Law*, 1916, p. 35).

3) Excellent examples of this were furnished by the actions of Hastings himself. He declared to Maharaja Sindhia (Adam to Close, 28th Sept., No. 4, Bengal Secret Consultations, Oct. 28th, 1817), and Holkar (Adam to Metcalfe, Oct. 1st, No. 13, *Loc. Cit.*) that the British Government considered the treaties subsisting between their States and the Company as virtually dissolved, because the latter felt it necessary to form alliances with the Rajput States.

law in dealing with them, which characterised Hastings' language and that of the Board of Control. It only serves to show their inability to comprehend correctly the full meaning of the change which had resulted from the war of 1817-18. When the transformation in human affairs is sudden and great, matters are often smoothed over by a refusal to see it. That is not the only instance in constitutional history when the form and fiction of a thing have been maintained even after its substance had vanished.

In order to arrive at a correct conclusion on this difficult and complex question, either of these two positions must be held to apply to the Indian States. (a) Either they had surrendered their powers of sovereignty to the Company of their own free will. That is, the treaties were in reality, as they certainly were in form, bilateral, between two free agents. In the first place, sovereignty is inalienable. States are not known to commit suicide although they might be murdered. Secondly, the crucial test to verify this condition will be to enquire whether the States were free to withdraw from the arrangement if they so wished. The answer to this question was given quite clearly in 1806 by Barlow, the then acting Governor-General, who was an avowed advocate of the policy of "ring-fence."¹ Since the Indian Princes were not free to withdraw from the arrangement, they were not in the position of free sovereigns. (b) The other alternative position to take is to consider the States as having been conquered by the Company and allowed to wield their powers during good behaviour, under effective, though undefined, checks.² It was not an actual conquest by war, but a constructive one by example, yet producing the same constitutional consequences. This supposition will deny the title of sovereignty to the Indian States, in the sense in which it is possessed by a free Power.

The Indian States could not by any means be considered sovereign bodies such as England, France or Turkey, since all matters relating to peace or war and all inter-state negotiations were excluded from their purview. In internal matters, they exercised a large measure of sovereign functions, belonging to them by original right. But in the discharge of those duties, they were, in practice, increasingly at the mercy of the British Power. This reduces them, more or less, to the position of glorified local Governments.

1) His minute of Oct. 2nd, 1806, dealing with the alliance with the Nizam. Malcolm's *Political History of India* (1826) Vol. I, pp. 376-7.

2) In actual practice, the amount of the powers which the States could exercise, were limited, not by their free will, but by the military strength of the Company to impose its will on them.

And in some cases, (as in Oudh, Kutch, Satara, Mysore and Travancore) even the treaties left the Company the judge of the extent and the nature of the interference which it was to exercise in the internal affairs of those States. By force of example, the effect could not but reach other States.

It is true that for ordinary purposes, the Indian States were, as they still are, foreign territory, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the British Indian courts. There is a great force in this argument.¹ This immunity from the ordinary laws and judicial processes of the Company's Courts does not, however, mean complete immunity from British authority. The law applied to the Indian Princes to-day falls under the prerogative of the Crown, and in the days of the Company it would have been described as political action or "Act of State." But, for constitutional purposes, the control thus exercised was equally, if not more, effective.

It might be urged that legal theorists and constitutional jurists are not equipped to meet all the different phases that arise in this world of variety. That scientific rules and legal notions of political constitutions are more or less intellectual disquisitions, too artificial for the realities of life; that statehood and sovereignty are mere abstractions of logical reasonings; what really matters in life is *Power*. The limits under which it will be wielded in actual life will be set by the considerations of time, place and general expediency, which vary as widely as human nature itself. "In the background of difficulties such as these it is impossible to make legal theory of sovereignty valid for political philosophy."² When this is true of the legal study of sovereignty in general, how much more should it be applicable to the position of the States of India in 1823, when the whole subject was in an unsettled stage. Baffled by this difficulty, Westlake explained about these States:—"Thus, India is a world of itself."³ This remark would indeed be much more applicable to the time when Hastings left India.

This is a perfectly straightforward view, in which no attempt is made at the impossible task of forcing the facts of life to fit within the corners of constitutional theories. The Indian case is peculiarly difficult, since there, almost all the forms of a bygone reality are intentionally kept alive. Even if one were to steer clear of the rocks of constitutional theories and international law, and simply seek the solution of the problem of the Indian States in the manifestation of the power of the Company, the conclusion arrived at above is not affected in any material respect. There would merely be a more simple manner of saying it: the States were sovereign to the extent and up to the time that they were allowed by the British Government to wield the powers of sovereignty.

1) In fact, Maine applied this as the test in the Kathiawar case in 1863. His *Minute on the subject, Life and Speeches of Sir Henry Maine, Op. Cit.*, pp. 321-3.

2) Laski, *Grammar of Politics*, p. 55.

3) *International Law-Peace* (1910), p. 42.

The position of the Indian States at the present day, though still complicated and undefined, has settled down to some sort of understanding. This period had only just begun when Hastings retired from office. In the absence of the advantages of precedent and usage to guide the student, the situation, as it then was, can only be summed up in an inexact manner.

About the year 1823, the Indian States could not be considered as independent sovereign bodies,¹ since they had been deprived of the attributes of external sovereignty. Theoretically speaking, they were internally sovereign. But since, in practice, even their functions of internal government were only discharged with the sufferance and by the goodwill of the British Government, they could only be considered as semi-sovereign States.

1) "Independence, unlike sovereignty, cannot be qualified as ('semi' or described as partial because it negatives dependence and negatives admit of no degrees." J. Westlake, *International Law-Peace*, (1910), p. 22.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

IMPORTANCE OF HASTINGS' TERM OF OFFICE - SITUATION ON HIS ARRIVAL IN INDIA - MARATHAS ENFEEBLED - GROWTH OF THE PINDARIS - OTHER INDEPENDENT STATES - HASTINGS' POLITICAL PLAN - PARTIAL SUCCESS AT FIRST - MARATHA WAR - COMPLETE REALISATION OF HIS AIM THROUGH MILITARY MEANS - A STRIKING CHANGE ACCOMPLISHED - ITS CHIEF CAUSES - SUPERIORITY OF THE EUROPEAN MODE OF WARFARE - DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND INDIAN SOCIAL SYSTEMS - PERSONAL ELEMENT DURING THIS PERIOD - MUTUAL DISTRUST AND DISUNION AMONG INDIAN RULERS - THEIR INDEPENDENCE DESTROYED BY HOSTILITY AND RIVALRY OF EACH OTHER - THEIR SUBORDINATION TO THE COMPANY, AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT - A NEW ERA SET IN - A GENERAL STEADYING, LEVELLING PROCESS BEGAN - DIFFICULTIES OF CLASSIFICATION OWING TO THE CHANGE EFFECTED BY HASTINGS' MEASURES - THE ESTIMATE OF HIS CAREER AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL AS COMPARED WITH WELLESLEY - HIS ACHIEVEMENT - WON AN EMPIRE FOR ENGLAND IN INDIA BY FINALLY DESTROYING THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF MOST OF THE INDIAN STATES

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

The constitutional change described in the last chapter gives to Hastings' term of office a place of special importance in modern Indian history. Had he been the immediate successor of Wellesley, and had the latter's forward policy not received a check in the years 1805-14, there would not be much justification for attaching any special significance to Hastings' period of office.

On his arrival in India he still witnessed the remote results of the political and military measures of Wellesley. The Maratha Powers had been rudely shaken, their strength and unity considerably damaged. The Maratha Empire, which was instrumental in undermining the Mughal supremacy in the country, in its turn began to decline, particularly after the Treaty of Bassein. Some of the confederate Powers (including the Peshwa himself) continued to cherish hopes of recovering the lost ground. Many of them used their freedom and independence for purposes of aggrandisement. But all of them were greatly enfeebled in military resources, particularly when compared with the superior strength of the Company. Realising their weakness, they lived in a state of alarm.

One important, and indeed unfortunate consequence of that weakness, and also its consciousness on the part of the Powers, was the corresponding growth of the Pindaris. Neither Sindhia nor Holkar was able to control the leaders of the marauding horsemen, who carried their nefarious activity further and further. This fact incidentally increased the feeling of disunion among the Maratha Princes, since the Pindaris, in their uncontrolled position, exercised no discrimination as to the territories they attacked. The subjects of the Peshwa and the Bhonsla suffered equally with those of Sindhia and Holkar. The growth of the Pindari evil is an indication alike of the military weakness and the lack of political sagacity of the Maratha rulers.

There were some other States which were independent of the Company, and they greatly prized that freedom. But they were unable to protect themselves against the Marathas and the depredators, who owed nominal allegiance to the Marathas. They were becoming reduced to such a condition that they would be willing rather to invoke the aid of the British, thus most probably losing their political freedom, than to continue to suffer those recurring exactions. The Rajput States, and Bhopal, came under this description.

When Hastings arrived on the scene, he found that there lay before the British a rich political harvest which they were not gathering, in spite of the fact that they possessed ample means for that purpose. The Marathas had already helped in destroying the Mughal sway. Wellesley had beaten the Marathas, and the latter had not recovered from their loss. The only Power which could ascend the seat of suzerainty, then lying unoccupied, was the English Company. He saw no reason why his country should deny itself the great gain which was so clearly in prospect.

This political supremacy over the whole country (excepting, of course, the Punjab and Sindh) was his goal. He did not seek more territories, although he would not have hesitated to annex them if their acquisition helped in his main object.¹ Nor did he aspire to control and direct the daily administration of the Princes. His one and clear purpose was to oblige all the other Powers to bow down in subordination to the Company, live under its protection, and acknowledge its supremacy. They must in any case be required to submit to this, either by diplomacy, or by war, if necessary. In either event success was certain.

In this ambitious plan Hastings did not receive the support of his colleagues at Calcutta. Nor was the Board of Control in England prepared to sanction those projects. However, on one point there was common ground between these two divergent views. The primary duty of good Government demanded that the life and property of the people must be protected against the growing danger of the Pindaris. All agreed that the latter must be destroyed.

The mere extermination of those freebooters was not sufficient to satisfy Hastings. In his mind the achievement of that object was indissolubly bound up with the greater and more comprehensive scheme of placing the British in a position of ascendancy. This was to be achieved by the revision of certain treaties (particularly with Sindhia, Holkar and Berar) and by forming new alliances (with the Rajput Princes). In consonance with this view, he attempted, though unsuccessfully, to conclude alliances with Raghuji Bhonsla, and with the rulers of Bhopal and Jaipur. The principle underlying this policy was disapproved by the authorities in England.

However, he had not long to wait for the realisation of his aim. Raghuji's death in 1816 offered to the British the eagerly sought opportunity, and Berar came under the Company's influence with the conclusion of a subsidiary alliance in May of that year. The British further strengthened their position by forcing on Baji Rao another

1) As he himself wrote in his Minute of Dec. 1st, 1816, *Op. Cit.*, paras. 196 and 273.

treaty in June 1817. These were indeed great steps in advance, but they were only isolated measures, not entirely fulfilling Hastings' original scheme of a complete, unquestioned supremacy, generally acknowledged and effectively exercised.

In 1817, when Hastings began to carry out the grand military operations for the final extermination of the Pindaris, he decided, on his own responsibility, to extend his measures to the attainment of his political ideal also. He took the field in person, and faced both Sindhia and Holkar with the alternatives of war, or compromise on British terms. The former quietly signed the treaty offered to him. The Government of Holkar was in a disorganised state. His army took a different course, and offered resistance, in which the lead had already been given by the Peshwa. Operations against the Pindaris thus developed into a war with the Marathas, the rivals of the British power. Hastings regarded the revival of their confederacy with constant alarm. The war gave him the much desired opportunity of finally destroying that danger by the drastic measure of abolishing the Peshwaship itself. This was a bold step of far-reaching consequence. The supremacy of the power which removed the head of the confederacy could not be any longer disputed by its remaining limbs. The result was the achievement of Hastings' aim in its entirety.

Although this aim was primarily political, it was attained by military means. The negotiations which were undertaken in 1814-15 (to take Bhopal and Saugor under British protection) and again in 1816 (for Jaipur Alliance) were fully supported by the mobilisation of big armies. The first arrival at Nagpur, in 1816, of the subsidiary force under Colonel Walker is an illustration of the same feature. Again, the Treaty of Poona was concluded under the threat of military action, and its provisions so drafted as to obtain added military advantages for the Company. Lastly, the accomplishment of the goal itself was effected through the military measures of 1817-18. Their direct consequence was the defeat of the strong independent Powers. Their indirect, though equally effective result, by the force of example, consisted in creating an impression on all the neutral and allied States, that the British Government was determined to attain and uphold the position of unrivalled supremacy in the country.

This was indeed a remarkable event. It affected the future of India and of the British Empire. It is true that the military ascendancy of the English in India began when Wellesley succeeded in expelling the French and defeating his Indian opponents. It must also be admitted that the British dominions in India did not reach their present frontiers until Dalhousie's time, forty years later. Nevertheless, it

cannot be disputed that the political sovereignty of England over India (except the Punjab) dates from the time of Hastings. This fact obviously gives to his term of office a great historic importance. Like Wellesley, he too engaged in wars against the Indian Princes. He added large portions of territory to the Company's possessions, just as Dalhousie did. But both those operations were of subsidiary importance and only incidental to his chief achievement, namely, the attainment of political paramountcy over the Indian Powers.

Such a striking result as this must excite the curiosity of the student of social history, who is naturally eager to understand its causes. It is proverbially difficult to establish clear relations of cause and effect in all human dealings. They cannot always be verified in the simple, sure manner of scientific experiments, since the wide world is their laboratory. The Indian situation also was full of complexity. Several factors of varying force conspired to bring about this result.

Some of them are too obvious to need more than a bare mention. The superiority in military warfare, which improved methods and scientific knowledge gave to the European, was a distinct advantage over the Indian. This was particularly effective in the artillery arm, which had been greatly perfected by Napoleon, and inherited by the English from their experience of Napoleonic wars. The Indians were quick in adopting western military methods, but they did not acquire that proficiency which the Europeans showed. In short, the advantage of technical offensive was on the side of the British.

The difference in the outlook of the two peoples, owing to their differing social conditions, must also have produced a marked influence on the result of the Anglo-Indian contest. The English came from a country which was fast becoming industrialised. Colonisation and nationalism, commercial competition and democratisation, were giving a new shape and a fresh impetus to their patriotism. Their discipline and loyalty were yielded to a system rather than to an individual, to their country, and not to a section of it. The nationalism of the nineteenth century England was aggressive, ambitious and adventurous. It kindled the enthusiasm of its nationals at home and abroad, setting standards for their actions and expanding the scope of their aspirations.

Against them were ranged a people whose patriotism was still in the mediæval stage. A substantial portion of the armies of the Indian States was furnished by their Jagirdars, more or less on a feudal basis. The discipline and unity of action of those forces could not match the European organisation. The allegiance yielded by the people was more to the leader and less to the cause he espoused. This is best illustrated by the fact that in almost all the wars of the British period,

a majority of the fighting men on both sides were Indians. This explains in a large measure why Indians lost in the contest. It is true that the leadership of an able Prince or a brave commander sometimes proved remarkably successful. But there was always an element of instability in it, and when he possessed no inspiring qualities or organising capacity, there was certain ruin. The Indians in that state faced an enemy whose Government and organisation, whose strength and resources were modelled on a different basis. The result was, of course, unfavourable to the Indians. It is not implied that the Indian social institutions were lifeless or ill-devised. On the contrary, they were effective in regulating the life of the community and in many respects they worked well. But as compared with the English, they were stagnant, and could not withstand the aggression of the people nurtured in a fresher and more vigorous system.

During the years covered in this study, the Indian side laboured under a distinct disadvantage in the personal element also. Persons such as Elphinstone and Munro, Malcolm and Metcalfe, Jenkins and Hastings, were a group of most able men, some of whom would indeed be considered of first rate competence for the most difficult undertakings in any age. The cause of a Government which was served by a team of such stalwarts was destined to flourish. Against them India put forward Baji Rao and Trimbakji, Appa Sahib and Chandulal, Chitu and Amir Khan. There were to be found, even at that time of the decline of the Indian States, men who possessed ample ability. There were also persons of character. But rarely was there found in the same person the combination of moral fervour with mental qualities, which was exhibited by men such as Elphinstone and Metcalfe. The undeniable ability of Baji Rao was counteracted by an utterly base and unprincipled nature. Daulat Rao Sindhia's high pretensions were neutralised by his indolent habits and indecision of mind. The statesmanship of Zalim Singh was indissolubly mingled with his opportunism and self-interest. There were to be found at every Court, men such as Nairoba Chitnavis (at Nagpur), Sita Ram (at Baroda), and Hyder Mehdi (at Lucknow), who were loyal to their States and eagerly desired to free them from foreign control. But they lacked the requisite merits and personality to achieve their object. Appa Sahib, the Bhonsla Raja of Nagpur, keenly felt the degradation of being under British domination, and actively supported Baji Rao in the latter's war with the Company. This very Raja, however, engaged in short-sighted intrigues for his own personal triumph, and pursued the suicidal course of first allying with the British against his own rivals, and then turning hostile to them. There was yet another type to which men like Chandulal belonged, whose undoubted abilities and experience

in public matters, were directed towards selfish ends, disregarding, even betraying, the true interests of their States and rulers.

Thus, every leading British officer had a single aim to serve; this led to a coherent diplomacy and to unified strategy. Each Indian was, however, troubled by divided loyalties. In part, he was battling against foreign intervention, but in part also, the fact that he was in conflict with foes, often enough in his own household, made him willing to ally himself with the very foreigner against whom his career was a protest. Inevitably, therefore, he was only capable of decisive and unwavering policy at intervals, where domestic and external interests seemed to combine. The English consequently scored a victory over the Indian both in war and in diplomacy.

The military, racial and personal differences account for the political gains of the British in India. But even they do not explain everything. However superior one country may be in those respects, it cannot conquer and also permanently establish its hold over another country for any great length of time, unless there exist stronger internal forces to support it. This power was supplied to the British in India by the undying jealousy and distrust of the Indian Princes for each other. They could never combine for a common purpose. It would indeed be difficult to say whether Sindhia's jealousy was greater towards the English or towards Holkar. If the Princes of Rajputana could have thrown in their lot together and remained united they would perhaps never have lost their independence. Thus, mutual hatred and hostile rivalry prevailed in the country and influenced public conduct of Princes, generals, ministers and courtiers. Secret alliances against neighbouring States, intrigues against rival ministers and betrayals of the country's interests were common enough. This gave the English not only the opportunity of advancing their position but of consolidating it as they progressed. They triumphed by the mutual suspicions of their opponents.

It would probably be correct to say that at that time the two strongest features of the Indian States were, firstly, their passion for independence, and secondly, their burning hatred of their rivals. The first would be even more particularly true of the leading Maratha States. But in a smaller degree the Mussalman, the Rajput and the Jat States alike shared this sentiment.¹ It is a sad commentary on their sagacity

1) The attitude of the Peshwa, of Sindhia and of Raghuji Bhonsla as that of Wasir Muhammad of Bhopal, of the Maharajas of Jaipur and Bharatpur or even of the Nizam, Raja Mahipat Ram's anti-British activity in Hyderabad, the military resistance put forth by the Diwans of Travancore and Cochin, the tone adopted by Rani Durga Bai, the Maharao of Kutch, and Siyaji Rao of Baroda, are all examples pointing to the same conclusion.

and judgment that they should have failed to understand the simple phenomenon that their mutual enmity and disunion was bound to destroy the sovereignty and the independence which they so proudly wished to preserve. From the time of Lord Hastings, this latter feeling begins to decline with the change in their position.

For this reason also, the period under review is of great political significance. The British sway over the country is thenceforward taken as an accepted fact by the Princes. Appeal to arms to realise their aspirations or to redress their grievances becomes an increasing improbability. They begin to look for their privileges, rights and opportunities within the pale of British protection, but not beyond it. This changed outlook and altered situation soon left the treaties out of date for expressing the true state of relations. There commenced an era in which usage and example were to be more and more employed for the interpretation of those documents. The last century has seen a steady growth of those usages and the formation of the policy which guides the British Government in its relations with the Indian States. A vast body of rules and precedents has been evolved, of which the foreign and political department of the Government of India is the custodian and active agent. It is beyond the province and also beyond the possibility of this work, to estimate their value or even to attempt their description. One simple example will be sufficient to indicate how deep has been the effect of this course of development.

If a glance is thrown round to-day to see the position of the various Princes—their rank and importance—it at once becomes clear that a general levelling process has been at work. This process has not worked in one direction only. It appears as though, after the events of 1817-18, all their claims of priority and status were thrown into a melting pot, out of which they emerged in a new order. This latter was not determined on a basis of military superiority or material resources. The questions of precedence and status are peculiarly liable to rouse the proud susceptibilities of even our present-day Princes. Nor is the discussion of this subject here of any usefulness, either public or academic. But a few instances can be chosen to illustrate the point, without in any way provoking a fruitless controversy.

In Hastings' time, Bhopal was a subject of contention between the British Government and Maharaja Sindhia. The latter claimed and the former denied that the Nawab was Sindhia's tributary. To-day, this Afghan principality occupies the rank of a first class State. Prinsep, writing about the importance of Travancore in 1814 said, "The State has not, since then, been entitled to much consideration in the

scale of native powers."¹ During Hastings' time, we hardly find it mentioned in the important discussions² that took place about the political measures to be adopted. At present, in many respects, it is accorded a high rank indeed in the family of Indian States, far higher than would seem to be justified by its importance a century ago.

In giving evidence before the Select Committee in 1832, James Mill classed the Jat Maharaja of Dholpur with Sindhia, Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the King of Nepal in the category of Independent Princes.³ The wordings of the Treaty with the Maharaja of Alwar would put him on a higher rank than the premier Prince of Rajputana, the Maharana of Udaipur, or the other two leading States of Jaipur and Jodhpur. No one will to-day seriously consider that Alwar or Dholpur can claim superior treatment to that accorded to the Maharana of Udaipur.

The Chiefs of Kathiawar afford another good illustration of the working of this shuffling process. Formerly, they were mostly dependents and tributaries of the Gaekwar (or the Peshwa). To-day, they have taken their place in the class of Ruling Princes and sit, in their own right, in the *Narendra Mandal* (Chamber of Princes) and imperial and international assemblies. Examples can be multiplied to describe further the slow but steady process of development which has rearranged the position of the Princes and transformed their outlook since the days of Hastings.

As this process began about the time of Hastings, one finds it difficult to classify the States into distinct and logically separate groups at this period. At the time when he took over charge from Minto in 1818, the Indian States were capable of classification according to some principle.⁴ Their classification in 1823, when he left the country, becomes extremely difficult, owing to the great political change that had resulted from his measures. One thing becomes indisputably clearer than ever before, that there was on the one hand the Company, the supreme Power in the land, and on the other, a collection of States of varying size and importance, more or less dependent on the Company. That is obvious and simple. But when it comes to classifying the States themselves, it is indeed very hard to find a logical basis for that purpose.

1) *Transactions*, etc. *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 16.

2) Except that Edmonstone casually mentions it in one of his Minutes. But no attention was given to it, because from a political and military standpoint, it was not of great importance at the time. (His Minute, 29th Apr., No. 5, Bengal Secret Consultations, 21st June 1814.)

3) *Parliamentary Paper*, Vol. XIV, 1831-32, p. 4.

4) As has been attempted in the first chapter, into

(a) Subsidiary States.

(b) Protected States.

(c) Independent States, with Treaty relations.

(d) Others, without any treaties at all.

Jenkins divided the States into two classes, one, the subsidiary, with whom the Company contracted relations on a footing of equality, and the other, which accepted the protection of, and subordination to the Company.¹ This would not be a very satisfactory rule to follow. It would put the Gaekwar and the Nizam into one group, and the Rajput States, and others like Bhopal and Sawantwari into the other. Under this principle of division it would be difficult to find a place for States such as Alwar and Bharatpur, whose treaties were framed on terms of equality, but which were not subsidiary, and Oudh and Mysore, which were subsidiary, and yet much more subordinate.

Sutherland's careful division of the internal States into six classes² indeed errs on the other extreme. He is far too meticulous in that classification, and pays an almost undue attention to the letter of the treaties. It would be granted, as Sutherland states, that Sindhia's Treaty gave him a position of independence. But his other groups, particularly the third and fourth, make out a distinction without any really marked difference in principle.³ Nevertheless, Sutherland's minute grouping, although overdrawn, is very helpful to the student.

Prinsep makes a still more arbitrary classification of the States into three categories. There are firstly, the States in which the Princes governed themselves, secondly, those in which the ministers, appointed through British influence, ruled, and lastly, the "Residential" States, where "the British political functionary in person, and by officers of his selection, manages the territory for the native prince."⁴ This classification is even less accurate than those discussed above. It is based on temporary events and, therefore, cannot stand the test of any rule or principle. According to this classification, Hyderabad would, under Prinsep's own admission, come under the latter two divisions, since it had nominated minister, and in its administration, British officers were employed.⁵

Another classification made in the report of the Parliamentary Select Committee in 1882, would appear more scientific. But on closer examination it resolves itself into a division of the internal States, roughly similar to that made by Jenkins, into subsidiary and protected

1) His evidence before the Commons Select Committee, *Parliamentary Paper*, Vol. XIV, 1831-32, pp. 25-6. It must be said in fairness to him that he was not making any deliberate attempt at a logical classification.

2) *Sketches*, etc., *Op. Cit.*, pp. 28-9.

3) Both contain States which did not pay tributes, received protection from the Company, bound themselves to "subordinate co-operation" and were supreme rulers in their own territory. *Ibid.*

4) *Transactions*, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. II, p. 417.

5) *Loc. Cit.*, p. 413, and pp. 415-16.

(with the exception of Sindhia).¹ It is hardly necessary to repeat that the subsidiary States such as Oudh and Baroda were as much under the Company's protection as for example, Jaipur or Bhopal, although it is true that no specific body of troops was maintained for the latter class of States.

Instead of attempting any definite classification of the States, it would be better to bear in mind the broad distinction between a semi-sovereign Prince exercising wide legislative and executive powers, in his own original right, and a Chief, who held his territory by a grant or *sanad*.²

It is obviously difficult to define exactly the position of the Indian States, and consequently, to group them according to some settled rule, about the time of Hastings' departure from India. While he had laid the foundation of the structure of the Indian political system, as previously remarked, up to his time no Indian political law had been constructed. This latter, as Tupper rightly observes, was based upon occurrences year after year, from the middle of the last century, and only took shape during the twenty years after the Sepoy War.³ Even to-day, the relations of the Indian States with the Government of India are not so clearly defined as to deserve the designation of Indian political law. However that may be, the fact remains clear that the foundations of the present system were laid by Hastings. And it is this fact, be it repeated, which makes the study of his political dealings with the Indian Princes a subject of special historical interest. It is this importance of the results of his policy that makes the enquiry into his period a matter of special significance. The man, who fundamentally transformed the position of the Indian Princes, would go down as a notable figure in history.

Hastings came just about midway between Wellesley and Bentinck, not only in point of time, but also in personal character. These

1) The States with whom the Company had dealings of any kind were enumerated under five headings :-

(a) Independent Foreign States.

(b) Independent Indian States.

(c) Subsidiary States.

(d) States under British Protection.

(e) State Pensioners. (*Parliamentary Paper*, Vol. XIV, 1831-2, p. 3.) States in (a) & (b), with the exception of Sindhia, do not concern us, as they were external States. (e) Class were not States at all. Therefore, only (c) & (d) remain.

2) This distinction was applied, for example, by Metcalfe, in determining the question whether the Princes should be allowed to adopt successors in case of failure in the direct line. (His Minute of 28th Oct. 1837, *Metcalfe Papers*, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 318-19. But even in this matter it was not easy to decide who were originally sovereign Princes and who were merely Jagirdars. *Loc. Cit.*, p. 390.)

3) Tupper. *Our Indian Protectorate*. (1893), p. 62.

two distinguished pro-consuls were two distinct types, and stood for two kinds of ideals in public administration. Although Hastings belonged wholly neither to one nor to the other, he shared the attributes of both. Those people who exhibit mixed characteristics, do not rise to extraordinary eminence either in the estimation of other men or in their own personal achievements. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hastings was not worshipped as a hero. It must also be admitted that he did not possess genius of a very high order. In short, no one would claim that he was a seer of his age or the idol of his adherents.

Hastings' nature does not exhibit that vigour and energy of intellect, that powerful grasp of mind, which were the traits of Wellesley's character.¹ The latter was, indeed, a masterful, though aggressive, personality, and possessed driving power to a much greater extent than Hastings did. Naturally, Wellesley was more intolerant of checks from his superiors, or of any signs of indiscipline on the part of his subordinates. His mind embraced everything, and his judgment was invariably thorough and quick. He had the remarkable tact of choosing and training the right stamp of officers for political and military duties—a gift in which Hastings could not bear any comparison with him.

Hastings, on the other hand, was of a milder nature. He had all the gentleness and also the weakness of moderate-minded people. He was imperialistic in his outlook, without being of a predatory mentality. He possessed considerable ability, although his judgment was not always reliable, as a result of which, he once or twice found himself in complications which damaged his reputation.² He was essentially a militarist, but at the same time there was in him a conciliatory spirit, which did not make him a ruthless conqueror. By nature and personal conviction he was not an interfering Governor-General, as Wellesley would certainly have been, had the latter lived in Hastings' time.³ Wellesley interfered, or would have interfered, in the political or internal affairs of the States whenever he could. Hastings avoided doing so as long as he could, consistently with the maintenance of British supremacy in the country.

Though Hastings and Wellesley differed from each other in personal characteristics, and somewhat also in their political outlook, it

1) Cf. White, *Op. Cit.*, p. 225.

2) Particularly in his attitude towards the Palmer Company, his listening to Rumbold's communications and his support of Chandulal.

3) Contrast Wellesley's Treaties with Oudh and Mysore with Hastings' engagements with the Rajput States. Whenever the former felt himself in a powerful position to be able to dictate terms of his own liking, as he did in those two cases, he reserved to himself the powers of interference. Hastings was similarly situated in relation to the Rajput States, but his treaties almost always embodied stipulations against interference.

is interesting to notice a close resemblance between some of the important events and achievements of the two empire builders. Just as Wellesley's chief aim was directed to the destruction of the French power in India, and his greatest achievement was the expulsion of the French from the field of political rivalry, so also the revival of the Maratha Empire was Hastings' chief fear. The latter succeeded in killing every possibility of such a revival. Again, Wellesley destroyed Tipu, who was the powerful rival of the British and a likely ally of the French. Similarly, Hastings abolished the Peshwaship and pensioned off Baji Rao. Even Wellesley's re-creation of the Hindu principality of Mysore is a parallel to Hastings' restoration of the Raja of Satara under almost the same restrictions as the Raja of Mysore. Wellesley overpowered the Kingdom of Oudh for all practical purposes, and reduced its ruler to a state of abject dependence on the Company. This event can be compared with the case of Berar in Hastings' time, which was practically ruled by British Agents. These are instances when the history of Wellesley's days repeated itself in the regime of Hastings, in spite of the fact that he did not possess the imposing and all-embracing mentality of his predecessor.

The achievement of Hastings consisted in winning for England an Empire in India. His dealings with the States constitute a prominent landmark in the course of Anglo-Indian annals. The problem of the Indian States ceased to be a military problem, although this result was certainly achieved by military means. He also permanently removed it from the province of the international lawyer, and transferred it to that of the practical statesman and the political philosopher, where it has rested ever since.¹

1) Very recently (on Dec. 16th, 1937) the Secretary of State for India appointed a Committee, consisting of Sir Harcourt Butler (an experienced administrator), Professor Holdsworth (an eminent jurist) and the Honourable Sidney Peel (a financial expert), to enquire into and report on the relations between the States and the Indian Government. The report of this Committee was published only a few weeks ago.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list contains the names of the sources, both primary and secondary, which have been utilised for the preparation of this monograph, and to which reference is made in the various footnotes. Works on Political Science and International Law have not been included in this list, since they treat the subject of the Indian States only in a casual manner.

I. PRIMARY

I. MANUSCRIPT

This study is based chiefly on the official correspondence of the period of Lord Hastings' Governor-Generalship, preserved among the records of the *INDIA OFFICE*.

- (1) *Bengal Consultations* form the most important and voluminous section of these writings, containing the Minutes of the Governor-General and his Council, letters addressed to and received from the Political Agents and Residents stationed at the various Capitals of the Indian States, and the resolutions adopted by the Council.

The *Consultations*, which were helpful in this thesis, fall into two separate series, namely :—

- a) *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations.*
- b) *Bengal Political Consultations.*

The two series ran concurrently, and both dealt with foreign and political matters. The Secret and Political (referred to in the footnotes as Secret) Consultations, were devoted to the more important and confidential affairs, dealing with diplomatic relations, while the political series embraced all other concerns relating to the Princes. It is noticeable that the volumes of Secret Consultations decrease in size after the war of 1817-18 and the information about political matters in later years, is to be found mostly in the political Consultations.

- (2) The dispatches of the Governor-General-in-Council to the Court of Directors and the Secret Committee. The latter dealt with secret questions of policy and of peace and war with the Indian Powers. Those addressed to the Secret Committee are collected in the series called *Bengal Secret Letters*.

- (3) The instructions issued by the authorities in London, and their dispatches. Those of the Secret Committee to the Governor-General were dictated by the Board of Control, hence the title of this series—*Board's Drafts*.
- (4) From time to time, official correspondence on certain subjects has been collected, classified, and separately recorded in *Home Miscellaneous Series*. (Volumes 603 & 604 are examples for this period.)

II. PRINTED

- (1) Some of the volumes in the *Home Miscellaneous Series* have been printed by special orders:—
 - a) Relating to Pindary and Mahratta Wars, Vol. 516A.
 - b) Hyderabad Affairs: Pecuniary Transactions of Messrs. William Palmer and Company, Vol. 517.
 - c) Oude Papers. Vol. 518.

These volumes indeed afford a very great help in studying the subjects with which they deal.
- (2) *Parliamentary Papers*.
 - a) Vol. VIII, 1831–32. Contains the summary of operations of his time, prepared by Hastings himself.
 - b) Vol. XIV, 1831–32. Contains the evidence given before the Select Committee of the House of Commons.
- (3) *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, compiled by Sir Charles Aitchison. Revised and continued up to the 1st June 1906, by the authority of the Foreign Department of the Government of India. (1909). 13 Volumes. These volumes, containing the translations and copies of the treaties concluded between the Indian States and the British Government, are indispensable for the study of their relations.
- (4) *Private Journal* of the Marquess of Hastings. (1858.) 2 vols. This diary was not kept regularly in later years. Still, it is very useful indeed for obtaining an insight into Hastings' feelings and nature. Its record of his travel in India is also interesting in many ways.
- (5) G. W. Forrest:—*Official Writings of Mountstuart Elphinstone*. (1884.)

II. SECONDARY

Other published works which have been freely consulted are:—

- I. Works on *General Political History* of the period.

- (1) H. T. Prinsep:—*History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings*. (1825) 2 Vols.
Prinsep was political secretary under Hastings. He had access to all the official documents on which his work is based. It is full of useful information, reliable in character and rich in details.
 - (2) H. H. Wilson:—*Mill's History of British India*. (1845) Vol. II.
 - (3) Sir John Malcolm:—*Political History of India*. (1826). 2 Vols.
Since Malcolm took a personal part in many of the important political and military arrangements, his work has almost the value of an original source.
 - (4) A. White:—*Considerations on the State of British India*.
A small book, written by a retired army officer of the time. He devotes some portion of it to political affairs, but in the rest of it, he refers to missionary activities, military matters and colonisation. The book is useful as containing the opinion of an independent observer.
- II. Works on the *Relations of the Indian States with the British Government*.
- (5) J. Sutherland:—*Sketches of the Relations Subsisting between the British Government and the different Native States*. (1838).
For the study of the relations of the Indian States and the Company in Hastings' time, this little work of an able contemporary "one of the most distinguished oriental diplomatists" (Kaye, *Administration of the East India Company*, p. 542) is a very valuable guide indeed, in spite of its being brief and sketchy.
 - (6) Sir Lewis Tupper:—*Our Indian Protectorate*. (1898.)
Some chapters are devoted to the historical treatment of the subject, but the main thesis of the work is constitutional. Its conclusions in this respect are not considered quite correct. A work of great ability.
 - (7) Sir William Lee-Warner:—*The Native States of India*. (1910.)
The best book so far written on the subject of the Indian States, being an able and authoritative presentation of their position, by a former official of the Political Department. It describes the constitutional development from the official point of view, but offers no suggestions for the future treatment of the problem.
 - (8) K. M. Panikkar:—*Relations of the Indian States with the Government of India*. (1927.)

Describes the relations from an unofficial and independent point of view.

III. Works on *Particular States* or a group of States.

- (9) Grant-Duff:—*History of the Mahrattas*. 3 Vols. A work of great importance and authority on the subject of Maratha History.
- (10) R. Wallace:—*The Guicowar and His Relations with the British Government*. (1868.)
Written by an ex-Resident, and based on official sources, the book is very helpful to the student, although, in parts, the latter is likely to experience some inconvenience owing to obscure arrangement and the lack of a table of contents.
- (11) R. Jenkins:—*Report on the Territories of the Rajah of Nagpore*. (1827).
This has the value of an original source. But the document contains administrative details and very little political or historical matter.
- (12) J. Tod:—*Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*. (1920). 3 Vols.
- (13) Sir John Malcolm:—*A Memoir of Central India*. (1826). 2 Vols.
As the first British Administrator of Malwa, Malcolm had a most favourable opportunity to acquire first hand information about that region. This work is therefore a very reliable account of contemporary events which took place in Central India.
- (14) W. Hough:—*Brief History of the Bhopal Principality*. (1845.)
Based principally on the works of Malcolm, Grant-Duff, and Prinsep.
- (15) H. C. Irwin:—*Garden of India: Chapters on Oudh. History and Affairs*. (1880.)
Useful little book, frank and critical of some British measures in Oudh. It does not devote much space to the period under review.
- (16) L. Rice:—*Mysore and Coorg Gazetteer*. (1877.) Vol. I.
An authoritative compilation on Mysore. It has a historical section also.
- (17) S. H. Bilgrami and Willmott:—*Historical and Descriptive Sketch of H. H. The Nizam's Dominions*. (1888.) 2 Vols.
A Useful book for reference, although it contains very little account of Hastings' period.
- (18) H. G. Briggs:—*The Nizam*. (1861.) 2 Vols. Written from a frankly partisan view.
- (19) *Calcutta Review*. (1849.) Vol. XI.
Contains an ably written article on the Nizam's contingent,

which supplies in a handy form, useful information on the subject.

IV. *Biographies, etc.*

- (20) Sir T. E. Colebrooke:—*Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone*. (1884.) 2 Vols.
- (21) Sir J. W. Kaye:—*The Life and Correspondence of Charles Lord Metcalfe*. (1854.) 2 Vols.
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- (23) Sir J. W. Kaye:—*The Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm*. (1856.) 2 Vols.

These works containing the chief events in the lives of three of the most eminent servants of the Company at the time, are naturally most useful to the student. Their great advantage to him lies in the copious extracts from the private and official writings of Elphinstone, Metcalfe and Malcolm, which these volumes contain. Since they all three played a prominent part in shaping and executing the policy of the time, these works are of immense value indeed.

- (24) Busawun Lal:—*Memoir of Ameer Khan*. Translated by Prinsep. (1892.)

Gives a good deal of information which is useful. But the memoir is more in the nature of an autobiography, written presumably by a court favourite, and its authenticity has to be accepted with great caution. On the whole, therefore, it would be safer to rely on the truth of those facts and events contained in this book, which would ordinarily be detrimental to Amir Khan's reputation.

- (25) R. Heber:—*Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India*. Vol. II. (1829.)

Bishop Heber, who was a shrewd observer of men and things, has left a very interesting account of his general impressions.

- (26) J. Tod:—*Travels in Western India*. (1830.)

Although a very interesting work, it does not contain much matter of political interest.

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